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Abstract 
This thesis was conceived around a single aim, to critically engage with the 
concept of the 'unemotional male'. The 'unemotional male' represents the 
embodiment of contemporary constructions of men's relationship with 
emotions as at least limited and at worst detrimental both to men and to those 
around them. 
Existing psychological and sociological literatures on masculinities and on sex 
and gender differences were submitted to critical review. These reviews 
provided overviews of the discursive resources that were commonly invoked 
to account for men's relationship with emotions. Adopting a critical discursive 
psychological approach, three types of data - men's talk about men and 
emotions, a male speakers autobiographical narratives of humiliation and 
episodes of anger within heterosexual relationships - were subjected to 
analysis. Across the first two types of data, the relationship between 
masculinity and emotions was identified as contingent upon the functions 
served by emotions in the constitution of social relationships and systems of 
power relations. In these two analyses, masculine subjectivities were 
demonstrably constituted relative to a 'hegemonic' masculine ideal. With 
regard to the final type of data, 'anger was demonstrated to be a resource 
available to members of both genders. Specifically, anger was done by 
members of both genders in response to unwarranted acts or accusations. 
Anger demonstrably functioned in the negotiation of individuals' rights and 
entitlements and in the constitution of local structures of power relations. 
The thesis finishes with an overview of the findings of the research in light of 
the literature reviewed. Future directions for critical discursive psychological 
engagements with emotions, as discourses and as performative acts, and the 
contribution that these might make to a social psychological understanding of 
the relationship between gender and emotion are outlined. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 One little pig! 
This is just a thought but it's one that seems relevant to this thesis. It concerns 
a line from a film, which, in a recent conversation with a male friend, was 
decided to be one of the most powerful expressions of emotion by a man in 
recent cinema history. Delivered by the wonderful James Cromwell, the line 
seemed to us to be the most perfect expression of pride (in an other), 
gratefulness (to an other) and love (for that other) - three emotions we might 
not expect to be expressed by a man of such reserved dignity as Farmer 
Arthur Hoggett. Indeed, on first hearing, the line may sound like no such thing, 
but, as I think about it now, I feel tears well in my eyes. The line comes at the 
end of the film after Farmer Hoggett's apprentice has saved the day and 
earned the respect, admiration and awe of all those who witnessed his 
remarkable achievement, the perfection of the art of the sheepdog trial. The 
line is simply, 'That'll do, pig'. 
It may be that the interpretation and valuing of this line is something peculiar to 
my friend and me. It may be argued that the line reflects the inability of men 
who do masculinity in the way so eloquently portrayed by James Cromwell to 
express emotion in all but the most limited terms. Certainly the expression of 
emotion, if any is to be argued to be there at all, is not explicit; it is not done 
through the use of emotion words. It is not effusive or ebullient. It is, I contend, 
modest and understated, but none the less meaningful. The meaning of the 
line, that is to say the interpretation I have offered, makes sense within the 
context of the film (if you doubt me, watch 'Babe'). Perhaps its power and 
significance are more apparent to those individuals with experience of this or 
other similar forms of masculinity. The value of the line is certainly appreciable 
by those who realize, or are, at least, willing to accept, that expressions of 
emotion are not absent from this and other versions of masculinity, but that the 
forms they take may be more subtle than could possibly be constituted through 
the use of emotion terms alone. The line is a masculine expression of emotion. 
As well as the three emotions already listed, the line evokes senses of 
satisfaction, approval and acceptance. I do not wish to imply that the valuing of 
these sentiments is peculiar only to those who 'do' masculinity. Nor do I wish to 
imply that masculine individuals are necessarily best placed to appreciate 
'That'll do, pig'. However, as one such masculine individual, I am offended by 
any suggestion that a subscription to masculinity, in one form or another, 
necessarily precludes being able to appreciate or able to express such 
sentiments. 
This thesis is an argument for an increased appreciation of the richness and 
subtlety of the relationship between men, masculinity and emotion. It is written 
through a masculine subjectivity (quite what that means will be discussed later) 
but it assuredly does not mean that this account is anti-feminist. Further, it is 
written through a poststructuralist subjectivity (again this will be developed 
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later) where masculinity, if it is to be assumed to exist at all, is assumed to be 
found in the details of everyday life, in what is said and what is done. 
The primary consequence of a 'masculine poststructuralist subjectivity' is a 
resistance towards assuming the status of material relations, i. e., a resistance 
to the imposition of patriarchy as an interpretative framework. As will be 
demonstrated, contemporary accounts of the relationship between men, 
masculinity and emotion are based upon a limited range of discourses and 
repertoires and most are based upon the assumption that the structures of 
power and material relations between men and women are already known and 
that these relations are constitutive of what are termed the 'genders'. The 
direction of the flow of power is assumed. This thesis resists assuming the 
direction of the flow of power and attempts to identify how positions of power 
are negotiated by male speakers through the use of or relative to the concepts 
of emotions. 
This thesis also represents an attempt to map the discourses that are 
constitutive of these power relations and to determine their arrangement. The 
effects of discourses are therefore assumed to be contingent upon both the 
occasion of their invocation and upon their locations within structures of value. 
As will be demonstrated, discourses are ordered according to theirmoral' or 
scultural' value; certain discourses are valued over others but all discourses are 
assumed to be in constant competition through the power re. lations that they 
constitute when invoked. Consequently, power is not assumed to reside solely 
in the locations of these discourses within those structures of value. 
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'Masculine' discourses, that is to say discourses that are gendered as typically 
constitutive of masculinity, are not assumed to be hegemonic; they are not 
assumed to bestow automatically positions of power on those who use them. 
Power would then simply be a synonym for 'masculinity' and, within the most 
basic level of theorising, for'men'. This would be a gross over simplification of 
men's relationships with each other, with women, with their'selves' and with 
their 'emotions'. 
1.2 A brief note on poststructuralism 
The rationale for a move towards a critical, language-centred approach to the 
topics of social psychology has been advanced elsewhere (Gergen, 1985; 
Henriques, et aL, 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). A poststructuralist, social 
constructionist approach to the topics of men, masculinity and emotion 
provides an account of these topics and the relationships between them that is 
sensitive to variability between speakers and across contexts. A 
poststructuralist, social constructionist approach is necessarily critical of the 
assumptions that underlie 'positivist' approaches to these topics and of the 
ontological status that is ascribed to 'objects' and 'concepts', such as men and 
emotions, within such approaches. Consequently, a poststructuralist approach 
cannot engage with the 'objects' and 'concepts' of more traditional approaches 
without reflexively acknowledging that their ontological status is not assumed. 
For this reason, poststructuralist works, and this one will be no exception, are 
characterized by the use of single quotation marks to imply that the ontological 
status of an 'object' orconcept' is not assumed. Thus, this thesis is concerned 
with the relationship between 'men' and 'emotion'. 
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A number of significant consequences of the adoption of a poststructuralist 
approach warrant mention before proceeding. The first is the implication of the 
structuralist assumption that the relationship between the sign (the word) and 
the signified (to object to which it refers) is both conventional and arbitrary 
(Saussure, 1974). Any word, any speech sound other than 'man' could signify 
'adult male human'; the meaning of 'man' is not inherent to the word 'man'. The 
various words that signify'adult male human' across different languages 
(homme, uomo and hombre) are evidence of this. Thatman' is socially 
understood to mean 'adult male human' is argued to be a consequence of its 
establishment as a linguistic convention. Further, within structuralism, once the 
relationship between a signifier and its signified has become a convention that 
relationship is fixed. The intelligibility of the relationship between a signifier and 
its signified is therefore contingent upon their location within a history of 
language use. 
The important consequence of the assumption that the relationship between 
the signifier and signified is arbitrary is that any other form of signifier could be 
used to signal the same object, assuming that the relationship could be 
adequately reified through convention. That an 'oak' is a 'tree' or that a 'table' 
is a piece of 'furniture' is not, therefore, self-evidently ontologically 'true', but, 
rather, is a consequence of social linguistic convention. Concepts of 'truth' and 
'objectivity' are amongst the first casualties of a move towards 
poststructuralism and social constructionism. Importantly, both are revealed to 
be dependent upon relations of reference for meaning and are in no way 
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attainable, meaningful or even conceivable outside of language. Consequently, 
a poststructuralist engagement with 'men', 'masculinity' and 'emotions' is by 
necessity a subjective one. 
From the work of Derrida (1974) two implications of fundamental importance 
have emerged. The first is that all attempts to make sense, to arrive at rational 
accounts and conclusions, are contingent upon the suppression of meaning. 
The second is that under sufficiently close scrutiny such rational accounts and 
conclusions will collapse. 
Both of these implications are derived from Derrida's conceptualisation of 
language as a system of differences. Language is theorized as composed of 
discrete units (words) each of which is different from any other. Derrida 
invoked the idea of binaries to describe the simplest level of distinctiveness of 
words; there is'the word' and there is'not the word'. Within this framework the 
meaning of 'man' is contingent upon its differentiation from 'not man'. The use 
of any particular word can therefore be interpreted as a presence set against a 
backdrop of absences (plural because there are a good many more things that 
are 'not man' than there are things that are 'man'). Further, although talk is, on 
the surface, comprised only of presences they gain meaning from the 
'backdrop of absences' against which they are set. The most fundamental 
consequence a theory of presences and absences is that the presences must 
be viewed as privileged at the expense of the absences; absences or'that 
which is absent' is marginalized. If a discussion of gender is constituted in 
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terms of femininity then not-femininity or masculinity is marginalized and vice 
versa. 
The second implication of the idea of language as a closed system, where the 
meaning of a word is dependent upon its relation to others, is the collapse of 
rational accounts. Within a deconstructionist approach the determination of 
meaning is dependent upon two components, difference and deferral 
(conjugated in the term diff6rance). Any one word differs from any other; 'man' 
differs from 'boy' and from 'woman' but this difference alone does not bestow 
meaning on 'man'. In order to begin to arrive at the meaning of 'man'we must 
defer to other terms to determine the meanings of those words with which 
'man' might be contrasted; terms such as 'young male human' could be 
deferred to determine the meaning of 'boy' and 'adult female human' to do 
likewise for'woman'. Through the process of diff6rance the meaning of 'man' 
could be understood to be not both these things. However, the process of 
deferral would need to continue in order to determine the meanings of terms 
such as 'young', 'adult', 'male', 'female' and 'human'. As Gergen (1999) 
concludes: 'once you have entered the process of diff6rance ... there is no 
principled exit. ... To understand them [terms] we must again defer to still other 
terms. We search for traces, and we find only further traces. ' (p. 28). 
The final important implications of the adoption of a poststructuralist approach 
follow from the work of Michel Foucault. The prominence of Foucault within the 
social sciences is in no small measuring owing to the increasing ubiquity of the 
word 'discourse'. Within Foucauldian theory, discourse is not solely a linguistic 
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concept referring to tranches of text or talk. Discourse makes the link between 
language and social practice. The meaning of a particular social practice, 
including talk, is understood as a consequence of its location within a 
historically and culturally constrained system of knowledge (episteme), which 
is itself a discursively constituted system for talking about, making sense of 
and assigning meaning to any particular object, person or practice. Discourse 
'defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way that a 
topic can be meaningfully talked about' (Hall, 2001, p. 72). 
Foucault was also concerned with the conceptualisation of mundane, everyday 
instantiations of power relations. The conceptualisation of mundane forms of 
power requires a radical re-conceptualisation of power. Preconceived notions 
of the possession of power and the direction of its action - for example as 
possessed and exercised by a dominant middle class over a working class or 
by men over women - are challenged. Instead, power is theorized as intrinsic 
to every site of social interaction, to every social context. Most importantly, 
power is theorized as not exclusively negative in its effects; within the 
contemporary view power is often still theorized as apparent only through its 
negative oppressive effects. Foucault (1980) theorised power as a productive 
force, constituting discourses, subjects and practices that can be positively 
valued. 
Arguably, the single most important implication of the adoption of a 
poststructuralist, Foucauldian approach is the idea that subjects are 
constituted through discourse. Though subjects may speak and be identified 
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by what appear to be their own discursive formations, those formations and the 
subjects that they identify, and indeed constitute, are necessarily limited by the 
contemporaneous historical and cultural systems of knowledge. Simply, the 
'subject' is produced within discourse. This conceptualisation is an inevitable 
consequence of the poststructuralist episteme, within which no meaning exists 
outside discourse. In order for there to be a meaningful 'subject' it must be 
subjected to discourse. 
While some of the concepts outlined above will be returned to throughout the 
thesis, this brief overview of the implications of a poststructuralist approach is 
intended only to prepare the reader for the discursive practices of the following 
chapters. 
1.3 Overview of the thesis 
Chapter 2 presents a critical overview of the contemporary psychological and 
sociological literature on men, masculinity and emotions. The first part is 
concerned with establishing the character of the 'unemotional man' as a focus 
of contemporary analytic concern. Through the literature on masculinities the 
predominant accounts of men's relationship with emotion are discussed, with a 
particular focus on the work of Victor Seidler. An alternative, poststructuralist 
approach to the study of masculinity is then advanced. This approach draws 
upon the work of Judith Butler and existing discursive analyses of masculinity. 
The second part of chapter 2 presents a critical overview of the positivist 
literature on sex and gender differences in emotions. The discourses of men's 
relationship with emotions that are reproduced within this literature and the 
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methods by which they are reified are identified. An alternative poststructuralist 
account of emotions as both discursive resources and of emotional 
gexpressions'as means of interpersonal communication is subsequently 
outlined. The research questions that inform the empirical chapters are also 
outlined. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the discourse analytic approaches and 
methods that inform the empirical chapters of the research. Three of the 
predominant discourse analytic approaches within British social psychology - 
discursive psychology, Foucauldian discourse analysis and critical discursive 
psychology - are reviewed. In light of the aims of the research and the 
research questions, a critical discursive psychological approach, with a focus 
on the constitution of subject positions, is identified as the analytic approach 
adopted in this thesis. 
Chapter 4 contains the critical discursive psychological analysis of men's talk 
about men and emotions. Generated through the use of focus group 
discussions, the prevalence of gendered terms within the data set provides 
ample evidence for an engagement with constructions of men's relationship 
with emotions and for a discussion of the implications of that relationship for 
the constitution of masculine subjectivities. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with an analysis of a single male speaker's 
construction of the 'self in emotion terms, within the context of a therapy 
session. Specifically, the analysis is concerned with the speaker's construction 
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of autobiographical narratives of humiliation and the implications that these 
have for the constitution of a masculine subjectivity. 
Chapter 6 represents a departure from the preceding two chapters in terms of 
the type of data taken for analysis. Drawing on 'naturalistic' data taken from 
'reality'TV programmes, the analysis is concerned with the interactional 
functions served by episodes of anger within heterosexual relationships and 
with the implications that these functions might have for the constitution of 
gendered subjectivities. 
Chapter 7 is simply a discussion of the main themes and findings of the 
empirical chapters in light of the literature reviewed in chapter 2. Directions and 
methods for future discursive research into men's relationship with emotions 
are outlined. 
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Chapter 2 
Challenging the unemotional man: Contemporary 
accounts of the relationship between men and emotion 
and their social constructionist alternatives 
2.1 The unemotional man: His history and character 
The emotional life of men has come to occupy centre stage in 
contemporary sexual politics. It is widely believed that by paying greater 
attention to their emotions and by talking "openly and honestly" about 
their relationships, men can change both themselves and society. 
(Petersen, 1998, p. 89) 
In the literature on masculinity and in the literature on sex or gender 
differences in emotion, a range of discourses is apparent and these are 
recursively drawn upon in constructions of men's relationship with emotions. 
Arguably the most prominent of these discourses is that of the 'unemotional 
man', though it may be apparent in more specific or more clinical terms as 'the 
inexpressive male' (Shields, 2002), 'restrictive emotionality' (Jansz, 2000; 
Levant, 1995) and 'normative male alexithymia' (Levant, 1998). All these 
discourses serve broadly the same function: the perpetuation of the 
representation of men's lives as emotionally impoverished and as potentially 
individually and socially problematic. 
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As identified above, there are two significant bodies of literature that address 
men's relationship with emotions. There is the positivist psychological literature 
on sex or gender differences in emotions and there is the literature on men and 
masculinity. The former body of literature would claim to be apolitical, owing to 
its location within a paradigm of positivist science. However, its findings are 
often drawn upon as evidence in the latter body of literature. The literature on 
men and masculinity emerged as a result of the feminist movement of the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Through the questioning of the established status of 
gender power relations, masculinity was subjected to social scientific analysis 
and theory. It is to the literature on masculinity and gender power relations that 
I would first like to turn to identify the character of the unemotional or 
inexpressive male and particularly the implications that he is argued to have for 
men as individuals and as a generic category and for gender relations, 
including gender power relations. I will return to the literature on sex or gender 
differences in emotions in the second part of this chapter to flesh out fully this 
particular representation of the modem male and his relationship with 
emotions. 
2.1.1 The appearance of the 'unemotional man' in the literature on 
men and masculinity 
Apparent throughout the literature on men and masculinity is the 
representation of men's relationship with emotions as troubled and 
problematic. This representation is embodied by the discourse of the 
'inexpressive male'. The representation of the 'inexpressive male' came to 
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prominence in the sex role literature of the 1970s and 80s (Balswick, 1988; 
Balswick & Peek, 1971; Goldberg, 1976; Jourard, 1974; Saftel, 1976), though 
precursors can be found in earlier work - for example, Parson and Bales' 
(1956) categorization of masculine and feminine sex roles as 'instrumental' 
and 'expressive' respectively. While 'instrumental' is not interpreted as a 
synonym of 'inexpressive', if masculinity is argued to be constituted by being 
not feminine then it would imply that to be notexpressive' would be to be 
'masculine". Though the precise age of the representation of the 'inexpressive 
male' is impossible to ascertain, one of its greatest strengths may be its ability 
to appear older than it is. Certainly, historical analyses provide very different 
accounts of men's relationship with emotion as recently as the nineteenth 
century, particularly during the rise of Romanticism (Richards, 1987; 
Yacovone, 1990). 
What is perhaps most important to consider with regard to the representation 
of the 'inexpressive male' is the context in which it emerged and the function 
that it served. The 'inexpressive male' emerged in a context of heightened 
interest in and concern with the material and power relations between men and 
women, themselves consequences of the emergence of second-wave 
feminism in the late 1960s. Sex role theory and the emergent focus on 'gender 
(Stoller, 1968) represented attempts to account for the problematic relations 
between men and women, in particular for men's dominance and women's 
1 The assumptions that underlie the argument that masculinity is constituted by opposition or, 
at least, relative to femininity, their basis and their implications will be returned to below. 
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subordination. 'Gender provided the means of differentiating between any 
essential or biological characteristics of men and women (sex) and the part 
played by culture (gender) in the constitution of the material and power 
relations between men and women. Male and female sex roles were theorised 
as normative patterns of behaviour, characteristics and traits into which boys 
and girls were socialized. Successful socialization into the appropriate sex role 
resulted in individuals who behaved as and embodied the characteristics and 
traits of men and women. In Parson and Bales' (1956) original formulation of 
male and female sex roles, men were socialized into being competitive, 
ambitious and rational, whilst women were socialized into being nurturing, 
caring and expressive. Male and female sex roles represented the reification of 
gender, of masculinity and femininity as what men and women, respectively, 
ought to be. 
The conceptual isation of masculinity and femininity within the sociological sex 
role literature contrasts with an earlier psychological tradition. Masculinity and 
femininity had been conceptualized in essentialist terms, as what men and 
women really were. This approach originated in the development of 
masculinity/femininity (M/F) scales by Terman and Miles (1936) and 
culminated in the generation of arguably the most famous M/F scale, the Bern 
Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) (Bem, 1974) (see Lewin (1984a, 1984b) and 
Morawski (1985) for historical accounts of the development of these scales 
and Constantinople (1973) for a critique of M/F scales). It is perhaps worth 
noting that Terman and Miles' (ibid. ) scale was argued to allow the 
identification of 'sexual inverts', that is to say, male and female homosexuals. 
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Homosexual men were assumed to be psychologically feminine and lesbian 
womeri were assumed to be psychologically masculine. Thus, the essentialist 
assumptions that underlie Terman and Miles' scales included the assumption 
of normative heterosexuality; being a 'real man' and being a 'real woman' 
meant being heterosexual. 
Both sex role theory and M/F scales draw heavily upon gendered beliefs about 
emotions in the codifying of behaviours, characteristics and traits as 
constitutive of socialized or as indicative of essential masculinity and 
femininity. For example, on the BSRI, approximately half of the items 
supposed to be indicative of femininity are emotion-related and include being 
cheerful, warm, tender and eager to soothe hurt feelings. Of the items 
supposed to indicate masculinity, only two are emotion-related - assertiveness 
and aggressiveness (Bem, 1974). The management or control of particular 
emotions but the free expression of others is implicit in Brannon's (1976) four 
core models of masculinity. 2 Through sex role theories and M/F scales, cultural 
gendered emotion stereotypes were reified as what men and women ought to 
be, both culturally and naturally. That emotions constituted one of the primary 
dimensions along which men and women were supposed to differ, at both 
cultural and academic levels, may, to an extent, account for the emergence of 
emotions as one of the primary dimensions in the critiquing and challenging of 
men's privileged position in gender relations and consequently for the 
2 The four core models of masculinity, according to Brannon (1976), are 'No Sissy Stuff, 'Be a 
Sturdy Oak', 'Give'em Hell'and'Be a Big Wheel'. 
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emergence of the 'inexpressive' or'unemotional' man within the masculinity 
literature. Also, emotions, owing to their being intrinsic to everyday 
interpersonal relations, might be argued to be a dimension along which the 
political project of feminism and the renegotiation of gender relations could be 
made personal. 
However, even a cursory glance at the above-listed, male-authored literature 
on the 'inexpressive male' reveals that, though it is broadly located within or at 
least aligned with the political project of second-wave feminism, its alignment 
takes the form of an analogous movement towards 'Men's Liberation' (see 
Connell (1995) and Messner (1997) for discussions of the 'Men's Liberation' 
movement). Men, like women, were argued to be the victims of the existent 
sex roles and their status as victims was based upon claims of their enforced 
detachment from their emotions and the deleterious effects that this inflicted on 
men and on men's relationships with those around them - their wives, 
girlfriends, children and other men. Nowhere are the negative consequences of 
male emotional inexpression more comprehensively listed than in Goldberg 
(11976). The litany of destructive consequences that follow from men's 
continuous management, censoring and suppression of emotions reportedly 
includes: a vulnerability to 'sudden unpredictable behaviour, including 'drinking 
binges, wild driving, a blatantly destructive affair, or a violent outburst'- all of 
which Goldberg poetically describes as 'spoutings of the inner, hidden vocano 
[sic. ]'; a propensity to'drive those closely involved with him "crazy"' and to 
distance himself from others, becoming 'increasingly lonely alienated, numb 
and with a deepening sense of futility about relationships', so that when 'he's 
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caught in his own turmoil, confusion, pain, and conflict his only alternative is to 
withdraw even more or to numb himself with alcohol or drugs'; a proneness to 
gemotional upsets and disturbances such as depression, withdrawal, anxiety, 
pseudo-euphoria, etc. ' and to 'countless psychophysiological disorders' such 
as 'backaches, fatigue, headaches, bowel problems and ulcers' (p. 59). 
There is, potentially, another and much older account for the emergence of the 
'inexpressive male'which can be seen to be embedded in the assumptions 
underlying both sex role theory and M/F scales. Since the Enlightenment and 
the emergence of Modernism, men have been associated with the exercise of 
reason and its privileging over nature (Seidler, 1997). Reason, rather than 
'natural' phenomena, such as the passions, became privileged as the basis for 
authority and the exercise of power. The subjugation and subordination of 
S nature' to 'reason', embodied in the emerging natural sciences, was the 
ultimate project of Modernism. Thus, women's association with nature, 
arguably a result of their being constructed as closer to nature through their 
more involved role as mothers, constituted a basis for their devaluation 
(Merchant, 1980; Ruether, 1995). Modernism, Seidler argues, is the basis for 
men's subordination of women and men's subordination of their own 'natural' 
emotions. The discourse of the'emotional female', argued to be an instrument 
of women's marginalization by men, finally found its partner in the emergence 
of the 'unemotional' or'inexpressive' male. 
However, as was alluded to above, there exists a healthy degree of scepticism 
as to the extent to which male authors' accounts of men as victims within the 
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sex role literature really represented an engagement with feminism and more 
particularly an acceptance of responsibility on the part of men for the gender 
relations that feminism sought to redress (Shields, 2002). It could be argued 
that the emergence of the discourse of the 'inexpressive male', supposed to be 
as much a victim as women were of the dominant cultural norms that 
constituted patriarchy, simply represented attempts by self-flagellating authors 
to disavow responsibility on the part of men for the roles that they played in the 
maintenance of patriarchy and the denial of the material and power dividends 
that they received in return. 
What is beyond doubt in discussions of the relationship between men, 
masculinity and emotion is the status that is accorded to emotion. Emotions 
are consistently conceptualized in essentialist terms, as naturally occurring, 
ontologically existent psychological and physiological phenomena. 3 Nowhere is 
this more apparent than in work of Victor Seidler (1989,1994,1995,1997). 
Seidler is, perhaps, the most prolific author of commentaries on men's 
relationship with emotions; his work epitomises the extent to which 
representations of the 'inexpressive' male are reified through accounts of 
individual experience and therapeutic practice within academic literature. 
Further, his work exemplifies attempts to make the political project of feminism 
3 Alternative, critical conceptual isations of and approaches to the study of emotions and the 
implications that these might have for the theorizing of relationships between men, masculinity 
and emotion will be discussed in greater depth below. 
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and the questioning of masculinity personal to the lives of individual men 
through a focus on the relative statuses of 'reason' and 'emotion'. 
2.1.2 A brief critical analysis of the work of Victor Seidler 
As one of the most prolific writers on the topic, the contribution of Victor Seidler 
to contemporary theories of men, masculinity and emotion should not be 
underestimated. That said, as will be shown in the following discussion, 
Seidler's work is hardly contemporary in terms of its complexity or 
sophistication (see Petersen, 1998). Simply, Seidler's approach combines an 
essentialist view of emotions with an account of masculinity that is, in equal 
measure, both essentialist and normative. This approach and the discourses 
that constitute it are apparent in the following quotation: 
There is something misguided about a theoretical position which asserts 
that there is something "wrong", "defective" or "inadequate" in 
masculinity itself, thereby leaving no space for men to change their 
experience as men. A rationalist construction of masculinity, whereby 
men see themselves as having to prove their masculinity constantly 
against some kind of an ideal, is given a new form when men are 
attempting to squeeze themselves into a new mould, even one provided 
by feminism, of what "a man is to be like". This continues in a new form 
an old Protestant tradition that says that men are unacceptable as they 
are, that men's natures are somehow evil. This fosters the notion that 
men can only be acceptable if they forsake their masculinity. (Seidler, 
1994, p. 1 14) 
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As is evident above, Seidler's approach to the 'problem of the unemotional 
male' is to frame it as resulting from men being compelled to 'squeeze' their 
essentially masculine selves, theorised as having an essential emotional 
component, into socially prescribed sex roles, either of 'traditional masculinity' 
or of feminist-'provided' or feminist-inspired masculinity. The 'crisis of 
masculinity', for Seidler, springs from the tension between essential masculine 
emotional selves and the expectations, demands and requirements for men to 
'be masculine', in one form or another, in contemporary Western cultures. 
The crisis that heterosexual men are feeling about what it means to be a 
man responsive to the challenges of feminism is tied up with a 
pervasive cultural crisis to do with meaning and value. (Seidler, 1997, 
p. 157) 
To account for the tension theorised as existing between essential and 
normative masculinity, Seidler (1994,1997) invokes the Enlightenment, 
Modernity and the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Normative masculinity is in 
tension with essential masculinity, so Seidler argues, because it is based upon 
a set of related dualisms that follow from the reason/emotion dualism and 
which include the Cartesian dualism of mind/body. A brief list of these related 
dualisms might include: reason/emotion, mind/body, men/women, 
masculinity/femininity, objective/subjective, dominant/subordinate, 
independent/dependent, invulnerable/vulnerable and strong/weak. The cultural 
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valorization of the first parts of these dualisms and vilification of the second 
parts lie at the heart of Seidler's theory of men, masculinity and emotion. 
It is precisely the cultural valorization of the first parts of the above listed 
dualisms that Seidler identifies as the cause of the 'crisis of masculinity' and 
'the problem of the unemotional male'. The first parts of these dualisms, that is 
to say the discourses which constitute the first parts of these dualisms are, are 
constitutive of the privileged epistemology of Western culture. Within Seidlers 
theory, contemporary men are represented as trapped by and torn between 
two competing epistemologies - the dominant epistemology of masculinism, 
reason, the mind and objectivity and the marginalized, but nonetheless 
challenging, epistemology of feminism, emotion, the body and subjectivity. 
Owing to the cultural and ideological dominance of the former, Seidler argues 
that, as boys, men learn to deny their emotional experiences, to the extent that 
men 'lose the capacity to discern different emotions' and as a consequence 
they'weaken a connection with significant aspects Of Our experience' (1997, 
p. 138). Seidler goes on to argue that, for men, the dissociation of emotion 
words from emotional experiences becomes manifest at a somatic level, to 
such an extent that '[n]o longer do we choose not to express a fear [but] we 
begin not to experience the fear itself because we do not want to be reminded 
of emotions which can compromise a sense of male identity' (1997, p. 138). 
The net result of this is said to be that as men 'we lose connection with our 
inner selves' (1997, p. 1 72). 
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For Seidler, the implications of men's disconnection from their essential 
masculine emotional selves are much the same as those reported by Goldberg 
(1976) and Jourard (1974): 
We fear showing ourselves as vulnerable and dependent human 
beings... [w]e feel terrified of losing the only kind of control we know 
[and] we barely know what we feel and desire. But, rather than face the 
pain and reality of this impoverishment, we will withdraw into ourselves. 
We will refuse to talk about feelings, nagged by a terrible desperation of 
an inner vacuum. We might get angry at a partner who is insisting that 
we say what we feel is going on. It is easy to feel cornered and just hit 
back. (1989, pp. 50-51) 
Further, Seidler argues, the cultural vilification of the epistemology of emotions, 
the body and subjectivity supports the instantiation of power relations, at an 
interpersonal level, on the basis of emotion: 
In everyday relationships ... men can silence the challenges of women by 
refusing to listen to their emotional "outbursts" until they "calm down" 
and learn to "talk rationally". ... It is only if women learn to "talk 
rationally" that they will be listened to, otherwise what they say will be 
denigrated - it will be treated as noise rather than speech. It is as if 
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language becomes "rational" if it is deprived of its emotional intensity 
and power. (1994, p. 28)4 
Thus, Seidler argues, men's compulsory subscription to the epistemology of 
reason, the mind and objectivity results in their estrangement from their own 
emotional lives and from the emotional lives of others. Power relations at 
intrapsychic and interpersonal levels, the exercise of self-control and of control 
over others, are based upon the devaluing and marginalization of the 
epistemology of emotions, the body and subjectivity. 
Seidlers proposed solution to the 'crisis of masculinity' and to 'the problem of 
the unemotional male' is unsurprising and disappointing. Despite claiming the 
need to challenge the Cartesian dualism of mind/body previously implicated in 
the constitution of 'the unemotional male', he reproduces it in his advocacy of 
I men learning to take greater responsibility for their emotional lives' (1994, 
p. 41) and in the benefits that, he claims, would follow if men expressed 
emotion more freely: 
When we let some of these emotions go we are often struck by just how 
much energy has been taken up in suppressing them. If there is a 
clearance, as opposed simply to a movement of energy, we are often 
The issue of the functions served by the paralinguistic qualities of speech in constituting an 
utterance or an interaction as 'emotional'will be attended to in chapter 6. As Seidler goes on to 
argue, 'It is not simply a matter of what we say but also of how we speak. ' (1994, p. 28) 
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left with a greater sense of freedom. We can recognize just how much 
tension we have been carrying around and how this tension was also 
lived out in the ways we are often blocked in our intimate relationships. 
(1997, p. 147) 
Seidler's invocation of the'hydraulic conception of emotions', credited to 
Foucault (1980) - though it is a general feature of many metaphors for 
emotional experience and expression (Lakoff, 1987) - evidences the 
contention that, for Seidler, emotions are essential, ontologically existent and 
physiologically manifest phenomena. 
The ultimate project for men with regard to emotions, as Seidler sees it, is for 
men to recognise the violence done by their adherence to the ideology of 
masculinism and then to reconnect with their essentially masculine and 
emotional 'self :5 '[T]here is a growing sense that men with diverse 
masculinities have to recover an inner relationship to self which allows them to 
recognize what particular nourishments they are getting from different 
relationships and activities' (1997, p. 218. ) For Seidler, the most important 
lesson that men need to learn is that their identities are not 'located in [their] 
minds alone' (1997, p. 156) but in their bodies as well. 
5 Although Seidler (1997) is at pains to point out that he advocates this reconnection be 
achieved in a different manner to that advocated by Bly (1990) in his well-known but often 
criticised book Iron John. 
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As can be seen in the above quotations, Seidler consistently conceptualises 
emotion, gender and the self in essentialist terms in an attempt to relate social 
theory to the lives and experiences of individual men. Therein lie the two most 
substantial problems with Seidler's theories. The first is that, in retaining the 
essentialist category of 'men', he assumes a commonality of men's 
experiences and men's bodies, which is apparent in his recursive use of first 
person plural pronouns. In common with many other writers on masculinity, 
particularly within the psychoanalytic tradition (Biddulph, 1995; Cohen, 1990, 
Keen, 1992; Jackson, 1992), Seidler adopts a confessional style of writing, in 
which his own experiences are drawn upon to illustrate emotional phenomena 
that are argued to be general to all men (see his discussion on the effects of 
attending boarding school in Seidler (1997). At best, Seidler's own experiences 
and consequently his accounts of masculinity and emotion may sound familiar 
to other white, middle-class, heterosexual, Jewish, educated men, but they 
may sound alien and unfamiliar to men of different generations, classes, 
ethnicities and sexualities. In emphasising the effects of the cultural dominance 
of the masculinist epistemology of reason, the mind and objectivity and by 
assuming an essential commonality between men, Seidler elides the 
uniqueness of men's individual experiences of 'being men'. 
The second major problem lies in Seidler's essentialist and humanistic 
conceptualisation of emotions. Emotions are conceptualised as reflections of 
the status and the needs of the 'true' inner self. Consequently, by proposing 
that men need to reconnect with emotion, Seidler advocates, at an individual 
level, a reduction in adherence to the masculinist epistemology of reason and 
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the mind and a reappraisal and revaluing of the feminist epistemology of 
emotions and the body. For Seidler, emotions represent the source of 
knowledge that should be privileged if 'the problem of the unemotional male' is 
to be solved and if men are to stop doing damage both to themselves and to 
those around them. As Petersen puts it, Seidler's theories are'based on the 
premise that there is a stable, gender-specific, emotional realm, unmediated by 
history, culture and the specificities of situation, and that the self operates as a 
fully autonomous, rational ego' (11998, p. 9 1). 
Seidlers theories of the relationship between men, masculinity and emotions 
are, therefore, uninformed by the contemporary movements of 
poststructuralism and social constructionism. Indeed, Seidler actively resists 
poststructuralist and postmodernist conceptualisations of the subject. He 
criticizes postmodern discussions within feminism as having 'focused upon 
whether feminism assumes a unified notion of "woman" and so of a subject 
who is oppressed and can be liberated. Sadly some postmodern feminism 
misses the point in its rejection of a discourse of oppression' (1997, p. 4). 
Further, he claims that recourse to experience should not be'dismissed as a 
form of humanism and essentialism' and argues that it provides a 'grounding 
[for] what we have to say' and does not constitute 'a lack of theoretical 
sophistication' (1997, p. 4). He is similarly dismissive of social constructionist 
conceptualisations of emotions as providing 'no handle with which to work with 
ourselves. It makes it hard to recognize that acknowledging feelings of 
jealousy and possessiveness might help us start dealing with these feelings in 
ourselves' (1989, p. 36). With regard to masculinity, Seidler attacks those 
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contemporary approaches that have attempted 'to treat masculinity as a set of 
social practices and to theorize a hegemonic masculinity' - an approach, which 
he argues, 'was not open to the contradictory nature of men's lives and their 
complex relationships with diverse masculinities'(1997, p. 4, emphasis in 
original). For Seidler, masculinities, whether essential or normative, are things 
with which men have relationships. Seidlers male subject is an autonomous 
and rational agent. Consequently, at this most basic level, Seidler's work will 
always be in conflict with the poststructuralist and social constructionist 
approaches to gender and emotion mentioned briefly above, which will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following sections. 
2.1.3 Social structural theories of masculinity 
It is self-evident that within the psychological and sociological literature, 
discourses of masculinity are intrinsic to accounts of such varied phenomena 
as men's relationships with their emotions, their bodies and their'selves', as 
well as their relationships with women and with other men. Yet, as Connell 
states, '[t]he definition of the basic term in the discussion has never been 
wonderfully clear (1995, p. 67). Masculinity can be defined in essentialist, 
positivist, normative and serniotic terms, as, respectively, the central essence 
of maleness, as 'what men actually are', as 'what men ought to be' and as the 
product of symbolic difference, i. e. not femininity (Connell, 1995). Frequently, 
in texts on men and masculinity', these differing definitions of masculinity may 
not be acknowledged and may even be conflated (see the above discussion of 
the work of Victor Seidler). 
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An alternative and contemporarily prominent alternative is to conceive of 
'masculinity' at a sociological level, as a part of a structure of social relations. 
As Connell defines it, masculinity is 'simultaneously a place in gender 
relations, the practices through which men and women engage that place in 
gender, and the effects of these practices in bodily experience, personality and 
culture' (1995, p. 71). The fundamental premise upon which Connell's social 
structural theory of gender and, consequently, of masculinity and femininity is 
built is 'the single structural fact [ofl the global dominance of men over women' 
(Connell, 1987, p. 183). Through the development of the concept of 
'hegemonic' masculinity (Carrigan, Connell & Lee, 1985; Connell, 1987,1995), 
social structures, particularly of power relations, are made central to the 
concept of gender. 
As the above definitions of masculinity demonstrate, the proximity of 
'masculinity' to the lives of 'men' is entirely dependent upon the level at which it 
is theorised. Across the various definitions, the lives of 'men' are constitutive of 
'masculinity' but are constrained by it. Similarly, in their day-to-day lives, 'men' 
are argued to benefit from 'masculinity', though it constitutes power relations 
that benefit some 'men' at the expense of other'men'. The obvious 
complexities of the relationship between 'men' and 'masculinity, engendered 
by the use of singular categories, have inevitably given rise to pluralism. Thus, 
following Connell (1995), it is typical to talk of 'masculinities' and to identify 
possible 'masculinities' with relatively discrete categories of 'men', organised 
through the use of familiar social categories such as age, sexuality, class and 
ethnicity or through reference to the particular cultural ideals or political 
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projects with which they are aligned, e. g. 'pro-feminist', 'new' or 
'unreconstructed' (Connell, 1995; Marriott, 1996; Segal, 1997; Whitehead, 
2002). 
From a social constructionist perspective, and though it is undeniably 
theoretically useful, the move toward multiple masculinities seems to speak of 
a level of essentialism. The categories that are used to construct differences 
between men at a 'material' level, e. g. of sexuality, class and/or ethnicity, are 
reproduced uncritically in the plurality of 'masculinities'. Thus, the theorised 
power relations between white and black 'masculinities' or between straight6 
and gay'masculinities' are predicated on the relative locations of 'white' and 
'black', 'straight' and 'gay''men' respectively, in historical, cultural and social 
structures of 'materially enacted' power relations. This approach appears to 
assume thatessential' or'material' differences between 'men' are determinate 
of 'men's' individual relationships with the possibilities that are available within 
a plurality of masculinities, i. e., 'gay men' do 'gay masculinity', 'black men' do 
'black masculinity'. Connell is aware of this possibility and cautions against'the 
acknowledgement of multiple masculinities collapsing into a character 
61 use 'straight' reflexively. Given that 'straight' is a part of a pair of terms (gay and straight) 
that are used by 'gay' men, I am not convinced by the argument that the use of 'straight' to 
refer to 'heterosexual' men implies, through antonyms, a pejorative construction of 'gay' or 
'homosexual' men as 'bent'. The context of a discussion of sexualities subverts the meanings 
of these words and changes their antonyms. Further, as a consequence of my objection to the 
use of the clinical and pathologizing term 'homosexual' in relation to 'gay' men, I reject the use 
of 'heterosexual' in relation to 'straight' men. 
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typology' (Connell, 1995, p. 76). This possibility can be avoided, so Connell 
argues, by maintaining a necessary'focus on the gender relations between 
men' (Connell, 1995, p. 76). It is not, therefore, assumed that it is the 
characteristics of the men who subscribe to particular masculinities that 
determine the relationships between masculinities. Rather, it is the 
organisation of 'masculinities' in a social structure of power relations that is 
assumed to determine the relative values of the men who subscribe to them 
and, therefore, to constitute men's relationships with each other. 
Connell accomplishes the maintenance of this necessary focus on the gender 
relations between men through his focus on and development of the concept of 
'hegemonic' masculinity (see Demetriou (2001) and Donaldson (1993) for 
critical engagements with the concept of 'hegemonic masculinity): 
'Hegemonic masculinity' is not a fixed character type, always and 
everywhere the same. It is, rather, the masculinity that occupies the 
hegemonic position in a given pattern of gender relations, a position 
always contestable. (Connell, 1995, p. 76ý 
7 The concept of 'hegemony' is derived from Gramsci (1971) and is taken by Connell to mean 
'a social ascendancy achieved in a play of social forces that extends beyond contests of brute 
power into the organization of private life and cultural processes' (1987, p. 1 84). Importantly, it 
is claimed that'though "hegemony" does not refer to an ascendancy based on brute force, it is 
not incompatible with ascendancy based on brute force' and that ... hegemony" does not mean 
total cultural dominance, the obliteration of alternatives. It means ascendancy achieved within 
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Again, it is worth stating that Connell's theorising of gender as a social 
structure is based upon one structural fact: 'the global dominance of men over 
women' (Connell, 1987, p. 1 83). Thus, hegemonic masculinity is also defined 
as'the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted 
answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is 
taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of 
women' (Connell, 1995, p. 77). Between masculinities, sexuality is advanced as 
the primary dimension along which power relations are constituted: 'The most 
important case [of gender relations between groups of men] in contemporary 
European/American society is the dominance of heterosexual men and the 
subordination of homosexual men' (1995, p. 78). Gay masculinity is argued to 
be'the repository of whatever is symbolically expelled from hegemonic 
masculinity, the items ranging from fastidious taste in home decoration to 
receptive anal pleasure' (1995, p. 78). As a consequence of the definition of 
hegemonic masculinity by opposition, both as not feminine and not gay, gay 
masculinity becomes symbolically allied to femininity and a further dimension 
of subordination is opened up for men who, though not necessarily gay 
themselves, display effeminate characteristics. 
a balance of forces, that is, a state of play' (1987, p. 184). Hegemonic masculinity, therefore, is 
conceptualized as a contested location in a dynamic system of gender power relations. 
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However reluctant Connell may be to identify the characteristics that might 
constitute hegemonic masculinity, focusing instead on its defining feature as 
the dominant location in a structure of power relations, he does go so far as to 
suggest the existence of a relatively stable pattern. Comparing it to the male 
sex role, Connell states that'[t]he number of men rigorously practising the 
hegemonic pattern in its entirety may be quite small' (1995, p. 79). Whilst this 
concession can be interpreted as an attempt to relate hegemonic masculinity 
to the lives of 'real' men, it is perhaps best interpreted as an indication of the 
number and range of practices that are potentially constitutive of hegemonic 
masculinity. Whilst hegemonic masculinity, through an analysis of those men 
who seem to wield power, e. g. President George W. Bush and Prime Minister 
Tony Blair, may appear to be constituted by the practices of white, 
heterosexual, middle-aged and middle-class men, this would be a gross 
oversimplification. As a system of practices, hegemonic masculinity will elude 
definition in abstract theoretical discussions. Hegemonic masculinity, defined 
as a location in gender power relations, can only be identified on those 
occasions and in those contexts where one masculinity demonstrably occupies 
a position of dominance relative to other genders, masculine and feminine. 
What is necessary, therefore, is an interpretative framework and analytic 
technique that will support an empirical engagement with the constitution of 
masculinity in practice. Such an interpretative framework and analytic 
technique can be found within poststructuralism. 
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2.2 Poststructuralist accounts of masculinity 
As stated in chapter 1, this thesis operates from a poststructuralist perspective, 
i. e. it operates from a perspective within which language is assumed to be 
constitutive of subjects and objects and the meaning of any word or phrase is 
interpretable only by its relation to others. 'Traditional' approaches to gender 
and masculinity, where the ontological 'reality' of sexed bodies is assumed and 
from which terms like 'man' and 'masculine' might be assumed to derive their 
meaning, are wholly incompatible with such an approach. Therefore, both a 
poststructuralist theory of gender and a poststructuralist approach to the topic 
of masculinity are required. 
2.2.1 Poststructuralist theory 
Arguably the most prominent poststructuralist theory of gender is that 
developed by Judith Butler. For all the complexity of Butler's style of writing 
(see Salih, 2002, for a discussion of Butler's writing style) and without wishing 
to oversimplify what are undeniably complex texts, both in terms of their topics 
and the style in which they are written, the central themes of Butlers main 
works Gender Trouble (1999; 2 nd edition) and Bodies that Matter. On the 
discursive limits of sex (1993) are quite straightforward. Located as these texts 
are within poststructuralist and postmodernist thinking, they emphasize the 
constitutive role of language. Broadly speaking, language is theorized as 
constitutive not only of the social categories and concepts that govern day-to- 
day life, such as 'men' and 'women', 'gender and 'sexuality', and 'masculinity' 
and 'femininity', but also of the 'ontological' status of objects, in particular of 
'sexed' and 'gendered' bodies. In this regard, Butlers work has a unique 
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appeal. It inverts, from the very outset, one of the obdurate problems of the 
literature on gender: that of how theories of gender, of 'masculinity' and of 
'femininity' relate to the day-to-day lives of supposedly 'ontologically' existent 
'men' and 'women' (Butler, 1999). 
For Butler, the categories of gender are products of compulsory 
heterosexuality. Consequently, identities are constituted by and located within 
the heterosexual matrix: 'The heterosexualization of desire requires and 
institutes the production of discrete and asymmetrical oppositions between 
'feminine' and 'masculine', where these are understood as expressive 
attributes 'male' and 'female" (Butler, 1999, p. 23). Further, in constituting 
gender categories and gendered and sexed bodies within an 'oppositional, 
binary gender system' (1999, p. 30), compulsory heterosexuality is implicated in 
constituting the 'limits of gendered possibilities' (ibid. ). The social and cultural 
intelligibility of the categories of 'sex' and of 'gender and of 'sexed' and 
'gendered' bodies is argued to be determined by compulsory heterosexuality. 
This constitutive force of language has huge implications for the functions 
served by particular speech acts within particular systems of language. 
Following from a discussion of Wiftig's The Mark of Gender- 
[A]s far as the categories of the person are concerned, both [English 
and French] are bearers of gender to the same extent. Both indeed give 
way to a primitive ontological concept the enforces in language a 
division of beings into sexes (Wittig, 1985, p. 4) 
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- Butler (1999) argues that Wittig's view is corroborated by that popular 
discourse on gender identity that uncritically employs the inflectual attribution 
of "being" to genders and to "sexualities". The unproblematic claim to "be" a 
woman and "be" heterosexual would be symptomatic of that metaphysics of 
gender substance' (p. 29). Thus, a discursive act whereby a speaker makes 
such a claim - Butler gives the example of Aretha Franklin singing 'You make 
me feel like a natural woman' (1999, p. 30) - presupposes and reinforces the 
idea of gender as a binary system and calls into being, within the restrictions of 
the presupposed system of social and cultural intelligibility, a simultaneously 
sexed and gendered being and body. As Butler argues, 'one is one's gender to 
the extent that one is not the other gender (1999, p. 30). 
Of course the discursive constitution of gendered and sexed identities is rarely 
as explicit as that sung by Aretha Franklin. Consequently, gender, referring 
jointly to what is elsewhere conceived of separately as 'sex' and 'gender', is 
argued to be constituted through a system of highly stylised and regulated 
acts. The idea of gender performativity is arguably Butler's most significant 
contribution to the theorizing of gender: 
[A]cts, gestures, enactments, generally construed, are performative in 
the sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport to 
express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal 
signs and other discursive means. That the gendered body is 
performative suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the 
36 
various acts which constitute its reality. (1999, p. 173, emphasis in 
original) 
The compatibility of the theory of gender performativity - in which gendered 
acts and attributes are interpretable not as expressing an identity but as 
constitutive of it - with the epistemological approach that informs this thesis - 
in which language is interpreted not as reflecting a reality but as constitutive of 
it - makes the concept of gender performativity highly appealing as an 
interpretative lens. 
The theory of gender performativity, with its emphasis on the constitutive force 
of acts, including discursive acts and attributes, may create the impression that 
gender is highly malleable and amenable to change simply through subversive 
acts. Indeed Butler (1999) highlights the possibilities for multiplicity and for 
change that are constituted by a theory of gender performativity. However, to 
conclude that gender, its categories, practices and institutions, can simply be 
undone by subversive acts is to succumb to an illusion. 8 The categories, 
practices, institutions and power relations of gender, constituted through 
signifying acts and, for the most part, constrained within an oppositional, binary 
system, have a temporal dimension; gender in its present form has a social 
8 My use of 'illusion' is not intended to imply that there is a 'material reality' of gendered 
categories, practices and institutions that is resistant to change. Rather it is intended to imply 
that the suggestion that change can be brought about by subversive acts woefully 
underestimates the weight of culture and history that can be brought to bear in the 
maintenance of gendered categories, practices and institutions. 
37 
and cultural history that cannot be so easily undone. The relationship between 
language and gender performativity is self-perpetuating over time. The 
attention to the tem porality of gender performativity, expressed through the 
emphasis that is placed upon reiteration, repetition and re-production, is one of 
the great strengths of Butler's theories. Importantly, repetition and reiteration 
are not conceived of as effects of agency -I will orient to Butler's discussion of 
agency shortly - but as effects of discourse. According to Butler, performativity 
should not be understood as'the act by which a subject brings into being what 
she/he names, but, rather, as that reiterative power of discourse to produce the 
phenomena that it regulates and constrains' (1993, p. 2). 
In an attempt to answer some the criticisms raised by the theory of gender 
performativity, specifically, that it negated the materiality of the body, Butler 
develops a theory of 'materiality' in specific relation to sexed and gendered 
bodies. In this theory, materiality is 'rethought as the effect of power, as 
power's most productive effect' (1993, p. 2). Drawing upon the notion of the 
'regulatory ideal', Butler argues that ýsex% here interpreted as referring to male 
and female bodies - themselves theorised as a consequence of gender - is 
normative but that it functions not only as a norm but as 'part of a regulatory 
practice that produces the bodies that it governs' (1993, p. 1). The 
materialization of 'sex', it is argued, is compelled by its status as a 'regulatory 
ideal' and is accomplished (or not) through 'certain highly regulated practices' 
(1993, p. 1): 
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In other words, 'sex' is an ideal construct which is forcibly materialized 
through time. It is not a simple fact or static condition of a body, but a 
process whereby regulatory norms materialize sex and achieve this 
materialization through a forcible reiteration of those norms. (ibid. ) 
As with gender or, rather, as an effect of gender, the materiality of sex is 
theorised as a consequence of compulsory heterosexuality; 'the regulatory 
norms of "sex" work in a performative fashion to constitute the materiality of 
bodies and, more specifically, to materialize the body's sex, to materialize 
sexual difference in the service of the consolidation of the heterosexual 
imperative' (1993, p. 2). 
One further issue requires elucidation, the issue of power. Power is central to 
many feminist theories of gender. In these theories, it is typically conceived as 
manifest in the institutions and practices of patriarchy but as contingent upon 
the uncritically presupposed material relations between men and women. 
Given Butlers critical take on the materiality of sexed and gendered bodies, it 
is important to identify how she theorises the mechanism by which the 
substantive 'content' or'qualities' of sexed and gendered bodies and the 
relationships between them are determined. Drawing upon the work of 
Foucault and upon Discipline and Punish (1977) in particular, Butler argues 
that the grammar of the relationship between subjects and objects imposes 
upon 'power a 'metaphysics of external relations' (p. 30) that is misleading. 
Power, it is argued, is not a 'subject' that acts upon bodies as 'objects': 'the 
body is not an independent materiality that is invested by power relations 
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external to it, but it is that for which materialization and investiture [with power 
relations] are coextensive' (1993, p. 34). Consequently, to attempt to theorise a 
structure or system that is determinate of power, such as patriarchy, which 
results both in bodies being sexed and gendered and in their relative positions 
in structures of power relations, is to be misled by the metaphysical effects of 
grammar. As Butler reiterates, "'[m]ateriality" designates a certain effect of 
power or, rather, is power in its formative and constituting effects' (1993, p. 34; 
emphasis in original). Power, then, must be oriented to and understood at the 
level of 'materiality', in the constituted 'materiality' of sexed and gendered 
bodies and the constructed 'material' relations between them. 
One of the aims of this thesis is to examine the utility of Butlees concept of 
'gender performativity' and the assumptions upon which it is based as a 
framework for the interpretation of the discursive acts and accomplishments of 
sexed -'male'- and gendered -'masculine'- speakers. While Butlers 
poststructuralist theories of gender have not previously been subjected to 
empirical examination, poststructuralist theory has previously informed 
engagements with the topic of masculinity. It is to these existing examples of 
poststructuralist practice that I will now turn. 
2.2.2 Poststructuralist practice 
The relatively small body of literature with which this thesis is most closely 
aligned is dominated by the work of Margaret Wetherell and Nigel Edley 
(Edley, 2001; Edley & Wetherell, 1996,1997,1999,2001; Wetherell, 1998; 
Wetherell & Edley, 1998,1999); but see also Coyle and Morgan-Sykes (1998), 
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Phoenix, Frosh and Pattman (2003), Gough (1998,2001), Gough and 
Edwards (1998), Speer (2001 a, 2001 b), Toerien and Durrheirn (2001), Walton 
(2003), Walton, Coyle and Lyons (2003,2004) and Willott and Griffin (1997). 
Within and across these works, the central concern has been to identify the 
ways that male speakers negotiate masculine identities. In the studies that 
draw upon empirical evidence, this has been done, almost without exception, 
through the use of focus group or interview data (Edley & Wetherell, 1997, 
1999,2001; Gough, 1998a, 1998b, 2001; Speer, 2001 a; Walton, Coyle & 
Lyons, 2003,2004; Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Edley, 1999; Willott & Griffin, 
1997). The two exceptions are Coyle and Morgan-Sykes (1998) and Toerien 
and Durrheim (2001), which draw respectively upon newspaper and magazine 
articles on the topic of men and masculinity. 
In the majority of studies in this literature, men are interviewed or participate in 
focus group discussions on the topics of men and masculinity, though these 
topics may be approached from a number of different angles, for example 
through discussions of 'fatherhood' (Edley & Wetherell, 1997) or'feminism' 
(Edley & Wetherell, 2001; Gough, 2001). However, across these works, there 
is a tension between the particular analytic approaches adopted and the 
implications that these have for the arguments that can be advanced about 
men's relationships with masculinity (Edley, 2001; Speer, 2001 a, 2001 b; 
Wetherell & Edley, 1999). This debate, specifically concerned with the topic of 
masculinity, reflects the much broader debate about the theoretical and 
practical utility of various discourse-based approaches and the potential 
usefulness of their combination (see the debates between Schegloff (1997, 
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1998) and Wetherell (1998) and between Billig (1 999a, 1999b) and Schegloff 
(1 999a, 1999b)). Whilst, this debate is of undeniable importance, it will not be 
discussed at length here, though it will recur in the outlining of the analytic 
approach adopted within this thesis in the following chapter. In this review, with 
its specific focus on masculinity, only one aspect of this debate will be oriented 
to, that being the implications that differing approaches have for the theorised 
relationship between discourse and the speaking subject. 
At its most simple, this issue is reducible to the tension between the theorising 
of speakers as the producers or as the products of discourse. In this literature, 
at the heart of this debate lies the issue of the purpose for which masculinity 
might be argued to be constituted. From the eth no methodology and 
conversation analysis-inspired discursive psychological perspective (Speer, 
2001 a, 2001 b), speakers, including men in focus group discussions on the 
topic of men and masculinity, are argued to negotiate their identities relative to 
the discursive topics as a means of managing certain local concerns, i. e. 
concerns that are specific to that interactional context. From the Foucauldian 
poststructuralist discourse analytic perspective (Edley & Wetherell, 1997, 
1999,2001; Wetherell & Edley, 1999), speakers are argued to be constituted 
by the discursive resources invoked in the negotiation of less local, more 
macro-level concerns, such as the negotiation of ideological dilemmas (Billig, 
Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton & Radley, 1988), one of which might be 
argued to be the performance of gender. Thus, whilst the former is open to the 
criticism of failing to acknowledge the ideological and political power of 
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discourse, the latter can be criticised as advancing a theory of 'discourse 
determinism' and an inattention to the local details of social interaction. 
It is, however, important to note that the resulting conceptualisations of the 
subject, as they are apparent in discursive psychology (Edwards, 1997; 
Edwards & Pofter, 1992; Speer, 2001 a, 2001 b) and in Foucauldian discourse 
analysis, (Edley & Wetherell, 1997,1999,2001; Wetherell & Edley, 1999; 
Willig, 2003), are not incompatible. The former may focus on the speakers' 
orientations or their negotiation of accountability, both of which could be read 
as implying a conscious agentic subject, but theorists working within this 
approach remain determinedly agnostic on such possibilities and look only to 
the data, the collected talk or texts, for such features; a speaker's orientation to 
a particular local concern is only talked about as such if it is identifiable in the 
text. The subject that emerges within discursive psychology is not, therefore, 
incompatible with the above identified poststructuralist, discursively constituted 
subject. It is perhaps not surprising that the argument has been made for the 
compatibility and integration of these two approaches and, indeed, for the 
inexpediency of the conceptualisation of them as two separate approaches 
(Coyle, 2000; Wetherell, 1998). As far as the performance of analysis is 
concerned, this whole issue is largely reducible to the question of where the 
analysts should look, i. e. to micro- or macro-textual contexts, when trying to 
answer the classic question 'Why this utterance now? ' 
It is precisely this consideration that can be used to differentiate between the 
above listed discourse-based studies. They can, for the most part, be identified 
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by their focus on the constitution of masculinity as an orientation to some local 
interactional concern, such as the negotiation of accountability, or as relative to 
a more macro-textual cultural or ideological concern, such as the maintenance 
of hetero-patriarchal privilege. There is also a further subtle distinction between 
these two approaches, which is related to the issue of speakers as either the 
producers or the products of discourse. The latter approach, the Foucauldian 
poststructuralist perspective, sees speakers as the products of discourse, 
determined and organised by identifiable and categorical discursive resources 
and the relations that are assumed to exist between them. The range of 
discursive resources that could be argued to be contemporarily and culturally 
existent and through which speakers might be constituted as masculine is 
huge - though some effort will be made to map these resources throughout 
this review. Sufficient to illustrate this point for the time being is the concept of 
hegemonic masculinity (Carrigan, Connell & Lee, 1985; Connell, 1987,1995). 
Perhaps as a consequence of Connell's rather intangible definition of 
hegemonic masculinity, as 'the configuration of gender practice which 
embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of 
patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position 
of men and the subordination of women' (1995, p. 77), analysts adopting 
discursive approaches to masculinity have attempted to identify what it might 
look like in practice. However, in doing so its defining feature, its 
conceptualisation as the configuration that normalizes or naturalizes the 
dominance of men in gender power relations, has been obscured by a focus 
on the particular resources or characteristics that might account for that 
dominance. The analytic lens focuses upon resources such as'control', 
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'discipline' and 'rationality' and their role in the constitution of forms of 
masculinity such as 'heroic, 'ordinary' and 'rebellious' (Wetherell & Edley, 
1999), which, though they are not argued to be synonymous with hegemonic 
masculinity, are at least argued to be complicit in its maintenance. Within 
analyses adopting a more Foucauldian form of discourse analysis, hegemonic 
masculinity is argued to be constituted by the discursive resources or 
strategies identified by the analysts as functioning in the maintenance of men's 
dominance and privilege in gender relations. 
In contrast, the discursive psychological approach, inspired by 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, does not ascribe to discourse 
the status of 'an extra-discursive, constraining influence on talk' (Speer, 2001 a, 
pp-1 11-112). Rather, within this approach, topics such as masculinity are 
treated as 'worked up and made relevant in the interaction, not as external 
determinants' (Speer, 2001 a, p. 113). Consequently, 'hegemonic masculinity' is 
treated within this approach as very much an analysts' resource; an 
unnecessary and unwarranted imposition of a concept taken from feminist 
social theory, which, most importantly, does not appear explicitly in the talk of 
the participants themselves. That said, if, in discursive psychological analyses, 
the effort were made to identify resources that constituted hegemonic 
masculinity, it could only be done through the identification of those resources 
that functioned in the maintenance of male speakers' positions of power and 
privilege within the local interactional context. 
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Whether it is theorised as accomplished through a negotiation of 'imaginary 
positions' (Wetherell & Edley, 1999) or through a negotiation of more local 
interactional concerns (Speer, 2001 a), the most important question that can be 
asked of this literature is, what accounts of masculinity emerge from it? That is 
to say, when men talk about being men or negotiate their identities relative to 
topics such as fatherhood, feminism or homosexuality, what resources are 
interpreted and advanced as constituting the accomplishment of masculinity.? 
Essentially, within this literature, what is taken to count as the constitution of a 
masculine identity? 
The first qualification that must be made is that it would be misleading to 
attempt to answer such a question with a concept of a singular masculinity'in 
mind'. Again, one of the most productive and important effects of Connell's 
concept of hegemonic masculinity and the emphasis on gender as a structure 
of. power relations is that it created the space for plurality within the concept of 
masculinity (Connell, 1995); intuitively, there would be no need for the concept 
of hegemonic masculinity if masculinity were only theorised relative to 
femininity. Consequently, it is masculinities that are sought in discursive 
analyses and, therefore, the space is also created for potentially conflicting or 
apparently contradictory resources and accounts to be interpreted as 
constituting masculinity, in one form or another. 
It should also be noted that the studies, from which the following list of features 
is generated, drew upon the talk of men of different ages, from 17 to 64 years 
of age, with differing employment histories and hailing from a range of differing, 
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but still British, locations. Further, the talk was generated in differing social 
contexts, from 'in and around the sixth-form common room of a UK-based 
independent boys' school' (Edley & Wetherell, 1997,1999,2001) to the flat of 
one of the researchers during a drinking session (Gough & Edwards, 1998). 
Similarly, the substantive focus of the various studies, e. g. an attention to talk 
about fatherhood (Edley & Wetherell, 1999), about feminism (Edley & 
Wetherell, 2001; Gough, 2001) or, seemingly, about anything at all (Gough & 
Edwards, 1998), determines the excerpts drawn upon and consequently the 
concepts relative to which masculinity might be argued to be constructed or 
accomplished. 
Thus, in the following list of features interpreted as constituting masculinities, 
drawn from a range of discursive analyses of the topic, it should not be 
surprising to note that while there is a high level of coherence and consistency 
about what constitutes masculinity, there is also a great deal of variability and 
contradiction. Masculinity is reported as variously constituted by discourses of 
strength, both physical and mental, control over the self and others, 
intelligence and the capability for aggressive action. Further, these features are 
constructed as common to both the dispreferred and preferred versions of 
masculinity, those versions that speakers position themselves in opposition to 
or in resistance of and those that are consequently constituted and occupied 
(Edley & Wetherell, 1997). In relation to the topic of feminism, masculinity is 
'both "pro" and "anti", in favour and against, both supportive and at the same 
time, critical of feminists' (Edley & Wetherell, 2001, p. 451; see also Gough, 
2001). Also, masculinity is both magnanimous in supporting the dissolution of 
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patriarchal power and privilege and invested in its maintenance; it promotes 
equality in principle but it accedes responsibility for the maintenance of 
inequality in practice to extraneous factors, such as the free market and nature 
(Edley & Wetherell, 2001; Gough, 1998). It is sexist, racist, anti-feminist, 
homophobic, invested in the cultural significance of the male body and 
particularly of the phallus (Gough & Edwards, 1998). It is complementary to 
and, therefore, in part determined by the discursive production of female or 
feminine identities, both in public and in more private contexts, such as 
heterosexual relationships (Gough, 1998,2001). Across all the studies listed 
here it is avowedly heterosexual. It is self-confidence, it is inauthentic, it is 
pretence, a mask, it is a prescribed 'mind-set', and it is a collectively 
determined way of being male, a 'hive mind' (Speer, 2001 a). It is 'heroic', it is 
performance- and achievement-related, it is risk-taking and courageous. It is 
'ordinary' and 'rebellious; it is independent, autonomous and resistant to social 
expectations and stereotypes. It is a rational, authoritative, agentic, self- 
determining subject (Edley & Wetherell, 1999). It is hegemonic when 'what is 
most hegemonic is to be non-hegemonicl'(Edley & Wetherell, 1999, p. 351) It 
is, quite simply, all things to all men, and a lot of things to discourse analysts. 
To date, the only discursive analyses to attend specifically to the relationship 
between constructions of masculinity and of emotions are those of Walton, 
Coyle and Lyons (2003,2004) (but see also Coyle and Morgan-Sykes (1998) 
for a discussion of the implication of men's relationship with emotions in an 
analysis of newspaper representations of the 'crisis' in male mental health). In 
their analysis of men's talk about emotions, Walton, Coyle and Lyons (2004) 
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argued that the speakers simultaneously negotiated subject positions as both 
emotional beings and as masculine, through their alignments with 
constructions of the social acceptability of men's emotional expression as 
highly event- or context-specific. The experience of emotion in response to an 
event of a sufficiently high order of magnitude - the specific example given 
was the death of one's mother - was constructed as entirely warranted and 
appropriate for a man. However, they aligned themselves with an account in 
which the expression of that emotion through tears would only be socially 
acceptable for a man in a private context, e. g. in the home, and, in doing so, 
positioned themselves as masculine. To express emotion through tears in a 
public context, e. g. at work, was constructed as socially unacceptable for a 
man and therefore contradictory to the accomplishment of a masculine identity. 
However, variability again sneaks into these constructions of the relative social 
acceptability of public male emotional expression. The expression of emotion 
through tears and the expression of extreme joy were both constructed as 
socially acceptable for men if the event and context were sufficiently 
masculinized, e. g. if the emotions were expressed in relation to and in the 
context of a football match. 
The above list of features is perhaps an inevitable consequence of the 
conceptualisation of masculinities, including hegemonic masculinity, as 
existent cultural resources and as constituted through combinations of 
particular interpretative repertoires and discourses. The variability in 
constructions of and the meanings ascribed to masculinity across contexts and 
between speakers has led theorists, working from both the identified camps, to 
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conclude that the idea of discrete, categorical masculinities is misleading and 
over-simplistic. 'What we can't accept, however, is the common assumption 
that hegemonic masculinity is just one style or there is just one set of ruling 
ideas (most often understood as macho masculinity). Rather, there is a 
multiplicity of hegemonic sense-making relevant to the construction of 
masculinity identities' (Wetherell and Edley, 1999, p. 351). This proposition is 
echoed by Speer: 'masculinity is not a mapping notion. There are a range of 
rhetorically effective constructions and reconstructions of masculinity that can 
be applied and reworked to include or exclude the self, and that are tailored to 
the local business at hand' (2001 a, p. 126). The effectiveness or the hegemony 
of the various resources identified above as potentially constitutive of 
masculinity is arguably highly dependent upon the interactional context, both 
as endogenously produced by the speakers in that context and as 
exogenously determined by the analysts. 
2.3 Review of the literature on sex and gender differences in 
emotional experience and expression 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The empirical positivist literature on sex or gender differences in emotions may, 
not, at first glance, be an obvious canon to engage with within a discourse 
analytic thesis on the relationships between men, masculinity and emotions. 
Indeed, a review of this literature within the context of this thesis is a difficult 
beast to manage. The review must engage with the terms, concepts and 
assumptions that are constitutive of this literature from a consistently social 
constructionist perspective. Particularly, this review is written from a 
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perspective that resists engaging with this literature, its complexities and its 
tensions in its own terms. That is to say, the authorial voice adopted in the 
review consistently locates the content of this literature within a social 
constructionist, discourse analytic framework. The most straightforward 
method of doing this is to focus on the predominant interpretative repertoires9 
within this body of literature, i. e., the discursive resources that constitute the 
objects of 'sex', 'gender and 'emotions', and the discursive resources that 
constitute the 'theoretical frameworks' that are invoked to make sense of or to 
account for the posited relationships between 'sex', 'gender' and 'emotions"O. 
Further, the review orients to the ways by which the predominant interpretative 
repertoires of this literature are both reproduced and reffied through the various 
positivist methodologies employed. The review is attentive to the ways by 
which positivist methodologies, as discursive practices, are 'onto-formative' 
9 'Interpretative repertoires' are defined by Potter and Wetherell (1987) as 'recurrently used 
systems of terms used for characterizing and evaluating actions, events and other 
phenomena. A repertoire [] is constituted through a limited range of terms used in particular 
stylistic and grammatical constructions. Often a repertoire will be organized around specific 
metaphors and figures of speech (tropes)' (p. 1 49). There are two reasons why the term 
'interpretative repertoire' is used here in preference to 'discourse', which, as will be seen in the 
following section, carries similar meanings. Firstly, 'repertoire' implies a broad collection of 
'resources' and secondly, what will be glossed as 'resources' in this broad-stroke analysis 
might, in a more detailed analysis, be readily categorised as 'discourses'. 
10 The conceptual isation of 'interpretative repertoires' and 'discourses' as 'constitutive' of 
'subjects'and 'objects' is grounded in social constructionist theory and will be expanded upon 
in the following chapter on discourse analytic methodologies. 
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and actively 'materialize' subjects and objects". That is to say, the review is 
concerned not only with mapping the predominant repertoires in this literature 
and the reproduction of that predominance through positivist methodologies 
but also with how the 'objects' and 'subjects' of those repertoires are made 
'real'. 
There is, of course, a huge body of literature on emotions upon which the 
literature on sex and gender differences in emotions depends for the various 
discourses that are constitutive of psychological engagements with 'emotions'. 
However, that literature is far too large to be reviewed in its entirety here (for 
existing reviews on emotions see Parkinson (1995), Ekman and Davidson 
(1994) and Oatley and Jenkins (1996)) and, indeed, such a review would be 
superfluous to the aims of this thesis. This review is limited only to the 
repertoires invoked in the literature on 'sex' and 'gender' differences in 
'emotion', though the interpretation of those repertoires is informed by an 
understanding of the broader emotion literature. The rationale for the restriction 
of this review and for the engagement with this literature as a whole is: 
the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions reproduces the 
discursive resources that are available to and which might be drawn 
11 See Edley and Wetherell's (1999) invocation of the concept of discourses of masculinity as 
'onto-formative', which draws upon Rose (11996). See also Butler (1993) for an extended 
discussion of Foucault's (1977) conceptual isation of the relationship between discourse, power 
and materiality; 'Foucault traces the process of materialization as an investiture of discourse 
and power'(Butler, 1993, p. 35). 
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upon by members of Western cultures in the construction of sexed or 
gendered accounts of emotions 
the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions produces and 
reifies accounts of men's relationship with emotions and the relationship 
between masculinity and emotions 
Consequently, engagement with this literature provides an overview of the 
range of discursive resources that are culturally available for the construction 
of accounts of the relationships between 'sex', 'gender and 'emotions'. 
Further, it provides a second account of men's relationship with emotions. It is 
a curious feature of the masculinity literature that, in its construction of the 
inexpressive or unemotional male, it does not commonly draw upon this body 
of literature to warrant its claims, preferring to warrant claims for the existence 
of such a character with references to therapeutic practice (Gratch, 2001) or 
through confessional styles of writing (Seidler, 1997). Whilst men's relationship 
with emotions may not be its singular focus, an inevitable consequence of the 
literature on sex and gender differences in emotions is that it does produce 
accounts of men's relationships with emotion, the relationships between 
masculinity and emotions and even men's relationships with masculinity 
mediated through emotions. For a social psychological thesis on the 
relationships between men, masculinity and emotions, even one operating 
from a discourse analytic perspective, the literature on sex and gender 
differences in emotions cannot and should not be ignored or glossed over. 
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The following review is structured in accordance with the above-outlined 
rationale. In the first section, the predominant repertoires of the literature on 
sex and gender differences in emotions are identified. This includes the 
discourses of 'sex' and 'gender and the various repertoires that are invoked in 
the construction of 'emotions', e. g. emotions as 'experiences' and as 
'expressions'. The analysis is not a fine-grained discursive psychological 
analySiS12. Rather, it is a 'broad-stroke' identification of the repertoires invoked 
in the literature. The warrant for such an approach is one of utility. The 
identification of these repertoires and their identification as repertoires highlight 
their ta ken-fo r-g ranted status. Simply, what are here identified as 'repertoires' 
are the concepts that are, within the literature on sex and gender differpnces in 
emotions, taken to be self-evidently 'real'. One of the purposes of this review is 
to call that status into question. 
The second section of the review consists of two parts. The first part focuses 
on the repertoires of 'aetiology', i. e., the repertoires that are invoked in the 
prediction of or in accounting for'sex' or'gender differences in 'emotions'. 
These are argued to constitute the bases for the reification of any observed 
relationships between 'sex% 'gender and 'emotions'. The second part involves 
an engagement with the processes by which these repertoires are reproduced 
and reified. Briefly, those processes are the methodologies employed in 
12 See the following chapter on the discourse analytic methodologies for an account of what 
constitutes a 'fine-grained discursive psychological analysis'. 
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positivist examinations of the veracity of the axiom that men and women differ 
with regard to emotions. 
The third and final section of the review is a brief outlining of the relationships 
between men, masculinity and emotions that are reproduced and reified 
through positivist examinations of sex and gender differences in emotions. 
That is to say, the representations of men's relationships with emotions and 
the accounts that are offered for them, which are reproduced and reified as 
'actual material facts'through the literature on sex and gender differences in 
emotions, will be outlined. 
Following the review of the literature on sex and gender differences in 
emotions, the conceptual isation of 'emotions' within this thesis is outlined. 
Briefly, the approach to emotions adopted in this thesis combines a social 
constructionist, discursive psychological concern with the functions served by 
emotion discourses (Edwards, 1997,1999) with a social functionalist view of 
emotions as interpersonal communication and as fundamentally constitutive of 
social relationships (de Rivera, 1984; Fridlund, 1991,1994; Parkinson, 1995; 
Smith & Lazarus, 1993). 
2.3.2 The discourses of 'sex' and 'gender' and the repertoires of 
lemotion' 
In their outlining of a discourse analytic approach to categories and 
categorization, Potter and Wetherell (1987) argued against the cognitive 
account of categories (Wilder, 1986) as constraining potential determinants of 
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'bias and stereotyping' (p. 1 18). 1 am of course in agreement with Potter and 
Wetherell's (1987) conceptual isation of categories as flexible and contextually 
occasioned resources that are drawn upon in everyday talk. However, Wilder's 
observation regarding the potentially deterministic effects of categories (see 
also Hamilton, 1979; Taylor, 1981) is particularly apposite when considering 
the repertoires, discourses and discursive resources that constitute and 
constrain the established psychological literature on sex and gender 
differences in emotion. 
What are outlined below as repertoires and discourses are, within the positivist 
paradigm, simply the terms of the debate; they are the straightforward 
representations of ontologically existent objects, such as the male and female 
sexes, masculine and feminine personalities and emotional experiences and 
expressions. However, the view taken of language within the positivist 
paradigm is not the view of language that is taken within this thesis. Hence, in 
this thesis, the repertoires and discourses outlined below are taken to be 
constitutive of the objects with which positivist examinations are concerned. As 
such, these repertoires and discourses are viewed as directly determinate of 
the methodologies that are employed. This first part of this section attends to 
the discourseS13 of sex and gender. The second part attends to the vadous 
interrelated repertoires of emotion. 
13 The term 'discourses' is used here in preference to 'repertoires' because there is a 
comparatively small range of discursive resources that are constitutive of 'sex' and 'gender'. 
Thus, whilst'sex'and 'gendercan clearly be identified as discrete discourses, as will be seen 
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2.3.2.1 Discourses of sex and gender 
It is self-evident that two of the predominant discourses in the psychological 
literature on sex and gender differences are the discourses of 'sex' and 
'gender. Briefly, the discourses of 'sex' and 'gender' are most obviously 
constituted by the terms 'male' and 'female', 'masculine' and 'feminine' 
respectively (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988). To regard the discourses of 'sex' 
and 'gender as straightforward and unproblernatic is to seriously 
underestimate their power. Arguably the most important effects of these 
discourses are that they confer ontological status on the objects that they 
purport to represent and in so doing are determinate of those repertoires of 
'aetiology' that can be brought to bear to predict or account for differences. 
Following Unger (1979), the 'sex' discourse confers upon the categories 'male' 
and 'female'an ontological status that is grounded in the 'materiality' of human 
bodies and consequently creates the possibility of 'evolutionary', 'biological' 
and 'genetic' repertoires of 'aetiology' being invoked to predict and account for 
any differences between 'males' and 'females'. In contrast, the 'gender' 
discourse confers upon the categories of 'masculinity' and 'femininity' an 
in the following section, 'emotional expression' and 'emotional experience' are best conceived 
of as repertoires because they are constituted by a large range of discursive resources, some 
of which can be categorized as 'discourses' and some of which are shared. For example, the 
'physiological' discourse is a resource that occurs in both the 'experience' repertoire and in the 
sexpression' repertoire. The use of 'repertoires' is perhaps therefore best understood as a 
means of managing the location of concepts and avoiding the confusing possibilities of having 
'discourses' within 'discourses'. 
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ontological status that is grounded in the 'psychologies' or 'personalities' of 
individuals and, given that the 'gender discourse is advanced as an alternative 
to the 'sex' discourse and therefore resists implying inherent 'biological' 
differences between individuals, creates the possibility of the 'socio-cultural' 
repertoire of aetiology of any observable differences. 
However, the inconsistent use of the discourses of 'sex' and 'gender (Parlee, 
1998; see also the papers edited by Kitzinger, 1994) and of the categories that 
constitute them, 'male' and 'female' and 'masculine' and 'feminine', make 
opaque the ontological status that they confer and conflate the repertoires of 
'aetiology' that might be invoked to account for any observed differences. This 
issue is particularly apposite when considering occasions on which the terms 
'men' and 'women' are used. 
Men and women do not differ dramatically in their immediate reports of 
emotional experience (Feldman Barrett, Robin, Pietromonaco & Eyssell, 
1998, p. 575) 
I contend that the use of the terms 'men' and 'women' in statements such as 
the above quotation is a rhetorical move. It conflates the ontological status 
conferred by the discourses of 'sex' and 'gender'. 'Men' and 'women' are 
simultaneously 'sexed embodied beings' andbeings with gendered 
psychologies or personalities'. Consequently, the use of the terms 'men' and 
'women' makes available the fullest possible range of repertoires of 'aetiology' 
to account for either the presence or absence of any differences. That is to 
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say, any observed difference between 'men' and 'women' can be accounted 
for by appeals to either repertoires of their differing 'physiologies' or differences 
in 'gender socialization'. 
The complex implications that the discourses of 'se)e and 'gender have for the 
ontological status of the objects they purport to describe and, particularly, for 
the repertoires of 'aetiology' that they make available have led some authors to 
suggest the possibility of dissociating the repertoires of 'aetiology' from the 
discourses of 'sexý and 'gender' (Deaux, 1993). Within this framework'sex' 
would refer to comparisons 'in which people are selected on the basis of the 
demographic categories of male and female' and 'gender would refer to 
comparisons based upon 'the nature of femaleness and maleness, of 
masculinity and femininity' (Deaux, 1993, p. 125). Rather than providing a set of 
less encumbered terms, Deaux's proposal, in particular the equating of 
'masculinity' and 'femininity' with the seemingly essentialist 'nature of 
maleness and femaleness', seems only to further confuse the ontological 
status that they confer upon the objects of 'male' and 'female', 'masculinity' 
and 'femininity' and to mire them more firmly in repertoires of 'aetiology'. It is 
acknowledged that there is a paucity of terms through which the discourses of 
'sex' and 'gender can be constituted (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988) and that 
more complex and explicit sets of terms are cumbersome and seem laboured 
(Gentile, 1993). However, it is futile to try to dissociate discourses of 'sex' and 
'gender from the repertoires of 'aetiology' given that the applicability of those 
repertoires is contingent upon the ontological status of the object, which is 
conferred by the discourses of 'sex' and 'gender. 
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Any discussion of 'sex' and 'gender differences in 'emotions' is, from the 
outset, bound up in repertoires of 'aetiology' to which categories, such as 
'female', 'male', 'masculine', 'feminine', 'women, 'men' and all the emotion 
categories are inextricably linked. A failure to engage adequately with the 
repertoires of 'aetiologies' and the ontological assumptions upon which they 
rely, conferred by the use of particular categories, is a failure to appreciate 
adequately and represent the constitutive social and cultural force of the 
discourses of 'sex' and 'gender (see Eagly, 1995; Eagly & Wood, 1999). 
Whilst the importance of the repertoires of 'aetiology' should not be 
underestimated, they will be returned to below. 
Briefly, I would like to draw the readers attention to the ongoing debate as to 
whether or not the questions that underlie the 'sex' and 'gender differences 
literature - "how are men and women different/the same? " (Kitzinger, 1994, 
p. 501) - are really the questions that should concern psychologists. This 
debate is of particular relevance to those working within field of the 'psychology 
of women' (see the papers edited by Kitzinger, 1994). Whilst there is 
insufficient space to engage with this debate at length, it is sufficient to observe 
that the questions that underlie the sex/gender differences literature result in 
the development of two complementary but conflicting bodies of studies and 
researchers: those that seek evidence to maximize claims of 'sex' and 'gender 
differences and those that seek evidence to minimize claims of 'sexý and 
'gender differences. Within the feminist literature, the political functions of 
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these two positions warrant, respectively, claims for a particular and valuable 
version of femininity and claims for fundamental equality (Wilkinson, 1994). 
'The tendency to exaggerate differences' and 'the tendency to minimize or 
ignore differences' have been labeled, respectively, 'alpha bias' and 'beta bias' 
(Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988, p. 457). Though they are likened respectively to 
Type I and Type H errors, alpha and beta biases are conceptualized as 
referring not to the 'probability of "error" (which would imply that there is a 
"correct" position), but rather to a systematic inclination to emphasize certain 
aspects of experiences and overlook other aspects' (ibid. 1988, p. 457). In 
feminist literature a tendency towards alpha or beta bias may be purposive and 
politically motivated. However, their prevalence in the positivist literature on 
sex and gender differences in emotions is much more insidious. The 
standpoints (Harding, 1986; Hartstock, 1985) taken by the researchers, 
theorists and authors within the majority of the literature on sex and gender 
differences in emotions are, in accordance with the positivist/objectivist 
paradigm, necessarily not acknowledged and, indeed, are purposefully 
obscured. The propensity for researchers and theorists in this area to invoke 
the defense of 'objectivity' when producing accounts of differences that are 
potentially highly problematic will be addressed in the discussion of the 
&evolutionary aetiology' repertoire. 
The importance of these issues for this thesis will be evident in the final section 
of this review where the comparative representations of 'men's' and 'women's' 
relationships with emotions will be reported and their implications discussed. 
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Now, having identified the resources that constitute the discourses of 'sex' and 
'gender' and having identified the implications that these discourses have for 
discussions of difference, I must consider the repertoires that constitute the 
dimensions along which the 'sexes' and 'genders' are measured as differing, 
i. e., the repertoires of 'emotion. 
2.3.2.2 Repertoires of emotion 
Within the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions, there are three 
clear, predominant 'interpretative repertoires', those of 'emotionality', 
6emotional experience' and 'emotional expression'. The following discussion 
will engage with each of these repertoires in turn and identify their constitutive 
discursive resources, i. e., the related terms and phrases, and the functions that 
these repertoires serve in the constitution of the objects of 'emotions'. As was 
acknowledged above, some of the discursive resources listed below conform 
to the definition of a 'discourse'14 and are common across the repertoires. The 
following review will identify how these three repertoires function and interact in 
the construction of the objects in relation to which 'males' and 'females', 
'masculine' and 'feminine' individuals, 'men' and 'women' are measured as 
differing. The review will first engage with the generalised concept of 
'emotionality'. Then, following the line of argument advanced by Fischer 
(1993), the structures of many of the reviews of this literature (Brody, 1985; 
Brody & Hall, 1993; Fischer, 1993; LaFrance & Banaji, 1992; Shields, 1991, 
14 Parker defines a discourse as 'a system of statements which constructs an object' (1992, 
p. 5). The concept of a discourse will be explored at length in the following chapter on 
discourse analytic methodology. 
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1995) and the principle distinction that is commonly drawn between empirical 
studies in this literature, the review will engage with the repertoires of 
6emotional experience' and 'emotional expression'. 
for analytic purposes there is obvious merit in separating the 
experience of an emotion from its expression (Brody & Hall, 1993, 
p. 448) 
The 'obviousness' of the utility of the distinction between 'expression' and 
'experience' is taken to be self-evident across the above-listed reviews. In this 
thesis, the claimed 'obviousness' of such a move is taken as evidence of the 
predominance of the two discourses. Across the outlining of the resources and 
strategies that are constitutive of the 'expression' and 'experience' repertoires, 
within the sex and gender differences literature, one of the most striking 
features is the extent to which these repertoires are uncritically accepted as 
reflecting the phenomenological 'reality' of emotions. Emotions are theorised 
as both 'experiential' and 'expressive' and emotional 'expression' is 
presupposed to be contingent upon an underlying emotional 'experience'. 
Within the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions, as will be 
demonstrated, the 'expression' repertoire necessarily implies 'experience'. 
The 'emotionalitv' repertoire 
It appears that public display plays a large role in affecting judgments of 
emotionality both by self and by observers, but whether differences in 
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overt expressivity should be taken as fundamental emotionality 
differences is quite another matter. (LaFrance & Banaji, 1992, pp. 195- 
196) 
The 'emotionality' repertoire is the most highly generalised repertoire invoked 
in discussions of differences between 'men' and 'women' or between 
'masculine' and 'feminine' individuals. It is implicit in discussions and enquiries 
where the aim is to identify whether one sex or gender is more 'emotional' than 
the other. In such enquiries 'women' are consistently rated as being more 
'emotional' than 'men' (Birnbaum, Nosanchuk & Croll, 1980). Similarly, when 
participants are asked to think of an 'emotional' person, most report that the 
person they thought of was a woman (Shields, 1987). 
The 'emotionality' repertoire is constitutive of discussions of whethermen'are 
comparatively more or less 'emotional' than 'women'. The 'emotionality' 
repertoire draws upon and conflates all the various discursive resources that 
are available for the construction of emotion phenomena and for the 
construction of dimensions of judgement along which the 'sexes' or'genders' 
might differ. It conflates the repertoires of 'experience' and 'expression' and it 
conflates all the available categories of emotion. As such, 'emotionality'' is 
treated like a unipolar disposition or personality trait, which is stable over time 
and largely independent of any social context or past experiences' (Fischer, 
1993, p. 305; see also Shields, 1987,2002). 
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Both Fischer (1993) and Shields (1987,2002) provide extensive critical 
engagements with the concept of 'emotionality'. Briefly, Fischer (1993) posits 
four primary problems with the 'emotionality' repertoire. Firstly, that, owing to 
'emotionality' being constructed as a dispositional attribute of individuals or of 
members of particular groups that is independent of social context and 
insensitive to the complexity of the differences in 'emotional experiences' and 
'expressions' of men and women, it'neglects a gender perspective towards 
emotions' (p. 305). Secondly, that the 'emotionality' repertoire is often invoked 
in place of the 'relationality' repertoire, i. e., 'emotionality' is equated with 
Orelationality' in attempts to construct 'emotionality' as a positively valued 
disposition or trait. This is particularly true of feminist attempts to reject the 
devaluing of the 'emotionality' repertoire relative to the 'rationality' repertoire. 
Thirdly, as stated above, 'emotionality' is aspecific and 'is used to refer to the 
frequency, the intensity, the expression or the social sharing of emotions' 
(p. 305). Finally, Fischer contends that the 'emotionality' repertoire is too firmly 
embedded in ideological structures, where it is equated with notions such as 
'impulsivity, instability or irrationality' (p. 305) and consequently is devalued. 
Shields (1987,2002) expresses similar concerns as Fischer (ibid. ) with regard 
to the 'emotionality' repertoire. However, by historicizing the relationship 
between 'gender' and 'emotions', Shields (2002) draws the ideological 
functions served by the 'emotionality' repertoire into sharper focus. Shields' 
particular concern is with the role that the 'emotionality' repertoire has played 
in the construction of 'feminine emotionality' and in constructions of the 
complementarity of the 'sexes' or'genders'. 
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To assert that one sex is inferior to the other in any area of competence 
conveys a sense of impairment or dysfunction in the inferior sex. To 
assert complementarity is to restore order to the world by allowing for 
qualitative as well as quantitative differences. In complementarity, kinds 
or types of emotion may be identified as more typical of one sex than of 
the other and purported sex-related differences in emotional 
temperament are automatically documented as natural and functional. 
(Shields, 2002, p. 71) 
Whilst Shields rejects '[t]he binary opposition of male-rational, female- 
emotional' as 'incompatible with a complementarity model' and 'an inaccurate 
representation of what was believed to be the ideal and the natural state of 
gender relations by late Victorian British and American middle- to upper-class 
scientists and laypersons' (p. 72), she does maintain that the 'emotionality' 
repertoire was and is instrumental in constructions of accounts of the 
complementarity of the genders. For Shields, the power of the 'emotionality' 
repertoire lies in it being so 'gendered', specifically so 'feminized', that the 
possibility of masculine 'emotionality' is elided. Whatmen'do and what might 
be considered 'masculine' are likely to be constructed through resources other 
than the 'emotionality' repertoire. Indeed, Shields' represents the 
complementarity of the sexes as between 'female emotionality' and 'male 
passion'. 
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For Shields, the important questions with regard to the 'emotionality' repertoire 
are 'Who gets called "emotional" and what does that mean when it happensT 
(2002, p. 139). The relationship between the 'emotionality' repertoire and 
gender is potentially advanced as a constitutive one. The 'emotionality' 
discourse is invoked in the construction or ascription of gendered identities. 
More specifically, the invocation of the 'emotionality' repertoire would likely 
result in the construction or ascription of a 'feminine' gendered identity and the 
notable absence of the 'emotionality' repertoire, that is to say the invocation of 
some other resource to account for phenomena that might otherwise be 
accounted for through the invocation of the 'emotionality' repertoire, would 
likely result in the construction or ascription of a 'masculine' gendered identity. 
The analytic project for an engagement with and analysis of the 'emotionality' 
repertoire therefore becomes one that is concerned with the specific occasions 
of use and the functions served by the repertoire on the occasions on which it 
isinvoked. 
instead of developing explanations of emotion/emotionality as a trait - 
that is, a stable attribute of the individual that exists in some quantity - 
perhaps we should examine the variables that influence how and when 
emotion, or explicit acknowledgement of emotion, occurs. (Shields, 
1987, p. 233) 
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The 'experience' repertoire 
More strongly felt and more volatile emotions are therefore 
characteristic of females over a large portion of the lifespan. (Brody & 
Hall, 1993, p. 449) 
The 'experience' repertoire is fundamental to the construction of an episode as 
'emotional' and constitutes one of the central dimensions along which 
constructions of sex and gender differences in emotions are accomplished. As 
a repertoire, it is constituted by a range of resources that may be examined 
singularly, as one 'part' of emotional 'experience', or in combination as a 
means of identifying variability within 'experience, across and within the sexes 
and genders. Briefly, these resources can be categorised according to the 
functions they serve either in the construction of 'experience' as having a 
temporal dimension or in the construction of the'content'of emotional 
'experience'. The resources that are constitutive of the 'temporal' dimension of 
emotional 'experience' include, 'frequency' (Allen & Haccoun, 1976; Averill, 
1983; Fabes & Martin, 1991; Stapley & Haviland, 1989), 'duration' (simply the 
length of an emotional 'experience') and 'hedonic level' (the percentage of time 
spent in an 'affective state') (Fujita, Diener & Sandvik, 1991; Larsen & Diener, 
1987). The primary resource for the constitution of the 'content' of emotional 
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'experience' is 'intensity' (Fujita, Diener& Sandvik, 1991; Grossman &Wood, 
1993)15. 
The resources that are constitutive of the 'experience' repertoire are 
reproduced in positivist experimental contexts and research reports through a 
variety of means. The primary methods employed in the examination of sex 
and gender differences in emotional 'experience' are 'reported beliefs', 'self- 
report' and 'physiological measures'. Briefly, 'reported beliefs' are taken as a 
measure of the existent social stereotypes of sex and gender differences, while 
'self-report' and 'physiological measures' are taken as indices for'emotional 
experience' within individual respondents or participants. The ways that these 
differing methodologies function in the reproduction and reification of the 
predominant interpretative repertoires will be discussed below. At this point I 
am concerned with the identification of those resources that are directly 
constitutive of the object of 'emotional experience'. 
15 The 'experience' repertoire as it appears in the literature on sex and gender differences in 
emotions is evidently informed by the 'appraisal' theory of emotion (see Frijda (2001) and 
Scherer (1999) for discussions of 'emotional experience' within appraisal theories). Within 
appraisal theories of emotions, the content of 'emotional experience' is comprised not only of 
'intensity' but also of 'appraisal components' and 'action orientations'. These constituents of 
the 'experience' repertoire are, however, not extensively addressed in the literature on sex and 
gender differences in emotions, though see Hess, Sen6cal, Kirouac, Herrera, Philippot and 
Kleck (2000) for a brief discussion of sex differences according to the 'relational' (Lazarus, 
1991) functions of emotions. 
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The various metaphors for 'emotional experience' that are apparent within 
studies of the physiology of 'emotional experience' include 'heart rate, 'skin 
conductance', 'electrodermal activity' (EDA) and 'electromyographic activity' 
(EMG) of the brow, as well as the 'neurological patterns of activity' of the 
human brain16 (for examples of how these metaphors are invoked and the 
functions they serve in the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions 
see Buss, Larsen, Weston and Semmelroth (1992), Harris (2000), Kring and 
Gordon (1998) and Levenson, Ekman and Friiesen (1990). These metaphors 
are the resources that are constitutive of 'emotional experience' as both 
'physiologically manifest', i. e., embodied, and as varying in 'magnitude. 
With regard to 'emotional intensity', scales such as the Differential Emotion 
Scale (DES: lzard, Dougherty, Bloxom, & Kotsch, 1974) and the Affect 
Intensity Measure (AIM: Larsen and Deiner, 1987) are used to elicit 'reports' of 
'emotional experiences'. The AIM scale comprises items such as, When I am 
nervous I get shaky all over, 'When I feel happy it is a strong type of 
exuberance', 'When I solve a small personal problem, I feel euphoric! and'My 
emotions tend to be more intense than those of most people'. The measured 
'intensity'with which individuals report 'experiencing' emotions is contingent 
upon their identification with the construction of emotional 'experience' as a 
physiologically manifest phenomenon (I get shaky') that can be ordered along 
some scale of magnitude ('strong type of exuberance'). Similarly, measures of 
16 For a more extensive list of all the various metaphors for the 'physiology' of 'emotional 
experiences'see Stoney, Matthews, McDonald and Johnson (1988). 
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the self-reported 'frequency' with which individuals 'experience' emotions rely 
upon respondents positioning themselves, on Likert scales, relative to end- 
points labelled 'almost never and 'almost always' (Grossman Mood, 1993). 
The important implication of these 'measures' is that they construct 'emotional 
experience' as a subjective 'experience' upon which individuals can 'reflect' 
and which they can 'report' on. Within the literature on sex and gender 
differences in emotions, the 'emotional experience' repertoire implies that 
emotions are distinctive 'states of consciousness' (Shields, 2000). 
The above-listed terms and metaphors combine to constitute 'emotional 
experience'as both 'embodied' and 'felt'. Consequently, the'emotional 
experience' repertoire provides for a host of possible accounts for any 
observed differences between the sexes and the genders. These include but 
are not limited to any such differences resulting from the differing physiologies 
of males and females or from the influence of social or cultural factors on the 
reporting of what is 'felt' by men and women. These possibilities will be 
returned to below in the discussion of the 'aetiology' repertoires. However, it 
should be acknowledged that the 'aetiology' repertoires are contingent upon 
complementary repertoires that are constitutive of 'emotional experience'. 
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The 'expression' repertoire 
One of the most consistent empirical findings in the current literature on 
sex differences regards emotional expressivity. Differences in emotional 
expressivity between men and women are found when considering self- 
reports of emotional expressiveness, when using observational studies, 
as well as when considering beliefs and stereotypes about emotional 
expressiveness. (Hess et aL, 2000, p. 610) 
Within the 'expression' repertoire, it is important to differentiate between the 
general concept of 'expressivity' and the phenomena that are interpreted as 
'modalities' of 'emotional expression' and are consequently measured and 
reified as 'indices' of 'emotional expression'. The general concept of 
lexpressivity' operates in much the same way as the 'emotionality' repertoire. It 
forms the basis for constructions of fundamental, dispositional differences 
between 'males' and 'females'. Just as 'males' and 'females' may be 
constructed as more or less 'emotional' so they may also be constructed as 
more or less 'expressive' (Hess et aL, 2000) (see also Shields (2002) for an 
engagement with 'masculine inexpressivity'). Whilst the concept of 
sexpressivity' is important to the development of an account of the 
contemporary status of the relationships that are supposed to exist between 
omen', 'masculinity' and 'emotion', owing to its generalised nature it will not be 
discussed at length here but will be returned to below in the discussion of the 
representations of the relationships between 'men', 'masculinity' and 'emotion' 
that emerge from the literature on 'sex' and 'gender differences' in 'emotion'. 
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This section of the review is more concerned with the identification of 
discursive resources that are constitutive of the 'expression' repertoire, i. e., 
those phenomena that are socially and culturally understood as 'modalities' of 
demotional expression'. Arguably, some of these 'modalities', such 
a electromyographic (EMG) activity', are specific to the culture of psychology. 
However, all are reified through positivist methods as 'indices' of 'emotional 
expression'. These 'indices' are assessed, either by'self-report', 'observer- 
report' or 'physiological measures', to determine the extent of 'emotional 
expression'. 'Self-report's' of 'expressivity' comprise the majority of the existent 
data and many, though not all, of the below-listed indices are examined 
through the use of self-report methods. Whilst the methods through which they 
are reified will be discussed in the following section, the 'modal ities/i nd ices' of 
'emotional expression'will be listed here. Briefly, they can be categorised as 
'verbal' and 'non-verbal', where 'non-verbal' includes both 'facial expressions' 
17 
and 'behaviours and gestures'. The discursive resources that are constitutive 
of each of these 'modalities' will be listed in turn, beginning with'verbal 
emotional expression'. 
In studies of 'verbal emotional expression', individual speakers use of 'emotion 
words' in reference to their self or others, such as 'I feel sad' orTm happy', are 
taken as 'indices' of 'emotional expression'. Typically, studies examining this 
17 For a cautionary note on the extent to which any of the listed 'modalities'can betaken as 
'indices' of emotional expression see Hall, Carter and Horgan, (2000). 
73 
'modality' of 'emotional expression' have relied upon observational or quasi- 
naturalistic methods, i. e., they have been concerned with identifying the 
frequency with which 'emotion words' are drawn upon in either'real-life' 
situations or in experimental situations that are supposed to provoke 
dernotional experiences' (Anderson & Leaper, 1998; Goldshmidt & Weller, 
2000; Notarius & Johnson, 1982). 
'Non-verbal emotional expression' is constituted through a host of resources 
that are reified through either 'observer-reports' or 'physiological measures'. 
Studies applying observer-report methodologies to sex differences in 'facial 
expressivity'are concerned with the 'accuracy' with which individuals can 
'encode'and 'decode' the 'emotional meaning'of particu la r 'facial expressions' 
(Buck, 1994; Fujita, Harper, & Wiens, 1980; Kring & Gordon, 1998; Wagner, 
Buck & Winterbotham, 1993). Similarly, other'behaviours', such as'smiling'or 
'crying' are invoked as indices of 'emotional expression' (see Hall, Carter and 
Horgan (2000), Hall and Halberstadt (1986) and Vingerhoets and Scheirs 
(2000) for extensive reviews and meta-analyses of the studies on 'smiling' and 
'crying'). The important implication of these particular constituents of the 
'expression' repertoire is that they are supposed to be communicative. 'Facial 
expressions' and 'behaviours' such as 'smiling, 'crying' or'gazing' are 
constructed as having culturally determined meanings and, through observer- 
report methods, are reified as implicitly'communicative acts'. The 
presupposition of a culturally available structure of meaning, in which particular 
'facial expressions' or'non-verbal behaviours' signify particular 'emotions', is 
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implicit in any assessment of the 'accuracy' with which 'emotional experiences' 
might be communicated or'expressed''non-verbally'. 
Alternatively, some 'indices of emotional expression' are reified as 
'physiological indices'through the use of 'physiological measures'. In the 
literature on sex and gender differences in emotions, invocations of this group 
of resources have been limited to'electromyographic (EIVIG) activity' at the 
zygomaticus and corrugator facial muscle regions (Vrana & Rollock, 2002), 
which are metaphors for'smiling' and 'frowning' respectively. As with the 
sexperience' repertoire, the primary function of these resources is to constitute 
'emotional expression' as an embodied phenomenon; 'emotional expression' is 
constructed as done by and through the body and the 'extent' to which it is 
done is constructed as objectively measurable. Again, the functions served by 
the methodologies employed in the studies of sex and gender differences in 
emotions, particularly with regard to the reification of the objects of interest 
('sex', 'gender, 'emotionality''emotional experiences' and 'emotional 
expression') and of measured, reported or observed differences between those 
objects, will be discussed below and will follow from the discussion of the 
daetiology repertoires', upon which the process of reification is in part 
contingent. 
As was discussed in relation to 'emotional experience', the primary function of 
'physiological indices' is the embodiment of 'emotions'. Through the above- 
identified 'indices', the 'expressive' element of 'emotions' is also embodied and 
constructed as intrinsic to 'emotional experience'. The effect of this is to 
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construct the supposed communicative functions of 'emotions' as not 
necessarily following from any'conscious'or'agentic self. 'Emotions' are 
constructed as intrinsically communicative. The implications of these 
'physiological indices' for the construction of emotions and for the concept of 
the 'emotional self will be discussed in greater detail in the following section on 
the functions of reification served by the use of 'physiological measures'. 
However, before moving on to discuss the theoretical bases for and the 
methodologies involved in the reification of the relationships between 'se)e, 
'gender' and 'emotion', it is just worth noting one further function served by the 
construction of 'expression' as intrinsic to 'emotional experience'. Such 
discursive resources are constitutive of any claims that the 'truth' of an 
individual's subjective 'emotional experience' is accessible to any skilled 
reader of 'non-verbal' behaviour. Despite whatever may be said or done by the 
$conscious' or'agentic emotional self, the 'true''emotional' status may be 
'betrayed' by these intrinsic communicative elements. As such, these 
resources may be the basis of any claims as to the falsity of an 'emotional 
expression' such as smiling or of any claimed absence of 'emotional 
experience'. 
2.3.3 The reification of relationships between 'sex', 'gender' and 
'emotion' 
The reification of the relationships between 'se)e, 'gender and 'emotions' within 
this literature is contingent upon both the positivist analytic methods that are 
employed and the repertoires of 'aetiology' that are invoked. The first part of 
this section of the review is concerned with the analytic methods through which 
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the above-identified repertoires and discourses of 'sex', 'gender and 'emotion' 
are reproduced and which are productive of the differences they purport to 
uncover. The second part is concerned with the repertoires that are invoked to 
account for these 'observed' differences, i. e., the repertoires of 'aetiology. 
Through the analytic methods employed and the invoked repertoires of 
'aetiology', the relationships that are produced between the discourses of 'sex' 
and 'gender' and the repertoires of 'emotion' are reified. 
2.3.3.1 Methods of reification 
The broad range of methodologies employed in studies of sex and gender 
differences in emotions will, for the purposes of this review, be fairly 
parsimoniously categorised as: studies employing self-report methods, studies 
employing observer-report methods, studies employing physiological 
measures and studies of the stereotypes and beliefs about gender and 
emotion. Each of these methods will be addressed in turn and the means by 
which each reproduces the above-identified discourses of sex, gender and 
emotions will be explicated. 
Self-report 
'Self-reports' of 'emotionality', 'emotional experience' oremotional expression' 
comprise the majority of data within the literature on sex and gender 
differences in emotions18. Within the studies employing 'self-report' 
methodologies, the distinction can be drawn between those that examine 
18 For a more complex breakdown of the various methodologies included under self-report, see 
LaFrance and Banaji (1992). 
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'beliefs about the self (literally, 'self-reports') and those that examine 'beliefs 
about the relationship between sex or gender and emotion in general' 
('stereotypes'). As will be demonstrated, through the reification of participants' 
responses to closed-ended questions as reflective of individuals'' beliefs', 
either about their'selves' or about contemporary 'culture', the possibility is 
created by which the latter may be hypothesized as informing or even 
determining the former. 
In studies of individuals' 'beliefs about their selves', participants are asked to 
indicate the extent of their agreement with statements such as 'almost nevee 
and'almost always'or'very mildly and'very strongly on dimensions such as 
the 'frequency' or 'intensity' with which they might 'experience' or 'express' 
emotion (Grossman & Wood, 1993). The marks that are made on Likert scales, 
which may range between 5 and 15 points, are then interpreted as 
descriptions, albeit highly abbreviated ones, of the relative 'frequency' and 
'intensity'with which individuals, or groups of individuals (when collated on the 
basis of categories of 'sexý), 'experience' or'express' emotions. It must of 
course be acknowledged that these scales are not simply concerned with the 
sexperience' orexpression' of 'emotion' as a generic category. All the various 
emotion words, from those categorised as 'basic' ('happiness', 'sadness', 
'love', 'anger, 'fear and 'surprise' ) to those categorised as 'complex' are 
assessed individually. Thus, a participant in a self-report study on sex 
differences in emotions may describe, through Likert scales, the 'frequency' 
with which they 'express''angee, 'grief or 'resentment' and the 'intensity' with 
which they 'experience''love, 'reg ret' or 'admiration'. These descriptions are 
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taken by the researchers as factual representations and are reified as the 'real' 
frequencies and intensities with which 'real' men and women 'really' 
experience and express emotions. However, as we will see in the next chapter, 
it is perhaps worth taking an alternative view of 'descriptions', with specific 
regard to the work that they might do. 
It is also worth considering the subtle effects of the research context and 
paying particular attention to the potentially deterministic effects of the 
discursive resources with which participants are furnished. A useful illustration 
of these concerns and ways that positivist research might simply result in the 
reproduction of culturally valued but culturally specific masculinities can be 
found in a cross-cultural repetition of Buss, Larsen, Westen and Sernmelroth's 
(1992) seminal study (Buunk, Angleitner, Oubaid & Buss, 1996). Forced- 
choice responses and physiological responses, including electrodermal activity 
(EDA), pulse rate and electromyographic activity (EMG), to two jealousy- 
provoking scenarios of sexual infidelity and emotional infidelity were recorded 
for men and women from America, Germany and the Netherlands. The two 
scenarios used in the study were identical to those used in Buss et al's. 
original study: 
Please think of a serious committed romantic relationship that you have 
had in the past, that you currently have, or that you would like to have. 
Imagine that you discover that the person with whom you've been 
seriously involved became interested in someone else. What would 
distress or upset you more (please circle only one): 
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(A) Imagining your partner forming a deep emotional attachment to that 
person. 
(B) Imagining your partner enjoying passionate sexual intercourse with 
that other person. 
A second forced choice item, which followed the same instructional paragraph, 
presented the alternatives of: 
(A) Imagining your partner trying different sexual positions with that 
other person. 
(B) Imaging your partner falling in love with that other person. 
(Buss et aL, 1992, p. 252) 
Item A in the first choice pair and item B in the second choice pair are intended 
to evoke responses to imagined emotional infidelity, whilst item B in the first 
choice pair and item A in the second choice pair are intended to evoke 
responses to imagined sexual infidelity. The above scenarios are drawn upon 
either in their entirety or in an adapted form in many of the replications of this 
study (see Buunk et aL, 1996; DeSteno & Salovey, 1996; Harris, 2000; Harris 
& Christenfeld, 1996; Pietrzak, Laird, Stevens & Thompson, 2002). 
As a whole, the empirical evidence generated by the above method, when 
located in a positivist scientific framework, is interpretable as strongly 
suggesting that men and women fundamentally differ in their jealous 
responses to emotional or sexual infidelity. How this difference might be 
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accounted for through the invocation of the 'evolutionary' discourse of 
'aetiology'will be discussed in the following section. However, an alternative 
account of these findings can be highlighted through reference to the findings 
of Buunk et aL (1996). Briefly, they found that that whilst 60% of American men 
reported sexual infidelity as the more distressing scenario, only 27% of 
German men and approximately 55%19 of Dutch men reported sexual infidelity 
to be the more distressing scenario. Also of interest is the finding that, whilst 
approximately 55% of men from the Netherlands self-reported that they would 
be more distressed by'imagining their partner enjoying passionate sexual 
intercourse with another person', ostensibly the 'sexual infidelity' scenario, this 
figure fell by approximately half in response to the second form of the 'sexual 
infidelity' scenario, 'imagining their partner trying different sexual positions with 
another person' (Buunk et aL, 1996, p. 360). 
One possible account of this difference lies in the primary difference between 
the two statements: the presence and absence of any affective component. 
Contrast the 'passionate enjoyment' of the former statement with the 
'dispassionate experimentation' of the latter. It could be argued that the 
discursive resources available in the first version of the question provide for the 
constitution of a more culturally valued masculinity than does the second 
version, one that is more 'distressed' by emotional and sexual infidelity than by 
19 The ambiguity in the reporting of the results is a direct result of the ambiguity of their 
reporting in the original article. The focus on sex difference with regard to sexual infidelity is 
entirely at the expense of the reporting of the remaining findings. 
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sexual infidelity alone. Similar arguments, though not quite so social 
constructionist, may be found in Desteno and Salovey (1996) and Harris and 
Christenfeld (1996). As for the cross-cultural differences, perhaps the denial of 
emotional vulnerability, which is implicit in the resistance of a masculinity that 
is more distressed by emotional infidelity than by sexual infidelity, may be 
assumed to be valued more in American culture than it is in German and Dutch 
cultures. It might, therefore, be worth shifting the analytic focus to consider 
what the valued versions of masculinity are and what discourses might 
constitute them. 
An alternative account of what is done through participation in a closed-choice, 
positivist analysis of sex or gender differences in emotions would be attentive 
to the effects of the research context and of the discursive resources with 
which participants' are furnished. Given that the closed-choice items in these 
studies are selected because they represent 'modalities' of emotional 
experience and expression with regard to which men and women are culturally 
'believed' to differ, it is arguably hardly surprising that research participants 
reproduce these 'beliefs' when invited to 'describe' their own gendered 
emotional 'identity'. Shields (1991) acknowledged that the possibility of beliefs 
about gender and emotionality shaping the responses of participants in 
psychological studies 'adds horrifying complexity to research design' (p. 239). 
However, it is a complexity that she does not prescribe shying away from. 
Rather, she argues that 'it at least offers a point of origin for the development 
of testable explanations of apparently ephemeral effects of gender. 
Paradoxically, instead of demonstrating the insignificance of gender effects in 
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emotions research, it shows how powerfully a tacitly held standard can deploy 
its effects. It also makes clear the boundaries for generalizing from effects 
observed in a single measurement context. To infer anything about gender, 
comparisons of male and female subjects must include consideration of the 
measurement context as a variable' (Shields, 1991, p. 239). 
It is at this point that the tautological process of the reproduction of the same 
discourses through positivist methods as being both 'beliefs about the self and 
'beliefs about contemporary culture' is most explicit. The single most important 
issue to appreciate is that the reification of 'stereotypes' or'cultural beliefs' 
about the gendered character of emotions constitutes the bases for the various 
components of the 'sociocultural' repertoire of 'aetiology', including such things 
as 'socialization'. Simply, through reifying the responses of participants as 
reflecting 'culturally and contemporarily existent beliefs' the discursive 
resources are constituted through which individuals can be constructed as 
'acting', 'behaving' or'responding' in accordance with the proscriptions and 
prescriptions of thosebeliefs'. 
Psychologists have always had to struggle against a persistent illusion 
that in such studies as those of emotions there is something there, the 
emotion, of which the emotion word is a mere representation. (Harr6, 
1986, p. 4; emphasis in original) 
Arguably, the search for empirical evidence of sex or gender differences in 
emotions is a response to the social and cultural prevalence of emotion 
83 
discourses in the construction of sex and gender differences. Psychologists 
are simply engaged in the empirical examination of the veracity of those 
constructions of difference. However, as stated above, the positivist 
framework, within which such examinations are located, results in the 
reification of the discursive resources through which such constructions of 
difference are constituted. Socially and culturally prevalent constructions of sex 
and gender differences in emotions are reproduced through closed-ended 
questionnaires and reified as 'social stereotypes' or'beliefs'. 
The basic 'stereotype' of sex or gender differences in emotions or the 'gender 
heuristic', as Robinson, Johnson and Shields (2001, p. 158) termed it, is that 
'[m]en are thought to experience and display more socially desirable self- 
oriented emotions (e. g., pride) and more socially undesirable other-oriented 
emotions (e. g., anger). Women are thought to experience and display more 
socially undesirable self-oriented emotions (e. g., guilt and sadness) and more 
socially desirable other-oriented emotions (e. g., love)'. The other key'belief 
concerns the distinction between 'emotional experience' and 'emotional 
expression'. Johnson and Shulman (1988) examined beliefs about both 
fernotional experience' and 'expression' and reported that women were 
believed to 'experience' and 'express' emotions more 'intensely' than men, 
though the difference between the sexes was greater for 'expression. 
_ 
Similarly, in arguably the most extensive examination of social stereotypes of 
gender and emotion, Fabes and Martin (1991) stated that'females (particularly 
adolescent and adult females) were perceived to express (but not experience) 
84 
both basic and non-basic emotions significantly more often than males' 
(p. 538). This led them to conclude that, With a few exceptions, it appears that 
the stereotype that females are more emotional than males is based on a 
deficit model of male expressiveness (i. e., a belief that males do not express 
the emotions they feel)' (p. 539). The most notable of those 'few exceptions' is 
anger. Across all five age groups men were believed to 'express, but not 
'experience', anger more frequently than women. Similar findings of the extent 
to which 'men' are constructed as 'expressing anger' more 'frequently' than 
'women'can be found in Birnbaum and Croll (1984), Birnbaum, Nosanchuk 
and Croll (1980) and Hess, Sen6cal, Kirouac, Herrera, Philippot and Kleck 
(2000). 
The possible effects of the reification of 'stereotypes' and 'beliefs' are most 
graphically demonstrated by the inclusion of concepts of 'emotionality' or 
'emotional behaviour in those scales intended to measure'gender, i. e. to 
measure 'masculinity' and 'femininity' (Shields, 2002). In Spence, Helmreich 
and Stapp (1975), the scale intended to measure 'femininity' is referred to as 
'expressive' while the scale intended to measure 'masculinity' is described as 
'instrumental' or'agentic'. Similarly, the Bern Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) (Bem, 
1974) includes items that relate to the 'emotional roles'that'men' and 'women' 
are reportedly 'stereotypically believed'to fulfil. Items on the'masculinity' scale 
emphasize competitiveness and achievement, behaviours linked to the 
concealment of vulnerabilities and ambitious aggression, while items on the 
'femininity' scale emphasize relationality and intimacy, behaviours related to 
the expression of positive other-oriented emotions such as love. 
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It is unsurprising therefore to find that studies that have examined the 
relationships between 'gender and 'emotions' have found consistent 'gender' 
differences. Conway (2000), using the short form of the Bern Sex Role 
Inventory (BSRI-SF; Bern, 1981), reported thatmale' and 'female' individuals 
who scored high on 'masculinity' produced less complex descriptions of their 
own and others' expected emotional reactions to the evocative situations 
presented in the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS; Lane et al., 
1990). Conway was however surprised to note that measured 'femininity' of 
'male' and 'female' individuals was not related to their scores on the LEAS. 
This finding might be taken as evidence in support of Fabes and Martin's 
(199 1) 'deficit model of male expressiveness', that the 'stereotype' of 
smasculine emotional behaviour is characterised by an absence of 
'expression', or at least by a comparative simplicity of form. 
A social constructionist account of the findings of 'self-report' studies would 
contend that the participants in such studies reproduce from the provided 
resources those discourses that perform valued acts, when invoked in the 
negotiation of the 'self or in the construction of the 'sex' or'gender with which 
the respondent might'identify' or to which they might be assigned. The primary 
'valued act'that might be accomplished through the reproduction of such 
discourses is the constitution of a 'positively valued gendered identity. 
Doing gender through doing emotion encompasses not only emotional 
display, of course, but also emotion values (e. g., real girls value 
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emotional self-disclosure) and beliefs about emotional experience (e. g., 
anger is appropriate only when one's rights are violated. (Shields, 2002, 
p. 55) 
For men this argument seems reasonable: by doing masculinity, through 
reproducing the discourses that are constitutive of it, men accrue the benefits 
that follow from masculinity's supposed place in the structure of gender power 
relations. There's a good reason why men might do 'masculinity' in the ways 
that are described by self-report studies. However, according to this 
hypothesis, there's no good reason why women should reproduce femininity 
given its supposed position in the structure of gender power relations. It could 
be argued that women are coerced, that doing anything but reproducing the 
forms of femininity valued in a culture dominated by masculinity would result in 
censure or that they are so well socialized in the reproduction of the 
subordinate gender that coercion need only be implicit. Importantly, such an 
argument assumes that the structure of power relations and the direction of the 
flow of power are already known, i. e., are constituted through the institutions 
and ideology of patriarchy. An alternative account might question those 
assumptions and consider the possibility that the reproduction of the 
discourses that are constitutive of femininity, i. e. the constitution of a feminine 
emotional 'self, also perform valued acts and that, in doing so, women accrue 
benefits that follow from femininity. Femininity is valued by women? 
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Observer-report 
The use of 'observer-re port' methodologies is limited to studies of 'emotional 
expression' (Birnbaum & Croll, 1984; Hall, 1984; Hall & Halberstadt, 1986; 
Kring & Gordon, 1998). As stated above in the discussion of the 'expression' 
repertoire, studies of 'emotional expression' employing observer-report 
methodologies are, for the most part, concerned with the accuracy with which 
men and women can communicate (encode) or understand (decode) an 
emotion through 'facial expressions' (Buck, Miller & Caul, 1974; Fujita, Harper 
& Wiens, 1980; Hall, 1984; Wagner, MacDonald & Manstead, 1986). However, 
some, such as Kring and Gordon (1998), are concerned only with the 
identification of 'sex' or'gender differences in the extent of 'expression', i. e., 
they are concerned with the generalised concept of 'expressivity'. For example, 
in reporting the 'sex' differences in o bserver-re ported facial expressivity, itself a 
conflation of the rated 'valence', 'duration' and 'intensity' of 'facial expressions', 
Kring and Gordon state that'[t]he sex main effect was significant ... indicating 
that women were more expressive than men across all films' (1998, p. 690). 
The consistency of the findings of studies employing observer-report 
methodologies that women are more 'non-verbally expressive' and that their 
'non-verbal expressions' are more readily understood has not surprisingly led 
reviewers to suggest that the 'observer-report' methodology is particularly 
susceptible to the effect of 'stereotype-based bias' (Brody & Hall, 1993). That 
is to say, 'observers" ratings of women as more expressive are informed by 
the social stereotype of the more 'emotional' woman. 
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Phvsioloqical measures 
In studies employing 'physiological measures' of emotions, it self-evident that 
emotions are conceptualized as manifest at a biological level, in the activity of 
the central nervous system, measured through heart rate, skin conductance, 
electrodermal activity (EDA) and electromyographic activity (EIVIG) of the brow, 
or in the neurological patterns of activity of the human brain 20 . The 
conceptualising of emotions as essentia//y'biological' phenomena is implicitly 
determinate of those discourses that might be invoked to account for any 
observed differences. By locating 'emotions' in the body, the discourses that 
might be invoked to account for differences between 'male' and 'female' bodies 
must therefore also assume the ontological status of 'male' and 'female' 
bodies. The 'essential izi ng' and 'naturalizing' of emotions implicit in the use of 
'physiological measures' means that only discourses that 'essential ize' or 
'naturalize''men' and 'women, such as those involved in the 'evolutionary' 
discourse of 'aetiology', can be invoked to account for observed differences. 
For example, in all the below-listed studies, discussions of differences in 
'physiological measures'are constituted through the 'sex' discourse and 
consequently assume the ontological status of 'sexed' bodies (Buss, Larsen, 
Weston & Semmelroth, 1992; Harris, 2000; Kring & Gordon, 1998 21; Levenson, 
Ekman & Friesen, 1990). 
20 For perhaps the most complete list of physiological measures of emotion, see Stoney, 
Matthews, McDonald and Johnson (1988). 
21 Kring and Gordon (1998) did attempt to measure any potential relationship between gender, 
as measured on the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) (Bem, 1974), but did not report any 
findings of any interaction, significant or not. 
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The 'physiological measures' methodology has a further important implication 
for the discourses that can be invoked to account for any observed differences 
between 'men' and 'women'. The embodiment of emotions, implicit in the use 
of 'physiological measures', imposes a Cartesian distinction on emotions. They 
are of the'body' rather than of the'mind'. The discourses that might be 
invoked to account for any observed differences are limited to those that 
assume the ontological status of 'bodies'. Consequently, accounts that might 
be constructed from discourses based on the presupposition of 'conscious' or 
'agentive selves', in which those 'selves' are invoked as determinants of any 
observed differences, are closed down. Indeed, discourses of an 'emotional 
self are alien to accounts of emotions as 'physiologically manifest phenomena' 
(see Frijda, 2001). Certainly, the above-outlined social constructionist accounts 
of the differences reported by studies employing 'self-report' methodologies 
cannot be applied to the findings of studies that employed 'physiological 
measures' methodologies. Simply, social constructionism cannot offer any 
alternative account of 'sex' differences in 'emotions' as long as both are 
theorised as 'ontologically existent, physiologically manifest phenomena'. This 
may be an admitted limitation of social constructionist theory. However, it is still 
capable of orienting to the effects of constructing 'emotions' as 'physiologically 
manifest phenomena' and the eschewing of the assumption of 'conscious' or 
sagentic selves'. The effects of constructing emotions as 'physiologically 
manifest phenomena'will be examined in much greater detail in the analysis 
sections of this thesis. 
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2.3.3.2 Repertoires of 'aetiology' 
As stated above, there are two broad repertoires of 'aetiology' that are invoked 
as theoretical and interpretative frameworks in predicting and accounting for 
observed differences in 'emotionality', 'emotional experience' and 'emotional 
expression' between 'males', 'females', 'masculine' and 'feminine' individuals, 
'men' and 'women'. They are the 'evolutionary' or'sociobiological' repertoire 
and the 'sociocultural' repertoire. Each will be discussed in turn as 
representing the basis for the reification of the relationships between the 
discourses of 'sex' and 'gender and the repertoires of 'emotion'. The 
discourses of 'sex' and 'gender' confer ontological status on the categories of 
t males', 'females'. The repertoires of 'emotionality', 'emotional experience' and 
I emotional expression' ontologize the categories that are constitutive of 
'emotions'. And the repertoires of 'aetiology' ontologize the relationships 
between discourses of 'sex', 'gender, 'emotional experience' and 'emotional 
expression' as grounded either in 'evolutionary' or'sociobiological' principles or 
in 'sociocultural' structures. 
Before engaging with these repertoires it must again be stated that their 
discussion in this review is limited only to the occasions of their appearance in 
the literature on 'sex' and 'gender' differences in 'emotions'. I acknowledge that 
these repertoires have a genealogy and complexity that are greater than is 
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represented here 22 . However, there is no particular utility, within the context of 
this thesis, in an engagement with these repertoires that moves beyond the 
literature on 'sex' and 'gender differences in 'emotions. This consideration is 
particularly relevant to the 'evolutionary' repertoire, the appearance of which, in 
the literature on 'sex' and 'gender differences in 'emotions', is largely limited to 
discussions of 'jealousy'. 
The 'evolutionary' or Isociobioloqical' repertoire 
As a theoretical and interpretative framework, the 'evolutionary' or 
'sociobiological' repertoire, here-on referred to only as the 'evolutionary' 
repertoire, is based on the assumption that'males' and 'females' have, over 
periods of evolutionary time, faced different selective pressures. Successful 
adaptive responses to these differing selective pressures are, within the 
'evolutionary' repertoire, assumed to be manifest in the differing physiologies, 
psychologies and behaviours of modern 'male' and 'female' humans (Buss, 
2003). As was stated above, the invocation of the 'evolutionary' repertoire in 
the literature on 'sex' and 'gender' differences in emotion has largely been 
limited to discussions of 'jealousy' (Buss, 1995; Buss, Larsen & Westen, 1996; 
Buss, et aL, 1992; Buss, et aL, 1999; Buunk, et aL, 1996; DeSteno & Salovey, 
1996; Harris, 2000; Harris & Christenfeld, 1996; Pietrzak, et aL, 2002; 
Wiederman & Allgeier, 1993; Wiederman & Kendall, 1999). The 'evolutionary' 
22 For more extensive coverage of evolutionary psychology, see Buss (2003) and Barkow, 
Cosmides and Tooby (1996). For a critical engagement with evolutionary psychology, see 
Rose and Rose (2001). 
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repertoire can be seen in discussions of 'sex' differences in anger (Buss, 1996; 
Buss & Shackelford, 1997) (see also Fischer and Rodriguez Mosquera's 
(2001) critical appraisal of the evolutionary theory of sex differences in 
aggression). 
With regard to jealousy, the 'evolutionary' repertoire rests upon and 
reproduces two basic ontological assumptions. Firstly, for'men', since 
paternity is never certain 23 and since the raising of another man's child is a 
threat to a man's Darwinian fitness, selective pressures are argued to have 
shaped a 'specific innate module''that causes them to be particularly bothered 
by a mate's sexual infidelity' (Harris, 2000: p. 1 082). Complementary selective 
pressures, based on the risk to a woman's Darwinian fitness posed by the 
potential loss of 'a mate's resources and assistance in raising offspring' 
(p. 1082), are supposed to have functioned to shape'a specific innate module 
in women that causes them to be particularly upset by a mate's emotional 
involvement with a rival' (p. 1082). Simply, within the 'evolutionary' repertoire, 
'men' should be more distressed by a mate's sexual infidelity and 'women' 
should be more distressed by a mate's emotional infidelity. 
Within the 'evolutionary' repertoire, 'emotion', specifically 'jealousy', is 
constructed as an adaptive response to environmental pressures. As such, 
23 Allowances must be made for the scale of the temporal dimension over which evolutionary 
psychological theories operate. Technological advances such as paternity testing are too 
recent to affect evolutionary timescales. 
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'emotions', which are successful adaptive responses to selective pressures, 
are constructed as increasing the Darwinian fitness of individuals. 
Consequently, these successful adaptive responses, i. e., 'emotions', are 
theorized as perpetuated through heterosexuafreproduction. Within the 
%evolutionary' repertoire, 'emotions' are ontologized as not just being 'of the 
body' but as determinate of it, i. e., 'emotions' are constructed as being 'in the 
genes'. Consider for example the following quotation: 
All people descend from a long line of ancestral men whose adaptations 
(i. e., psychological mechanisms) led them to behave in ways that 
increased their likelihood of paternity and decreased the odds of 
investing in children who were putatively theirs but whose genetic 
fathers were other men. ... All people are descendents of a long and 
unbroken line of women who successfully solved this adaptive 
challenge [the securing of resources during times of pregnancy and 
lactation] - for example, by preferring mates who showed the ability to 
accrue resources and the willingness to provide them for particular 
women. (Buss, 1995, p. 164) 
The value of a 'scientific account' of 'jealousy' is heavily emphasized in the 
evolutionary literature (Buss, 1995; Buss, Larsen & Westen, 1996; Buunk, 
Angleitner, Oubaid & Buss, 1996) through the invocation of problematic and 
undesirable social phenomena in which jealousy and male jealousy in 
particular are supposed to be heavily implicated, such as spousal abuse and 
murder (e. g. Daly & Wilson, 1988; Daly, Wilson & Weghorst, 1982). The value 
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of the 'evolutionary' repertoire as a truly 'scientific' account of the psychology 
of 'jealousy' is also heavily emphasized through claims of its ability to both 
predict and account for'sex' differences in a host of undesirable social 
phenomena, e. g. perceptions of the level of distress experienced by victims of 
sexual aggression (Buss, 1989), men's increased propensity for violent crimes 
of all types (Daly & Wilson, 1988) and of rape in particular (Thornhill & Palmer, 
2000, Symons, 1979; see also Archer & Vaughan (2001) for a brief review of 
evolutionary theories of rape). 
Its status as a 'scientific' theory is further worked up through claims that it is 
apolitical and objective (Buss, 1995) and therefore not influenced or informed 
by the political 'standpoints' of evolutionary psychologists, whatever they may 
be. The 'evolutionary' repertoire is firmly located within objective positivist 
scientific methods as predicated upon and capable of predicting and 
accounting for matters of fact. 
The 'sociocultural' repertoire 
Arguably the most prevalent repertoire of 'aetiology' within the literature on sex 
and gender differences in emotions can be categorised as the 'sociocultural' 
repertoire. The predominance of this repertoire is evident in the major reviews 
of this literature (Brody & Hall, 1993; Fischer, 1993,2000; LaFrance & Banap, 
1992; Shields, 1987,1991,2002). The 'sociocultural' repertoire is constituted 
by a wide range of discursive resources, including such concepts as'beliefs', 
'stereotypes', 'gender roles' and 'socialization'. Whilst there may be variety in, 
the forms that the repertoire takes, all the resources that constitute it are based 
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upon the presupposition and function in the perpetuation of the axiom that men 
and women differ and that two of dimensions along which they differ are their 
'experience' and 'expression' of 'emotions'. 
The axiomatic status of this particular construction of differences between 
'men' and 'women' has led to it being examined in minute detail at a 'cultural' 
level through studies concerned with mapping the predominant 'stereotypes' 
and 'beliefs' that people 'hold' about sex and gender differences in emotions. 
The primary effect of such studies and the methodologies they employ is the 
reification of the discourses that they reproduce as the existent and 
predominant 'stereotypes'and 'befiets'about emotions. Sufficient numbers of 
marks at similar points on Likert scales indicating the frequencies with which 
categories of individuals, e. g., 'ADULT WOMEN, INFANT BOYS, 
ADOLESCENT GIRLS''express'or'experience''basic emotions, such as 
'anger and 'happiness', or'complex emotions', such as'guilt' orresentment' 
(Fabes & Martin, 1991, p. 534) are reified as representations of the 
predominant cultural 'stereotypes' and 'beliefs' (see also Birnbaum and Croll 
(1984) and Johnson and Shulman (1988)). 
... subjecis' beliefs about sex difference in the expression of these 
emotions were so pervasive that they believed females expressed 
emotions more often than males regardless of the primacy or complexity 
of the emotions. (Fabes & Martin, 1991, p. 538) 
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The reification of participants' responses to closed-choice items on 
questionnaires as the predominant 'stereotypes' and 'beliefs' about emotions 
within particular cultures provides the basis for the remaining features of the 
'sociocultural' repertoire of 'aetiology'. Specifically it provides for the 
advancement of 'sex-differentiated socialization' and 'sex- or gender-role 
consistency' as processes that account for the observed differences between 
men and women in self-reports and observer-reports of emotional 'experience' 
and 'expression'. Of these two resources, 'sex-differentiated socialization' is 
arguably the most prevalent. 
As an account of observed differences in emotions between men and women, 
'sex-differentiated socialization' relies upon the presupposition of consistent 
gendered beliefs about emotions. That is to say, it relies upon the notion that 
people hold and are aware of consistent beliefs and stereotypes about the 
patterns of 'emotional experience' and 'expression' that are typical of 'men' and 
of 'women'. These beliefs and stereotypes are then assumed to form the basis 
for the socialization of individuals, over their lifespan, into 'sex' or'gender 
appropriate ways of behaving emotionally. 
There is clear evidence that beliefs about gender and emotionality 
influence interactions between infants and caregivers and other adults' 
communication with the infant. (Shields, 1991, p. 238) 
Simply, boys are 'socialized' into behaving in ways that are consistent with the 
culturally held beliefs and stereotypes about the relationship that men have 
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with emotions (Brody, 1985; Brody & Hall, 1993; Davis, 1999; Haviland & 
Malatesta, 1981; Saami, 1993; Shields, 1991,1995,2002). 
For example, Davis (1999) concluded that sex differences in recall of 
autobiographical memories for childhood emotional experiences most likely 
resulted from 'early gender differences in the socialization of emotions and in 
the nature of parent-child co-constructions of past events, both of which shape 
the ways in which personal, real-life emotional experiences are processed at 
the time of occurrence and subsequently encoded and stored as memorial 
representations' and, therefore, that 'autobiographical memories of emotional 
events are socially constructed memories' that 'uniquely reflect the effects of 
gender-differentiate socialization processes' (p. 509)24. 
Similarly, Brody and Hall's (1993) review of the literature on sex and gender 
differences in emotions, in particular their 'finding' that '[t]he evidence indicates 
that females are superior to males both at recognizing feelings in others and at 
verbally and facially expressing a wide variety of feelings themselves' (p. 457), 
led them to conclude that'[g]ender differences are undoubtedly partly rooted in 
peer and family socialization patterns [and are] also consistent with (and have 
24 In the above passage, 'socially constructed' may be understood in its weakest possible 
sense, that 'memories' are not snapshots of events and experiences as much as they are 
cognitive phenomena, the form of which was determined by the sociocultural contextual 
influences at the time of occurrence and subsequent recollections (compare with Edwards & 
Middleton's (1986,1988) strongly social constructionist, discursive psychological view of 
autobiographical memories). 
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been found to be related to) the differing gender roles that males and females 
play in this [western] culture. ' (p. 457) 
Alternatively the 'sociocultural' repertoire can be invoked through appeals to 
the concept of 'sex-' or'gender-roles'. LaFrance and Banaji (1992), in their 
reflections on the findings that women both show and report more 'emotional 
expressivity', imply that the role of social context and the interactional functions 
of gendered emotion displays should not be underestimated. They identify'a 
need to inquire further as to the social functions of observable emotive display' 
and imply a 'sociocultural' aetiology for the finding that'one group [women] 
appears to work harder at being demonstrative while the other [men] appears 
to expend more energy on dampening such expression' (p. 196). Within this 
view, 'emotional expression' is conceptualised as performing social functions 
and, consequently, sex differences in 'emotional expression' are accounted for 
by the'social roles'that are accorded and afforded to men and women in 
contemporary Western societies. Individuals are constructed as expressing 
emotions in ways that are concordant with the roles and functions that'men' 
and 'women' are culturally 'believed' or'expected'to fill and perform. It is clear 
within this version of the 'sociocultural' repertoire that the structure of gender at 
a cultural level is already assumed and follows the 'instrumental/expressive' 
distinction. 
The 'sociocultural' repertoire is also constituted by appeals to 'sex-role 
consistency' to account for observed differences in self-reports of 'emotional 
experience' and 'emotional expression'. Grossman and Wood (1993) reported 
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that sex differences were observed in self-reports of the 'frequency' and 
'intensit)( of both the 'experience' and 'expression' of discrete emotions, such 
as 'fear, 'joy', 'sadness' and 'love'. Notably, no sex differences were observed 
in self-reports of the 'frequency' and 'intensity' of both the 'experience' and 
I expression' of 'anger. These observed 'sex differences' were found to 
correlate highly with the participants' endorsement of cultural 'stereotypes' of 
'sex differences' in the 'intensity' and 'frequency' of 'emotional experience' and 
sexpression'. 
To the extent that men endorsed stereotypes of greater intensity of 
feeling and of expression in women than in men, they reported less 
intensity in their own personal feelings and in their personal 
expressions. ' (Grossman &Wood, 1993, p. 1 014) 
Grossman and Wood concluded that these findings lent strong support to the 
idea that'sex differences in emotional intensity derive from sex-differentiated 
normative pressures that specify that women are more emotionally responsive 
than men (1993, p. 1 020). In other words, observed differences between men 
and women in self-reports of emotional behaviour are accounted for by 
appeals to the 'intemalisation' of cultural 'beliefs' and 'stereotypes' about what 
it means to be a man or a woman with regard to emotions. 
A similar 'sociocultural account' of differences in emotional expression can be 
found in Fischer (1993). These differences are argued to result from the 
gendering of emotions at a sociocultural level, their reification into gendered 
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'emotion display rules'and the 'social isation' of male and females into'sex- 
appropriate9 patterns of 'emotional expressiveness' and the reporting of 
$emotional expressiveness'. 
'Gender is related to emotions, because gender is intrinsic to the 
cultural meaning of emotions: it determines their significance, which 
rules are applied and what the social implications of emotional 
expressions are. Emotions traditionally are a feminine province, and 
discourse on emotion is far more inherent in the social lives of women 
than in that of men. ' (Fischer, 1993, p. 313) 
The gendering of emotions at a cultural level, and particularly the gendering of 
discrete emotions as consistent or inconsistent with one's 'sex-role' and the 
'socialization' of men and women into these 'patterns of gendered emotional 
expressivity' results, Fischer argues, in the differential reporting of 'emotional 
expressiveness' between men and women. Fischer gives the example of how, 
prior to an important exam, a male student may describe himself as nervous, 
whereas a female student may describe herself as fearful. These differences in 
description are not, within Fischer's suggested framework, interpreted as 
reflective of any underlying 'actual' differences in male and female emotional 
experiences so much as they are interpreted as consistent with the social and 
cultural prescriptions of sex-typical emotional experiences. Thus, -according to 
Fischer's argument, as long as the Western conception of masculinity implies a 
cultural approval of qualities such as independence, invulnerability and 
agency, expressions of emotions that are culturally interpretable as implying 
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weakness or vulnerability, such as sadness, grief and even love, will be 
antithetical to a strong masculine identity. In contrast, while the Western 
conception of masculinity implies a cultural approval of dominance, 
expressions of emotions such as anger by men will be interpretable as 
consistent with a strong masculine identity. 
Finally, it should be appreciated that the 'evolutionary' and the 'sociocultural' 
repertoires of the 'aetiology' of any observed sex differences in emotions are 
not mutually exclusive and indeed can be complementary if a temporal 
dimension is invoked. While Grossman and Wood advanced the 'sociocultural' 
repertoire, it was tempered by the qualification that it was 'not inconsistent with 
other views of sex differences that locate the cause of men's and women's 
characteristic styles of emotional reaction in inherent, biological differences 
between the sexes or in sex-d ifferentiated socialization pressures' (1993, 
p. 1 020). That these two discourses are complementary is the result of their 
invocation as either'proximal'or'distal determinants'. The 'sociocultural' 
repertoire can be invoked to account for the more 'proximal''immediate 
contingencies and beliefs surrounding emotional experience' and to reflect a 
'social psychological emphasis on immediate contextual predictors of 
behaviour (p. 1020). In contrast, the 'evolutionary' discourse and to a lesser 
extent developmentally focused discourses of 'socialization processes', can be 
represented as concerned with 'more distal predictors' (p. 1020). Both 
discourses can be simultaneously invoked to account for the same observed 
difference by positing and assuming determinants that occupy different 
locations along a temporal dimension. 
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2.3.4 Discourses of men's relationship with emotions 
At this stage, it may be worth dispensing with the use of quotation marks to 
indicate that the ontological reality of a particular subject or object is not 
assumed. This final section of the review of the literature on sex and gender 
differences is concerned only with briefly listing the discourses of men's 
relationships with emotions that are reproduced and reified through the 
empirical positivist literature. As such, the entire following section should be 
read as if it were placed in quotation marks. Further, each of the following 
representations of men's relationship with emotions, and the discursive 
resources that constitute them, should be considered in the light of the above- 
identified functions of the discourses and repertoires of 'sex', 'gender', 
$emotionality', 'emotional experience' and 'expression', as well as the 
'evolutionary' and 'socio-cultural' discourses of aetiology. 
Simply, men are believed to be less emotional than women (Birnbaum, 
Nosanchuk & Croll, 1980) and less likely to be identified as emotional 
individuals (Shields, 1987). Men are believed to experience and express more 
socially desirable self-oriented emotions, e. g. pride, more socially undesirable 
other-oriented emotions, e. g. anger, less socially undesirable self-oriented 
emotions, e. g. guilt, and less socially desirable other-oriented emotions, e. g. 
love (Robinson, Johnson and Shields, 2001). In general, men report 
experiencing emotions less intensely than women do but no less frequently 
(Allen & Haccoun, 1976; Diener, Sandvich & Larsen, 1985; Fujita, Diener & 
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Sandvik, 1991). Men report experiencing intropunitive emotions, such as guilt, 
fear, shame or sadness, less often and with lower intensity than women do 
(Brody, Hay & Vandewater, 1990; Fischer, 1991,1993; Stapley & Haviland, 
1989; Tangney, 1990). Men report experiencing contempt more than women 
do (Stapley & Haviland, 1989) but men report experiencing anger and joy with 
the same frequency and intensity as women do (Allen & Haccoun, 1976; 
Averill, 1982,1983; Brody, 1993; Brody & Hall, 1993; Scherer, Walbott & 
Summerfield, 1986). Men report experiencing love more frequently than 
women do (Dion & Dion, 1985). In studies employing physiological measures 
of emotional experience, men are either reported as not differing from women 
(Levenson, Ekman & Friesen, 1990) or as differing only by small degrees on 
certain measures or in response to certain stimuli (Buss, Larsen, Weston & 
Sernmelroth, 1992; Kring & Gordon, 1998). Men are unable to identify 
subjective experiences as emotions and are therefore emotionally inexpressive 
(Levant, 1995,1998; Levant et al., 2003). Men report experiencing anger with 
the same frequency as women do and are no more likely than women to 
describe themselves as dispositionally angry (Deffenbacher, et al., 1996a; 
Kopper & Epperson, 1991,1996). 
Men report that they are generally less emotionally expressive than women 
(Gross & John, 1995; Kring, Smith & Neale, 1994). Men reportedly conceal 
their emotions, i. e. they experience but do not necessarily express emotions 
(Brody & Hall, 1993; Fischer, 1993; Jansz, 2000). Observers report that men 
are less emotionally facially expressive than women (Kring & Gordon, 1998), 
except when expressing anger (Schwartz, Brown & Ahern (1980), Kring & 
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Gordon (1998) and Wagner, Macdonald & Manstead (1986). The emotional 
meaning of men's facial expressions are less accurately identified by 
observers (Buck, Baron, Goodman & Shapiro, 1980; Fujita, Harper & Weins, 
1980; Wagner, Buck & Winterbotham, 1993; Wagner, MacDonald & 
Manstead, 1986) and men are reported by observers as smiling and gesturing 
less than women (Barr & Kleck, 1995; Riggio & Friedman, 1986). Men report 
that they cry less than women do (see the review by Vingerhoets and Schiers, 
(2000)). Men do not report that they express anger more frequently than 
women (Deffenbacher, et aL, 1996a; Deffenbacher et aL, 1996b; Faber & 
Burns, 1996; Kopper, 1991; Kopper & Epperson, 1996; Stoner & Spencer, 
1987; Thomas & Williams, 1991). Men report that their expression of anger 
may take the form of aggression towards others more than women do 
(Deffenbacher et aL, 1996a). Men report crying when angry with much lower 
frequency than women (Crawford, Kippax, Onyx, Gault & Benton, 1992; Eagly 
& Steffen, 1986; Timmers, Fischer & Manstead, 1997; Zernmen & Garber, 
1996). 
On the whole, men and women are reported by observers as not differing in 
their use of emotion terms in naturalistic talk or in the recounting of emotional 
experiences (Anderson & Leaper, 1998; Campbell & Muncer, 1987; Lutz, 
1990; Shimanoff, 1983; though for a conflicting finding see Goldshmidt & 
Weller, 2000). Men verbally communicate their feelings less than women do 
(Dindia & Allen, 1992; Dosser, Balswick & Halverson, 1983). 
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These are the accounts of the relationship between men, masculinity and 
emotions that are reproduced and reified through positivist psychological 
enquiry. The functions that such constructions may serve can be understood in 
light of the preceding engagement with the discursive resources that are 
constitutive of these constructions and the explication of epistemological bases 
and their ideological functions. What I will examine through the analysis is the 
extent to which these constructions recur in men's talk about emotions 
(chapter 4), men's negotiation of their'selves' relative to emotions (chapter 5) 
and men's performance of emotions (chapter 6). Before moving to the outlining 
of the analytic method employed in the analysis, the conceptual isation of 
'emotions' that will be employed in this thesis must first be outlined. This is of 
particular importance to the analysis of chapter 6, which, in contrast to 
chapters 4 and 5, is concerned not with men's talk about emotions but with 
occasions on which men might be argued to be 'doing emotions'. The analysis 
of chapter 6 therefore requires an interpretative framework that is capable of 
dealing with 'emotions' as interactional accomplishments. Emotions must be 
conceptualized at a level that extends beyond the simply discursive, i. e. the 
analysis of chapter 6 must be attentive not only to how, when and to what ends 
emotion discourses are invoked but also to how emotions are done and 
indexed as being done in everyday interactions. 
2.4 A poststructuralist approach to emotions 
First, it is important to recognise that this thesis is concerned with gender and 
emotion at two levels, though these levels are not conceptualised as 
necessarily distinct or discrete. Simply, the two levels are the performative and 
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the discursive - alternatively, how emotions and gender are 'done' and how 
they are talked about. Given the constitutive functions that are assumed to be 
served by language, it is relatively easy to appreciate how the former might be 
related to the latter. It would, however, be overly simplistic to assume that 
emotion or gender discourses are, in any way, 'essential'to the performance of 
emotion or of gender. 'Being angry' can be done without the use of emotion 
discourses; a person does not need to describe their self as angry in order to 
be understood to 'be' angry. A great many other resources, including facial 
expressions and the paralinguistic qualities of speech, are constitutive of the 
performance of emotions. This point is perhaps even easier to understand with 
regard to gender. The idea of a person proclaiming explicitly that they are 
engaged in the performance of masculinity -Tm behaving like a man'- 
sounds very strange indeed. Particular discursive resources and strategies, as 
well as behaviours, may be interpreted as gendered and their invocation or 
enactment may then be interpreted as constituting the performance of gender. 
This thesis is, therefore, concerned with identifying the discursive and 
performative formulations of emotion and of gender, the interactions between 
them and the functions they serve in social and cultural contexts. At both 
levels, whether they are conceptualized as particular repertoires of discursive 
resources or as performative acts, emotions and gender are assumed to serve 
rhetorical and relational functions, the most obvious of which is the 
construction and negotiation of a particular self or identity as emotional and/or 
gendered. 
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Psychological, and by extension social psychological, research on emotion is 
dominated by approaches that are based on the presupposition that emotions 
are ontologically existent, physiologically manifest phenomena (Ekman, 1984, 
1992; Frijda, 1993; Izard, 1977; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Lazarus, 
1991 a, 1991 b; Schacter & Singer, 1962). The hegemony of such approaches 
is hardly surprising when the history of the study of emotions is considered 
(Darwin, 1872; James, 1884). Even social constructionist (Averill, 1985; Harr6, 
1986; Harr6 & Gillet, 1994) and social functionalist (Armon-Jones, 1986; 
Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner & Haidt, 1999) approaches to emotion, with 
their respective foci on the social and cultural constitution of emotions and on 
the functions served by emotions at various social and cultural levels, retain a 
sense of the ontological reality of emotions. For example, in his outlining of a 
social constructionist approach to emotion, with specific reference to love, 
Averill argues that love, and by implication any other theorised discrete 
emotion, 'is a complex syndrome composed of many component processes. 
These components may differ in the extent to which they are determined by 
biological, psychological, and social factors, but no component by itself is a 
necessary or sufficient condition for the entire syndrome. ' (1985; p. 94) 
To draw a comparison with the previously-reviewed work of Judith Butler, no 
theory of emotions has gone so far as to argue that one of the functions of the 
categories of emotions, of the ways that emotions are talked about, is to make 
the 'bodily experience' of emotions matter. The materiality of emotions, the 
theorising of them as physiological and biological phenomena, seems in many 
ways to be sacrosanct; to borrow from Edwards, Ashmore and Potter (1995), it 
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seems to be a 'truth' that cannot or should not be denied. By adopting a 
strongly social constructionist, poststructuralist perspective, it is, however, 
possible to engage with the entire range of phenomena that are taken to 
constitute emotions, including bodily experience, facial expressions and the 
paralinguistic qualities of speech, at the discursive and performative levels, but 
to resist engaging in a discussion of the possibility that emotions are 
ontologically existent. By doing so, the utility and the limits of the assumptions 
that underlie both existing approaches to emotion and social constructionism 
can be explored. Simply, we can determine what might be gained or lost by not 
assuming the ontological existence of emotions. 
The dual concern with emotions at the discursive and the performative levels 
requires two differing, but still social constructionist, approaches. An approach 
suitable for the analysis of emotions at the discursive level, that is to say in 
language and in talk, is available off-the-peg in the form of the discursive 
psychological approach to emotions outlined by Edwards (1997,1999). The 
analysis of emotion at the performative level requires an approach that is, in a 
manner similar to that of discursive psychology, oriented to the functions 
served by the phenomena traditionally taken to be evidence of the 
physiological experience and expression of emotions, facial expressions, non- 
verbal behaviour and the paralinguistic qualities of speech. These extra- 
discursive but none the less communicative phenomena will be analysed 
through an approach broadly based upon the interpersonal communicative 
theory of emotions outlined by Parkinson (1995). However, the interpretation of 
these extra-discursive communicative phenomena will be contiguous with the 
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interpretation of discourse. Simply, the analysis at this level will be concerned 
with the relationship between the phenomena taken to be performative of 
emotion and the discursive content that they accompany. The use of one 
approach or the other will, in the analysis, be determined by the type and 
content of the data. Thus, the discursive approach will be most apparent in the 
analysis of chapters 4 and 5 and the performance oriented approach will be 
fore-grounded in chapter 6. 
One possible way of avoiding involvement in any debate on the possible 
ontological reality of emotions (a necessary requirement for a thesis operating 
from the above outlined strongly social constructionist perspective and for any 
attempt to marry the above outlined critical approach to gender with an 
equivalent approach to emotion) is to engage with emotion only in language, 
with emotion categories and metaphors and the interactional, social and 
cultural functions they serve, with what Edwards (1997,1999) categorizes as 
emotion discourse. As will be demonstrated in the following review of Edwards' 
approach, to adopt this position is not entirely to eschew the issue of the bodily 
experience of emotions, in much the same way that Butler does not eschew 
the issue of gendered bodies. Indeed, the bodily experience of emotions is 
opened up to critical enquiry through its conceptual isatio n as a significant 
feature of emotion discourse. 
Edwards' approach to emotion discourse is located within the larger project of 
discursive psychology, which is itself derived from ethnomethodology, linguistic 
philosophy, conversation analysis, rhetoric and the sociology of knowledge 
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(Billig, 1987; Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987)25 . Broadly, discursive psychology can be described as 
concerned with analysing, critiquing, deconstructing and challenging dominant 
approaches to and conceptualisations of psychological phenomena (see 
Edwards, Middleton & Potter, 1992) and as concerned with the use of 'folk' 
psychological concepts in everyday life and talk. With regard to 'folk' 
conceptual isations of psychological phenomena, discursive psychology is 
concerned with the identification of the functions served by particular 
constructions or resources in particular contexts, what Edwards' 'describes' as 
'the action-performative nature of everyday accounts' (1999; p. 272) and is 
particularly attentive to issues and areas of inconsistency, conflict and 
variability in the'uses and functions of psychological concepts in those 
accounts. 
In Edwards'view, emotions are a prime example of a psychological concept 
drawn upon, in equal measure, in both sociological and psychological 
theorizing and in everyday life and talk. Discursive psychology's interest in 
emotions is not, however, shaped by traditional conceptions of emotions within 
academic discourses as 'natural bodily experiences and expressions, older 
than language, irrational and subjective, unconscious rather than deliberate, 
genuine rather than artificial, feelings rather than thoughts' (Edwards, 1999; 
p. 273), so much as it is by an empirical concern with how such conceptions 
25 The theory and analytic techniques of discursive psychology will be discussed at greater 
length in the next chapter. 
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and categories are invoked, in what contexts and to what rhetorical or 
interactional effects. The project of a discursive psychological engagement 
with emotions is, therefore, to identify the functions served by emotion 
discourses in the interactional management of a discursively constituted self, 
including such things as negotiations of social accountability (Shotter, 1985; 
1989) and the management of interpersonal relations. In this thesis, the 
discursive psychological approach to emotions will be extended to include the 
relationship between emotion discourses and gender discourses. This 
relationship will be empirically examined at both the rhetorical and ideological 
level, the relationships between emotion and gender discourses in talk and, at 
the performative and interactional level, the relationships between the 'doing of 
emotions' and the 'doing of gender'. Further, the relationship between these 
levels will also constitute a site of empirical enquiry. 
Precedents for discursive psychological engagements with emotions 
discourses are limited (Bamberg 1997a, 1997b; Edwards, 1997,1999). The 
most significant contribution from these works is, perhaps, Edwards' (1997) list 
of 'rhetorical contrasts. This 10 item list, whilst not intended to be exhaustive, 
highlights many of the possible functions that emotion discourses can serve in 
text and in day-to-day talk. The great strength of the items contained in this list 
is that they are not intended to be discrete or exclusive. An invocation of one 
part of one of the rhetorical contrasts does not preclude the simultaneous 
invocation of another part of one of the other contrasts. For example, three of 
the rhetorical contrasts on Edwards' list are: 'Emotions as irrational versus 
rational', 'Emotional behaviour as controllable action or passive reaction', 
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'Internal states versus external behaviour: private ('feelings') versus public 
('expressions', 'displays')' (1997, p. 1 94). This list of just three of the items 
demonstrates some of the possible variability that is afforded by emotion 
discourses in negotiations of social accountability and in the management of 
social interactions and relationships. A violent act, constructed through 
emotion discourses as'anger, could be accounted for as the public expression 
of an irrational, passive reaction to a particular stimulus or situation 26 . It is the 
very flexibility of emotion discourses that Edwards identifies as the basis for 
their utility in social interactions and, consequently, for empirical social 
psychological analysis. 
It is because people's emotion displays (thus categorized) can be 
treated either as involuntary reaction, or as under agentive control or 
rational accountability, as internal states or public displays, reactions or 
dispositions, that emotion discourse can perform flexible, accountability- 
oriented, indexically sensitive, rhetorical work. (Edwards, 1999, p. 288) 
The aim of this thesis is, therefore, to identify the particular configurations of 
emotion discourses, including invocations of rhetorical contrasts, drawn upon 
by speakers in negotiations of social accountability, where that negotiation 
might also be interpreted as simultaneously concerned with the performance of 
gender, specifically of 'masculinity'. 
2'3 Alternatively, a violent act, constructed as anger, could be accounted for as a rational, 
intentional response to perceived slight (see Aristotle). 
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While a concern with the rhetorical and ideological functions of emotion 
discourses, particularly in relation to gender discourses, is adequate for the 
analysis of talk on the topic of emotions, it is insufficiently kphisticated for the 
analysis of talk in which the speakers might be argued to 'be emotional'. Such 
interactions require an approach that is also capable of orienting to emotions at 
a performative level, but which retains the sense that emotional enactments, 
like emotion discourses, are necessarily functional, communicative and 
constitutive of 'self or identity. 
However, existing approaches to emotions that are categorised as social 
constructionist (Averill, 1980,1982,1985; Harr6,1986; particularly Sarbin, 
1986) are liable to the criticism that they place excessive emphasis on cultural 
factors as the determinants of emotional behaviour. By conceptualising 
emotions as prescribed social roles, enacted, experienced and embodied in 
response to social and cultural requirements, these theories are insufficiently 
attentive to the subtle effects of local interactional factors in the determination 
of nuanced emotional behaviourS27. Social constructionist approaches, in their 
application of a top-down approach, are therefore liable to the criticism that 
they elide the complexity of emotions as they occur at the more local level. 
27 The emphasizing of cultural factors may also be argued to elide the possibility of global 
factors as determinants of emotional behaviour, i. e. the existence of basic, essential emotions. 
However, given the approach adopted within this thesis, this is not a line of criticism that 
warrants further development here. 
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[M]any of the occasions for emotion arise from local negotiations in the 
course of everyday interpersonal interaction and do not directly reflect 
societally proscribed norms. The conflicts, disagreements, and 
commitments that lead to emotion may be based on mutually 
established rights and obligations in relationships which have only a 
remote connection with culturally imposed rules and roles (Parkinson, 
1995, p. 162). 
In Parkinson's argument, it is difficult not to hear echoes of Davies and Harr6's 
revised definition of a subject position as incorporating 'both a conceptual 
repertoire and a location for persons within the structure of rights and duties for 
those who use that repertoire' (Davies & Harr6,1999, p. 35; emphasis added). 
Emotions, as both performative acts and as discursive resources, might 
therefore be argued to be constitutive of subject positions and, indeed, to be 
central to the process of their (re)negotiation, including the negotiation of the 
rights and duties that they afford and ascribe, within day-to-day interactional 
contexts. Emotions, in Parkinson's view, are central resources in the day-to- 
day accomplishment of a relational self and the management of interpersonal 
relationships. Indeed, he explicitly states that an interpersonal communicative 
theory of emotions is predicated on the assumption that emotions are 'an 
interpersonal strategy for realigning relative identity positions' (1995, p. 275). 
In developing an interpersonal communicative theory of emotions, Parkinson 
questions the emphasis that is placed on individual agency as an explanation 
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for the adoption of emotion roles in the above listed social constructionist 
approacheS28 . An attention to agency in emotional episodes is radical in so far 
as it is contrary to traditional conceptions of emotions as passions, as events 
and experiences by which individuals are passively overcome. Indeed, both 
Averill and Sarbin advance functionalist theories for the existence of the 'myth 
of the passions'. However, the theory of an agentic subject, who self- 
consciously takes up emotion roles in interactions, is argued to be as 
restrictive as the 'myth of the passions'. 
[E]motion arises not from within an individual's authorial consciousness 
but emerges in the dialogue of an ongoing interaction... The acting out 
of emotion episodes is guided on-line by the afforclances offered or 
denied by other people's ongoing actions, which in turn are mutually 
coordinated with the actor's own self-presentation. (Parkinson, 1995, 
p. 162-163; cf. Lutz & White, 1986). 
The conceptualization of emotions as consequences of social interactions, but 
as simultaneously constitutive of the speakers, including their rights and duties 
within those interactions, and the resistance of an agentic subject all accord 
28 The dramaturgical metaphor of 'role' is central to both theories. It is apparent in Averill's 
(1980) formulation of emotions as 'transitory social roles' but is more extensively developed by 
Sarbin (1986) in his differentiation between types of roles, specifically in his development of 
emotions as a particular set of dramatistic roles. 
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with poststructuralist conceptual isations of the subject and with the theorising 
of a dialogically and relationally constituted moral self (Lewis, 2003)29. 
Recent functional accounts of emotion (Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner & Haidt, 
1999) are more firmly located within traditional approaches to emotion and are 
not so concerned with the interactional role played by emotions in the 
constitution and negotiation of identity. 
The advancement of an interpersonal communicative theory of emotion 
requires the reinterpretation of the phenomena that are argued to be 
constitutive of emotions and of the findings of existing research on those 
phenomena, from whatever perspectives that research might operate 
(Parkinson, 1995). Of particular relevance to this thesis are the 
reinterpretations of emotional differentiation and amplification. Emotional 
differentiation, a core implication of the basic emotions thesis (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1971) is argued to result from the different identity goals served by 
different emotions, rather than from any intrinsic difference in their patterns of 
physiological effects, or from differing patterns of cognitive appraisal or from 
the different functions they might serve as adaptive behaviours. Within the 
interpersonal communicative theory of emotion, the importance of relatively 
29 When considering the relational production of the 'self, it is all too easy to be drawn into 
thinking of a singular subject. It should therefore be remembered at all times that it is assumed 
that all speakers in all contexts are, to some degree, engaged in the relational production of 
'selves' through their ongoing negotiation of subject positions; from a social constructionist 
perspective, it is a process in which we are all supposed to be simultaneously involved. 
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stable of patterns of 'bodily reactions, action impulses, and facial displays' 
(Parkinson, ibid. p. 274), as well as the paralinguistic qualities of speech, is 
argued to lie not in their constitution of basic emotions, but in their functioning 
as'modes of communication ... involved in the ongoing delivery of the 
emotional message' (Parkinson, ibid. p. 275). All the phenomena taken to 
constitute emotional experiences are argued to be communicative components 
of an identity-oriented performance. One of the more obvious examples of the 
implications of this theory is the reinterpretation of emotional intensity, typically 
conceptualised as a dimension of emotional experience (Frijda, Ortony, 
Sonnemans & Clore, 1992; Reisenzein, 1994) and along which men and 
women are reported as differing (Averill, 1983), as simply the enactment of the 
rhetorical strategy of emphasis. Apparent or reported emotional intensity can 
be reinterpreted as a strategy by which the importance of the identity goal, to 
which the emotion is related, is worked up. 
For an interpersonal communicative theory of emotion, existing theories 
provide a number of resources through which the performative functions of 
emotions might be conceptualised. However, these mappings of the functions 
of emotions, predicated as they are on theories of relatively discrete emotions, 
are highly generalised. De Rivera (1984) and Smith and Lazarus (1993) both 
provide a number of dimensions along which emotions can be theorised as 
functioning in the (re)negotiation of self-other relationships. For example, in a 
simplification of de Rivera, emotions function, along a proximal dimension, in 
the management of the distances between the self and the other, where the 
other is assumed to be the object of the emotion. Though de Rivera was 
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concerned with non-verbal factors of emotion, bodily response and facial 
displays, it is perhaps easier to appreciate how discursive enactments of 
emotions, such as 'Fuck ofr and 'I love you' - interpretable as performative of 
anger and love respectively - might function as negotiations of, potentially, 
both the physical and metaphysical distances between the speaker and the 
addressee. Smith and Lazarus (1993) identify the 'core relational themes' of 
discrete emotions - based upon the amalgamation of the appraisal 
components that are argued to be characteristic of that emotion - which are 
further theorised as reflecting relational harms and benefits. Core relational 
themes are, in effect, the central relational meanings of emotions. Thus, anger 
is argued to have the core relational theme, or to communicate the relational 
meaning, of other-blame. This is based upon the amalgamation of the primary 
cognitive appraisals of motivational relevance and motivational incongruence 
and the secondary appraisal of other-accountability and reflects the appraisal 
of the interactional context as potentially harmful to the individual. Simply, 
anger is argued to occur in interactional contexts where the other is identified 
as accountable for actions that obstruct aims that are relevant or important to 
the self, where these aims may be more or less tangible, for example the 
achievement of practical tasks or some particular identity goal. The 
communication of the relational meaning of anger, other-blame, is therefore 
assumed to function in the renegotiation of this potentially harmful self-other 
relational dynamic. 
Whilst these two theories differ with regard to the extent that emotions might 
be theorised as intrapsychic phenomena - as appraisal theorists, Smith and 
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Lazarus inevitably regard emotion as primarily an intrapsychic phenomenon, 
but de Rivera explicitly states that the 'emotional dynamics are not really in the 
infant' (1984, p. 120; emphasis in original)30 _ it is evident that, within both 
theories, emotions are conceptualised as phenomena that are constituted by 
and are constitutive of the relationship between the self and the other. 
Consequently, it is possible to focus on emotions at this level in an analysis 
and to remain agnostic about the ontological reality of the intrapsychic or 
physiological components of emotion experiences. 
An interpersonal communicative theory of emotions is also able to account for 
reported disjunctions between emotional experience and expression, through 
the emphasising of the constraining, if not deterministic, effects of interactional 
context. For the sake of consistency, between this review and the following 
analysis, I will employ the term 'subject position' (Davies & Harr6,1980) in the 
following explanations. Reported disjunctions between emotional experience 
and expression are argued to occur when the potential for the self to occupy 
some emotion-based subject position, which by definition would be constituted 
by some expressive, communicative but not necessarily discursive act, is 
constrained by the subject positions afforded or ascribed by others or by some 
other requirement for the constitution of the self, which combine to constitute 
the interactional context. Consider, for example, the requirement for a police 
30 De Rivera continues, 'They are not just physiological states with concomitant facial 
expressions and subjective feelings. Rather, the dynamics are between the infant and the 
other' (1984, p. 120; emphasis in original). 
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officer to remain calm and rational even in the face of extreme provocation. 
Professional and work contexts may constitute, and indeed be constituted by, 
subject positions that are incompatible with emotion-based subject positions. 
That said, of course, we do not need, nor can we, assume that reported 
disjunctions between emotional experience and expression reflect ontological 
reality. A claim by a police officer to have been angered by provocation but to 
have remained externally calm is just that, a claim, one way by which being a 
professional police officer might be accomplished. Within the analyses, such 
invocations of 'emotions' as accountability-oriented discursive resources will 
allow meaningful engagement with the research questions. 
2.5 The research questions 
The research questions as they appear here and in the following chapters are 
the result of a recursive movement between the above-reviewed literature and 
the collected data. They represent the points of entry for an engagement with 
the issues raised in the review regarding existent assumptions about men's 
relationship with emotions and with theories of the broader relationship 
between gender and emotions. Further, they are phrased so that they support 
engagement with these issues in ways that are consistent with the above- 
outlined poststructuralist approaches to'gender and 'emotions'and are 
sensitive to the limits of the data. 
Chapter 4 will be concerned with the discursive relationship between concepts 
of 'masculinity' and 'emotions' and is intended to answer the following 
questions: 
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How do men construct men's relationship with emotions? 
In constructing this relationship, what discourses do men draw upon to 
account for it? 
In answering these questions the analysis will be attentive to variability, both in 
the constructions of men's relationship with emotions and in the discourses 
that they invoke to account for it. 
9 In accounting for men's constructed relationship with emotions, do men 
reflexively orient to the implications of the discourses upon which they 
draw for their own subject positions as 'men'? 
Chapter 5 will be concerned with one speakers negotiation of the discursive 
relationships between one particular emotion concept - humiliation - and the 
'self and is intended to answer the following research questions: 
* How does a male speaker construct accounts of episodes of 
'humiliation'? 
9 Are discourses of 'humiliation' used to construct accounts of the 
negotiation of subject positions and the constitution of power relations? 
* And, based upon the presuppositions that humiliation constitutes 
episodes of disempowerment and that the performance of masculinity 
is, in some way, constituted through the negotiation of power relations, 
does a male speaker, when constructing episodes in which he is the 
object of humiliation, simultaneously orient to their implications for the 
constitution of a masculine subjectivity? 
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Chapter 6 is concerned with the relationships between 'emotions' and 'gender 
in practice and is intended to answer the following research questions. 
9 What functions are served by men's responses to the emotional 
expressions of others? 
e What functions are served by men's 'doing' of emotional expressivity? 
* Are these functions synchronous with the performance of masculinities 
or constitutive of masculine subjectivities? 
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Chapter 3 
Discourse analytic approaches and the turn to 
language 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the publication of Discourse and social psychology. Beyond attitudes 
and behaviour (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) there has been a steady and 
continuous development of discourse analytic theory and practice in social 
psychological research. The process of this development has, perhaps 
inevitably, led to divergence and the emergence of differing forms of analysis, 
all of which might broadly be categorised as discursive. These divergences 
centre on attempts to balance the epistemological bases for and limitations of 
the answers that analysts can give in response to the classic conversation 
analytic conundrum 'why that now? ' (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973; though it might 
also be represented as 'why this utterance here? ' (Wetherell, 1998, p. 388) with 
more pragmatic or political concerns for the answers that analysts ought to be 
able to give. The practical and political utility of discourse analytic approaches 
within social psychology, i. e. their ability to answer the questions that concern 
social psychology, is entirely dependent upon the epistemological assumptions 
that underlie them. Debates between researchers and theorists adopting 
various discursive approaches, including debates between discourse analysts 
and conversation analysts, have centred on the answers that can be given to 
the question 'why that now? 'within particular epistemological frameworks and 
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the consequent usefulness of those answers (Billig, 1999a, 1999b; Edley, 
2001; Schegloff 1997,1998,1999a, 1999b; Speer, 2001; Wetherell, 1998; 
Wetherell & Edley, 1999). The relative values of respective epistemological 
frameworks and the forms of analysis they support are negotiated with 
reference to their claimed utility. 
It is worth noting at this point that the forms of discourse analysis discussed 
here are only those forms that are predominant within British social 
psychology. Other forms of analysis, which might broadly be glossed as 
discursive, such as conversation analysis (Sacks, 1992; Sacks, Schegloff & 
Jefferson, 1974) and critical discourse analysis (van Dijk, 1993,2001) will only 
be mentioned as reference points in the locating and outlining of the dominant 
forms of discourse analysis that are found in British social psychology, namely 
discursive psychology, Foucauldian discourse analysis and critical discursive 
psychology. 
Within the discourse analytic approaches developed and employed in social 
psychology, two broad types of analysis and two broad groups of allied 
researchers, authors and theorist have emerged. Briefly, these two 
approaches and their respective theorists have been represented as 
concerned either with 'the social functions of talk and writing and [with] how 
these functions are achieved through the construction of accounts' (Coyle, 
2000, p. 254) or as concerned with 'issues such as identity, selfhood, social 
change and power relations' (Coyle, ibid., p. 254) (see also Burr (1995), 
Widdicombe and Woofift (1995) and Willig (1999) for discussions of the 
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differing discourse analytic approaches). More recently, a third way has 
emerged in which attempts are made to combine the two approaches (Coyle, 
2000; Edley, 2001; Edley & Wetherell, 1996,1997,1999,2001; Wetherell, 
1996,1998; Wetherell & Edley, 1998,1999). 
Arguably, the divergence of these approaches occurs about the differing 
conceptual isations of the eponymous focus of their analyses, that is to say, 
with regard to whatdiscourse' is understood to refer. Within 
eth no methodology and conversation analysis 'discourse' is understood to refer 
to 'talk-in-interaction' (Garfinkel, 1967; Sacks, 1992; Sacks, Schegloff & 
Jefferson, 1974), whilst in the sociology of scientific knowledge it is understood 
to refer to all forms of talk and writing (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). In these 
approaches 'discourse' refers to the primary object of interest, that is to say, it 
refers to language in use. A contrasting understanding of 'discourse' emerges 
from poststructuralism. Here 'discourse' is understood to refer to historically 
and culturally emergent structures of linguistic practices (Foucault, 1972). 
Thus, in poststructuralist analyses, the interplay of discourses within 
'discourse' (understood in the eth no methodological and conversational analytic 
sense) becomes a focus of analysis. As was discussed above in the outlining 
of a poststructuralist account of gender, one feature of discourses is their 
ability to constitute objects and subjects; subjectivities are theorised as 
emerging from and indeed as constituted by discourses. 
The analytic techniques that can collectively be grouped as concerned with 
'discourse', in either of the above identified senses, the assumptions that 
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underlie them, their primary interests and the practical or political utility will be 
addressed in turn. I will maintain the above identified distinction between the 
two major types of discourse analytic work apparent in contemporary social 
psychology, firstly addressing the discursive psychological approach, then the 
more Foucauldian discourse analytic approach, before finally considering their 
synthesis in critical discursive psychology. However, it should clearly be stated 
that these approaches differ only by degrees. They share more similarities 
than differences; they have, on the whole, a common philosophical history and 
so share many theoretical underpinnings. My concern is simply with identifying 
the analytic approach that Vvill render the above stated research questions 
answerable. 
3.2 Discursive Psychology 
Arguably, the most prominent form of discourse analysis in British psychology, 
perhaps owing to the concentration of authors who constitute the 
Loughborough Discourse Analysis and Rhetoric Group (DARG), is that of 
discursive psychology. The discursive psychological approach of Edwards, 
(1997), Edwards & Potter, (1992) and Potter, (1996) is grounded in the analytic 
traditions of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967), the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984) and conversation analysis (Sacks, 1992; 
Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). At the simplest level, discursive 
psychology can be represented as concerned with the identification of features 
within discourse and the functions that these features might serve for 
individuals in interactional contexts. In contrast, whilst critical discursive 
psychology of the type advocated by Edley and Wetherell (Edley, 2001; Edley 
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& Wetherell, 1996,1997,1999,200 1; Wetherell, 1996,1998; Wetherell & 
Edley, 1998,1999) shares these concerns it is also concerned with the 
identification of 'interpretative repertoires' (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell 
& Potter, 1988,1992; Wetherell, Stiven & Potter, 1987)31 within talk-in- 
interaction and the functions that these might serve in the constitution of 
particular identities and subjectivities. 
At this stage, it is perhaps worth restating the view of language that is adopted 
within a discursive psychological approach, that language is constructive, 
rather than simply reflective, of social reality and that language-in-use, i. e. 
discourse, is a form of social action (Austin, 1962). Thus, the central concerns 
of the discursive psychological approach are the twinned issues of construction 
and function. Particularly, it is attentive to the ways by which 'factual accounts' 
and 'descriptions', which might in other approaches be interpreted as 
straightforward 'objective' representations of external or internal 
(psychological) reality, unmediated by personal interest or investment, are 
made to seem as such. Discursive psychology is concerned with the ways by 
which an account may be made to seem to be 'a description rather than a 
31 The conceptualisation of interpretative repertoires as 'recurrently used systems of terms 
used for characterizing and evaluating actions, events and other phenomena. A repertoire ... is 
constituted through a limited range of terms used in particular stylistic and grammatical 
constructions. Often a repertoire will be organized around specific metaphors and figures of 
speech (tropes)' (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 149). There is a high degree of similarity 
between 'interpretative repertoires' and the Foucauldian concept of 'discourses' (Parker, 
1992). 
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claim, a speculation, or indeed a lie. This is the force of saying that people do 
description' (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p. 1 04). Within the discursive 
psychological approach descriptions are oriented to as occasioned social acts. 
The view of descriptions as both occasioned and as social acts opens up two 
important related lines of debate, which might generally be referred to as the 
relationship between context and function. 
The relationship between context and function, specifically the assumptions 
that inform its theorisation and the consequent implications for the forms and 
limits of the analyses that can be offered, is arguably the most contentious 
issue within discourse analytic, including conversation analytic, theory (see the 
debates between Billig and Schegloff, Schegloff and Wetherell, and Edley and 
Speer (Billig, 1999a, 1999b; Edley, 2001; Schegloff 1997,1998,1999a, 1999b; 
Speer, 2001; Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Edley, 1999)). The various 
conceptualisations of this relationship constitute the basis for the differentiation 
of analytic techniques that are concerned with 'discourse', whether 'd iscou rse' 
is conceptualized as talk or text or in the more Foucauldian sense. The 
theorised relationship between context and function is also the fundamental 
basis for claims of the applied or political utility of each technique. Whilst this 
area of discourse analytic theory is hugely important, I do not intend to enter 
into a detailed exposition of it here. Rather, as will be seen, the relationship 
between context and function, the assumptions that underlie it and its 
delimiting affect on the interpretations of talk that can be offered, will constitute 
a recursive theme not just of this review but of the thesis as a whole. At this 
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juncture I will limit my concerns with context and function to the ways that they 
are conceptualised within the discursive psychological approach. 
The issue of context is of paramount concern for analysts concerned with 
discourse. The context in which a particular feature of talk occurs, whether that 
feature is a word, a phrase, a change in pitch or emphasis or a whole 
sentence, stands as a resource upon which analysts can draw to advance 
interpretations of the functions of that feature. However, context is a highly 
variable concept. Consider the following exchange (taken from chapter 6): 
Speaker A: = no you stress me out (. ) I'm alright (. ) until you 
come home = 
Speaker B: = you just = 
Speaker A: = you moan at ýýid little things = 
Different conceptual isations of the context of this interaction could be 
advanced based upon the provision of such information as: 
Speaker A is male and speaker B female 
Speaker A and speaker B share a house and it is in this house that the 
interaction takes place 
Speaker A and speaker B are married 
The exchange takes place during a discussion of the cleanliness of the house 
and the division of domestic duties 
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The above example is demonstrative of what might be termed an analyst's 
conceptualization of context. Information known to the analyst is invoked to 
contextualize the text and then to provide an interpretative framework. For 
example, the above example could be contextualized as an interaction 
between a man and woman who are involved in a heterosexual relationship 
that is ratified through the institution of marriage. From this perspective what 
the analyst may know or may claim to know about the dynamics of 
heterosexual relationships and marriages and the division of domestic 
responsibilities within such relationships may be drawn upon to determine the 
meaning and function of the utterances. Such an approach may be adopted by 
analysts working from an explicitly 'feminiSt32 perspective. Such analysts may 
be concerned with the methods by which the material relations between men 
and women at a cultural level, such as the unequal division of domestic duties 
within heterosexual relationships, are interactionally and discursively 
accomplished at a more local level. It is evident from the preceding sentence 
that the analytic project in such an example proceeds from the top down. What 
the analyst knows or may claim to know about the material relations between 
men and women at a cultural level determines both the features of interest 
within the interaction and the context that is drawn upon in their interpretation. 
An alternative bottom-up feminist conversation analytic approach has been 
32 It is not my intention to construct the political project of feminism as a unitary project that is 
devoid of variance, rather 'feminist' is used reflexively to echo the identifications of analysts 
who may adopt a range of perspectives and methodologies all of which might commonly be 
categorised as 'feminist'. For the most extensive overview of the relationship between 
feminism and discourse analytic approaches see Wilkinson and Kitzinger (1995). 
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advanced by, amongst others, Frith (1998), Frith and Kitzinger (1998), 
Kitzinger (2000), Stokoe (1998,2000), and Speer, (1999,2001). 
Again, owing to being heavily grounded in ethnomethodology and conversation 
analysis, the conceptualisation of context and the role that context can play in 
the interpretation of talk within discursive psychology tends to be limited to the 
interactional context, as it is evidenced through talk. Schegloff (1997) outlined 
the conversation analytic conceptualization of context in the following manner: 
And because it is the orientations, meanings, interpretations, 
understandings, etc. of the participants in some sociocultural event on 
which the course of that event is predicated-and especially if it is 
constructed interactionally over time, it is those characterizations which 
are privileged in the constitution of socid-interactional reality, and 
therefore have a prima facie claim to being privileged in efforts to 
understand it. (pp. 166-167, emphasis in original) 
Similarly, in outlining the ethnomethodological approach to language Heritage 
stated: 
Understanding language is not, in the first instance, a matter of 
understanding sentences but of understanding actions - utterances - 
which are constructively interpreted in relations to their contexts. This 
involves viewing an utterance against a background of who said it, 
where and when, what was being accomplished by saying it and in the 
132 
light of what possible considerations and in virtue of what motives it was 
said. (1984, pp. 139-140, emphasis in original) 
In its orientation to talk and to texts, discursive psychology further draws upon 
two related concepts from ethnomethodology, indexicality and reflexivity. 
Like other actions, descriptions are 'indexical' and are to be understood 
by reference to where and when etc. they occur. Like other actions too, 
descriptions are 'reflexive' in maintaining or altering the sense of the 
activities and unfolding circumstances in which they occur. (Heritage, 
1984, p. 140) 
The fundamental importance of the concept of indexicality to discursive 
psychology is evident in the following statement from Potter: 
The central idea of indexicality is that the meaning of a word or 
utterance is dependent on its context of use. This is true whether the 
utterance is conventionally thought of as a description, a question, an 
order or whatever. Put another way, the study of what an utterance 
means will not reach a satisfactory conclusion without some , 
understanding of the occasion on which that utterance is used. (1996, 
p. 43) 
Reflexivity is the notion that features of talk, such as descriptions, 'are not just 
about something but they are also doing something; that is, they are not 
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merely representing some facet of the world, they are also involved in that 
world in some practical way' (Potter, 1996, p. 47, emphasis in original). 
Combining these two concepts, discursive psychology can be seen to be 
concerned with the identification of the meaning of utterances within the 
contexts in which they occur (indexicality), where those contexts are 
themselves understood to be constituted by the functions of the those 
utterances (reflexivity). In the discursive psychological approach, the context 
within which utterances are taken to have occurred, and upon which they are 
dependent for their meaning, is limited only to the context that can be seen to 
be constituted by the utterances themselves. This is perhaps a literal 
application of the Derridean idiom that'there is nothing outside of the text' 
(1976); there is no importing of extra-textual information or knowledge to 
constitute the interpretative framework of context in discursive psychology. 
A focus on the construction of accounts has led discursive psychologist to 
attend to such features of discourse as the construction of 'facts' and 
'descriptions' (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996), the use of categories 
(Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1996; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) to psychological 
concepts such as emotions and memory (Edwards, 1997,1999; Edwards, 
Middleton & Potter, 1992), are analysed from the perspective that they do 
things for speakers. Two issues arise from such analyses, the rhetorical work 
that such features perform, i. e. what those features do for speakers, and the 
assumed 'nature' of speakers. As discussed above, the focus on speakers' 
orientations or their negotiation of accountability could be read as implying a 
conscious agentic subject. However, discursive psychologists remain 
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determinedly agnostic on such possibilities. Discussions of the 'nature' of the 
'subject', the 'self oridentity' are only entered into if such concepts emerge as 
participants' categories within the talk or texts taken as data. This approach 
has been categorized as'blank subjectivity' (Parker, 1997). 
Primary amongst the identified rhetorical functions of discourse is the 
accomplishment and management of attributions (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & 
Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996). Edwards and Potters (1992) development of a 
discursive psychological account of attribution is accomplished relative to the 
established social cognition account of attribution theory (Smith, 1994). Whilst 
there is an acknowledgment of the importance of language in the social 
cognition approaches (Hewstone, 1989) it is in Edwards and Potter's view not 
sufficient, particularly in so far as it maintains the conceptual ization of 
attributions as internally accomplished cognitive phenomena. The discursive 
approach developed by Edwards and Pofter'urges that these be studied as 
social acts performed in discourse, and not merely as cognitions about social 
acts, which happen to be expressed within conversations' (1992, p. 84). 
Within the discursive approach, 'categorisations' and 'descriptions', as well as 
invocations of psychological phenomena such as 'memory' and 'emotions', and 
the attributional functions that they serve are viewed as occasioned features of 
talk and that as such they are action-oriented. In short, '[p]eople do 
descriptions and thereby do attributions' (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p. 103, 
emphasis in original). Further, the features taken to be constitutive of 
attribution are, owing to their being situated in interactions between two or 
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more speakers, designed not only to constitute particular versions of reality or 
accounts of causality but also to be resistant to alternative versions and 
accounts. 
Within discursive psychology, 'accountability' is oriented to as the primary 
function of attributions done through description. Shotter (1989) defined 'social 
accountability' as 'the fact that we must talk only in certain already established 
ways, in order to meet the demands placed upon us by our need to sustain our 
status as responsible members of our society - where the "must" involved is a 
moral must' (p. 141). Within discursive psychology 'accountability' is more often 
conceptualized as a locally determined and discursively occasioned need; it is 
the way by which speakers construct and negotiate their location and status 
within and, in doing so constitute, the local interactional context. An orientation 
to negotiations of accountability, in terms of the management of issues of 
responsibility and agency, is undoubtedly the first step in the interpretation of 
discourse and the functions that it serves. However, discursive psychology, 
with its focus on the local interactional context, is typically reluctant to move 
beyond this first step and to engage with more macro-textual accounts of the 
functions served by particular discursive resources. For this reason, discursive 
psychological analyses may be interpreted as limited in their findings and as 
unable to contribute significantly to discussions of broader social concerns. 
Arguably, it is a desire to engage with such concerns that is determinate of 
more poststructuralist or Foucauldian discourse analysis. 
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3.3 Poststructuralist or Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
Poststructuralist or Foucauldian 'discourse analysis' (Burman, 1992,1995, 
1997; Burman & Parker, 1993; Hollway, 1989; Parker, 1992; Willig, 2003) has 
been advanced as an alternative to 'discursive psychology'. The need for an 
alternative has been argued to result from discursive psychology's inability to 
engage adequately with issues of politics, ideology, power and. materiality 
(Parker, 1992,2004. ) Particularly, discursive psychology has been represented 
as a move towards linguistic relativism, or what Parker (1992) calls 'idealism' 
(see the debate between Parker (1999a, 1999b) and Potter, Edwards and 
Ashmore (1999); see also Edwards, Ashmore and Potters (1995) classic 
refutation of the bottom-line realist arguments against relativism. ) Relativism in 
psychology is, Parker argues, 'both progressive and reactionary' (I 999a, p. 74, 
emphasis in original) and relativists, he charges, 'reproduce rather than 
challenge dominant bourgeois conceptions of academic knowledge as in 
principle separate from the world and as independent of moral-political activity' 
(I 999a, p. 74, emphasis in original). 
In place of relativism Parker adopts a critical realist perspective which, it is 
claimed, 'offers a version of materialism which takes account of different sense 
of reality, and of reality outside sense, is attentive to both 'the material basis 
for, potentials for, and constraints on action that are rooted in biology' and 
those 'systems of relationships and positions which make certain actions and 
accounts possible, and some impossible' (1992, p. 36). Further, the critical 
realist perspective confers 'ontological object status [on] the physical location 
of bodies in space' (Parker, 1992, p. 36). In doing so and in its recognition of 
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the constructive and constraining force of biology, critical realism also confers 
ontological status on those bodies as sexed, i. e., that there really are males 
and females, men and women. This point is of particular relevance to 
discussions of the differing material realities and power relations that are 
encountered by men and women. 
Of further concern for Parker (1 999a) is that, as he sees it, discursive 
psychology is, at least, complicit in the perpetuation of the 'psy-complex. The 
Opsy-complex' is perhaps best conceived of as the total product of psychology 
as an academic discipline, it is 'the dense network of theories and practices to 
do with the mind and behaviour which divide the normal from the abnormal in 
order to observe and regulate individuals' (Parker, 1999a, p. 62) (see also 
Parker, Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin and Stowell-Smith's (1995) 
deconstruction of psychopathology). 
Primary amongst the products of psychology, given the paradigmatic 
dominance of cognitive psychology, is the concept of a highly individuated 
agentive subject. Parker argues that discursive psychology is, owing to its 
focus on such individualised concerns as the management of attributions and 
accountability, again complicit in the perpetuation of this dominant 
conceptualisation of the 'subject'. From this perspective, discursive 
psychologists' position of agnosticism on issues such as agency and 
intentionality can simply be dismissed as a failure to engage adequately with 
the issues before them. Consequently, discursive psychology, in Parker's view, 
compounds the possibility of transforming psychology, 'to [socially] construct it 
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as something better (1999a, p. 62); it is 'traditional positivist methods 
masquerading as discourse analysis' (Burman & Parker, 1993, p. 1 1). In 
contrast, the approach proposed by Parker is more firmly located within a 
critical psychological approach, where the objects of critique are often the texts 
and practices of psychology itself (Parker, et aL, 1995). 
The form of discourse analysis promoted by Parker and colleagues (Burman, 
1992,1995,1997; Burman & Parker, 1993; Parker, 1992,2004; but see also 
Hollway (1989) and Willig (2001,2003)) should not, therefore, be viewed as an 
alternative to discursive psychology in terms of the analytic process, indeed, as 
will be demonstrated, in this regard the two approaches purport to be highly 
similar. However, they diverge in the extent of their engagement with and 
indeed acceptance of political, ideological and material realities and the power 
relations that they constitute. The discourse analytic approach advocated by 
Parker is represented as an alternative, and, indeed, as superior, to discursive 
psychology on the basis of its claimed potential to allow critical and 
constructive engagement with political issues (Willig, 1999). 
As an analytic process, poststructuralist or Foucauldian discourse analysis is 
consistently represented as a bottorn-up approach (Parker, 1992,2004; Willig, 
2003). It is concerned with the identification of 'discourses' within texts. 
Following Foucault, a discourse may be defined as 'a system of statements 
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which constructs an object' (Parker, 1992, p. 5)33. Whilst discourses are 
theorised as constitutive of objects within poststructuralist discourse analysis, 
in Parker's outlining of the analytic method a peculiar distinction is introduced 
between 'layers of reality'. 
There are fuzzy borders between the sets of things we know exist 
outside discourse and the things which may have a reality only within it. 
The first layer of reality, then, is the reality of the objects of discourse, 
the things the discourse refers to. (Parker, 1992, p. 8) 
Thus, '[t]he object that a discourse refers to may have an independent reality 
outside discourse, but is given another reality by discourse' (Parker, 1992, 
p. 9). At this point, through the separation of the discursive and the extra- 
discursive, the differing potentials for the importation of interpretative 
frameworks between relativist and critical realist positions, between discursive 
psychological and poststructuralist discourse analytic approaches are realised. 
What the analyst may know about the 'reality' of an object outside discourse 
becomes an analytic resource that can and, indeed, it is recommended that it 
should be drawn upon in the interpretation of a text. Poststructuralist discourse 
analysis, thus outlined, boldly crosses the line between participants and 
analysts concerns. 
33 This definition was later extended such that discourses may be understood as 'sets of 
statements that construct objects and an array of subject positions' (Parker, 1994, p. 245). 
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[W]e have to bring our own sense of what'the family' is to this text in 
order to make it coherent, to string these repeated references to 'the 
family' together so we recognise it as an object (the family) and with 
subjects (mothers, fathers, children). ... But we also have to bring a 
knowledge of discourses from outside, our awareness in this case that 
this is not the only way of talking about relationships, to bear on any 
example or fragment of discourse for it to become part of a coherent 
system in our analysis. (Parker, 1992, p. 1 2) 
The coherence of a discourse is not supposed to be inherent in the text, i. e., in 
the specific occasion of its use, nor is its recognizability as a discourse. Both 
these qualities of discourses are constructed as emerging from the analyst, 
from their quality as an interpreter of a text. The quality of an analyst is argued 
to be contingent upon their'cultural competence' (Burman & Parker, 1993), 
that is to say, it depends upon an 'awareness of cultural trends, of allusions to 
political and social developments [which] is essential for a discourse analysis 
to work' (Burman & Parker, 1993, p. 1 58). In this formulation of discourse 
analysis, the analyst, their cultural knowledge, their political and social 
interests and concerns, their standpoints, their subjectivity, is foregrounded in 
accounting for the analysis that results from their engagement with and 
interpretation of a text. Again, a contrast can be drawn between discursive 
psychology and poststructuralist discourse analysis. On this issue, discursive 
psychology with its emphasized focus on participants concerns and categories, 
and the consequent elision of the role of the analyst, could be represented as 
an appeal to objectivity. In contrast, poststructuralist discourse analysis clearly 
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and reflexively foregrounds the subjectivity of the analyst as functioning in the 
constitution of the analytic account. Following this line of argument, which 
closely accords with the tenor of social constructionism, in the academic 
discipline of psychology it is poststructuralist discourse analysis that is the 
more radical approach and perhaps the one that provides more scope for 
critical analyses. 
The role of the analyst is again invoked in poststructuralist discourse analysis 
in the consideration of the dilemmatic nature of language (Billig, et aL, 1988), 
particularly in the analytic orientation to the possibility that'discourse can 
contain its own negations, and these are part of its implicit, rather than explicit, 
meanings' (Billig, et al., 1988, p. 23). Whilst the explicit meaning of a discourse 
could be taken to refer to its meaning as understood either by participants or 
by analysts, discussion of the implicit meaning of a discourse is necessarily 
limited only to analysts, and might therefore be contingent upon the analysts 
cultural competence or their social and political concerns. Thus, any discussion 
of what might be suppressed, subordinated or marginalized though the use of 
a particular discourse is also necessarily an analysts concern, unless of course 
those possibilities were oriented to by the participants (though this would have 
the effect of transforming them from implicit to explicit meanings). 
Of course, poststructuralist or Foucauldian discourse analysis is most readily 
identified by the view that is taken with regard to the constitutive force of 
'discourses', as outlined above, particularly that 'discourses' constitute 
subjects. A'discourse', when drawn upon in conversation or in written text, 
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makes available a 'space'for the user of that discourse. At the same time as 
constituting a 'space' for the speaker, a discourse is also assumed to provide 
for that speaker a location within social structures, such as those of rights and 
responsibilities. The organisation of those rights and responsibilities, relative to 
rights and responsibilities of other subjects constituted by other 'discourses', is 
assumed to be determined by the ideological relations between the constituting 
'discourses'. For example, the rights and responsibilities of subjects constituted 
by discourses of 'masculinity' and 'femininity' may be assumed to be structured 
and organised according to a patriarchal ideology. The 'space' and its 
concomitant location within social and cultural structures are commonly bound 
together in the concept of the 'subject position' (Davies & Harr6,1990). 
The second characteristic feature of poststructuralist or Foucauldian discourse 
analysis, which follows from the constitution of subjects, is a focus on the 
organisation of those subjects within structures of power relations, through 
institutions and ideologies (Parker, 1989,1992). Introducing the idea of 
'discursive practices', which includes 'material practices'that are invested with 
meaning and which categorizes the activities of speaking and writing as 
practices, and drawing upon the example of the medical discourse, Parker 
outlines how'"[d]iscursive practices", then, would be those that reproduce 
institutions, among other things'34 (Parker, 1992, p. 1 7). 'Feeling an abdomen, 
34 Amongst the 'other things' that are reproduced by discursive practices are subject positions. 
Consider Davies and Harr6's (1990) outlining of the concept of the 'subject position'; 'the 
constitutive force of each discursive practice lies in its provision of subject positions. A subject 
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giving an injection or cutting a body' (Parker, 1992, p. 17), presumably as well 
as invoking a host of discursive resources which could be taken to constitute 
the medical discourse, are taken to be the discursive practices that reproduce 
and maintain the institution of primary health care. 
Discourses, therefore, may be represented as constitutive of both subjects and 
institutions and, it is contended, of the organisation of the former within the 
latter: 'Institutions, for example, are structured around and reproduce power 
relations' (Parker, 1992, p. 1 8). Thus, the organisation of subjects within 
institutions may be argued to occur along dimensions of power. Again, 
consider the example given by Parker of the way that the medical discourse 
constitutes subjects such as 'doctors' and 'patients' as more and less powerful 
within the institution of primary health care (see also Parker's (1992) second 
example of the British Psychological Society as an institution, which was 
subsequently developed in the outlining of the concept of 'discursive 
complexes' and the proposition of psychoanalysis as an interpretative 
framework for discourse analysis (Parker, 1994): this analytic possibility will 
discussed below). 
Within the orientation to the relationship between discourse and power, most 
simply represented by Foucault (1980) as the coupletpower/knowledge', two 
position incorporates both a conceptual repertoire and a location for persons within the 
structure of rights for those that use that repertoire' (p. 46). 
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positions occur. The first argues against the'power/knowledge' couplet and 
argues that there is a need to distinguish discourse from power (Parker, 1992). 
The second position argues that power and discourse are synonymous, at 
least in the relational constitution of subjectivities; 'We need, in fact, to ask how 
the self is implicated moment by moment, through the medium of discourse, in 
power' (Parker, 1989, p. 68). Consider also Burr's claim that: 
[D]iscourses offer a framework to people against which they may 
understand their own experience and behaviour and that of others, and 
can be seen to be tied to social structures and practices in a way which 
masks the power relations operating in society (1995, p. 71-72) 
This form of power, the effectiveness of which is contingent upon its invisibility 
to those whose subjectivities it constitutes and organizes relative to those of 
others, is referred to by Foucault (1977) as 'disciplinary power. 
One possible reason for Parker's change in perspective with regard to the 
ubiquity of power is his evident conceptualisation of power as a necessarily 
oppressive and negative force. This possibility is most evident in the following 
quotation: 
[W]e should not talk about discourse and power as necessarily entailing 
one another [because] we would lose a sense of the relationship 
between power and resistance, lose the distinction between power as 
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coercive and resistance as a refusal of dominant meanings (Parker, 
1992, p. 18, emphasis in original ) 
There is in Parker's theorising an absence of any sense of power as a 
productive or positive force and, arguably, this may be a consequence of the 
particular political investments that Parker may bring to the table as an analyst. 
The relationship between discourse, power and ideology is more intangible 
than that between discourse, power and institutions owing to the various 
definitions and understandings of 'ideology' (Burr, 1995; Parker, 1992; Billig, et 
aL. 1988). Arguably, the most useful understanding of 'ideology, for a social 
constructionist engagement with masculinity and therefore the one that will be 
adopted in this thesis, is one that views ideology as both dilemmatic (Billig, et 
aL, 1988) and as knowledge that functions in the service of power (Burr, 1995). 
Ideology is therefore 'a description of relationships and effects ... at a particular 
place and historical period' (Parker, 1992, p. 20) that functions to instantiate 
and even make transparent structures of p6wer relations. However, it is argued 
that these descriptions are arrived at and negotiated through a dilemmatic 
process. Thus any account or description given by an individual is argued to be 
informed by the negotiation of prevailing cultural ideologies through a 
dilemmatic process. The concept of ideological dilemmas and its usefulness to 
discourse analytic research will be discussed in greater detail in the outlining of 
the critical discursive psychological approach. 
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A more recent emergence from the poststructuralist or Foucauldian discourse 
analytic perspective is the possibility of invoking psychoanalysis as an 
interpretative framework (Frosh, Phoenix & Pattman, 2004; Parker, 1992, 
1994,1997; Wetherell, 2003). The move is warranted by constructions of 
conceptualisations of subjectivity within discourse analytic approaches as 
insufficient and as unable to take experience into account without 
essentializing it. Two forms of subjectivity are identified as existent with 
contemporary discourse analytic approaches, 'blank subjectivity' and 
'uncomplicated subjectivity. 
Briefly, within 'blank subjectivity', experience is viewed only as an effect of 
language and the 'self is viewed as a rhetorically occasioned resource; 'blank 
subjectivity' is represented as apparent within discursive psychological 
approaches (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996). One 
particular problem for blank subjectivity is how, if at all, agency can be 
incorporated in discourse analytic approaches. 'Uncomplicated subjectivity' 
refers to'some variety of "core self"which is able to choose which discourse or 
interpretative repertoires to use in different situations' (Parker, 1997, p. 482). 
This conceptual isation of a rational unitary subject is, however, antithetical to 
the poststructuralist position (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn & Walkerdine, 
1984; Hollway, 1989; Gavey, 1989), within which subjectivities are constituted 
when the individual is subjected to discourse. This idea will be developed 
through the following section on positioning theory. 
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Drawing upon the use of psychoanalysis by others, most notably Frosh, 
(1987), Henriques et aL, (1984) and Hollway, (1989), Parker proposes using 
psychoanalysis as an interpretative framework for engagement with the 'self or 
the'subject' because of 'how it has been fashioned as part of a particular 
system of self-talk and self-reference in Western culture"and because 
'psychoanalytic knowledge helps structure the dominant culture in the West' 
(Parker, 1997, p. 483). This approach requires that the psychoanalytic 
vocabulary be regarded as embedded in culture 'as a culturally and locally 
bounded discourse' and the treatment of 'the psychoanalytic institution as a 
"regime of truth" with effects of power no less reactionary than those of 
psychology itself (Parker, 1997. p. 484). The use of psychoanalysis as an 
interpretative framework, Parker claims, would result in the concept of 
"complex subjectivity", which 'takes seriously both the intentions and desires of 
the individual and the operation of social structures and discourse' (1997, 
p. 491). However, in line with the poststructuralist position adopted within this 
thesis and on the basis of parsimony, psychoanalysis will purposefully not be 
engaged with in this thesis, either as a theory for the constitution of 
'masculinity' or as an interpretative framework within discourse analysis. 
3.4 Critical Discursive Psychology 
The potential for the combination of the two above outlined approaches has 
been most extensively developed by Margaret Wetherell and Nigel Edley in 
their discursive analyses of masculinity (Edley, 2001; Edley & Wetherell, 1996, 
1997,1999,2001; Wetherell, 1996,1998; Wetherell & Edley, 1998,1999); see 
also Coyle (2000) for similar calls for a synthesis of the two approaches. It is 
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perhaps a happy coincidence that this thesis finds both its method and its topic 
most extensively developed and explored within the same body of literature. 
The issue of topic and its relationship to the development of discourse analytic 
methods is not, however, one that can be lightly glossed over. Indeed, 
Wetherell and Edley's development of a discourse analytic approach that 
draws upon both the above outlined approaches can clearly be seen to be 
motivated by the topic with which they are engaged and the questions that they 
want to ask of the data: 
How are the norms [of hegemonic masculinity] conveyed, through what 
routes, and in what ways are they enacted by men in their daily lives? 
What are the norms? Are they the same in every social situation? ... 
How is hegemony conveyed interactionally and practically in mundane 
life? How do men conform to an ideal and turn themselves into complicit 
or resistant types, without anyone ever managing to exactly embody 
that ideal? (Wetherell & Edley, 1999, p. 337) 
The questions demonstrate both the imposition of an analytic framework, 
based upon a feminist sociology of masculinity and drawing upon the concept 
of hegemonic masculinity (Carrigan, Connell & Lee, 1985; Connell, 1987, 
1995), and a concern with the constitutive force of discourse, most particularly 
with issues of variability within individuals and across contexts. 
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Broadly, while Wetherell and Edley's work is concerned specifically with 
masculinity, the analytic approach that they develop can be seen to be 
concerned with identities and subjectivities. A concern with identity, and with 
gendered identities in particular, led Wetherell and Edley to consider not only 
what functions the micro-textual features of talk might serve for the speakers 
within a given interaction but also how discourses or interpretative repertoires 
might be drawn upon, as participants resources, in the management of 
ideological dilemmas (Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton & Radley, 
1988), which are understood to be situated in and constituted by the 
interactional context. The subject positions and subjectivities of speakers, the 
standpoints constituted by particular discourses from which speakers might 
subsequently be heard to speak, are themselves conceived as participants' 
resources. They are the ways by which speakers manage concerns that are at 
once interactional and ideological. 
Simply, Wetherell and Edley are concerned with the generation of an analytic 
technique that will support engagement with 'the relatively autonomous 
ideological practices of a culture' (Wetherell, 1996, p. 89). Where 'the function 
of an ideology is assumed ... to be the elimination of the awareness of 
contradictions in material circumstances or perception of exploitation; mainly 
through the presentation of relationships (which seem important only for a 
particular kind of social arrangement) as natural or common sense' (Wetherell, 
1996, p. 89). 
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The first component of this integrated critical discursive psychology is an 
emphasis on 'the highly occasioned and situated nature of subject positions 
and the importance of accountability rather than "discourse" per se in fuelling 
the take up of positions in talk' (Wetherell, 1998, p. 394). Identities are 
theorized as constituted in interactions, where the process of constitution is 
accessible as a participants' concern and accomplishment. The emphasizing 
of the analytic importance of this process successfully heads off criticisms that 
this is a top-down approach and meets the 'requirement that all analytic claims 
should be empirically grounded' (Wetherell, 1998, p. 394). 
The second component of the critical discursive psychology approach is an 
acknowledgement of 'the forms of institutional intelligibility ... which comprise 
members' methods' (Wetherell, 1998, p. 394. ) The delimiting of the object of 
analytic interest to conversation, as proposed by Schegloff - where 
sconversation' is limited only to what is available to the analyst - is rejected as 
'unhelpful and unproductive' (Wetherell, 1998, p. 394). In its place a more 
poststructuralist conceptualization of discourse is adopted which draws upon 
Laclau's (1993) notion of the 'vast argumentative texture through which people 
construct their reality' (p. 341), as well as the familiar discursive psychological 
concepts of variability (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), ideological dilemmas (Billig 
et al., 1988) and interpretative repertoires (Potter & Wetherell, 1987: Wetherell 
& Potter, 1988). This move represents an attempt to situate the texts that are 
taken for analysis within the myriad possible contexts. Particularly, the 
approach developed by Wetherell and Edley, is attentive to the temporal 
contexts within which conversation may be situated, but which might 
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empirically be unavailable to the analysts; 'this is a conversation among friends 
which resonates with and carries forward voices, positions and identities from 
other contexts and other conversations' (Wetherell & Edley, 1998, p. 170). I am 
in strong agreement with Wetherell and Edley on this point. The temporal 
dimension of context must be considered, particularly given the relative brevity 
of the 'conversations' with which we concern ourselves. Many of the contexts 
that people inhabit are long-lived, they are recursively entered into and 
suspended over lifetimes. They are our intimate relationships, our friendships 
and our familial relations; they are our employment and our leisure. They have 
histories that may not and, indeed, cannot be reworked on every occasion. 
Consequently, much of the work, such as the accomplishment of identities and 
subjectivities, that is of interest to discourse analysts is likely to have already 
occurred outside those contexts that they are fortunate enough to find as data. 
However, some of that work may be indexed in those the snippets of 
interaction that we take as data. 
The critical discursive psychological approach, in its most extensively 
developed form (Wetherell, 1998), draws heavily upon the concept of subject 
positions. Wetherell's discussion of subject positions draws primarily on the 
work of Mouffe (1992), which is a strongly poststructuralist conceptualization 
and which constitutes a de-centred subject: 
It is therefore impossible to speak of the social agent as if we were 
dealing with a unified, homogenous entity. We have rather to approach 
it as a plurality, dependent on the various subject positions through 
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which it is constituted within various discursive formations (Mouffe, 
1992, p. 372) 
The concept of subject positions has, however, been most extensively 
developed by Rom Harr6 and colleagues (Harr6 & van Langenhove (1999) and 
Harr6 & Moghaddam (2003); though see also the development of the concept 
of positioning by Bamberg (2000) and it is with this still small body of literature 
that I will now engage. 
3.5 Positioning theory 
The writings found in the volumes edited by Harr6 and colleagues (Harr6 & van 
Langenhove, 1999; Harr6 & Moghaddam, 2003) represent developments of 
the concepts of positioning theory and of subject positions that follow directly 
from Davies and Harr6 (1990) original formulation: 
We shall argue that the constitutive force of each discursive practice lies 
in its provision of subject positions. A subject position incorporates both 
a conceptual repertoire and a location for persons within the structure of 
rights for those that use that repertoire (p. 46). 
In an amended version this definition reads '... a location for persons within the 
structure of rights and duties' (Davies & Harr6,1999; p. 35, emphasis added). 
The idea that subject positions ascribe and afford rights and duties to those 
who occupy them is an important concept. Subject positions are, from the 
outset, assumed to be located within and constitutive of social and moral 
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structures. Further, the locations of subject positions within these structures 
may be known from our understanding of the particular constituting repertoire. 
This point is readily illustrated by the example of 'humiliation'. 'Humiliation' is 
broadly understood to be constituted by an unjust act perpetrated against an 
individual who is disempowered to such an extent that they are unable to resist 
the consequences of that unjust act. Thus, the repertoire of 'humiliation' may 
be understood to constitute complimentary subject positions for speakers that 
are located within a known structure of rights and duties. One evident 
consequence of the above definition of subject positions is that they are 
relational. 
Where discursive practices are situated in interpersonal conversational 
contexts they are understood to constitute subject positions not just for the 
user of that discursive practice but also for other interlocutors to whom the 
practices may be directed or who might otherwise be located within that 
practice. Discourse practices afford and ascribe subject positions to speakers 
and hearers. Furthermore, through the various turns in a conversation subject 
positions are consistently afforded and ascribed, occupied and accepted, and 
resisted and renegotiated. The numerous possibilities within this process of 
positioning were outlined by Harr6 and van Langenhove (1992). 'First order 
positioning' refers to the subject positions afforded by an initial utterance, such 
as'could you pass me the remote? ''Second order positioning' refers to 
occasions on which acts of first order positioning are called into question and 
have to be negotiated, such as'what did your last slave die of? 'van 
Langenhove and Harr6 (1999) also identified 'performative and accountive 
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positioning', 'moral and personal positioning', 'self and other positioning' and 
'tacit and intentional positioning' but these categories will not be engaged with 
at this point. 
There is, however, a more grammatical conceptualisation of positioning as a 
simple consequence of the potential provided for by the use of pronouns. 
Arguably the most extensively developed area of positioning theory and the 
implications of pronouns concerns the use of first person pronouns, through 
which a speaker can cast themselves as both subject and object in a single 
utterance, the classic example being 'I made myself do it'. Instances of the 
latter are categorised by van Langenhove and Harr6 (1999) as 'deliberate', 
'intentional' or'reflexive self-positioning' and are a consequence of the 
anaphoric first person (Urban, 1989)35. Instances of 'deliberate self-positioning' 
are a common feature of autobiographical narratives and represent a way by 
which 'a person expresses his/her personal identity' (Harr6 & van Langenhove, 
1999, p. 62). This somewhat traditional description, implying both the existence 
of an identity and a conscious and agentic subject, belies the potential for a 
more poststructuralist approach. I would argue the acts of positioning, 
accomplished through the use of first person pronouns -I would eschew the 
use of adjectives such as 'deliberate' and 'intentional- may be represented as 
the way by which a person makes both their status as a subject and their 
35 The implications of deliberate or reflexive self-positioning for the constitution of gendered 
subjectivities, specifically through the telling of autobiographical narratives, will be developed 
further in the introduction to Chapter 5. 
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subjectivity the topics of talk. This particular aspect of positioning theory will be 
more extensively developed in chapter 5. More subtle, however, are the 
functions served by second and third person pronouns in the constitution of 
subject positions relative to particular discursive constructions and accounts. 
The functions served by second and third person, particularly plural, pronouns 
will be extensively examined across the analysis of chapter 4 (see Mah1h6usler 
and Han-6 (1990) for an extensive engagement with the functions served by 
pronouns). 
Within positioning theory, subjectivity is theorized as a consequence of the 
occupation of subject positions. 
Once having taken up a particular position as one's own, a person 
inevitably sees the world from the vantage point of that position and in 
terms of the particular images, metaphors, story lines and concepts 
which are made relevant within the particular discursive practice in 
which they are positioned. (Davies & Harr6,1990, p. 46) 
Though I would question the wording of the above definition, in terms of the 
possible implication of a conscious subject, I find this definition of subjectivity 
appealing because it implies that subjectivities are constituted and made 
amenable to analysis in talk, through the use of particular metaphors, images 
and concepts, and are interpretable in their own terms. This approach to 
subjectivities contrasts with more recent attempts to marry psychoanalysis and 
discourse analysis to provide a framework for the interpretation of subjectivities 
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(cf. Frosh, 1987; Hollway, 1989; Parker, 1997). My preference is for the more 
parsimonious approach to subjectivities as constituted and interpretable in their 
own terms; in occupying particular subject positions speakers are discursively 
constituted as experiencing the world in a particular way, through and relative 
to certain discursive resources. 
The analytic utility of positioning theory within discourse analytic approaches to 
masculinity is well demonstrated in Wetherell (1998). Through the use of an 
extended 36 sample of text, the topic of which is one young man's reported 
'success' with the opposite sex over one weekend, Wetherell demonstrates 
how a marriage between a discursive psychological concern with issues of 
accountability and a poststructuralist concern with the constitutive power of 
language can be made to work through the concept of subject positions. 
In the analysis, individuals are shown to have taken up and resisted numerous 
subject positions through the course of the interaction. Further, these subject 
-positions or their renegotiation are shown to occur in response local 
interactional concerns, such as the management of accountability. At this level 
alone, identities or subjectivities would be seen to be highly dynamic but 
36 By 'extended' I simply mean that the sample of text that Wetherell provides is considerably 
longer than many of the excerpts commonly found in published discourse analytic works. In 
providing this text Wetherell meets her own call for 'more extended bodies of data, involving 
larger samples of interaction, such that it becomes possible to identify discursive patterns or 
regularities' (Wetherell & Edley, 1998, p. 163. ) The lengths of the excerpts drawn upon in the 
analyses of this thesis are also a response to this call. 
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oriented only to local interactional concerns. But, Wetherell argues, an 
orientation to the patterns of subject positions taken up and resisted apparent 
across this extend sample of texts reveals 'that they fit within several 
recognizable broader interpretative repertoires available to young men', 
including, but not limited to, the repertoires of 'male sexuality as performance 
and achievement, a repertoire around alcohol and disinhibition, and an ethics 
of sexuality as legitimated by relationships and reciprocity (Hollway, 1984, calls 
this the "have and hold" discourse). ' (Wetherell, 1998, p. 400. ) Further, rather 
than constituting an imposition of analysts concerns on to a text, these 
repertoires are argued to 'comprise members' methods for making sense in 
this context - they are the common sense which organizes accountability and 
serves as a back-cloth for the realization of locally managed positions in actual 
interaction (which are always also indexical constructions and invocations) and 
from which ... accusations and justifications can be launched' (Wetherell, 1998, 
pp. 400-401). 
3.6 Conclusions 
Based upon the above listed research questions, it was decided that the aims 
of this thesis - to engage with the relationships between men, masculinity and 
emotions, at discursive, ideological and performative levels and to be sensitive 
to both the micro- and macro-textual implications and functions of those 
relationships - would be best met by the adoption of a critical discursive 
psychological analytic approach, with a particular focus on the construction 
and negotiation of gendered subject positions and subjectivities. 
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Chapter 4 
"It's not a man thing is it? " Accounting for men's 
relationship with emotions 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with constructions of men's relationship with 
emotions as offered by men. It is intended to provide answers to the following 
research questions: 
9 How do men construct men's relationship with emotions? 
In constructing this relationship, what discourses do men draw upon to 
account for it? 
In answering these questions the analysis will be attentive to variability, both in 
the constructions of men's relationship with emotions and in the discourses 
that they invoke to account for it. 
* In accounting for men's constructed relationship with emotions, do men 
reflexively orient to the implications of the discourses upon which they 
draw for their own subject positions as 'men'? 
The preceding question is based on the presupposition that speakers recruited 
to participate in a focus group discussion on the topic of men and emotions on 
the basis that they are 'men' are already 'gendered, i. e., they are already 
engaged in, and will therefore account for, their own performance of 
masculinity, relative to their constructions of what is culturally 'masculine'. The 
question is also informed by a poststructuralist understanding that speaking 
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subjects are constituted when they are subjected to discourse (Butler, 1993; 
Edley & Wetherell, 1999; Foucault, 1977; Rose, 1996). 
Further, through the resolution of ideological dilemmas (Billig et ah, 1988) - 
constituted by the speakers' constructions of 'masculinities, the discourses 
speakers invoke to account for these 'masculinities' and the speakers' 
negotiation of their own 'masculine' subjectivities relative to these 
constructions and accounts - the analysis is intended to map the ideological 
relationships between the discourses that are constitutive of 'masculinities'. 
4.2 Data 
The data drawn upon in this chapter were generated through the use of focus 
group discussions on the topic of men and emotions. In all 48 men, aged 
between 18 and 78 years of age, participated in nine focus group discussions. 
The demographic information for the participants of each group is provided in 
appendix A 37 . The focus group discussions were informed by an unstructured 
schedule and were conversational in nature. 
4.3 Method 
All nine transcripts were read and reread before being subjected to thematic 
coding, in the manner advocated within grounded theory analysis (e. g. Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990; Pidgeon & Henwood, 1996). QSR NVivo qualitative research 
software was used to assist the process of thematic coding (QSR International, 
37 The participant information sheet, consent form and the interview schedule are also included 
in Appendix A. 
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1999). The aim of the initial thematic coding was to render manageable a 
sizable data set; the transcript of each focus group discussion was between 50 
and 60 pages in length. The systematic thematic coding of data was used as a 
means of identifying and grouping those tranches of text that might yield 
interesting and relevant analyses, i. e. that might support engagement with the 
above outlined research questions. These tranches of text where subsequently 
organized according to the particular discourses that were drawn upon to 
account for the men's constructed relationship with emotions. 
These grouped tranches of text were then subjected to a form of critical 
discursive psychological analysis of the type outlined in chapter 3. This form of 
analysis advocates a recursive movement between micro- and macro-textual 
levels (Coyle, 2000). However, moves to the macro-textual level should be 
firmly grounded in the micro-textual details of the data. In the case of a gender- 
focussed analysis, this may mean that the move towards a macro-textual 
analysis is contingent upon the presence of explicitly gendered terms or on the 
presence of some other resources that can reasonably be argued to be 
gendered (see Wetherell (1998) for a discussion of this issue). In this instance, 
given thatmen' and 'emotions' were the predominant topics of talk there was 
no paucity of gendered terms. 
The analysis was also highly attentive to the subject positions afforded to the 
speakers (Davies & Harr6,1990) by their constructions of gendered emotional 
behaviour. Specifically, the analysis was attentive to the possibility that these 
subject positions may be actively negotiated and managed in the negotiation of 
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ideological dilemmas (Billig et aL, 1988). One such dilemma to which the 
analysis was particular attentive was the potential requirement for speakers to 
simultaneously construct accounts of men's relationship with emotions and 
warrant their right to do so through their own performances of 'masculinity' 
(Butler, 1999) and through the constitution of 'masculine' subjectivities 
(Hollway, 1984). Thus, the analysis was simultaneously concerned with the 
participants' construction of men's relationship with emotion and their 
negotiation of their own positions as 'men'. 
4.4 Analysis 
The analysis of the data generated by the focus group discussions is divided 
into two main parts, those excerpts concerned with accounting for masculine 
emotional inexpressivity and those concerned with accounting for anger, the 
constructed exception to masculine emotional inexpressivity. The first part is 
further divided into sections according to the particular discourses drawn upon 
to account for masculine emotional inexpressivity; they are the 'socialization' 
discourse, the'social structures' discourse and the "evolutionary' discourse'. 
Those excerpts grouped under the section heading of the 'socialization' 
discourse are primarily concerned with accounting for the proscription of 
emotional expression through crying. Those excerpts grouped under the 
section heading of the'social structures' discourse are further subdivided 
according to whether they are concerned with accounting for the proscription of 
emotional expression through crying or with accounting for the proscription of 
the expression of emotions such as love. The excerpts grouped under the 
section heading of the 'evolutionary' discourse are concerned with general 
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inexpressivity, though there Is a particular focus on the proscription of the 
expression of fear In one excerpt. The second part of this analysis, concerning 
accounts of anger as the exception to masculine emotional inexpressivity, is 
divided Into two sections. The first section is simply concerned with those 
excerpts in which 'angee Is constructed as an appropriately masculine form of 
emotional expression. The second section Is concerned with those excerpts in 
which the 'hydraulic model'discourse is Invoked to account for the expression 
of anger as the exception to masculine emotional inexpressivity. The 
implications of the various discourses for the subject positions of the speakers 
who draw on them will be discussed at the end of each section and part and 
will be drawn together as a whole in the discussion. 
4.4.1 Accounting for masculine emotional Inexpressivity 
The 'socialization' discourse 
The following excerpts contain occasions on which the 'socialization' discourse 
was invoked to account for male emotional Inexpression. These excerpts are 
identified as distinct from those in the following section, which are concerned 
with the 'social structures' discourse, on the grounds that in these excerpts 
socialization is constructed as an active developmental process in which male 
children are engaged. They therefore contrast with the 'social structures' 
discourses, which Imply a less active process of acculturation. Importantly, on 
all the occasions on which the 'socialization' discourse was invoked it was to 
account for men's constructed resistance to expressing emotion through 
crying. In these excerpts, male resistance to expressing emotion through 
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crying is constructed as resulting from involvement in the process of 
socialization, through which such emotional expressions were proscribed. 
The first excerpt contains the most extensive and well developed invocation of 
the 'socialization' discourse to account for men's constructed resistance to 
expressing emotion through crying. Within the constructed process of 
socialization, men are positioned as the primary agents of the proscription of 
masculine emotional expression through crying. The 'socialization' discourse 
has demonstrable Implications for the occupation of gendered subject positions 
by those speakers who Invoke it. Within the excerpt, extensive use is made of 
reported speech to work up the persuasiveness of the 'socialization' discourse. 
Consequently, the functions served by invocations of reported speech will also 
be substantively engaged with. 
Excerpt I 
1128 Ian: = but like (. ) like you said that about emotions If you fall over your 
1129 Dad's going to say'get up that didn't hurt you'(. ) 
1130 Neil: 'boys don't cry = 
1131 Ian: = whereas If a girl's different if a girl falls she'll get up and she'll cry 
1132 and the mother will 'aww' and they'll mollycoddle her [whereas a man] if his 
1133 Tony: 'don't be soft' 
1134 Ian: son falls over 'get up It didn't hurt you'= 
1135 Tony: = yeah 'don't be soft'= 
1136 Ian: = It's bred Into you that = 
1137 Tony. - you get a that as well don't youyou're not a girl what's up with 
1138 you? get up' - 
1139 Ian: = yeah It's bred Into you 
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1140 Graham: = or they (. ) when you're first born they slap your arse and you cry 
1141 don't you? = 
1142 Tony: = yeah It starts straight away ((group laugh)) 
1143 Ian: = that's to make sure you're alive = 
1144 Graham: = yeah I know but It's obvious it's obviously a it's like breathing 
1145 Innit? = 
1146 Ian: = yeah bu- but that Is an emotion that = 
1147 Colin: = you do it different with your daughters though 
1148 Graham: = It's just something that happens = 
1149 Colin: = If your daughter hurts herself and your son hurts himself In exactly 
1150 the same accident with your daughter it's 'aww aww' and your son it's 'it's 
1151 alright you're alright you son' = 
1152 Tony: ='come here you're ok'= 
1153 Colin: = 'you're a lad you you're alright' 
1154 Ian: = 'you're a lad aren't you? girls are'classic Is 'girls are sofr 
1155 Tony: -I mean you get compared off your parents don't you'come on 
1156 you're not a girl what's up with you? get up don't be soft'= 
1157 Colin: = (h)yeah = 
1158 Ian: z and what do you Instantly do you go to your Mum and cry on your 
1159 Mum ['cause you ] know you'll get that love and attention off your Mum 
1160 Rory: If I had a lad 
1161 Ian: whereas you wouldn't off your Dad 
1162 Tony- - you get nowt off your Dad 'get off go away= 
1163 Ian: = because It's stemmed from generations where the man has always 
1164 been the one 'get up that didn't hurt you'= 
1165 Rory: = see If I had a lad and he were crying I'd let him cry 
1166 Neil: z would you be (all sympa]thetic'oh you're alright'and all that? 
1167 Rory: I wouldn't yeah 
1168 1 would yeah = 
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1169 Neil: = and then he goes to [senior school at ]twelve year old and gets beat 
1170 Rory: but It's up to them 
1171 Neil: up = 
1172 Rory: = yeah 
1173 Neil: = because he's been mollycoddled all his life 
T7: 1128-1173. 
Within the 'socialization' discourse, the effects of gender discourses are 
observable at a number of levels. Gender is constructed as determining not 
only the nature of what Is said in the process of socialization, but it also 
constitutes both the agents and the objects of socialization. Consequently, the 
analysis of this excerpt will be concerned with how the 'socialization' discourse, 
when applied to the proscription of masculine emotional expression through 
crying, interacts with gender discourses to constitute both parents and children 
as gendered beings. 
Before continuing with the analysis, it is necessary to engage with the more 
technical topic of reported speech, which is a characteristic of this excerpt. 
Drawing on the work of Bakhtin and Volosinov, Maybin (2001) stated that 
'invoking a voice always also involves invoking an evaluative viewpoint, which 
may be used by the current speaker as a rhetorical resource to support their 
own speaking or writing purposes' (p. 68). Further, she argued that: 
There are always In fact two layers of evaluation: the reported speech or 
writing conveys its own evaluative viewpoint, but the current speaker or 
writer also frames and evaluates this viewpoint in their turn (quite often 
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in rather subtle ways), through the manner in which they reproduce and 
recontextualize the words they are quoting or reporting. (p. 68) 
Though the rhetorical power of Instances of reported speech does not derive 
from an assumption of authodal'truth 38 , they do represent a powerful and 
important rhetorical resource for speakers. Following Davies & Harr6 (1990), 
part of the power of any'discursive practice lies in its provision of subject 
positions' (p. 46). Building upon this Interpretative framework, if a speech act is 
assumed to constitute a subject position, then I argue that a reported speech 
act, i. e. an instance of reported speech or an Invocation of voice, also 
constitutes a subject position. Whilst such 'conditional' subject positions" are 
ascribed only to the constructed individual or group to whom the reported 
speech is attributed, they are available as discursive resources for the 
speakers within an interaction. They provide a means of negotiating, in what 
would commonly be constructed as 'hypothetical' terms, the subject positions 
that would be constituted by particular speech acts. Consequently, they allow 
the construction of speech acts, subject positions and contexts, and the 
38 What Is said as 'reported speech' Is not uncritically accepted as a description of what was 
said. Indeed, It does not matter, nor do we assume, that what Is reported as 'reported speech' 
may or may not have 'actually' been said at sill The reported speech serves Indexically 
sensitive functions, Le. Its functions are contingent upon the context In which it occurs. what Is 
reported as 'reported speech' and who Is 'reported' as having 'said' it. 
39 I've called the subject positions constituted by reported speech 'conditional' subject positions 
because if you were to say what Is reported as 'reported speech' then you would be positioned 
by that utterance. 
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implications and consequences that would follow from them, that lay outside 
the immediate Interactional context. 
Given the above-outlined functions served by instances of reported speech 
and given their prevalence within excerpt 1, this part of the analysis is 
concerned with the functions served by the instances of reported speech within 
the 'socialization' discourse. The Instances of reported speech constitute the 
subject positions taken up and afforded within the constructed process of 
socialization. The instances of reported speech are reported from two different 
subject positions. Ian and Tony are consistently aligned with the subject 
position of the child, through their constructions of what would likely be heard 
from the voices of "your Dad"40 (lines 1128-1129), "the mother" (line 1132). "a 
man" (line 1132) and "the man" (line 1163). By contrast, Colin and Rory are 
consistently aligned with the subject position of the parent, through their 
constructions of what would likely be said to "your daughter" and "your son" 
(both on lines 1149 M 150) and to your"lad" (lines 1160 & 1165). While the 
alignment of the speakers to the subject positions constituted by their use of 
reported speech may differ, the 'voice' that they invoke does not. 
The 'voice' Is consistently that of the adult, the parent, the agent in the process 
of socialization and the provider of gendered subject positions. Further, the 
40 Throughout the empirical chapters double quotation marks will be used to Indicate 
quotations from the excerpts. Single quotation marks will be used to Indicate quotations from 
published works and constructed entities. 
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subject position constituted by the 'voice' is primarily a male one, it is either the 
'voice' of "your Dad" (lines 1128-1129), "a man" (line 1132) and "the man" (line 
1163) or it is the speaker's male 'voice'; the 'voice' of a man when he speaks 
to his "daughter' or "son" (both on lines 1149 & 1150). The lafter part of the 
preceding sentence draws upon the interpretation of the speakers' use of 
second person pronouns. The instances of reported speech constitute what 
I youwould be likely to hear (from your parents) or say (to your children) if you 
were male. Consequently, through the use of second person pronouns, all the 
speakers in this group are positioned as gendered subjects or objects within 
the discourse of parental socialization. All are afforded one or both of the 
masculine subject positions - of 'son' and 'father' - constituted by the 
discourse. The subject position constituted by the invoked 'masculine' 'voice' is 
one that prescribes strength, proscribes vulnerability and is concerned with the 
provision, promulgation and policing of gender difference and gender specific 
ways of doing and dealing with emotions. 
That one of the central tenets of the 'masculine' subject position is the 
promulgation and policing of gender differences is based upon the 
interpretation of the 'socialization' discourse as determined by the, already 
existent, sex of the child. This construction is explicit in Colin's use ofcontrast 
in lines 1149-1151. Colin uses contrast to construct the sex of the child as 
determining of the parental socializing response. The contrast relies upon the 
manipulation of a single feature. In the utterance, "if your daughter hurts 
herself and your son hurts himself in exactly the same accident" (lines 1149- 
1150), the masculine subject position ('you') - as in "your daughter" - and the 
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emotion provoking stimulus -"exactly the same accident" - remain the same; 
only the sex of the child changes. Socialization into the masculine proscription 
of emotional expression through crying is constructed as determined by the 
already existent sex of the child. Gender, understood as the product of 
socialization within a particular culture, is constructed as mapped onto the 
I essential' differences of sex. However, a poststructuralist reading of this 
construction may contend that the materiality of 'sex' is an effect of gender 
(Butler, 1993,1999). 'Gender does not result from the process of socialization 
but is determinate of it. 
The instances of reported speech and the conditional subject positions that 
they constitute are highly consistent. Indeed, across the instances of reported 
speech it seems that a singular subject position is afforded. That subject 
position is categorised as being "a lad" (lines 1153,1154,1160 & 1165) and, 
perhaps to a greater extent, as being "not a girl" (lines 1137 & 1156). Given the 
use of gender specific nouns and the explicit invocation of gender difference, it 
is reasonable to categorise this subject position as a 'masculine' one. The 
constitution and consequent requirements for the occupation of this subject 
position are explicitly stated through the numerous instances of reported 
speech. The prescribed 'masculine' subject position is contingent upon such 
things as: the denial of pain - "'that didn't hurt you'" (lines 1129 & 1164) - the 
denial of vulnerability or weakness - "'don't be soft'" (lines 1133,1135 & 1156) 
and the equating of masculinity with invulnerability - "'you're a lad you you're 
alright'" (line 1153). By contrast and by implication, a feminine subject position 
would be contingent upon weakness, vulnerability - "'girls are soft'" (line 1154) 
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and, presumably, not being "alright". Indeed, girls are variously constructed as 
receiving sympathy - "the mother will 'aww.... (line 1132) and "with your 
daughter it's'aww aww... (line 1150) - and as being cared for and protected - 
"they'll mollycoddle her"(1ine 1132). 
Towards the end of the excerpt a turn sequence develops in which the validity 
of a subject position, occupied by one of the participants, is challenged on the 
basis of the potential consequences of its occupation. At line 1165, Rory 
positions himself as willing to transgress the masculine subject position as 
proscriber of emotional expression through crying in boys - "see if I had a [ad 
and he were crying I'd let him cry". The adoption of this subject position, as 
unwilling to promote and police gendered ways of doing emotion, is challenged 
by Neil at line 1166. Neil's challenge takes the form of a question. Through the 
question, Neil constructs a generalised three-part list of responses or actions, 
advanced as those associated with Rory's 'preferred' subject position. The list 
involves the explicit invocation of 'sympathy'. an instance of reported speech 
that constitutes a conditional subject position as sympathetic and a final 
generalisation - "would you be all sympathetic 'oh you're. alright' and all that? " 
(line 1166). The challenge and the subject position that it constitutes are 
explicitly accepted by Rory - "yeah I would yeah" (lines 1167-1168). 
Having positioned Rory in this way, Neil constructs an account of the likely 
detrimental consequences that would follow from the occupation of such a 
position. Neil constructs the male object of Rory's turn, his "lad", as liable to 
encounter violence -"gets beat up" (lines 1169-1171) - upon entering "senior 
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school" (line 1169). The invocation of a specific context and age as marking 
the likely onset of violence cannot be assumed arbitrary. However, there is 
nothing in the excerpt to which the invocation of this context and this age is 
indexically linked. My own interpretation is that this context and this age are 
culturally understood as signifying a point in individual and social development 
at which gender differences gain significantly in importance. Alternatively, they 
construct a spatio-temporal location at which reactions to transgressions of 
gendered behaviour are more likely to be met with violence. Within Neil's 
construction of the consequences of Rory's eschewing of the provision of 
traditionally gendered ways of doing emotions, there is also no explicit 
construction of the specific consequences for the gendered behaviour of the 
"lad". However, we (the hearers and the readers) may assume that the 
consequences would be manifest in gender atypical emotional expressivity and 
that this would provoke the constructed violence. 
In line 1173, Neil constructs the process of socialization that would occur if the 
provision of 'traditional' masculine socialization were resisted - "because he's 
been mollycoddled all his life". On an initial reading, 'mollycoddling' seems to 
be constructed as directly deterministic of the violence perpetrated against the 
"lad"; as Neil puts it he "gets beat up [] because he's been mollycoddled". 
However, if we look to an earlier example of the use of "mollycoddle" we get 
some sense of the indexical work done by Neil's invocation. "Mollycoddle" is 
use in line 1132 to construct the adult response to an expression of emotion, 
through tears, by a girl. On this occasion, "mollycoddle" was located within a 
contrast structure. The contrast was constructed between boys and girls, with 
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regard to their socialization in gendered ways of doing emotion. 'Mollycoddling' 
formed part of the socialization in feminine ways of doing emotions and 
contrasted with the socialization in masculine ways of doing emotions, which 
involves the admonishment of vulnerability - "'don't be soft"' and ... get up it 
didn't hurt you"' (lines 1133 & 1134 respectively). Consequently, to 
mollycoddle a "lad", which Neil positions Rory as advocating, would be to 
socialize him in the feminine way of doing emotions, in which displays of 
softness or vulnerability are permissible. It is perhaps this, the raising of a soft, 
vulnerable and consequently effeminate "lad", that we are to assume would 
result in his being beat up upon entering senior school. 
There are also other potential implications for Rory from his adopted subject 
position. The constructed responses of mothers and fathers, to emotional 
expressions by male children, are interpreted as highly gendered. With regard 
to their sons, Mums are constructed as the providers of "love and attention" 
(line 1159). Dads are, by contrast, constructed as unsympathetic - "whereas 
you wouldn't off your Dad" and "you get nowt off your Dad" (lines 1161 & 1162 
respectively). Further, the act of mollycoddling can be interpreted as a 
gendered act. In its initial instance of use it is located within a contrast between 
"the mother['s]" response to a girl and "a man[s]" response to his son. 
Consequently, the act of mollycoddling in "they'll mollycoddle her' can be 
interpreted as attributed to mothers. By accepting a subject position as 
sympathetic and as mollycoddling, Rory effectively challenges the gendered 
construction of masculine and feminine parental responses, as well as the 
provision of gendered ways of doing emotions. 
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The 'socialization' discourse predominates again in the following excerpt. The 
turns contained in the excerpt follow from a discussion of the relative freedom 
to express emotion through crying that the members of the group reported 
experiencing within the social context of their local church, of which they were 
all members. In the excerpt, Simon invokes the 'socialization' discourse, and 
positions "parents" as agents within it, to account for both his own emotional 
expressivity and his behaviour towards his children. 
Excerpt 2 
388 Simon: =I think a lot of people do I know when if if my when my parents 
389 were if my parents were here or came to this church then I know well unless 
390 came regularly if they came infrequently then I think I would probably react in 
391 a different way to how I would if they weren't here I don't I don't necess- I 
392 don't necessarily think that's an emotional thing I think it's just (. ) they're your 
393 parents and (. ) you react diff- oh well you [act 
394 Luke: so your parents do affect 
395 Simon: = your parents do affect you yes (. ) I mean I was you were talking 
396 about emotions (as young people) I was thinking about hh when our 
397 children go to school (. ) I mean (. ) I d- I d- whether we intentionally think this 
398 or or it's at the back of our mind but I know that there is the pressure not to 
399 encourage your children not to show: erm (. ) too much emotion at school 
400 because then they might be considered to be weak and then they get 
401 persecuted so in a sense you do it as a protective 
402 Luke: = hmm = 
403 Simon: = you encourage them to to hide it to to protect themselves 
404 Luke: = hmm = 
405 Simon: = whether that's right or wrong I don't know but certainly I mean 
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406 that's I mean we had this problem with Jimmo (. ) that he was very he was 
407 getting very upset for a while didn't really know why on the way to school but 
408 it wasn't something (. ) that we encouraged him (. ) er to continue with in a 
409 sense we discouraged it (. ) er and encouraged him to sort of erm not show it 
T5: 388-409 
Echoing the previous excerpt, "school" (lines 397,399 & 407) is invoked as a 
context within which the performance of gender, through emotional 
(in)expressivity, is closely monitored. That this is a construction of gendered 
emotional (in)expressivity is not immediately obvious. Simon initially uses 
gender non-specific nouns such as "children" (lines 397 & 399) to construct the 
objects in his invocation of the 'socialization' discourse. It is "children" who are 
constructed as socialized to manage emotional expression at school. However, 
Simon subsequently develops the 'socialization' discourse and locates his son 
"Jimmo" (line 406) as the object and himself and his partner as the agents - 
the first person plural pronoun "we" reoccurs through lines 406-409. Thus, 
whilst it is possible to argue that on this occasion the 'socialization' discourse is 
invoked to account for generalized and gender non-specific proscription of 
emotional expression, it can also be argued that the constructed proscription of 
emotional expression is particularly masculine. 
There is, in lines 398-399, an ambiguity regarding the direction of the process 
of socialization, which arises from Simon's use of double-negatives. He 
constructs a perceptible "pressure not to encourage your children not to show: 
erm (. ) too much emotion at school" (lines 398-399). If the use of double- 
negatives is followed logically then this invocation of the 'socialization' 
175 
discourse would contrast with all the other occasions in that it would appear to 
promote emotional expressivity. However, owing to Simon's subsequent 
development of the 'socialization' discourse, I am inclined to interpret this 
invocation of the 'socialization' discourse as like the others-, parents are 
constructed as socializing children, particularly their sons, not to be emotionally 
expressive. 
There is also an ambiguity regarding the expression of which emotions are 
constructed as proscribed within the 'socialization' discourse. It is the 
expression of "emotion" per se that is constructed as proscribed in line 399 
and indexed through the use of "it" in line 403. However, the likely 
interpretation of such emotional expressions is made explicit - "they might be 
considered weak" (line 400). Rather than arguing that Simon is constructing all 
forms of emotional expression as interpretable as signifying weakness, I would 
argue that the forms of emotional expression constructed as proscribed within 
the 'socialization' discourse are those that are interpretable as signifying 
weakness. One example of such an emotion is given in line 407 - "very upset". 
Public displays of 'upset', a generic term given to a range of emotional 
expression, are implicitly constructed as signifying weakness. 
However, it is not the signification of weakness that is constructed as 
inherently problematic and therefore the basis for the proscription of such 
forms of emotional expression. Rather, the argument for the proscription of 
such emotional expressions, within the 'socialization' discourse, rests on the 
construction of the social consequences that will inevitably follow from such 
176 
emotional expressions that are culturally interpretable as indicative of 
weakness - "they might be considered weak and then they get persecuted" 
(line 400-401). Certain forms of emotional expression are constructed as 
signifying weakness. Any social expressions of weakness are subsequently 
constructed as inevitably resulting in persecution or exploitation. Thus, 
'socialization' and parents' role as 'agents' of socialization are warranted as 
protective actions; 'socialization', in gender typical forms of emotional 
expressivity, is the action of any reasonable and caring parent who 
understands the highly gendered and competitive nature of schools in the UK. 
Perhaps the most significant feature of this excerpt is the work that Simon 
does to negotiate his subject position relative to the 'socialization' discourse. 
Put simply, Simon's subject position seems to be one of severe ambivalence. 
He is simultaneously positioned as an agent within the 'socialization' discourse 
and as promoting the proscription of male emotional expression as "upset' as 
benefiting (male) children - "you encourage them to hide it to to protect 
themselves" (line 403). These positions potentially conflict with ones that 
Simon had occupied earlier as 'masculine', 'emotionally expressive' and 'able 
to cry in public', albeit only in particular contexts, and as questioning the need 
for men to control or manage their emotional expression. In lines 397-398, line 
405 and line 408-409, Simon orients to these potential tensions. He attempts 
to manage any attributions of 'intention' that could be made to the role of agent 
within the 'socialization' discourse -"whether we intentionally think this or or 
it's at the back of our minds" - he explicitly positions himself as uncertain with 
regard to the moral value of socializing children into gendered ways of doing 
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emotion - "whether that's right or wrong I don't know" - and couches his 
position as 'agent' in the process of socialization in the most tentative terms - 
"it wasn't something (. ) that we encouraged him (. ) er to continue with in a 
sense we discouraged it". 
Arguably, Simon's ambivalence is a response to an ideological dilemma. 
Within the group, the proscription of masculine emotional expression through 
crying had been roundly rejected as restrictive and unhealthy. 'Crying' had 
been reframed as signifying strength rather than weakness (see excerpt 15). 
For these speakers, expressing emotion through crying was constructed as a 
valued freedom. And yet, through the 'socialization' discourse, Simon is 
positioned as an agent of the proscription of such forms of masculine 
emotional expression. Expressing emotion through crying is constructed as a 
transgression of the performance of masculinity in certain social contexts and 
these contexts are constructed as stable and unyielding. Socialization into 
gender specific ways of doing emotions is constructed as a necessary evil, the 
right and caring response to cultures and contexts within which performances 
of gender are inflexible and stringently policed. 
In the final excerpt in this section the 'socialization' discourse is invoked by the 
speakers to account for their relationship with emotions. The speakers position 
themselves as having been subject to a process of socialization in which the 
public expression of certain emotions was proscribed. Whilst their account is 
properly constructed in the past tense, as a process they experienced, their 
use of the past tense seems also to locate the proscription of certain emotional 
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expression in the past. In this excerpt, the constructed process of socialization 
is limited temporally and in terms of context and class. It is perhaps worth 
noting that the speakers in this group were between 61 and 78 years of age. 
Excerpt 3 
78 James: = of course there are situations where it is necessary and essential 
79 indeed that you do actually controlt your emotions erm road-rage ((sounds 
80 of acknowledgement from group)) if somebody does something particularly 
81 annoying erm you have to er force yourself sometimes not to:: react er and 
82 the temptation to react is an emotional response and you have to apply your 
83 reason to not do it = 
84 David: =I mean to some extent you're (. ) erm as youngsters told more or 
85 less to suppress your emotions I mean for instance 'boy's don't cry' was a 
86 common one = 
87 James: = that's a thought that occurred to me when this was (. ) proposed 
88 was that er we or certainly feel I come from an age where er the stiff upper 
89 lip was the thing and er you were not encouraged to be demonstrative in 
90 your emotions at all in fact it was hh in some ways considered to be 
91 unmanly = 
92 John: = yes that was the who:: Ie point of much of the traditional sort of prep 
93 and public school education and erm I think as a result one does tend to 
94 grow up at least hh externally = 
95 Arthur: = yep I was brought up in that 
96 Bob: = we cover our emotions = 
97 John: = exactly exactly = 
98 Arthur: =I think it's made me more introverted than I might otherwise have 
99 been I mean to suppress emotions an- and er cope particularly at boarding 
100 school with situations on my own as it were (. ) 
T9: 78-100 
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As can be seen from the excerpt the invocation of the 'socialization' discourse 
follows James's construction of the occasional need to control emotional 
expression. Within his turn, the discourses of 'reason, and of 'emotion' can be 
seen to be in conflict. While the privileging of 'reason' over'emotion' is 
frequently represented as a central tenet of masculinity (Seidler, 1997) in this 
specific example it is explicitly constructed as a social necessity. Citing the 
example of anger in the specific context of driving - "road-rage" (line 79) - the 
privileging of 'reason' overemotion' is constructed as necessary in order to 
avoid simply 'reacting' - "you have to er force yourself sometimes not to:: react 
er and the temptation to react is an emotional response" (lines 81-82). 
Emotions are implicitly constructed as comprising an 'experience' and an 
'expression'. The emotional 'experience' is constructed as the internalized and 
cognitive "temptation to react'. The emotional 'expression' is constructed as 
the reaction over which agentic control can and should be exercised. The 
persuasiveness of this account of the necessity for controlling emotional 
expression depends heavily upon the cultural understanding of the example - 
"road-rage". Emotional reactions in the context of "road-rage" may be 
understood to range from verbal and non-verbal expressions of annoyance, 
e. g. shouting and flicking the V-sign, to acts of violent and occasionally 
murderous aggression. It is worth noting the emphasis that James places on 
the second syllable of "react" (line 81) and on the construction of an emotional 
reaction as something that is done - "you have to apply your reason to not do 
it" (lines 82-83). What is constructed as necessarily requiring control is not 
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simply an emotional expression but an emotionally motivated act. The 
discourse of 'reason' is privileged over that of 'emotion' in accounting for 
actions. 
Over the remaining turns, the 'socialization' discourse is invoked by the 
speakers to construct the relationship between masculinity and emotions and 
to account for their own relationship with emotions. The discourse is invoked 
through the by now familiar trope of "'boy's don't cry"' (line 85). This brief 
instance of reported speech is a short-hand way of constructing the 
proscription of masculine emotional expression through crying as resulting 
from a process of socialization. However, in this excerpt, crying seems to stand 
as just one example of proscribed emotional expression; all forms of emotional 
expression are constructed as proscribed - "you were not encouraged to be 
demonstrative in your emotions at all" (lines 89-90). The generality of the 
proscription of emotional expression is apparent in Bob and Arthur's respective 
references to "our emotions" (line 96) and "emotions" (line 99). The 
proscription of generalized emotional expressivity is explicitly gendered. Within 
this invocation of the 'socialization' discourse, all forms of emotional 
expression are constructed as conflicting with the performance of masculinity - 
"to be demonstrative in your emotions at all in fact it was hh in some ways 
considered to be unmanly" (lines 89-91). 
In this excerpt, the process of socialization is limited both temporal and in 
terms of social contexts. It is constructed as belonging to man age" (line 88) and 
to particular social contexts - "the traditional sort of prep and public school 
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education" (lines 92-93) and "boarding school" (lines 99-100). The invocation 
of these contexts has the effect of constructing this particular version of the 
process of socialization as historically and culturally bounded. These 
discourses are very similar to those in which Seidler (1989,1997) constructs 
the 'contemporary' status of the relationship between 'masculinity' and 
'emotions'. However, these discourses constitute only one particular version of 
masculinity; one that is white, middle-class, heterosexual and privately 
educated. They do not and cannot account of all possible 'masculinities' 
constituted in myriad discursive ways 
Throughout the excerpt the speakers are positioned by the discourses they 
draw upon. They take up subject positions (Davies & Harr6,1990). In 
Foucauldian terms, they are subjected to discourse. For Butler, it is 
performativity; it is the 'reiterative power of discourse to produce the 
phenomena that it regulates and constrains' (1993, p. 2). The speakers 
reflexively orient to the positions afforded by the discourses that they invoke to 
account for the relationship between men, masculinity and emotions. They 
engage in the management of accountability, with regard to the implications of 
those discourses for their own masculine subjectivities. 
As stated above, the process of socialization is constructed as temporally 
bounded. And yet the 'socialization' discourse is invoked by the speakers to 
account for their own relationships with emotions. They take up subject 
positions relative to the masculinized proscription of emotional expression and 
position themselves as subjects of it. A collective masculine identity is 
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constituted by the proscription of emotional expression - "we cover our 
emotions" (line 96). Both, John and Arthur take up positions relative to this 
bounded masculinity. Arthur explicitly invokes the contextually bounded 
'socialization' discourse along with more psychoanalytic terms -Introverted" 
and "suppress" (lines 98 & 99 respectively) - to account for his own 
contemporary masculinity. But this account of masculinity is reflexively oriented 
to as only one possible account - "it's made me more introverted than I might 
otherwise have been" (lines 98-99). The possibility of alternative masculinities 
depends upon the maintenance of subject positions as emotional beings. The 
speakers position themselves as 'inexpressive', emotions are covered; they 
are had and they are suppressed. Alternative prescriptions of what can or 
should be done with emotional 'experiences' make possible alternative 
performances of masculinity. What is striking with regard to these speakers is 
the way that the possibilities of taking up these alternative masculinities, 
through the renegotiation of the gendered discourses of emotion, are 
effectively closed down by their use of the 'socialization' discourse. Their 
masculine subjectivities, constituted by the proscription of emotional 
expression, are not reflexively oriented to as dynamic and performative. 
Rather, they are reflexively oriented to as stable and inflexible, constituted and 
constrained by the 'socialization' discourse and by the proscription of 
emotional expressivity. 
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Summary 
Across these three excerpts, emotional expression through crying is 
constructed as antithetical to the performance of masculinity. Such emotional 
expressions are constructed as culturally interpretable as connoting weakness 
and vulnerability. Displays of weakness and vulnerability as well as 
transgressions of hegemonic cultural conceptions of the performance of 
masculinity are constructed as resulting in social and cultural exploitation or 
sanction. Emotions are illegitimized as the basis for actions and are 
subordinated to the exercise of reason. The performance of masculinity is 
therefore constituted through the concealment of weakness and vulnerability, 
the exercise of reason and the policing and promulgation of gender typical 
forms of emotional expression. The 'socialization' discourse not only accounts 
for these features of the performance of masculinity but frames them as the 
most expedient response to the cultural status quo. The 'socialization' 
discourse is highly inflexible in so far as it constitutes only masculine or 
feminine subjects with no scope for variability within those categories. 
Consequently, masculinity and femininity are conceptualized as oppositional 
within the 'socialization' discourse. 
The speakers in these excerpts negotiate their own masculine subjectivities 
relative to this discourse in a range of different ways. Some invoke it to 
account for their contemporary subjectivity and are subjected to it. Others are 
demonstrably ambivalent about its restrictive implications for the performance 
of masculinity and the freedom of emotional expression. Others invoke it to 
account for the actions of parents, potentially including their'selves', as 
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appropriate and caring and are constituted as agents of gender typical 
socialization. Indeed, occupation of this position is itself interpretable as 
constitutive of a masculine subjectivity. Arguably the power of the 
'socialization' discourse, its subtleties and sophistication are much greater than 
is evident from more traditional approaches to 'gender and emotions' (Brody, 
1985; Brody & Hall, 1993; Davis, 1999; Haviland & Malatesta, 1981; Saami, 
1993; Shields, 1991,1995,2002). 
The 'social structures' discourse 
In contrast to the preceding excerpts, the following excerpts draw upon a more 
dynamic discourse to account for the proscription of male emotional 
expression. The performance of masculinity through emotional inexpressivity is 
constructed as a culturally determined response to context specific social 
structures. Masculinity is constructed as relationally accomplished in 
accordance with cultural prescriptions of the locations that males should 
occupy relative to others in social structures and power relations. In these 
excerpts, masculinities emerge as the ways by which the occupation of those 
locations is achieved and maintained. These excerpts closely echo the 
discourses that predominate in the work of Connell, for whom masculinity is 
'Simultaneously a place in gender relations, the practices through which men 
and women engage that place in gender, and the effects of these practices in 
bodily experience, personality and culture' (1995, p. 71). 
Across the first three excerpts (excerpts 4,5 & 6) the 'social structures' 
discourse is invoked to account for the proscription of men's emotional 
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expression through crying. Excerpts 7 and 8 are also concerned with the 
proscription of emotional expression through crying but with specific reference 
to the context of 'gay spaces'. Most significantly, these two excerpts conflict in 
the extent to which discourses of sexuality are used to open up alternative 
forms of masculinity through the construction of emotional expression through 
crying as more or less proscribed. The final three excerpts in this section 
(excerpts 9,10 & 11 ) are concerned with the construction of other forms of 
emotional expression as proscribed in accordance with gendered social 
structures. The 'social structures' discourse is invoked to account for the 
proscription of expressions of emotions such as love and for the consequent 
constitution of masculinities. 
"Boys don't cry" 
The turns contained in excerpt 4 follow from a discussion of the proscription of 
certain forms of emotional expression in the work place. The turns that 
constituted that discussion are reproduced below as excerpt 11. As will be 
seen, James moves from that discussion into an account of the proscription of 
emotional expression through crying. In the excerpt, the'social structures' 
discourse is invoked to account for both that proscription and for the 
consequent constitution of masculinities. 
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Excerpt 4 
447 James: []I was listening to a radio programme 
448 erm about this chap (. ) who went to boarding school (. ) now and one of the 
449 things that he said was that hh there was a child that came in at the same 
450 time as him and cried the first day and he said for the first three weeks of his 
451 school life in boarding school he was persecuted mercilessly and they're not 
452 my words they're his words and then his parents took him out of school 
453 why? because he showed a vulnerable side hh erm and that was taken 
454 advantage of (. ) now er that that can't be ha pre planned thing it can't be 
455 something that we er that we er get together and decide or as young children 
456 they got together and decide it must be erm a part of oux make up as a male 
457 that you seek to be higher or hh a more dominant person within a group h 
458 so you would persecute the more vulnerable to make you higher up in that 
459 peer group (. ) er er and that way you establish your position and the higher 
460 up the position the bet- the better you are (4) 
T5: 447-460. 
The narrative concerns a boy who cried on the first day at boarding school 
and, consequently, was bullied to such an extent that his parents removed him 
from the school three weeks later. Owing to the fact that James is 
simultaneously managing two narratives - the first about what one "chap" had 
to say about his observations of bullying in a boarding school and the second 
about the experience of the "child" who was bullied - there is a lack of clarity in 
the turn with regard to the use of pronouns. Consequently, some confusion 
arises as to whom - the "chap" or the "child" - James is referring when he 
uses the pronouns "he" and "his". Therefore, the analysis that follows and the 
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representation of the narrative that opens this paragraph are based upon my 
interpretation of to whom those pronouns refer. 
The 'social structures' discourse is initially apparent in James's construction of 
emotional expression through crying as culturally interpretable as a display of 
vulnerability. Emotional expressions are explicitly constructed as locating 
individuals within social structures and power relations. The constructed 
antecedent of the bullying - that the boy in question "cried" (line 450) - is 
subsequently reconstructed as a display of vulnerability - "because he showed 
a vulnerable side" (line 453). It is this display of vulnerability that is invoked to 
account for the bullying. As will be seen throughout the analysis displays of 
emotion through crying are un problematically (re)constructed as displays of 
vulnerability; tears and crying are equated with weakness and vulnerability. 
The relationship between displays of vulnerability and its implications for the 
performance of masculinity is most substantially developed in James's account 
of the constructed actions of the antagonists in the narrative. 'Masculinity' is 
constructed as constituted by the actions of those who bullied or "persecuted 
mercilessly" (line 451) the child who displayed vulnerability on the first day of 
school. 'Masculinity' is constructed as essentially related to the occupation of 
positions of dominance and power -"it must be erm a part of ou: r make up as 
a male that you seek to be higher or. hh a more dominant person within a 
group" (lines 456-457). That it is the constitution of 'masculinity' that is being 
accounted for is evident in James's use of pronouns. James moves recursively 
between accounting for the actions of the antagonists in the narrative and 
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accounting for the actions of men in general, including the other members of 
the group - "it can't be something that we er that we er get together and 
decide or as young children they got together and decide it must be erm a part 
of ou: r make up as a male" (lines 454-456). Through attempting to manage 
these two accounts the original context of the "boarding school" (line 448) is 
effectively gendered, it becomes a male-dominated, masculine context. Within 
that context, and more generally, dominance and power are constructed as 
celebrated masculine achievements - "the higher up the position the bet- the 
better you are" (lines 459-460). The achievement of dominance and power, the 
constitution of masculinity, is explicitly constructed as accomplished relationally 
and at the expense of others - "you would persecute the more vulnerable to 
make you higher up in that peer group" (lines 458-459). The performance of 
masculinity, constituted by an absence of emotional expressions that may be 
interpreted as connoting vulnerability and by the policing and exploitation of 
such expressions in others, is constructed as a response to the relational 
positioning of individuals within social structures and power relations. 
As far as James's subject position relative to the 'social structures' discourse is 
concerned, arguably the most important feature of the turn is his construction 
of masculinity, as concerned with the organisation and perpetuation of social 
structures and power relations and with the relational achievement of 
dominance in those structures, as essentially determined - "it must be erm a 
part of oux make up as a male" (line 456). Men's performance of masculinity, 
constituted through the maintenance of social structures and power relations, 
the relational achievement of dominance within those structures and the 
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policing and exploitation of emotional expressions, is constructed as resulting 
from an 'essential biological maleness'. 
As such, men are disavowed of responsibility for such performances. They 
follow from biology rather than individual or collective agency; consider 
James's rejection of this very possibility - "that can't be ha pre planned thing 
it can't be something that we er that we er get together and decide or as young 
children they got together and decide" (lines 454-456). Socially undesirable 
acts that are constitutive of performances of masculinity, such as 'merciless 
persecution' and the exploitation of vulnerability in the pursuit of power and 
self-advantage, are accounted for through the invocation of such a distal 
determinant, which provides for the disavowal of individual or collective 
agency. The 'social structures' discourse and the socio-biological discourse 
function in tandem. Evolutionary and biological discourses will be returned to in 
the final section of this analysis. I would now like to move to those excerpts in 
which the 'social structures' discourse is invoked to account for masculinity, 
including the proscription of certain forms of emotional expression, as a more 
agentically managed and accomplished performance. 
The turns contained in excerpt 5 are a continuation of a discussion regarding 
gendered ways of doing emotion and the expression of emotion through crying 
as conflicting with the 'masculine' way of doing emotion and consequently with 
the performance of masculinity. In the course of the excerpt, the'social 
structures' discourse is invoked to account for the performance of masculinity 
through the management of emotional expressivity. Emotional expressivity, 
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particularly the connotations of vulnerability and, within that, the implicit 
constitution of power relations, are constructed as intrinsic to the social 
structures within which gendered subject positions are located. 
Excerpt 5 
228 Maurice: = sometimes I (. ) yeah hh I remember being somewhere and 
229 watching something and it was re:: ally touching it was like 'awww' ((Philip 
230 laughing)) and I felt like going'awww'but hell did I 1HELL DID 1 
231 ff(all laughing)) ]that's right hell did II sat therel'man that's 
232 Philip: you felt like crying too 
233 Maurice: really bad' ((others laugh)) but that wasn't what was going on yeah 
234 that wasn't what was going on inside it was something else that was going 
235 on inside but I expressed it I mean I= 
236 Philip: = expressed it another way = 
237 Maurice: = yeah and expressed it differently erm (3) 
238 Philip: I think I agree with that = 
239 Maurice: = so maybe you know that goes on you know we will touch 
240 something we will we'll be aware of something but we'll manage it and 
241 suppress it and not let it out 
242 Philip: = hmm = 
243 Maurice: = because you know errr mm you don't want to be seen to be 
244 unmanly er the woman's there you don't want both of you crying at the same 
245 time ((others laugh)) = 
246 Philip: = YOU'RE SUPPOSED TO BE SUPPORTING HER [you know 
247 Maurice: this kind of 
248 myth that goes on [you know and structure yeah 
249 Philip: and strong for her and all that 
T8: 228-249 
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In this excerpt, I am concerned only with Maurice's construction of certain 
forms of emotional expression as incompatible with the performance of 
masculinity. These constructions are located in Maurice's narrative, advanced 
in lines 228-231 and 233-235. Both the social context and the emotion eliciting 
stimulus are constructed in non-specific terms -"I remember being 
somewhere and watching something (lines 228-229). In contrast, the powerful 
emotive quality of the stimulus is worked up through the use of emphasis, 
repetition and reported speech - "it was re:: ally touching it was like 'awww' [] 
and I felt like going 'awww... (lines 229-230). This construction of a powerful 
emotive stimulus and the 'instinctive' form of emotional expression -I felt like 
going 'awww'" - is immediately qualified through the equally worked up 
construction of Maurice's resistance to this form of expression - "but hell did I 
ýHELL DID I" (line 230). 
My interpretation of the function served by the decrease in pitch, in Maurice's 
repetition of "hell did I", is based on the assumption of a relationship between 
the tonal qualities of speech and the performance of gender. Simply, 
'masculinity' is assumed to be characterized by a low pitched voice and 
femininity by a comparatively high pitched voice. Further, the relationship 
between the tonal qualities of speech and gender is assumed to be linear, i. e., 
the lower the pitch the more masculine the voice is heard as being. 
Consequently, Maurice's lowered pitch is heard as a figurative invocation of a 
more masculine voice than would be constituted by his already relatively low 
pitched voice. The invocation of the figurative masculine voice is interpreted as 
a reflexive orientation to the resistance of the conditional subject position that 
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would constituted by saying 'awww' as performative of masculinity. Simply, 
resisting expressing this particular emotional response is constructed as 
performative of masculinity. 
Overlapping the laughter of the group at line 231, Philip contributes to 
Maurice's narrative and offers a second possible form of emotional expression 
- "you felt like crying too" (line 232). Implicit within this elaboration is the 
construction of Maurice as not alone within the constructed social context of 
the narrative. Further, the as yet unspecified 'other' is implicitly constructed as 
expressing emotion through tearS41. Maurice confirms "felt like crying" as the 
emotional experience and as the 'dispreferred' form of expression. Further, he 
immediately qualifies it with the third repetition of his constructed resistance - 
"that's right hell did I" (line 231). 'Crying' is constructed as a proscribed and/or 
resisted form of emotional expression in men. Consequently, the resistance of 
emotional expression through tears is constructed as performative of 
41 An alternative interpretation of Philip's turn is possible, in which "too" is interpreted not as 
referring to a co-present 'otherwithin the social context of the narrative but as referring to a 
secondary form of emotional expression, i. e. "I felt like going 'awww'", "you felt like crying too". 
My preference for the former interpretation is informed by the content of the subsequent turns, 
particularly lines 243-249, in which explicit reference is made to a co-present female 'other'. 
My interpretation is also informed by earlier analyses (Walton, Coyle and Lyons, 2004) in 
which the acceptability of male emotional expression through tears is constructed as 
dependent on it occurring in private and not in public. Men's crying is constructed as 
acceptable so long as it occurs in private. Consequently, Maurice's tears would perhaps not be 
regarded as unmasculine if no'otherwas assumed to be present. 
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masculinity. The expression of emotion through 'crying' when 'others' are 
present is implicitly constructed as incompatible with the performance of 
masculinity. In lines 231 and 233 Maurice again invokes the figurative 
masculine voice to construct the 'preferred' form of emotional expression - 
" Vman that's really bad'. Devoid of any emotional terms this invocation of voice 
could only constitute a subject position of dispassionate evaluative judgement. 
It is potentially interpretable as the 'voice' of masculine objective reason. 
Over the remainder of the excerpt, Maurice and Philip cooperate in the 
construction of the masculine relationship with emotions. In doing so, they 
draw heavily on the discourses of emotional 'experience' and emotional 
'expression' and ascribe agency to men as actively managing and controlling 
the latter. Constructions of this type are characteristic of constructions of men's 
relationship with emotions and will be engaged with further in the next part of 
this analysis. At this stage, the analysis will focus on the invocation of the 
Isocial structures' discourse to account for the agentic management of 
emotional 'expression'- "we'll be aware of something but we'll manage it and 
suppress it and not let it out' (line 240-241 and the consequent performance 
of masculinity. 
Between lines 243 and 249, Maurice and Philip cooperate in the construction 
of the social functions served by, and consequent need for, controlling 
emotional expressions. Masculinity, constituted by the proscription of 
emotional expression through crying, is constructed as a location in gender 
power relations that men are relationally compelled to occupy. The social 
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context of Maurice's narrative is developed, such that the previously 
unspecified 'other is explicitly constructed as a female companion - "the 
woman's there" (line 244). The performance of 'masculinity' is explicitly 
constructed as relationally accomplished relative to femininity. Further, the 
expression of emotion through crying is also explicitly constructed as culturally 
interpretable as antithetical to the performance of masculinity -2'you don't want 
to be seen to be unmanly" (lines 243-244). Maurice's use of the second person 
plural pronoun in his construction of the performance of masculinity as a 
concern of men - "you don't want" (lines 243 & 244) - effectively positions 
both him and any other hearers who might occupy the position of 'the man' in 
such a context as reflexively managing that performance. 
Whilst avoiding being positioned as "unmanly" is interpretable as accounting 
for the proscription of masculine emotional expression through crying, an 
alternative account is constructed through the invocation of the 'social 
structures' discourse. The performance of masculinity, constituted by not 
expressing emotion through crying, is accounted for through the construction 
of the relative locations occupied by masculinity and femininity within social 
structures and power relations. Femininity, constituted by women's expression 
of emotion through crying, is constructed as characterized by the need for 
support. The prescribed performance of 'masculinity', the absence of emotional 
expressions such as crying, is constructed as functioning in support of 
'femininity'- "YOU'RE SUPPOSED TO BE SUPPORTING HER" (line 246) 
and "strong for her and all that" (line 249). Masculinity is again constructed as 
characterized by strength and by the occupation of positions of dominance 
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within social structures. However, in this instance masculinity, strength and 
dominance are constructed as relationally accomplished for the benefit of 
others. 
Arguably, the invocation of the 'social structures' discourse allows the 
negotiation of the complex ideological dilemma, of accounting for the 
performance of masculinity through strength and dominance in a way that is 
not socially or culturally questionable. However, the'social structures' 
discourse and the account of masculine emotional expressivity that it 
constitutes are not unproblematic. Emotionally expressivity is still constructed 
as both constitutive of femininity and as connoting weakness. Thus, women, 
through their constructed greater emotional expressivity, are constructed as 
weak and as requiring masculine support. The'social structures' discourse 
does not exactly empower women. 
This possibility is reflexively oriented to by Maurice in his final turn - "this kind 
of myth that goes on" (lines 247-248). Maurice had occupied subject positions 
constituted by constructions of the proscription of emotional expression 
through crying as constitutive of masculinity; his use of pronouns firmly located 
his 'self as subjected to those discourse. However, he distances himself from 
the construction of an external, stable structure of gender power relations 
within which women are explicitly positioned as weak and as requiring 
masculine support. Maurice may be interpreted as orienting to an ideological 
dilemma, between constructing a positive account of masculinity as noble and 
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socially beneficial and the implicit assumption of a stable structure of gender 
power relations, within which women are disempowered. 
The speakers in the following excerpt demonstrate no such reservations about 
the assumption of gender power relations and the disempowerment of women 
in their invocation of the 'social structures' discourse. In the excerpt, 
discourses of gendered social structures and the locations of masculinity and 
femininity within them are again invoked to account for the proscription of 
men's expression of emotion through crying in public. The turns in the excerpt 
follow from and are part of a longer discussion of the acceptability of male 
emotional expression in public. 
Excerpt 6 
529 [an: = well but you know you don't show your emotions do you until you're 
530 on your own and then it hits you 
531 Tony: = well every[one 
532 Graham: yeah 
533 Ian: = ifs different when it's a family (. ) dea- a death 
534 Tony: ='cause when my granddad died everybody at the funeral were crying 
535 like well all the women were crying but none of the men did they sort of 
536 stood and looked at each other an' all the women going 'oohh'= 
537 Ian: = yeah like that way I think that way is because the woman needs a 
538 man for the support 
539 Tony: = yeah = 
540 Ian: = so the man's got to be this hard person [he's got to ) be this strong 
541 Tony: I think a lot 
542 Ian: person 
543 Tony: =I think a lot of the men did their crying at home when nobody's there 
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544 Ian: = yeah = 
545 Tony: = that's what I think 
546 Ian: = yeah you know = 
547 Chris: = do you think it's the case that men can't can't cry in public? 
548 Tony: = no 
549 Ian: = no = 
550 Tony: =I think it's more of a case that they don't really they don't do it 
551 Ian: = it's not a man thing really is it? if you think about it it is not a man thing 
552 to do that in public 
T7: 529-552 
The excerpt opens with a construction of masculine emotional expression as 
typically occurring in private. Within constructions of the men's relationship with 
emotions the requirement to control expression is often contextually bounded. 
The most parsimonious distinction that is commonly made is between 'public' 
and 'private' contexts. The acceptability of male emotional expression is, it 
seems, highly contingent upon whether or not it is observable. Observable 
emotional expression, particularly through crying, is proscribed, but crying may 
be constructed as acceptable so long as no 'other' is there to observe it. Ian's 
turn draws upon the familiar distinction between 'experience' and 'expression' 
- "you don't show your emotions until you're on your own" (line 529-530). 
However, whilst emotional expressions are constructed as controllable in 
public, in private contexts they are ascribed the force of imperatives - "and 
then it hits you" (line 530). The masculine ability to control emotional 
expressions is constructed as context specific. This type of construction is 
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typical of the'hydraulic model' discourse, which will be engaged with in greater 
detail in the next part of the analysis. 
The public/private distinction in the proscription of masculine emotional 
expression through crying is subsequently developed through reference to the 
specific context of a family funeral - "when my granddad died" (line 534). This 
context is initially constructed as characterised by universal emotional 
expression through crying - "everybody at the funeral were crying" (line 534). 
However, this extreme case formulation is subsequently qualified through the 
invocation of gender. In this construction the distinction between masculine 
and feminine emotional expressivity is worked up as clear cut and absolute - 
"all the women were crying but none of the men did" (line 535). In contrast to 
feminine emotional expressivity, masculinity is constructed as characterized by 
dispassionate appraisal - "they sort of stood and looked at each other an' all 
the women going 'oohh"' (lines 535-536). Men are constructed as not taking 
subject positions that are constituted by the expression of emotions. 
This sharp distinction between the genders with regard to emotional 
expressivity is accounted for by the invocation of the 'social structures' 
discourse. Men and women are assigned complementary locations within a 
gendered social structure. Women, and by implication femininity, are 
characterized by public emotional expressivity, weakness and the need for 
support. Men, and by implication masculinity, are characterized by public 
emotional inexpressivity, strength and the provision of support. Whether 
masculinity is 'truly' characterized by the provision of support is, of course, 
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beyond the epistemological standpoint of this thesis. But it is worth noting, that 
the requirement for masculine emotional inexpressivity is accounted for by the 
construction of the needs of women - "the woman needs a man for the 
support" (line 537-538) and "the man's got to be this hard person he's got to be 
this strong person (lines 540 & 542). Again, the construction of an external 
determinant of masculine emotional inexpressivity serves important functions 
for the speakers' negotiation of subject positions. Though they position 
themselves as inexpressive, their inexpressiveness is constructed as 
functioning for the benefit of others. This may seem like an adequate solution 
to the ideological dilemma of accounting for the proscription of masculine 
emotional expressivity by crying in public; it is constructed as noble and 
altruistic. However, as it did in excerpt 5, it depends on the assumption of a 
system of gender power relations within which women are positioned as 
weaker than men. 
The invocation of the 'social structures' discourse to account for the 
proscription of masculine emotional expression through crying in public also 
potentially accounts for the permissibility of masculine emotional expression in 
private. However, by constructing the proscription of masculine emotional 
expressivity in public as functioning solely in the constitution of complementary 
gendered subject positions, i. e. as for the benefit of 'feminine' others, the 
6social structures' discourse does not account for the proscription of masculine 
emotional expression before an audience of 'masculine' others. Masculine 
emotional expressivity, particularly through crying is constructed as permissible 
only in the absence of all others - "I think a lot of the men did their crying at 
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home when nobody's there" (line 543). Arguably, discourses of vulnerability 
and social or cultural sanctions could be invoked to account for the proscription 
of masculine emotional expressivity in 'masculine' contexts. 
Of course, the construction of men as crying in private is hypothetical; it is not 
constructed as a known or observed phenomenon, merely as a supposition 
(but see Walton, Coyle and Lyons (2004) for other accounts of the 
public/private distinction in masculine emotional expressivity). The important 
implications of the 'social structures' discourse and the proscription of public 
masculine emotional expressivity are that masculinity is constructed as done 
relative only to femininity and no allowance is made for men simultaneously to 
occupy subject positions as masculine and as requiring or receiving support. 
Masculinity is constructed as independent and publicly invulnerable. These 
implications of the 'social structures' discourse are not reflexively oriented to by 
the speakers in their negotiation of subject positions. 
Over the final few turns the speakers resist the construction of men as unable 
to cry in public (line 547). The absence of men's emotional expression through 
crying in public is constructed as resulting from agency, rather than either 
inability or external proscription - two possible interpretations of "can't'. Public 
emotional inexpressivity is constructed as the reflexive performance of 
masculinity. The construction of crying in public as antithetical to the 
performance of masculinity is advanced as an adequate account of why it does 
not reportedly occur - "if you think about it it is not a man thing to do that in 
public! ' (lines 551-552). 
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Throughout the excerpt the speakers consistently talked about men as a 
generic category and through the use of third person pronouns. At no point did 
any of the speakers position themselves as members of the category'men'. 
While they may be argued to have distanced their 'selves' from their 
constructions of men and of masculinity through their use of third person 
pronouns it is worth acknowledging that their constructions were 
overwhelmingly positive. They constructed an account of men as emotional 
beings, whose emotional inexpressivity in public was ultimately altruistic and 
whose performance of masculinity was the result of individual agency. This 
account of masculine emotional inexpressivity is interpretable as oriented to 
the possibility of the speakers being positioned within it. 
The final two excerpts of this section of the analysis are also concerned with 
the proscription of masculine emotional expression through crying42 . However, 
in contrast to the preceding excerpts the (un)acceptability of such expressions 
of emotion by men in public is accounted for by the invocation of discourses of 
sexuality, which I contend is subtly linked to the 'social structures' discourse. 
Both excerpts draw upon the same example to develop their accounts, a man 
crying in a 'gay' space. Excerpt 7 follows a discussion of the equating of 
homosexuality with femininity, which I attempted to account for through the 
invocation of emotion discourses and the category of the "overly emotional gay 
man stereotype". 
42 Extended versions of these excerpts and their analyses can be found in Walton (2003). 
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Excerpt 7 
386 Eric: =I don't think the gay community likes erm men showing emotions so 
387 much either'cause I know occasionally at clubs or something you'll be out 
388 with a group and one will like (. ) someone will start to cry and everyone's just 
389 like behind their back will be saying "I can't believe he's crying because he's 
390 made himself look so stupid" and erm 
391 Chris: = hmm = 
392 Eric: ='cause I well (. ) erm (. ) well I think it's also a gay in the gay 
393 community as well quite (. ) erm (4) there there is a (. ) well not everyone is 
394 like this but I think I think erm more masculine gay men are usually seen 
395 as more attractive quite often if that makes I'm trying to choose my words 
396 carefully 
TIA: 386-396 
Of greatest interest in the excerpt is Eric's construction of the proscription of 
overt emotional expression by men within, what could be termed 'gay' physical 
and metaphysical spaces. Eric begins by implicitly aligning the constructed 
"gay community" with other non-specified social bodies with regard to the 
general proscription of public male emotional expression (lines 386-387). He 
then warrants the validity of this construction with a prescriptive narrative (lines 
387 to 390). Though the narrative begins cautiously, advanced only as his 
Eric's own knowledge and concerning events of indeterminate frequency - 
'"cause I know occasionally" (line 387) - it rapidly gains in certainty. The 
repeated use of the modal auxiliary "will" - contracted in line 387 but complete 
in lines 388 and 389 - gives the narrative the form of a prescription of what can 
be expected of visits to 'gay spaces' such as "clubs or something" (line 387). 
Briefly, "someone will start to cry" and this emotional expression will be 
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universally - "everyone's" (line 388) - negatively evaluated by those observing 
it. Eric's use of reported speech, in the construction of the negative appraisal, 
works up its rhetorical power and persuasiveness - "'I can't believe he's crying 
because he's made himself look so stupid... (lines 389-390). Men's expression 
of emotion through crying in 'gay spaces' is constructed as meeting with 
disbelief and disapproval from the "gay community"; the individual who is 
crying is constructed as negatively positioned by observers. 
Eric accounts for the constructed negative evaluation of public male emotional 
expression by the "gay community" through the invocation of discourses of 
attractiveness. In this excerpt, the basis for an individual's location within the 
social structure of attractiveness is the performance of masculinity. Implicitly 
equating an absence of or, at least, the control of public emotional expression 
with the performance of 'masculinity', Eric tentatively constructs the "gay 
community" as equating 'masculinity' with 'attractiveness'- "more masculine 
gay men are usually seen as more attractive quite often" (lines 394-395). The 
proscription of public emotional expression through crying is accounted for by 
the negatively valued location that such an expression would afford an 
individual within the social structure of masculine attractiveness. 
Throughout the excerpt Eric reflexively manages his subjectivity relative to the 
construction of male emotional expression through crying as proscribed in 'gay 
spaces' and his attempt to account for it through the invocation of the 
attractiveness discourse. His ascription of the negative appraisal of male 
emotional expression to the "gay community" (lines 386 & 392-393) is 
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interpreted as a distancing device; the account is not constructed as reflecting 
Eric's own opinions. The instance of reported speech that constructs the 
negative appraisal of male emotional expression is ascribed to the collective 
population of 'gay spaces'- "everyone's just like behind their back will be 
saying" (lines 388-389). This distancing continues in the remainder of Eric's 
account between lines 392 and 396. In the opening line, Eric continues to 
reflect upon the qualities of the "gay community" (lines 392-393). However, 
following a substantial four second pause in line 393, Eric explicitly orients to 
possible criticisms regarding over-generalisation; he qualifies his construction 
as reflecting only his own perceptions of the "gay community" - "well not 
everyone is like this but I think I thinW' (lines 393-394). Eric's closing statement 
- "I'm trying to choose my words carefully (. )" (lines 395-396) - is interpreted 
as a reflexive orientation to the construction of emotional expression as 
indicative of a lack of 'masculinity' and the invocation of the attractiveness 
discourse to account for the proscription of public masculine emotional 
expression as potentially problematic. 
The following excerpt is also concerned with male emotional expression 
through crying in 'gay spaces'. The speakers in this group all self-identified as 
6 gay' men, but were on average about fifteen years younger than the speakers 
whose turns constitute excerpt 7. Though this excerpt is not characterised by 
the invocation of the 'social structures' discourse, I felt it was worth including 
because of the contrasting construction of the acceptability of male emotional 
expression through crying in 'gay spaces' to that apparent in excerpt 7. 
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Discourses of sexuality and gender are simultaneously invoked to account for 
male emotional expression through crying. 
Excerpt 8 
475 Chris: = it follows from what Xander said and what you know this idea of 
476 mates (. ) do you think that it that it's different (. ) you know we've had this 
477 idea that straight men do it in one way do you think it's the case that gay men 
478 do it in another (1.5. ) do you think that it's the case that gay men do have that 
479 resource that gay men can talk about these things? (2.2) 
480 Dave: I think we can do yeah 
481 Chris: = yeah = 
482 Ben: = in general and a very big generalisation I think (. ) yeah (. ) a lot more 
483 sort of comfortable with emotions generally (1.1) 1 think = 
484 Kieran: = yeah 'cause if you were in the Manx Arms ((local gay pub)) and 
485 you saw a guy crying in the corner you wouldn't start laughing about him or 
486 taking the micky out of him or anything = 
487 Dave: = no exactly not whereas if you were in a straight pub 
488 Kieran: = yeah ((group laughs)) he'd never do it 
489 Dave: = everyone's like'ha ha look at him'(. ) 
490 Chris: Obig spaceO 
491 Dave: = [hmm] 
492 Kieran: hmm 
493 Lawrence: =I think it's more expected though as well (. ) I think erm society 
494 sees it kind of like gay people as the overlap ((group laughs)) 
495 Kieran: = hmm = 
496 Lawrence: = do you know what I mean ? ((group laughs)) 
497 Chris: = the middle ground = 
498 Lawrence: = the middle exactly kind of halfway house thing (. ) I don't know 
499 
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500 Chris: = is that something that you would agree with? (2.9) 
501 Lawrence: ybe-yes and no (. ) I think I don't think you get variance you get 
502 some gay men that are you know (1) in all intents and purposes straight they 
503 kind of just sleep with other men (. ) that's how you kind of define the 
504 difference whereas other people kind of like will wear their nice kind of bright 
505 pink fluffy things and (. ) kind of parade round 
506 Kieran: = crop tops and stuff 
507 Dave: = yeah = 
508 Lawrence: = alright OK ((laughs)) (3) 
509 Chris: they would be the ones = 
510 Lawrence: = they would be the ones that would be crying in that corner 
511 Dave: = yeah ((laughs)) = 
512 Kieran: ='cause they broke a nail or something 
513 Lawrence: = yeah = ((group laughs (9.6))) 
T6: 475-513. 
Though this is a long excerpt and one within which there is a great deal that is 
of potential interest, this analysis will be limited only to the construction of male 
emotional expressivity as not negatively evaluated in 'gay spaces', and 
consequently as not proscribed, and to the discourses that are invoked to 
account for the acceptability of such forms of emotional expression. 
My opening question, at lines 475-479, represents a summary of an earlier 
segment of the discussion in which 'straight' men had been constructed as 
constrained with regard to the extent of their engagement with emotional 
'expression'. The question is, therefore, effectively a request for the reciprocal 
construction of 'gay' men to be made explicit and provides the speakers with 
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the opportunity to position themselves as 'gay' men. Dave's initial response 
(line 480) simultaneously offers support for the construction of 'gay men' as 
able to engage with emotions on a discursive level and, through the use of the 
first person plural pronoun "we", functions as a negotiation of Dave's subject 
position as a 'gay' man. Whilst Ben also confirms the construction of 'gay' 
men's greater affinity for engaging with emotions on a discursive level he does 
so in a much more cautious and qualified way (lines 482-483). The 
construction of the generalised greater emotional expressiveness and freedom 
of emotional expressions of 'gay' men is reflexively oriented to as potentially 
problematic and undesirable. As will be seen, the construction of generalised 
greater emotional expressiveness amongst gay men is subsequently qualified 
through the construction of variability within the category of gay men. 
The construction of gay men as afforded a greater freedom of emotional 
expression is warranted by an invocation of sexualised social contexts and the 
construction of the freedoms implicit within or absent from them. Drawing upon 
the social context of a pub, 'gay' and 'straight' pubs are contrasted with regard 
to both the forms of male emotional expression that might be observed within 
them and the social consequences that would likely follow from such emotional 
'expressions'. The contrast is set up through the example of a man observed to 
be crying - "you saw a guy crying in the corner' (line 485). As has been 
established over the preceding excerpts and analyses, crying in a public space 
is typically constructed as antithetical to the performance of masculinity. 
Consequently, it provides the ideal resource for the construction of differences 
between men, in terms of their relative freedom for emotional 'expression'. 
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The construction of the freedom of emotional expression afforded to the users 
of 'gay' pubs is accomplished through the use of contrast with constructions of 
what would happen in 'straight' pubs. The interpretation that this is a contrast 
between 'gay' and 'straight' pubs rests on the locally understood meaning of 
the "the Manx Arms" (line 484). This pub is a local 'gay' pub, indeed it is the 
pub to which the Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Society, from which these 
speakers were recruited, adjourns after its weekly meeting. I contend that it i's 
invoked as an exemplar of 'gay' pubs, rather than for any specific qualities that 
it alone might posses, other than it is the 'gay' pub with which all the speakers 
are most familiar. The interpretation that the "Manx Arms" is invoked as an 
exemplar of 'gay' pubs is further strengthened by the invocation of a 
complementary context of a "straight pub" (line 487). 
'Gay' pubs are constructed as characterised by an absence of the strictures 
governing, and the negative evaluative consequences that would follow from, 
male emotional expression through tears within 'straight' pubs. The 
persuasiveness of these constructed differences between 'gay' and 'straight' 
pubs is worked up through the use of three part lists (lines 485-486), extreme 
case formulations (lines 488 and 489) and the use of reported speech (line 
489). All these features combine to construct'gay' men and 'gay' pubs as 
enjoying and affording comparatively higher degrees of freedom of emotional 
expression than are enjoyed or afforded by'straight' men and 'straight' pubs. 
However, it should be noted that through the use of contrast the patrons of 
'gay' pubs are constructed only in terms of what they do not do. No alternative 
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- for want of a better phrase -'gay' way of dealing with or engaging with public 
displays of male upset is advanced. 
Having warranted the construction of the generalised greater freedom of 
emotional expression enjoyed by'gay' men relative to 'straight' men, through 
the invocation of sexualised social contexts, a more complex account of the 
relationship between sexuality, gender and emotional expressivity is 
subsequently developed. Lawrence's turns, from line 493 onwards, are 
concerned with a renegotiation of 'gay men's' constructed higher level of 
emotional expressiveness. The discourse of gender is invoked in the 
construction of difference within the previously unitary category of 'gay men'. 
This follows from Lawrence's construction of the perception of 'gay men' as 
more emotional than 'straight men' as a socially and culturally available 
resource - "society sees it kind of like gay people as the overlap" (lines 493- 
494). Together Lawrence and I then develop the construction through the use 
of such metaphors as "the middle ground" (line 497) and "kind of a halfway 
house thing" (line 498). "Gay people" are constructed as located between two 
categories, which, I contend, are the binary categories of gender, i. e. "gay 
people" are constructed as located between 'masculinity' and 'femininity'. 
The construction of "gay people" as gender transgressors is well established 
and documented (Greenberg, 1988; Chauncey, 1994; Edwards, 1994) and 
psychological research into male homosexuality and gender has promulgated 
this idea (Hooberman, 1979: Sanders et aL, 1985; Pillard, 1991). Discourses of 
gender represent a resource that can be drawn upon in the construction, 
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negotiation and performance of sexuality, and vice a versa. The ideological 
relationships between discourses of gender, discourses of sexuality and 
gendered discourses of emotions support the construction of an openly 
emotional and emotionally communicative 'gay man'as a culturally available 
resource. A'gay man' can persuasively be constructed as emotionally 
expressive because emotional expression is socially and culturally ferninised 
and so aregay men'. 
Lawrence goes on to construct variability within the category of 'gay men' with 
regard to emotional expression, by constructing the characteristics of two 
'types' of 'gay men'. The first'type, constructed in lines 501-504, is 'gay men' 
who are not openly emotionally expressive - the interpretation is based on the 
subsequent contrasting construction of a 'type' of 'gay men' who are openly 
emotionally expressive. These emotionally inexpressive 'gay men' are 
constructed as "in all intents and purposes straight they kind of just sleep with 
other men" (lines 502-503). This is a highly gendered construction, despite the 
fact that gendered terms are not used to describe the particular categories. 
"Straight" is interpretable as signifying hegemonic (heterosexual) masculinity. 
This interpretation is based upon a number of features. The first is the 
implication that the categories 'gay' and 'straight' do not solely signify 
homosexual and heterosexual behaviour - "they kind of just sleep with other 
men" (lines 502-503). The second is that the category of 'straight gay men' is 
contrasted with a more detailed and more highly gendered second 'type' of 
'gay men'. 
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The second 'type' is constructed through the use of gender and sexuality non- 
specific nouns and pronouns -"other people" (line 504), "their' (line 504) and 
"they" (lines 510 & 512). However, this construction can be interpreted as 
concerned with 'gay men', since it is advanced within a construction of 
variability within the category of 'gay men'. Nouns such as 'man' or'men' may 
be interpreted as signifying an essential level of 'masculinity'. Consequently, 
the use of the gender non-specific noun "people" functions to obscure and 
therefore diminish the potential for the second 'type' to be interpreted as 
'masculine'. These 'gay men' are constructed as likely to "wear their nice kind 
of bright pink fluffy things" (lines 504-505) and "crop tops and stuff' (line 506), 
to "parade around" (line 505) and, most significantly, to "be the ones that 
would be crying in that corner' (line 510) - this is a reference to the content of 
Kieran's earlier turn at line 484-486 - because "they broke a nail or something" 
(line 512). 1 contend that all these constructed characteristics are gendered 
and that they function in the construction of this second type of 'gay men' as 
'effeminate'. While the phrase "bright pink fluffy things" is, strictly speaking, 
used to construct the sort of clothes that 'effeminate gay men' might wear, this 
constructed characteristic potentially also then functions as a short-hand way 
of signifying members of the category 'effeminate gay men'; in this instance it 
can be argued that the clothes do maketh the men. 
The interpretation of this is a construction of 'effeminate gay men' is dependent 
upon the interpretation of the constructed characteristics as signifying 
deffeminacy', or at the very least 'not-masculinity'. Within a dyadic conception 
of gender 'not-mascul ine' may either be constructed as 'feminine' or 
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'effeminate', dependent upon the constructed 'sexý of the 'actor. The above 
listed characteristics are invoked in the construction of a category of 'gay men' 
that is intended to contrast with the previous category of 'straight' traditionally 
masculine emotionally inexpressive gay men. The characteristics might 
therefore be interpreted as drawn from a particular repertoire of gendered 
characteristics, which constitute constructions and performances of 
'effeminacy'. To qualify an earlier statement, some 'gay men' can persuasively 
be constructed as openly emotional because male emotional expression is 
'effeminate' and so are some 'gay men'. 
Ultimately from excerpt 8, we can argue that gendered emotion discourses 
provide a resource for the construction of variability within the category of 'gay 
men'. Emotional expression through crying is constructed as constitutive of an - 
'effeminate' subject rather than a 'masculine' one. While male expression of 
emotion through crying in 'gay spaces' is not constructed as negatively 
evaluated and likely to result in social sanctions, as it was in excerpt 7, it is still 
not constructed as 'masculine'. Even within an account that aims to be 
progressive, within which 'gay spaces' are constructed as more relaxed about 
and open to challenges to traditional performances of gender, the construction 
of emotional expression through crying as antithetical to the performance of 
masculinity remains. 
What of the speakers? What gendered subjectivities do they negotiate relative 
to the discourses that they invoke? The terms 'masculinity and 'effeminacy' do 
not appear in excerpt 8. Yet in order to advance an analysis that does not 
213 
simply reproduce the speakers' terms the interpretation of this excerpt is 
suffused with them, based upon the argued presence of signifiers of 
'masculinity' and 'effeminacy'. The question that must be asked is: why is a list 
of characteristics used to constitute a construction of 'gay men' as gendered? 
The specific use of gender terms may be problematic for the speakers. To 
draw upon explicit gender terms such as 'masculine' and 'effeminate' in the 
construction of categories of 'gay men' may be potentially problematic for 
speakers who elsewhere position themselves as 'gay men. If we attend to the 
subject positions of the speakers, they are positioned only as information or 
opinion givers, as credible participants in a focus group discussion. Their 
subject positions, relative to the constructed types of 'gay'men, are entirely 
obscured through their use of broad categorical nouns, such as "gay people" 
(line 494), "gay men" (line 502) and "other people" (line 504). The speakers 
are entirely distanced from the constructed categories of 'gay men'. To all 
intents and purposes, and based only on this excerpt, these speakers might 
easily be assumed to be 'straight men'. 
However, there is one instance within excerpt 8 where the positioning of one of 
the speakers within one of the categories of 'gay men' is potentially 
discernable. Lines 506 to 508 seem to constitute a private joke for the 
speakers. This interpretation is highly contestable, but it makes sense of an 
otherwise puzzling utterance. Kieran's development of the construction of 
lefferninate gay men' is interpreted as directed at Lawrence - "crop tops and 
stuff' (line 506). This interpretation is primarily based on Lawrence's response 
- "alright OK ((laughs)) (3)" (line 508) - to Kieran's utterance, but also on 
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Dave's alignment with the content of it (line 507). Kieran's utterance is 
interpreted as not only a further development of the construction of 'effeminate 
gay men' but also as an act of first order positioning (van Langenhove and 
Han-6,1999); Lawrence is effectively positioned as a member of the category 
of 'effeminate gay men. Consequently, Lawrence's response and subsequent 
pause - "alright OK ((laughs)) (3)" (line 508) - are interpreted as both 
acknowledgement and tacit acceptance of this act of positioning. As far as I 
can see, there is no other interpretation that makes as much sense of 
Lawrence's utterance and laughter. The interpretation of these turns as 
constituting a joke is based only on Lawrence's laughter. There are at least 
three possible sources of the apparent humour in these turns: it might be 
derived from the renegotiation of Lawrence's subject position, from that of 
'opinion giver to that of 'effeminate gay man', or from the constructed 
characteristics of the category to which he is assigned, or, perhaps most likely, 
from some combination of the two. 
Summary 
The preceding five excerpts were grouped under the heading of the 'social 
structures' discourse and were concerned with accounting for the proscription 
of men's expression of emotion through crying. Across these excerpts the 
expression of emotion through crying was constructed as connoting 
vulnerability. The proscription of such displays of vulnerability was accounted 
for by the invocation of the 'social structures' discourse within which men and 
masculinity were ascribed positions of power and dominance within the social 
structures of interactional contexts. Displays of vulnerability were therefore 
215 
constructed as antithetical to the occupation of those locations and the 
performance of masculinity. Constructions of masculinities were characterized 
by public independence and invulnerability and by the absence of the 
requirement for or receiving of support. 
In the first excerpt, masculinity, as a position of dominance in social structures 
and power relations, was accomplished relative to masculinity, i. e. the 
occupation of positions of dominance was constructed as accomplished 
through interactions with other men. In the second two excerpts, masculinity, 
as a location in gendered power relations, was constructed as relationally 
accomplished relative to femininity. In the final two excerpts discourses of 
sexuality were drawn upon to open up multiple masculinities. However, in the 
first of these, masculinities, constituted through levels of emotional 
(in)expressivity, were located within a social structure of 'attractiveness' and 
were consequently ascribed statuses as more or less valued. In the final 
excerpt, a masculinity constituted through emotional expressivity was 
constructed, through the use of gendered signifiers, as transgressing the 
binary conception of gender as either masculine or feminine. Across all the 
excerpts therefore emotional expressivity, specifically through crying in public, 
was constructed as antithetical to the performance of masculinity. 
Across the excerpts speakers varied in the extent to which they were aligned 
either with their construction of the relationship between masculinity and 
emotions or with the 'social structures' discourse that they invoked to account 
for it. The'social structures' discourse arguably provided a means of resolving 
216 
the ideological dilemma of accounting for the proscription of public masculine 
emotional expression through crying. The interpretation of this as an 
ideological dilemma is based on the contemporary cultural importance that is 
placed on the expression of emotions. In one instance the'social structures' 
discourse was explicitly linked to a 'socio-biological' discourse, resulting in the 
potential for disavowals of responsibility for the constitution of masculinity 
through the accomplishment of dominance. In another two, the performance of 
masculinity through the occupation of particular positions in social structures 
and power relations was constructed as agentically undertaken, albeit in 
accordance with socio-cultural norms, for benefit of specifically 'feminine' 
others. The disempowerment of women as an implication of this discourse was 
only reflexively oriented to by one speaker. Across all the excerpts the 
speakers maintained the fundamental distinction constituted by the discourses 
of emotional 'experience' and emotional 'expression' through which they were 
able to maintain positions as emotional beings. 
"The expression of love" 
Amongst all the talk of the proscription of masculine emotional expression 
through crying, there were a few constructions of other'emotions' the 
masculine expression of which was proscribed. These constructions of the 
expression of affectionate or tender emotions as proscribed for men seem to 
echo the'gender heuristic'of Robinson, Johnson and Shields (2001), with men 
being constructed as not expressing and as not free to express socially 
desirable, other-oriented emotions such as 'love'. Again, in these excerpts the 
$social structures' discourse and the locations that individuals or groups occupy 
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within those structures are invoked to account for these particular instances of 
masculine emotional inexpressivity. 
The next excerpt follows from a discussion on the subject of 'coming out' as 
'gay'. 'Coming out'was constructed as a highly emotionally charged time for 
'gay' men and through their contributions to this discussion many of the 
speakers negotiated their subject positions as 'gay' men by advancing 
narratives concerning their own experiences of 'coming out'. The substantive 
focus of the analysis of this excerpt will be the way in which the 'social 
structures' discourse is invoked to further qualify the construction of 'gay' 
men's greater emotional freedom. 
Excerpt 9 
533 Eric: = because interestingly enough we haven't really talked much about the 
534 emotion of love and because before I came here I was thinking about 1 
535 asked myself rerm] what's how men and emotions that topic how is it 
536 David: yes 
537 Eric: different for straight and gay men? " and it I think that being inhibited 
538 and not crying in public is true for gay and straight going back to what I said 
539 earlier hh if you're a gay man you don't really want to cry in a club either hh 
540 but what's different I think is the expression of love 'cause that's something 
541 that's the definition almost of of being gay hh and erm and that's something 
542 where where all of us have probably have had to inhibit our emotions much 
543 more than straight people ever have and err = 
544 David: = my god we've been through the mill haven't we? 
545 Eric: = yeah so er 
TI. 1: 533-545. 
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Eric begins the excerpt with the introduction of the emotion category "love" - 
"we haven't really talked much about the emotion of love" (lines 533-534). The 
introduction of this category is warranted by a construction of prior 
consideration and forethought regarding the possible differences between 'gay' 
and 'straight' men with regard to the topic of emotions (lines 534-535 & 537). 
Eric then references his earlier construction equivalency between 'gay' and 
'straight' men in terms of the proscription of crying in public (see excerpt 7 and 
its analysis). Eric's referencing of this construction works up the similarity 
between 'gay' and 'straight' men in terms of the performance of masculinity 
through gendered ways of doing emotion. Significantly it does so prior to a 
qualification - ". hh but what's different I think is the expression of love" (lines 
539-540). 
The emotion category of "love" is tentatively constructed as fundamental to the 
performance of sexualities -"that's the definition almost of being gay" (lines 
541). Discourses of affectionate or relational emotions, such as 'love', are 
constructed as central to the construction of 'gay' sexuality and therefore they 
are interpretable as in part constitutive of the subject position of a 'gay' man. 
Consequently, given the comparative social unacceptability of openly 
occupying the subject position of a 'gay' man, the invocation of discourses that 
are constitutive of that position can persuasively be constructed as proscribed 
- "all of us have probably have had to inhibit our emotions much more than 
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straight people ever have" (lines 542-543f 3. Put simply, owing to the relatively 
marginalized status of 'gay' identities within contemporary Western cultures the 
performance of 'gay' identities through such things as the public expression of 
particular emotions or even the use of particular emotion terms, such as 'love', 
are at least problematic and at worst proscribed. 
Whilst the intersection of discourses of gender and sexuality may provide for 
constructions of greater freedom of emotional expression for men, as seen in 
excerpt 8, it is evident that they can also interact in ways that further limit 
accounts of emotional expressivity. Eric clearly invokes discourses of sexuality 
as well as gender and locates them in a structure of power relations in order to 
account for a construction of restricted masculine emotional expression. 
Further, through his use of pronouns, Eric clearly positions himself and the 
other members of the group, who all self-identified as gay men, as subjected to 
the same discourses of sexuality and gender and therefore as subject to the 
same restrictions of emotional expressivity. This was not a positioning that 
anyone resisted. Indeed, it is taken up as a badge of honour by David (line 
544). 
43 Eric's use of the gender non-specific noun "people" must be acknowledged. Arguably, the 
use of such a noun functions to make the construction more general. Sexuality is invoked not 
only as a resource for the construction of difference between men, though it still does this, but 
as a dimension about which difference can be constructed on a more general level. The 
privileges of normative heterosexuality, in terms of the freedom to express publicly affectionate 
or tender emotions to a significant other, are not limited only to men. 
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The turn contained in excerpt 10 occurred early in group 5's discussion and 
was a response to my opening question regarding their expectations of a focus 
group discussion on the topic of men and emotions. 
Excerpt 10 
50 James: it's funny that you thought crying 'cause I thought crying as well but 
51 also the sorts of emotions that you feel especially the way I feel about my 
52 erm my my young children er er about the feeling of of love that I have erm 
53 and those sorts of emotions that don't ever get expressed in groups of men 
54 (. ) the: y're (. ) I think every one of us knows that they're there we just never 
55 express it you never say those sorts of things you never talk about those 
56 sorts of things it's it's not a man thing is it? well it hasn't been for me 
T5: 50-56. 
James invokes "love" as an example of an emotion that is not commonly 
expressed by men, relative to specific objects - "the way I feel about my erm 
my my young children" (lines 51-52) and within specific contexts - "in groups 
of men" (line 53). It is the verbal expression of these emotions that is 
constructed as incompatible with the performance of masculinity - "you never 
say those sorts of things you never talk about those sorts of things" (lines 55- 
56). 
In his turn, James recursively uses first and second person pronouns in 
relation to the category "men" and in relation to his constructions of emotional 
(in)expression. Most significant is the three-part list, line 54-56, that constitutes 
the near universal proscription of male expression of emotions such as "love". 
Though the list contains second person pronouns it is preceded by the use of 
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first person plural pronouns "us" and "we" (line 54). James is positioned, and 
he positions the other members of the group, within the category "men" and 
therefore as not expressing or talking about emotions such as 'love'. There is, 
however, a subtle shift in James's subject position at the very end of his turn. 
The utterance "it hasn't been for me" (line 56) is interpreted as calling the 
permanence of this subject position into question. I interpret this utterance as, 
at least, an allusion to the possibility that other forms of masculine emotional 
expressivity are possible and to the possibility of change on an individual level. 
Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that James is positioned outside his 
construction of the expression of emotions, such as'love, as proscribed for 
men. This possibly lies in the distinction that can be made between what is 
said and what is done at lines 51-53. At the same time as warranting a 
construction of men as experiencing but not expressing emotions, such as 
their'love' for their children, within all male social contexts James explicitly 
positions himself relative to his children through the use of the emotion term 
'love'. Despite the extreme case formulation invoked in the construction of this 
particular feature of male emotional inexpressivity - "that don't ever get 
expressed in groups of men" (line 53) - James's subject position seems to be 
in conflict with his own account. He could be interpreted as having done 
precisely the thing that he'constructed as absent from all male social 
interactions. Even though he aligns himself, through his use of first and second 
person pronouns, with the construction of men as being unable to do or as not 
doing such things, he is tacitly positioned outside it. His subject position is that 
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of a man who can and does express feelings such as love for his children 
within a group of men. 
In the next excerpt and in response to my indexing of his earlier construction of 
'love' as an emotion that was not commonly expressed amongst men (excerpt 
10), James offers a very different account of proscribed masculine emotional 
expression. Within this excerpt, certain, largely unspecified, but presumably 
'relational' forms of male emotional expression are constructed as both 
politicised and proscribed within the social context of 'work'. 
Excerpt II 
436 Chris: I mean you James you mentioned love didn't you? and 
437 James: yeah yeah 
438 Chris: = whether or not you were free to express that 
439 James: = hmm 
440 Chris: = is that 
441 James: = er well I work in a strongly er female dominated environment hh 
442 erm and I can't express emotions to the people that I work with because it's 
443 not seen as the thing to do and in some circumstances it would be seen as er 
444 a sexual approach 
445 Chris: = hmm = 
446 James: = as opposed to a sharing of emotion and there were a couple of 
447 things that I was thinking about erm 
T5: 436-447 
In line 442, James constructs emotional expression within the specific context 
of 'work' as proscribed - "I can't express emotions to the people that I work 
223 
with". This proscription of emotional expression is accounted for through the 
invocation of social contexts and the social structures implicit within those 
contexts as determining the interpretation of emotional expression. James 
constructs the context within which he works as a "strongly er female- 
dominated environment" (line 441). The significance of this construction 
depends upon James's implicit subject position as male. The emotional 
expression that is subsequently constructed as proscribed may, therefore, be 
interpreted as emotions expressed by a male towards a female. 
Two reasons are then advanced to account for this proscription. The first is 
highly generalised - "because it's not seen as the thing to do" (lines 442-443). 
Emotional expression by males towards females within a work context is 
inherently problematic. However, the second reason invoked to account for the 
proscription of emotional expression by males towards females is much more 
specific and much more powerful. An instance of emotional expression by a 
man towards a woman in the context of work is constructed as potentially 
interpretable as "a sexual approach" (lines 443-444). 1 contend that this 
interpretation of male emotional expression within the context of work depends 
upon the broader interpretative repertoire of 'sexual harassment' and the 'male 
sexual drive'discourse (Hollway, 1984). Through discourses of the social and 
legislative structures of the work place certain forms of male emotional 
expression are constructed as potentially interpretable as sexually motivated 
and highly problematic. Further, this account of proscribed male emotional 
expression involves the implicit attribution of responsibility to women - recall 
the construction of "a strongly er female dominated environment" (line 441). 
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Discourses of the social and legislative structures and the power relations that 
they constitute, through which male emotional expression can be made so 
problematic, are constructed as primarily the product and concern of women. 
An alternative interpretation of male emotional expression within the context of 
work - as "a sharing of emotion" (line 446) - is purposefully innocuous. This 
contrasting interpretation represents the absence of the 'sexual harassment' 
and 'male sexual drive' discourses and the subject positions that they 
constitute. It is a construction of male emotional expression not viewed through 
a feminist lens. As such, it is the product of a masculine subjectivity. 
The implications of gendered contexts as determining interpretations of male 
emotional expression are worked up through the contrasting of the highly 
politically loaded repertoire of 'sexual harassment'with the more naYve 
repertoires of emotional 'expression' or 'relational ity'. Thus, on this occasion, 
the politicisation of male emotional expression and the consequences that that 
may have for men who might express emotion towards female colleagues, in 
contexts such as work, are constructed as determinants of male uncertainty 
over the acceptability of emotional expressions and, ultimately, of male 
emotional inexpressivity. As such, this construction echoes one of the primary 
themes of writings on the crisis in masculinity (Coyle & Morgan-Sykes, 1998) 
and of this data; women and their expectations are constructed as the primary 
agents of change in the landscape of social interactions and in the 
(re)gendering of social structures and power relations, and, therefore, as the 
cause of male vacillation regarding the appropriateness or acceptability of their 
emotional expressions and of the performance of masculinities. 
225 
Summary 
In these excerpts, men's expression of emotions such as 'love' is constructed 
as broadly proscribed. This proscription is accounted for through the invocation 
of discourses of sexuality and the problematizing of male sexualities, both 'gay' 
and 'straight', within the contemporary cultural context. Constructions of 
expressions of love between men as proscribed are accounted for through the 
invocation of thernami-nal-izedstatus of 'homosexuality'. Constructions of 
expressions of unspecified 'relational' emotions between men and women as 
proscribed in particular contexts are accounted for through discourses of the 
pý61iticise and(66ýýtatus of ulýljq-masculine heterosexuality. 
Particular configurations of masculinity, constituted through the public 
expression of emotions such as 'love', are not permissible within certain social 
structures. Two of the speakers clearly position themselves as subject to the 
discourses that they invoke to account for the proscription of masculine 
expression of emotions such as love. Their'gay' and 'heterosexual' masculine 
subjectivities are constituted by the proscription of such emotional expressions. 
Again, the important distinction remains, the performance of masculinities is 
constituted by 'experiencing' emotions such aslove'and by not'expressing' 
them as a consequence of the social structures within which those 
masculinities are constituted. 
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The 'evolutionary' discourse 
The final two excerpts of this part of chapter 3 represent two examples of the 
invocation of the evolutionary' discourse to account for male emotional 
inexpressivity. The first, excerpt 12, is arguably the more serious of the two, 
with the latter, excerpt 13, taking the form of caricature. Within the 
'evolutionary' discourse, masculinity is accomplished through the performance 
of particular behaviours and the occupation of certain subject positions, such 
as 'provider' and 'protector'. Though these facets of the performance of 
masculinity are couched in the terms of the 'evolutionary' discourse their 
invocation in an account of contemporary masculine emotional inexpressivity 
suggests that the occupation of these positions still remains central to the 
contemporary cultural understanding and accomplishment of masculinity. 
As will be seen, the invocation of such distal determinants to account for 
contemporary masculinity is not reflexively oriented to. 'Evolutionary' 
discourses have a currency as accounts of contemporary as well as historical 
or pre-historical masculinity (see the discussion of the 'evolutionary' or 
'sociobiological' repertoire in chapter 2). 1 acknowledge that there were few 
invocations of the 'evolutionary' discourse within the data and so their inclusion 
here should not be interpreted as an indication of their prevalence within 
contemporary accounts of masculinity. These excerpts are included because 
they demonstrate the particular functions served by and problems that follow 
from invocations of 'evolutionary' discourses and that no matter how ridiculous 
an account may seem it might not be reflexively oriented to as such. 
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The talk in excerpt 12 follows from a previous construction by Bob of a 
perceived expectation that men should be without emotions and from my 
subsequent question - "do you think it's possible and or desirable for men to 
be you know without emotions? " (lines 412-413). 
Excerpt 12 
412 Chris: well shall we open it up to everybody else I mean do you think it's 
413 possible and or desirable for men to be you know without emotions? = 
414 Paul: =I think without any negative emotions I think is more 'cause I mean 
415 we you know we all laugh we all otherwise you know comedy wouldn't would 
416 fall flat wouldn't it if that but I think negative emotions you know we're not 
417 supposed to hh we're not supposed to show out grief we're not hh we're 
418 supposed to remain calm in a crisis that sort of thing so anything that's 
419 counter productive to the task in hand I suppose or a situation = 
420 Vic: = yeah because erm that task in hand bit I think could in most in lots of 
421 societies especially and that's carried on into ours it has been a case of the 
422 the man going out or the men going out and er mastering the environment 
423 and bringing back home the steaks and you know erm the tasks doing the 
424 carrying out the tasks whereas women obviously have an equal amount if not 
425 you know I would say an equal amount of tasks to do but (. ) I don't know 
426 somehow that got missed ((laughs)) something = 
427 Harry: = when you say sort of hunter gather tribes and sort men didn't catch 
428 the food by using their emotions (inaudible) ((group laughs)) = 
429 Paul: = whereas raising children is all about emotions or a lot of it is isn't it 
430 'cause you know the interaction between mother and child is a very emotional 
431 one = 
432 Vic: = hmm yeah (. ) 
433 Bob: we're it just seems as though we're erm classifying emotion into a 
434 certain understanding of why should it necessarily be mother and child why 
228 
435 should that erm be the source of emotion so let's say in the hunter gather 
436 example when going out to hunt surely is sort of engaged in all sorts of 
437 emotion = 
438 Paul: = yeah true 
439 Vic: = yeah 
440 Harry: = fear that's right 
441 Paul: = but you would that fear would be suppressed because it you know 
442 you're not supposed to show fear when you know confronted by a rhinoceros 
443 or whatever you hh = 
444 Harry: = or at least maybe it would act in some sense to impair your 
445 performance 
T3: 412-445. 
The excerpt begins with Paul's construction of the expression of certain 
emotions, categorised as "negative" (line 416), as incompatible with other 
requirements of the performance of masculinity, such as 'objectivity', 'agency' 
and being 'task-oriented'- "we're supposed to remain calm in a crisis that sort 
of thing so anything that's counter productive to the task in hand" (lines 417- 
419). 
These features of the performance of masculinity are constructed as both 
culturally and evolutionarily determined over the next two turns. Through the 
historicizing of the location of masculinity within the social structures of 
particular cultures - "that task in hand bit I think could in most in lots of 
societies especially and that's carried on into ours" (lines 420-421) - the 
rhetorical spaces is created for the invocation of a more distal account of 
masculine emotional inexpressivity, i. e., the invocation of 'evolutionary' 
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discourses. Further, appeals to history are established as a legitimate resource 
for accounting for contemporary gendered social structures and the 
consequent performances of gender. 
Over the course of his turn Vic constructs an account in which the positions 
occupied by men and women in the social structures of history and prehistory 
are advanced as distal determinants of contemporary performances of gender 
and particularly of gendered differences in emotional expressivity. As with 
'evolutionary' discourses in psychology, such accounts rely on the assumption 
of a singular fundamental difference between men and women, such as men 
and women's contrasting levels of certainty over their position as biological 
parent (Buss, Larsen, Westen & Sernmelroth, 1992) about which a theory of 
divergent yet complementary gendered ways of doing emotion can be 
arranged. Vic's initial attempt to do this is arguably unsuccessful and ultimately 
breaks down. Men are constructed as occupying the positions of 'provider and 
'agent' - "bringing back home the steaks and [] tasks doing the carrying out 
the tasks" (lines 423-424). There is also, in lines 422 to 423, a strong sense of 
a 'publicTprivate' distinction that men are constructed as required to cross - 
"the man going out or the men going out and er mastering the environment 
and bring back home the steaks". Masculinity is constructed as characterised 
by'agency'and 'dominance' across the 'publicTprivate' distinction. 
It is when Vic attempts to construct a complementary account of the positions 
occupied by women in history and prehistory, and therefore to account for the 
constitution of performances of contemporary femininity with particular regard 
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to emotional expressivity, that Vic's version of the 'evolutionary' discourse runs 
into trouble. By constructing masculinity, and masculine emotional 
inexpressivity, as determined by the requirement for men to 'provide' and to be 
generally 'task-oriented' the reciprocal account of femininity should include a 
contrasting account of the positions occupied by women. Specifically, the 
account of femininity cannot include the performance of tasks or the 
occupation of the position of 'providee, owing to them having been invoked as 
determinants of masculinity. This constitutes an interesting ideological dilemma 
for Vic. If he continues his account of gendered emotional expressivity as 
determined by the relative requirements of men and women to perform tasks in 
history and prehistory, then the only complementary account of feminine 
emotional expressivity is that it results from the absence of a requirement to 
perform tasks. 
The construction of generalized task performance as constitutive of masculinity 
is highly problematic within the contemporary cultural context and it is to this 
ideological concern that the content of Vic's turn at line 424-426 is oriented. Vic 
abandons his development of the evolutionary account of gendered emotional 
expressivity in favour of an attempt to resolve the contemporary ideological 
dilemma constituted by the construction of task-performance as primarily a 
male concern. Vic's construction of equality in terms of the number of tasks 
faced by men and women not only in history and prehistory but also in the 
present - note the present tense in the following quotation "whereas women 
obviously have an equal amount if not you know I would say an equal amount 
of tasks to do" (lines 424-425) - is interpreted as the explicit negotiation of 
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Vic's subject position. The invocation of discourses of 'equality' in terms of the 
quantity of 'tasksfaced by men and women in contemporary culture 
constitutes a preferable subject position to that that would be constituted were 
Vic to persist in his construction of task-performance as particularly masculine. 
That attempting to account for gendered ways of doing emotion through this 
particular version of the 'evolutionarily' discourse and to maintain the subject 
position as an enlightened, non-sexist male, results in an unsatisfactory 
$evolutionary' account is reflexively oriented to by Vic -N don't know somehow 
that got missed ((laughs)) something" (lines 425-426). For Vic, being 
positioned as non-sexist within the interactional context is, arguably, more 
important than the production of a coherent 'evolutionary' account of masculine 
emotional inexpressivity. 
However, the 'evolutionary' discourse is subsequently taken up by both Harry 
and Paul at lines 427-428 and 429-431 respectively. Harry takes up the 
masculine part of the 'evolutionary' discourse and explicitly constructs 
engagement with emotions as superfluous to the performance of masculine 
tasks - "men didn't catch the food by using their emotions" (lines 427-428). 
The positions of 'provider' or even 'hunter are constructed as characterised by 
the absolute lack of any need for engagement with emotions. The humour of 
this construction functions to increase the rhetorical power of the 'evolutionary' 
repertoire: the idea of men using their emotions to catch food is laughable. In 
his turn beginning line 429, Paul develops the complementary feminine part of 
the 'evolutionary' discourse. In order to do so he invokes the same singular 
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fundamental distinction between the sexes that is evident in the 'evolutionary' 
repertoires of psychology, i. e., the 'irrefutable fact' that women bear children 
and men don't. Thus, gendered ways of doing emotional expressivity, and 
particularly women's greater emotionally expressivity, are accounted for not by 
any of the requirements of masculinity in terms of the occupation of certain 
subject positions but by the constructed absence of any requirement for men, 
presumably in prehistory, to be involved in parenting or care-giving - "the 
interaction between mother and child is a very emotional one" (lines 430-431). 
Masculine emotional inexpressivity is consequently accounted for not by what 
men in prehistory did, such as 'hunting', 'providing' and 'protecting', so much 
as by what they didn't do, 'parenting'. 
The resilience and appeal of 'evolutionary' discourses is amply demonstrated 
in the turns that follow Bob's explicit challenge to the persuasiveness of the 
$evolutionary account of gendered emotional expressivity. Bob attempts to 
reframe masculine 'behaviours' and subject positions, such as'hunter', as 
suffused with emotions - "going out to hunt surely is sort of engaged in all 
sorts of emotion" (lines 436-437). Bob's turn echoes Shields' (2002) 
observation that the 'emotion' components of masculinity or masculine 
activities tend to be downplayed or at least not constructed in 'emotion' terms. 
Certainly, this invocation of the 'evolutionary' repertoire relies on the features, 
'behaviours', 'activities' and 'subject positions', constructed as constitutive of 
masculinity being devoid of emotions. 
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Whilst Bob's challenge that emotions are inherent in the activities and positions 
previously constructed as masculine does meet with support from Paul, Vic 
and Harry (lines 438,439 and 440 respectively) it is subsequently qualified 
through the invocation of the discourses of emotional 'experience' and 
'expression'. Thus, masculine activities such as hunting are constructed as 
suffused with emotional 'experience- the specific example given is'fear 
(lines 440,441 & 442). However, the distinction between 'experience' and 
'expression' provides the basis for the construction of masculinity as 
characterized by the exercise of control over such emotional 'experiences' and 
the consequent absence of emotional 'expression' - "that fear would be 
suppressed because it you know you're not supposed to show fear when you 
now confronted by a rhinoceros" (lines 441-442). The incompatibility of 
emotional expressivity and effective performance of task is subsequently 
restated by Harry in lines 444-445. 
As I said at the beginning of this analysis, I felt it was worth including because 
of the sheer preposterousness of the account of contemporary masculine 
emotional inexpressivity constituted by "evolutionary' discourses' and by the 
relative absence of any reflexive orientation to its absurdity. Amongst the 
speakers in the excerpt only Bob orients to the particular assumptions upon 
which the 'evolutionary' repertoire is based. Further, those speakers who are 
involved in the advancing of the 'evolutionary' account do not reflexively orient 
to their subject positions relative to it - note the tense and the pronouns used 
in Paul's utterance "you know you're not supposed to show fear when you 
know confronted by a rhinoceros". From the present tense and the second 
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person plural pronouns, being confronted by a rhinoceros could be interpreted 
as a contemporary cultural concern for these speakers and perhaps for other 
men. 
Arguably, the absence of reflexivity results from the scenario of being 
confronted by a rhinoceros being oriented to as one example of a facet of the 
performance of masculinity that has as much contemporary currency as it has 
pre-historical currency. The performance of masculinity within the 
contemporary cultural context is, for these speakers, constituted by the 
occupation of such positions as 'provider - from 'hunter'to 'breadwinner'- by 
being 'task-oriented', by'agency' across 'private' and 'public' contexts, by the 
exercise of control over emotional expression, and ultimately by the 
achievement of dominance within social structures and power relations. That is 
why they do not reflexively orient to the seeming absurdity of invoking an 
encounter with a rhino as a determinant of contemporary masculinity. The 
invocation of the 'evolutionary' repertoire makes the constitution of masculinity 
trans-historical. 
The final excerpt of this section and indeed this part of the analysis includes 
just a brief invocation of the 'evolutionary' repertoire to account for the features 
that are constructed as constitutive of contemporary masculinity. The excerpt 
and my opening question follow from an invocation of one of the metaphors of 
the 'hydraulic model' discourse (see the next part of the analysis), specifically 
the construction of emotions as things that could be 'bottled up'. 'Bottling up' 
emotion is interpretable as a construction of emotions as 'experienced' but 
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purposefully not 'expressed' and as such is linked to accounts of the 
proscription of masculine emotional expressivity. 
Excerpt 13 
225 Chris: do you think there's an expectation for men to to control their 
226 emotions or as you said you know bottle it up 
227 Lawrence: = [it depends on the] emotion (8) 1 think to kind of talk about how 
228 Ben: to a certain extent 
229 Lawrence: they feel and express you know kind of (1.9) more feminine 
230 emotion I think is something that society you know (1.6) has up till now kind 
231 of quite strongly prohibited I think there's that kind of hh Gillette man image 
232 that all men should have and be kind of slightly rugged a bit kind of tough 
233 guy (1.0) erm (. 9) and you know that has its place and it does 'cause you 
234 know kind of going back to kind of like 'ug ug' and the cavemen what have 
235 you you're there as a protector (1.0) on one level but I think you need to 
236 have another level where you can hh you know act as like a confidante to 
237 your partner or friends or whoever and you need to be able level with people 
238 on a very kind of (1.3) inward and emotional level 
T6: 225-238 
Within the excerpt, the proscription of emotional expression is constructed as 
dependent upon the particular type of emotion and the form of expression that 
it would take. Any form of positioning of the self in terms of 'feminized' 
emotions, either through 'non-verbal' or'verbal' 'expression', is constructed as 
culturally proscribed - "to kind of talk about how they feel and express you 
know kind of (1.9) more feminine emotion I think is something that society you 
know (1.6) has up till now kind of quite strongly prohibited" (lines 227-231). The 
temporal qualification of the cultural proscription of men's expression of 
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'feminized' emotions - "up till noW'- must be acknowledged. The version of 
masculinity for which Lawrence is accounting is reflexively oriented to as 
outdated. 
The culturally prescribed version of masculinity, for which Lawrence is 
accounting, bears a strong resemblance to constructions of hegemonic 
masculinity (Connell, 1995). Lawrence invokes images of idealised 
contemporary masculinity from advertising - "that kind of hh Gillette man 
image" (line 231) - and the qualities of being "slightly rugged" and "a bit kind of 
tough guy" (lines 232-233) in his construction of this culturally prescribed 
masculinity. Having done this, Lawrence then invokes the 'evolutionary' 
repertoire to account for the above-identified features of this particular version 
of masculinity. In the pre-historical context of "the cavemen" (line 234), 
masculinity is constructed as constituted by the occupation of the position of 
"protector' (line 235). Presumably, 'toughness', 'ruggedness' and a smooth 
chin are essential to the occupation of this position. Again, the links between 
the 'evolutionary' and 'social structures' repertoires are apparent. The 
devolutionary' repertoire historicizes the locations occupied by gendered 
individuals in social structures and power relations, thus negating the need for 
more proximal temporal accounts. 
That said, the idea of versions of masculinity specific to spatio-temporal 
locations is very much in evidence in Lawrence's turn, recall "up till now". The 
potential requirement for and the possibilities of change in the culturally 
prescribed version of masculinity is developed over the remaining lines of 
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Lawrence's turn. Lawrence constructs a need for men to engage with the 
relational functions of emotions. Emotional literacy across a range of social 
relationships - "your partner or friends or whoever" (line 237) - is constructed 
as a contemporary requirement of men. Thus, while the 'evolutionary' 
repertoire is invoked to account for some features of contemporary masculinity, 
there are others with which the 'evolutionary' discourse is entirely incompatible. 
The basis of this incompatibility may be that the more contemporary 
constituents of masculinity do not assume the same social structures and 
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gendered locations within those structures that are implicit in the 'evolutionary' 
repertoire. 
It is worth noting the transition of pronoun use when referring to the category of 
'men', from third to second person plural, in Lawrence's turn. His initial use of 
the third person - "they" (line 229) - is interpretable as following from my use 
of the third person in line 225. However, his subsequent shift to the potentially 
self-inclusive second person plural in line 235 is significant. Lawrence is 
subjected to the discourses of a contemporary, emotionally literate version of 
masculinity. 
Summary 
The 'evolutionary' repertoire is invoked to account for versions of masculinity 
that are constituted through the performance of gendered activities and the 
occupation of gender positions within social structures and power relations, 
e. g. being the 'breadwinner, the 'provider, the 'protector and the 'master of 
both the environment and subjective experiences. In short, the 'evolutionary' 
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repertoire accounts for what may be termed hegemonic masculinity. They 
account for'the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently 
accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which 
guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the 
subordination of women' (Connell, 1995, p. 77). Further, as such distal 
determinants, where speakers are subjected to the 'evolutionary' repertoire (as 
in excerpt 12), they provide for the disavowal of responsibility for both the 
constitution of masculinity and for the status quo of gender power relations. 
These functions may account for the power and appeal of the 'evolutionary' 
repertoire and for it being evidently constitutive of contemporary masculine 
subjectivities. It provides for a way of 'being masculine' and resisting change. 
4.4.2 Anger: Accounting for the exception to masculine emotional 
inexpressivity 
This final part of the analysis of the focus group data is concerned with the 
construction of 'anger as an acceptable or expected form of masculine 
emotional expression and with the discourse that is most commonly invoked to 
account for masculine emotional expression, including the expression of anger. 
The excerpts drawn upon below share many of the discourses, rely on many of 
the same distinctions and generate many of the same themes as were 
identified in the preceding part of the analysis, for example the discourses of 
emotional 'experience' and 'expression', the distinction between 'public' and 
6private' contexts, the discourses of 'vulnerability' and 'strength', the 'social 
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structures' repertoire and the emphasis on 'agency'. However, on these 
occasions they are invoked to account for masculine emotional expressivity. 
The two excerpts in the first section of the analysis, excerpts 14 and 15, 
provide accounts of 'anger as a culturally gendered, masculine emotion. The 
four excerpts in the second section also engage with constructions of male 
expressions of anger. However, the analysis of these excerpts will be 
concerned primarily with the invocation of the'hydraulic' model discourse to 
account for masculine emotional expression. The analysis of these excerpts 
requires the use of two very similar phrases, the'hydraulic model'cliscourse 
and the'hydraulic model of emotions'. The first of these terms is used to 
categorize those discursive resources that are constitutive of the 'hydraulic 
model of emotions'. The 'hydraulic model of emotions' refers to constructions 
of emotions as ontologically existent, as subjectively experienced, as 
amenable to control or management and as imperative conditions. The 
'imperative' element of the 'hydraulic model of emotions' is the constructed 
inevitability of expression; within the 'hydraulic model of emotions' emotional 
experiences are constructed as requiring and ultimately finding expression, in 
one form or another. 
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"So anger is seen as strength": Anger and the performance of 
masculinity 
Excerpt 14 provides a construction of the male expression of 'anger' as 
culturally 'expected' and as not antithetical to the performance of masculinity. 
In this excerpt, the construction of the expression of anger as culturally 
expected of men is accounted for through the invocation of the 'social 
structures' repertoire. The expression of anger is constructed as acceptable for 
men because it functions in the maintenance of the positions occupied by men 
in social structures and power relations, i. e., it functions in the maintenance of 
'hegemonic masculinity'. 
Excerpt 14 
356 Harry: =I was going to mention something not necessarily related to men but 
357 1 think sort of happy emotions are sort of social things and then negative 
358 emotions are kind of shut away or that's kind of how it's supposed to work 
359 so I think that sort of applies to men and women 
360 Vic: = [I find 
361 Chris: equally across the two 
362 Harry: = yeah I think so = 
363 Vic: = yeah I mean I would find that to a certain extent even happy emotions 
364 are sometimes erm seen as more socially acceptable in this culture in women 
365 than in men because if a woman's like generally you know just take a 
366 canteen situation if a woman's laughing and everything like that it can often 
367 be taken as she's a fun one or whatever whereas if it's a man sometimes it's 
368 like you know he's a bit of a girl basically or he's you know he's not erm you 
369 know it's taken I think even even that I think there are certain emotions that 
370 are negative emotions that are more acceptable in men almost which are 
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371 things like anger and stuff and I think you know not acceptable as in if you 
372 take it out on everyone but or or more expected of them anyway let's put it 
373 that way and you were talking about expectations anyway weren't you? 
374 Chris: = yeah = 
375 Vic: = yeah so I think anger and er what's you know the sort of imposition 
376 of dominance and you know confidence and you know that sort of stuff are 
377 sort of expected of men 
TI 356-377. 
The turns in the excerpt follow from my asking the group to what extent they 
thought men were expected to control the expression of emotions. The excerpt 
opens with Harry's construction of equivalency between the genders in terms 
of prescribed and proscribed public emotional expressions. This construction 
of equivalency between the genders -I think that sort of applies to men and 
women" (line 359), was exceptional within the data set. 
The features that are of particular relevance to this analysis are contained in 
Vic's turns at lines 363-373 and 375-377. Vic's first turn is primarily a 
qualification of Harry's previous construction of gender equivalency in the 
cultural evaluations of male and female public emotional expressions. Vic 
constructs a scenario within which equivalent expressions of "happy emotions" 
(line 363) be male and female actors meet with differing evaluative responses. 
The evaluation of the appropriateness of a particular form of emotional 
expression is constructed as dependent upon the gender of the 'actor. Male 
expressions of "happy emotions", though the form of such an expression is not 
242 
specified (line 367), are constructed as likely to be evaluated as conflicting with 
cultural expectations regarding the performance of masculinity. 
In contrast, public expressions of "negative emotions" (lines 357-358), 
developed so that it includes "anger and stuff' (line 371) are constructed as 
"more acceptable in men almost' (line 370). However, with regard to men's 
expression of anger there is an obvious tension between what is constructed 
as socially 'acceptable' and what is constructed as socially 'expected'. Vic 
reflexively orients to his construction of the expression of anger as "more 
acceptable in men" and qualifies it - "not acceptable as in if you take it out on 
everyone" (lines 371-372). The qualification is, however, a partial one; only 
one particular form of men's expression of anger is constructed as 
unacceptable. 
The constructed 'd is preferred' form of male expression of anger has two 
features that work up its problematic status. The first is that it is constructed as 
object-related. This is, of course, hardly surprising. Within the social- 
psychological literature, emotional expressions are conceptualised as 
responses to particular emotion-eliciting objects, persons or things and as 
constitutive of the relationship between the individual and the object (de 
Rivera, 1984; Fridlund, 1991,1994; Parkinson, 1995; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). 
However, in this instance the 'object' towards which the expression of anger is 
directed is constructed through the extreme case formulation "everyone". 
Consequently, the directed expression of anger to "everyone" can be heard as 
unreasonable since "everyone" could not have feasibly elicited the emotion. 
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The second feature is the implicit distinction between emotional 'experience' 
and 'expression' and the possibilities this distinction affords in terms of the 
construction of agentic control over 'expression'. Men's expression of anger is 
constructed as unacceptable only when it is intentionally visited upon those 
who cannot possibly warrant it - "not acceptable as in if you take it out on 
everyone" (lines 371-371). In making this qualification, Vic manages his own 
subject position through implicit appeals to repertoires of individual 
responsibility and fairness. 
However, regardless of the cultural acceptability of men's expression of 
negative emotions, particularly anger, they are constructed as culturally 
expected - "but or or more expected of them anyway let's put it that way" (lines 
372-373). Vic's closing question - "and you were talking about expectations 
anyway weren't you? " (lines 373-374) - directed to and answered by me, is a 
rhetorical move. By asking the question, the preceding move from talking 
about acceptability to talking about expectations is reframed as an orientation 
to the discursive requirements of the local interactional context. Consequently, 
Vic is positioned as an attentive and responsive participant in a focus group 
discussion. This act of positioning may function as an inoculation against the 
possibility of being positioned as an apologist for men's unwarranted venting of 
emotions such as anger. 
Vic's final turn, at lines 375-377, sees the invocation of the'social structures' 
discourse to account for the construction of the expression of anger as not 
antithetical to masculinity. The expression of anger is constructed as belonging 
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to a category of behaviours, actions or attributes that accord with and is 
constitutive of the locations in social structures and power relations that men 
are culturally supposed to occupy; these behaviours, actions and attributes, 
including the expression of anger, is gendered as'masculine'. That'power' is a 
part of the constitution of masculinity is apparent in Vic's generalised three-part 
list - "the sort of imposition of dominance and you know confidence and you 
know that sort of stuff" (lines 375-376). The construction of the relational 
functions served by male expressions of anger accounts for the construction of 
such emotional expressions as not antithetical to, but rather as constitutive of, 
masculinity. The features listed by Vic as constitutive of masculinity reads very 
much like a construction of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995). Finally, by 
invoking the discourse of 'social expectations' - "that sort of stuff are sort of 
expected of men" (lines 376-377) - Vic potentially inoculate himself, and other 
men, from criticism. Men are constructed as behaving in ways that, regardless 
of their acceptability, are at least expected of them. Consequently, the 
positions in power relations that men may occupy through the performance of 
masculinity, constituted by such things as gendered ways of doing emotions, 
are effectively constructed as culturally bestowed upon men. Arguably, the 
invocation of these discursive resources represents a management of stake 
(Potter, 1996) and the reflexive management of subject positions (Davies & 
Harr6,1990) and gendered subjectivities (Hollway, 1984,1989). 
The next excerpt follows from a discussion of the extent to which the members 
of the group felt free to express emotion through crying within the context of 
the particular church of which they were all members and of the possibility that 
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for other men other emotions, such as anger, may be freely expressed in other 
contexts. 
Excerpt 15 
245 Chris: = so there are potentially some that are more [kind of socially 
246 James: yeah 
247 Chris: acceptable [between men? 
248 James: yeah 
249 Mark: = or maybe different emotions are acceptable in [different kinds of 
250 James: yeah 
251 Mark: social contexts 
252 Chris: = yeah = 
253 Matthew: = or different ways of expressing the the emotion are acceptable 
254 like I mean hh you can deal with anger in a lot of different ways it it's er it fits 
255 in with a sort of male macho image to get angry in the sense of of you know 
256 on the borderline of violence and that's ok ((laughing)) apparently but erm to 
257 do something constructive with with anger to you know use it as a motivator 
258 to do something hh I think is probably erm well it would be less less obvious 
259 but erm I think it's er it's not sort of taken as a hh a thing that you would see 
260 somebody doing you know that somebody becomes hh incensed about 
261 some injustice or something and it actually moves them to do something 
262 about it I think that's probably quite rare hh you know having a rant and rave 
263 about it and throwing things around is probably a lot more hh acceptable 
264 and in some ways more comfortable to see that happening than for 
265 somebody to actually let something get under their skin that they would do 
266 something about it and that could be hh quite uncomfortable even if you 
267 agree with the original sort of idea behind that = 
268 James: = isn't that to do with more to do with the the vulnerability of the 
269 emotion? (. ) like for example the ones that we were just talking about erm 
270 prior to to talking about anger erm make you a more vulnerable person 
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271 whereas in anger you are er not vulnerable (. ) you are not open to attack 
272 because people won't approach you 
273 Mark: = if you're angry = 
274 Luke: = so anger is seen as strength 
275 James: = strength yes = 
276 Luke: = crying is seen [as a weakness 
277 James: as a weakness that's right yeah = 
278 Luke: = but in whose concept you see in that's in the worldly concept (. ) see 
279 see because I believe that if you can let your emotions go and you can cry 1 
280 think that's quite a stro- a strength I actually find that a strength I find anger 
281 a weakness = 
282 James: = hmm 
283 Luke: = how do I know that? I used to be a very angry person 
284 James: = hmm but that but you're drawing on your own experiences here 
285 we're generalising about er about man as er as aa whole concept and 
286 within the group here a lot of the things that we talk about don't apply to us 
287 in church it's only to when we go back into that world outside that we put on 
288 our man persona of being (. ) stronger in er an angry rather than perceptually 
289 weaker erm with crying (. ) 
290 Luke: I'm not sure (that) I do anymore 
291 James: anymore but how long has it taken you to reach that point 
292 Luke: it took probably many years = 
T5: 245-292. 
In the opening turns, two accounts of the acceptability of emotional expression 
between men are advanced. The first, advanced by me, is that emotion 
categories, such as'anger, are gendered and that the gendering of emotion 
accounts for the acceptability of expression. Mark subsequently invokes the 
concept of gendered contexts to account for acceptable masculine emotional 
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expression. Both these repertoires of 'gendered emotions' and 'gendered 
contexts' are familiar resources invoked to account for masculine emotional 
expressions (Walton, Coyle & Lyons, 2004). However, in his turn, Matthew 
develops a more complex account of the acceptability of male emotional 
expressions as contingent upon the particular form that expression takes. 
Matthew invokes'anger as the emotion through which he develops his 
account of the acceptability of emotional expression as contingent upon the 
form of expression. The invocation of anger is noteworthy since it is an 
emotion that men are regularly constructed as relatively free to express (see 
the above section on the findings of self-report methods in the literature on 
gender and emotions and the preceding excerpt). Within Matthew's turn (lines 
253-267) forms of expression of anger are contrasted in terms of their relative 
social acceptability. From the outset, the discourses of 'experience' and 
dexpression' are apparent as is the exercise of 'agency' over their management 
-"you can deal with anger in a lot of different ways" (line 254). 
Matthew then goes on to construct two forms of expression of anger. Given 
that these two forms of expression are being contrasted with regard to their 
relative social acceptability, it is inevitable that one will be constructed as 
'preferred' and the other as 'dispreferred'. The first form that Matthew 
constructs is the 'preferred' form. Constructed as "on the borderline of 
violence" (line 256), the 'preferred' form of expressing anger is constructed as 
according with "a sort of male macho image" (line 255). Matthew reflexively 
orients to his construction of this form as 'preferred' - "and that's ok 
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((laughing)) apparently" (line 256) - in such a way that he is simultaneously 
distanced from it. His use of "apparently" accords the constructed acceptability 
of this form of expression to an 'other'. 
The initial construction of this form of expression of anger - "on the borderline 
of violence" - is subsequently developed as "having a rant and rave about it 
and throwing things around" (lines 262-263). Both these constructions stop 
short of constructing 'actual' violence as a part of the 'preferred' form. 
Consequently, there is no ideological obstacle, such as appearing to be an 
apologist for violence, to Matthew constructing this form as "probably a lot 
more hh acceptable and in some ways more comfortable to see that 
happening" (lines 263-264). The subtle qualifications that occur within that 
construction - "probably" and "in some ways" - are interpreted as the reflexive 
management of subject positions. Matthew's subjectivity is constituted as 
distinct from the constructed cultural perspective. From Matthew's subjectivity, 
this 'preferred' form of expression of anger is oriented to as potentially 
problematic. 
In Matthew's turn the visibly and audibly obvious expression of anger, through 
"having a rant and rave", through "throwing things around" and through being 
on "the borderline of violence", is explicitly constructed as according with "a 
sort of male macho image" (line 255). The discourse of 'masculinity, for that is 
how I interpret the "male macho image", is invoked to account for the 
construction of this form of expression of anger as socially acceptable. It is 
worth noting the use of two gendered adjectives in the invocation of discourses 
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of masculinity and the combined implications of these adjectives in terms of the 
discourses of 'aetiology' that they make possible. The phrase effectively 
conflates 'essential maleness', which may be accounted for through discourses 
of 'biology' or'evolution, with the culturally determined concept of "macho". In 
this invocation, the discourse of 'masculinity' must be understood as drawing 
upon and making available both repertoires of 'aetiology'. 
The second constructed form of expression for anger is the 'dispreferred' form 
and is markedly different from the 'preferred' form. It is explicitly constructed as 
11constructive", in contrast to what could be argued to be the implicitly 
'destructive' character of the 'preferred' form - "but erm to do something 
constructive with with anger to you know use it as a motivator to do something" 
(lines 256-258). This 'constructive' form of expression for anger is developed 
further in lines 260-262. This construction is striking because of the rhetorically 
powerful formulation of anger that is employed - "incensed" (line 260) - and 
because the form of expression is explicitly functional44 - "to do something 
about it [some injustice]" (line 261-262, [lines 260-261]). 1 find it interesting that 
this constructed form of dealing with and expressing anger should be 
constructed as 'dispreferred'. Indeed, in the terms that it is presented here, 
such a construction seems to be contrary to common sense; a constructive 
44 It is not my intention to imply that this construction is exceptional because emotional 
expression is constructed as functional, nor do I wish to imply that there can be any form of 
'emotional expression' that is not functional at some level. Within the context of this thesis, all 
forms of emotional expression are assumed to be functional, i. e. it is assumed that they do 
something. 
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form of expression of anger, which results in the rectification of an 'injustice, 
would surely be preferred over an implicitly destructive form. 
Within the excerpt, there are clues to how the 'destructive' form of expressing 
anger can be advanced as the 'preferred' form. The two forms of expression 
are contrasted in terms of their social visibility. The 'dispreferred' form is 
constructed as "less less obvious" (line 258) and as "not sort of taken as a hh 
a thing that you would see somebody doing" (lines 259-260). Consequently, it 
is also constructed as "probably quite rare" (line 262). The contrasting of the 
two forms of expression on the basis of their 'visibility' and 'audibility' is 
interpreted as forming the basis of a construction of familiarity. The destructive 
form is constructed as 'preferred'- "a lot more hh acceptable and in some 
ways more comfortable to see that happening" (lines 263-264) - precisely 
because it is the form with which people are constructed as most familiar. The 
sheer unfamiliarity, because of its constructed rarity of occurrence or 
observation, of the constructive form is the basis of its 'dispreferred' status. 
The relationships between discourses of 'familiarity', 'acceptability' and 
#expectations' are relatively straight forward; what may be constructed as 
'familiar can subsequently be constructed as 'expected' and that which can be 
constructed as 'familiar and as conforming to 'expectations' may be 
constructed as 'acceptable'. 
There is a less 'local' interpretation of why the 'constructive' form of expression 
of anger is constructed as 'dispreferred, which is based on the closing 
constructions of Matthew's turn - "to actually let something get under their skin 
that they would do something about it and that could be hh quite 
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uncomfortable" (lines 265-266). This construction echoes the original 
construction of emotion within the 'dispreferred' form as "a motivator' (line 
257). However, it is worked up as problematic through the invoked metaphor 
for internalization - "get under their skin". Thus the emotion, being 'incensed', 
is constructed as internalized. This construction of 'internalized' emotion is 
located within a broader framework that is constituted by the preceding phrase 
"to actually let something". Within this construction the repertoires of 
'emotionality' and 'rationality', 'agency' and 'passivity' are at play. The 
'internalization' of emotion is constructed as resulting from 'agentic passivity' 
and the consequent functional form of expression may be interpreted as the 
dagentic' privileging of 'emotionality' over'rationality'. It would be easy to 
advance an interpretation of this form of expression of anger as 'dispreferred' 
for men because it conflicts with the hegemonic status of 'rationality', as the 
basis for masculine actions. To act on the basis of an 'emotion', even when 
that action has positive consequences, is potentially interpretable as conflicting 
with the performance of hegemonic masculinity. 
In the final line of his turn, Matthew orients to an ideological dilemma (Billig et 
al., 1988) constituted by his construction of the 'destructive' form of expression 
of anger as 'preferred', the concomitant construction of the 'constructive form 
as 'dispreferred' and the consequent possibility of being positioned as an 
apologist for male aggression and possibly even violence. This dilemma is 
negotiated through the invocation of a rhetorical strategy that Edley & 
Wetherell identified as'dividing theory and practice' (1999, p. 187) (see also 
Wetherell, Stiven and Potter, 1987). Matthew's construction of the 
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'dispreferred' form is qualified by the statement "even if you agree with the 
original sort of idea behind that' (lines 266-267). This statement makes the 
distinction between 'theory' and 'practice' and is applicable to both the 
'preferred' and 'dispreferred' forms. The 'dispreferred' form can be constructed 
as the more agreeable in 'theory', but not in 'practice' because its 'practice' is 
insufficiently familiar. In contrast, it would be difficult to construct the 'preferred' 
form, constructed as on the "borderline of violence", as agreeable in theory. 
Consequently, its acceptability is dependent on the constructed familiarity of its 
practice. The implication of Matthew's invocation of the distinction between 
'theory' and 'practice'for his subject position is that he is aligned with 
'dispreferred' form in 'theory' rather than with the 'practice' of the 'preferred' 
form. 
The second part of excerpt 15, from line 268, also provides an excellent 
example of the type of constructions of male emotional expression and the 
consequent negotiation of subject position that were apparent in several of the 
transcripts. From line 268, the excerpt primarily involves James and Luke and 
it is Luke's negotiation of his subject position that is of specific interest. 
James's turn, beginning at line 268, sees the invocation of the concept of 
vulnerability and its equation with the expression of certain discrete emotions 
(in a similar way as was seen in excerpt 4). On this occasion, emotions are 
constructed as 'states, as things within which individuals are located - 
"whereas in anger' (line 271). The construction of emotions as 'states' 
dissolves the distinction between emotional 'experience' and 'expression'; the 
construction of being "in anger' is interpreted as conflating 'experience' and 
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'expression'. The equating of vulnerability with certain emotional 'states' but 
not others occurs within a contrast. 'Crying', indexically referenced by the 
statement "the ones that we were just talking about erm prior to talking about 
anger' (lines 269-270), is constructed as constituting a display of vulnerability 
- "erm make you a more vulnerable person" (line 270). Being in a 'state' of 
anger, by contrast, is constructed as causing an individual to be "not 
vulnerable" (line 271). 
The above representation of certain emotions as connoting vulnerability is not 
strictly accurate. A more apposite representation would be that the expressions 
of certain emotions are constructed as positioning individuals as vulnerable; 
the occupation of a subject position as vulnerable is an effect of expressing 
certain emotions. Emotional acts, like speech acts, can be interpreted as 
constituting subject positions and therefore as constituting acts of first and 
second order positioning (Harr6 & Van Langenhove, 1999). This possibility is 
alluded to in James's construction of the consequences of being "in anger"- 
"you are not open to attack because people won't approach you" (line 271- 
272). Presumably, being "in anger" is somewhat similar to Matthew's 
constructed 'preferred' form of masculine expression of anger. Nobody would 
approach you if you were "having a rant and rave about it and throwing things 
around" (lines 262-263). 
From this point, James is drawn into a negotiation of subject positions by Luke. 
In an apparent development of James's construction, Luke constructs the 
expression of anger as constitutive of subject positions of 'strength' and the 
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expression of emotion through crying as constitutive of subject positions of 
weakness (lines 274 & 276). Both these constructions gain explicit 
confirmation from James (lines 275 & 277). Luke's negotiation of his subject 
position relative to these constructions can succinctly be represented as an act 
of 'distancing'. As has been demonstrated above, acts of distancing are a 
common occurrence, are based on a wide range of discursive resources and 
are characterized by the speakers resistance of a particular subject position, 
that they are either afforded or assumed to occupy, in favour of another subject 
position of that is of greater interactional, social, cultural or ideological 
currency". 
Luke's act of distancing is negotiated through the invocation of discourses of 
context, which frame the constructed forms of emotional expression as 
constitutive of subject positions of either 'strength' or'weakness'. By invoking 
the distinction between 'culture' - "the worldly concept" (line 278) - and the 
'individual', Luke creates the rhetorical opportunity to position himself as 
diametrically opposed to the constructed cultural equations of anger and 
strength, crying and weakness -I actually find that [crying] a strength I find 
anger a weakness" (lines 280-281). At the level of the individual, a man's 
expression of emotion through crying is constructed as interpretable as 
demonstrable of individual strength; in contrast a man's expression of anger is 
45 These categories should not be interpreted as discrete but as interactive. The currency of a 
subject position at an interactional level is contingent upon its currency at an ideological level 
and vice versa. 
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demonstrable of individual weakness. Arguably, this inversion of cultural 
equations at the level of the individual and the potential for them to be cast as 
$positive' is based on the discourses of 'individuality' and 'non-conformity'. To 
resist what is culturally prescribed - the masculine expression of anger - is 
interpretable as resulting from individual 'agency' and 'strength'. To conform to 
cultural proscriptions - the proscription of masculine emotional expression 
through crying - is, by contrast, interpretable as an individual 'weakness'. 
This shift in the rhetorical focus of the discussion is explicitly oriented to by 
James in his turn beginning at line 284. He argues that the previous equations 
of anger with strength and crying with weakness are highly culturally prevalent 
and that renegotiations of those equations are context specific. Indexing the 
preceding constructions of cultural expectations of masculinity, he contrasts 
the freedom that the speakers may exist within the context of their church - "a 
lot of the things that we talk about don't apply to us in church" (lines 286-287) 
with the requirement to conform to cultural conventions of gender performance 
in all other contexts - "it's only to when we go back into that world outside that 
we put on our man persona" (lines 287-288). This construction is interpretable 
as reworking of the public/private distinction that is characteristic of accounts of 
masculine emotional expressivity. "Church" is ascribed the status of a 'private' 
context and the "world" is the public context. This is a reworking of the 
public/private distinction because the 'private' context is shared, there are 
audiences to masculine emotional expressivity but it is not proscribed. 
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Within that construction 'masculinity', the "man persona", is explicitly 
constructed as a performative act. Being a man, in terms of managing 
emotional expressivity, is constructed as something that is agentically 
accomplished in accordance with context specific requirements. Consequently, 
to not 'do'' masculinity' in that way is also a performative and agentic act, one 
that Luke positions himself as undertaking - "I'm not sure (that) I do anymore" 
(line 290). Luke's subject position - as a man who does not 'do' masculinity in 
the constructed culturally prescribed, expected and acceptable way - is 
constructed as the product of a process of change. While we cannot and do 
not assume the 'truthfulness' of the speakers constructions, it is still a little 
disheartening to hear the challenging of hegemonic 'masculine ways of doing 
emotions' constructed as a process that "took probably many years" (line 292). 
Certainly, the constructed length of the process of change works up the idea 
that change in the relationship between gender and emotions, even at the 
most basic level of the individual, does not and perhaps cannot happen 
overnight and in so doing works up the account of the expression of 'anger as 
according with the performance of masculinity as culturally determined. As for 
Luke, the constructed length of the process of change positions him as having 
had a long-term reflexive engagement with his performance of masculinity and 
works up his status as 'agentic'. Arguably, the constitution of a subjectivity as 
engaged in the determined, principled and above all agentic resistance of 
culturally hegemonic 'masculinity' still constitutes the performance of a 
'masculinity'. As Edley & Wetherell (1999) argued, one of the best ways of 
doing hegemonic masculinity is to claim to resist conforming to'hegemonic' 
masculinity. 
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RJust'cause he'd bottled it all up": The 'hydraulic modei'discourse 
As stated above, this section of the analysis is concerned with invocations of 
the'hydraulic model of emotions'. The metaphors, images and phrases that 
are drawn upon in constructions of the 'hydraulic model of emotions' are 
collectively categorised as belonging to the'hydraulic model' discourse. The 
'hydraulic model' discourse is arguably the most frequently invoked resource in 
the data set to account for male emotional expressivity, and particularly for 
male expression of anger, in one form or another. Within this discourse 
emotions are constructed as ontologically existent things. The most apposite 
analogy that can be made is to energy. Emotions are talked about as if they 
involved, indeed as if they were constituted by, quantifiable levels of energy. 
However, to continue the analogy, like energy - following the First Law of 
Thermodynamics - emotions are talked about as if they cannot be destroyed, 
but can only be controlled and contained or transformed. It is upon this 
fundamental way of constructing emotions that the entire 'hydraulic model' 
discourse is built. Of course, 'hydraulic' metaphors and metaphors of 'energy' 
have a long history of association with constructions of 'emotions' and 
particularly with constructions of 'anger' (Lakoff, 1987ý6. This analysis will 
allow engagement with the relational and ideological functions served by the 
46 Lakoff (1987) provides an alternative metaphor to 'energy' for the construction of 'anger'. 
'Anger', according to Lakoff, is constructed as if it had 'mass'; 'it has a scale indicating its 
amount, it exists when the amount is greater than zero, and it goes out of existence when the 
amount falls to zero' (p. 386). See also Mesquita and Frijda (1992) for the 'Volcanic' metaphor 
for 'anger'. 
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invocation of the 'hydraulic model of emotions', in terms of the negotiation of 
subject positions and ideological dilemmas. 
Excerpt 16 provides a good example of the rhetorical work done by the 
'hydraulic model' discourse. As will be demonstrated over the following 
excerpts, the 'hydraulic model' discourse is often invoked to account for male 
expressions of emotions or emotion-related actions or responses that are 
potentially socially problematic or questionable. The excerpt follows from a 
series of autobiographical narratives all of which warranted the construction of 
men's expression of emotion through crying as exceptional. Consequently, the 
whole excerpt and the'hydraulic model'discourse in particular are interpreted 
as accounting for instances of male emotional expression. The'hydraulic 
model' discourse accounts for problematic or questionable male behaviours by 
constructing them as in 'fact' exceptional instances of unmanaged emotional 
sexpression', resulting from nothing more than the power of men's emotional 
'experiences'. The status of 'emotions' as 'imperatives' within the 'hydraulic 
model' discourse, mentioned above, cannot be overstated. More than any 
other feature of the 'hydraulic model' discourse, the status of 'emotions' as 
imperatives is the basis of accounts of the masculine expression of 'anger. 
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Excerpt 16 
406 Maurice: = erm (. ) but it's this thing of I think where I'm going with this 
407 thread it's that thing of building up where you actually absorb a lot of issues 
408 Philip: = yeah = 
409 Maurice: = and you don't find an outlet for them 
410 Philip: = yeah yeah yeah = 
411 Maurice: = erm and that outlet (1.1) because although we're talking about 
412 emotion we're talking >it seems that the expression that we're< (1.0) 
413 describing is one that results in tears say 
414 Philip: = hmm = 
415 Maurice: = but it can be anything 
416 Philip: = anger or = 
417 Maurice: = absolutely 
418 Philip: = guilt or = 
419 Maurice: = and the way we (. ) the way that we may or (. 7) experience 
420 Philip: = hmm = 
421 Maurice: = what's happening and absorb that makes manifest in in Pnger 
422 Philip: = hmm yeah = 
423 Maurice: = or, dysfunctional rela- er behaviour with your er with your 
424 girlfriend your wife = 
425 Philip: = hmm hmm 
426 Maurice: = erm not holding your job down or taking drugs or whatever it 
427 might be you just kind of just lose it erm 
T8: 406-427. 
Elements of the 'hydraulic model' discourse are first apparent in Maurice's 
turns at lines 406-407 and 409. Prefaced by "it's that thing" (line 407), the 
'hydraulic model of emotions' is constructed as a recognisable and familiar 
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phenomenon. Maurice then draws upon the previously identified distinction 
constituted by discourses of emotional 'experience' and 'expression. 
Emotional 'experience' is constructed as internal, cumulative and subjectively 
understood - "it's that thing of building up where you actually absorb a lot of 
issues" (line 407). 
Maurice's use of the word "issues" in the opening turn must be addressed, 
since this analysis is concerned with how thehydraulic model'discourse 
relates to 'emotions', not to "issues". To interpret "issues" as signifying 
emotional 'experiences' would be to impose my categories upon the text. In 
contemporary culture, people are constructed as having "issues" with 'things'. 
Therefore, "issues" may be interpreted as signifying both the existence and 
quality of a relationship between an individual and an 'othee, person, object or 
thing. One possible resource through which the quality of that relationship may 
be constructed is discourses of 'emotion'. Consequently, "issues" is interpreted 
as locating emotional 'experiences' within social contexts and as an effect of 
social relationships, rather than as simply 'internal' and 'subjective' 
phenomena. Thus, while "issues" is not interpreted as a simple synonym for 
emotional 'experiences', it is argued that emotional 'experiences' may be 
culturally understood to be an important component of what "issues" signifies. 
This interpretation is supported by the Maurice's subsequent move from talking 
about "issues" to talking about "emotions" in lines 411-412. 
The above advanced interpretation of "issues" is essential to the interpretation 
of "you don't find an outlet for them" (line 409) as a construction of the 
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inexpressive component of the 'hydraulic model of emotions'; "them" refers to 
the previously constructed "issues". Consequently, it is the implicitly 
constituted emotional 'experiences' that are interpreted as internalised and as 
not expressed. However, inexpressivity is accounted for by the constructed 
interaction between emotional 'experiences', the individual and the social 
context. Through the use of the third person pronoun - "them", emotional 
'experiences' are constructed as entities over which the generalised individual 
- "you" - exerts agentic control. Emotional inexpressivity is constructed as 
resulting from a perceived lack of "outlet[s]". The use of "outlet" can, in itself, 
be interpreted as an invocation of a fluid, if not hydraulic, metaphor. Further, 
"outlet[s]" are constructed as located in or as properties of social contexts. 
Implicit within this construction is the possibility that if an "outlet" could be 
'found'then emotional 'expression' would occur. However, the determination of 
the form of 'expression' is largely ascribed to the "outlet'. Whether or not 
emotional 'expression' occurs is implicitly constructed as contingent upon the 
gendered form of 'expression' provided by any particular "outlet". Male 
emotional '(in)expression' is constructed as resulting from a complex, reflexive 
and agentic relationship between the individual and the social contexts within 
which he is located. 
The remainder of the excerpt, from line 411. is concerned with the construction 
of a list possible "outlet[s]" or forms of emotional 'expression', which are 
amenable to or even typical of men. Maurice evokes "tears" (line 413) as the 
form of exceptional emotional 'expression' that had been predominant in the 
group's discussion. He then goes on, with co-operation from Philip, to advance 
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a number of possible alternative forms that male emotional 'expression' might 
take. These forms are all constructed as passively occurring or, at least, the 
constructions lack any explicit ascription of agency. The closing part of 
Maurice's turn - "you just kind of just lose if' (line 427) - is interpreted as a 
construction of a simultaneous loss of control over both the 'internalised 
emotional experiences' and the forms of 'expression' that they might take. 
Internalised emotional 'experiences' or are constructed as'expressed'as 
"anger' (line 416) or "guilt" (line 418), as being made "manifest in in anger, 
(line 421), in "dysfunctional rela- er behaviour with your er with your girlfriend 
your wife" (lines 423-424), or in "not holding your job down or taking drugs or 
whatever it might be" (lines 426-427). This list is highly reminiscent of the 
projected dangers of an adherence to the male sex role (Goldberg, 1976; 
Jourard, 1974; Sattel, 1976). 
Only two of the forms of expression for internalised 'emotional experiences'- 
"anger"and "guilf'- are actually constructed in terms of emotion discourses. 
The others are constructed as specific or generalised behaviours located 
within personal or professional social contexts. Thus, behaviours or actions 
that might not typically be perceived to be emotional 'expressions' are 
accounted for by being constructed as just that. The 'hydraulic model of 
emotions' is a discursive resource for accounting for socially undesirable male 
behaviour. Specifically, this rhetorical work is achieved through the distinction 
6f emotional 'experience' and emotional 'expression', the explicit construction 
of the exercise of agency and control over emotional 'experience', the 
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construction of emotions as imperatives and the consequent disavowal of 
responsibility for the specific form that emotional 'expression' might take. 
Before we proceed to the next excerpt there are two further lines of analysis 
that warrant mention. The first is Maurice's use of the word "issues", as argued 
above "issues" is interpreted as implying a strongly social component to men's 
emotional 'experiences'. Men, including Maurice - note his use of first and 
second person pronouns - are constructed as managing their emotional 
'expressions'. By doing so, they are also implicitly constructed as managing 
their social relationships. The control or absence of emotional 'expression' 
functions in the management of social relationships. To borrow from Maurice, 
men are constructed as not making socially apparent the "issues" that they 
have with 'things'. Thus, they are implicitly constructed as managing the 
availability of a good deal of socially pertinent information. This is interpretable 
as a construction of the exercise of power. The performance of masculinity, 
through the management of emotional 'experiences' and 'exprpssions', is 
constituted by the management of the socially availability of information about 
the 'self, through such strategies as the reflexive occupation and affording of 
'emotion-based' subject positions. 
The second point concerns the construction of inexpressivity as agentically 
accomplished and expressivity as passively experienced. The masculine 
requirement for agentic control over the '(in)expression'of emotional 
$experiences' is implicit within the'hydraulic model of emotions'. Any absence 
of control, that is to say, any instance of emotional 'expression', can be 
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constructed as exceptional and accounted for through the invocation of 
passivity, implicit in the'hydraulic model' discourse. Consequently, the 
'hydraulic model of emotions' provides for the disavowal of responsibility for 
these exceptional and problematic forms of male emotional expression and for 
the failure to maintain control over both the performative 'self and the 
information that is socially available about that'self. This last point will be a 
major concern of this section of the analysis. For now it is sufficient to state 
that the discourse of 'control' and the subject positions that it makes available 
are central to the performance of masculinity and, therefore, that any 
constructed absence of control must be accounted for. It is with this 
accountability oriented work that the'hydraulic model'discourse is concerned. 
In excerpt 16 the 'hydraulic model' discourse was used to account for 
behaviours that could be interpreted as detrimental at personal, interpersonal 
and social levels. Importantly, the'hydraulic model'discourse allows these 
behaviours or phenomena to be accounted for as the unintended or accidental 
consequences of the performance of masculinity, constituted through the 
reflexive management of emotion-based subject positions, and the imperative 
force of 'emotions'. Through invocations of the 'hydraulic model' discourse to 
account for male emotional expressivity, the following excerpts provide the 
basis for a developing account of the functions served by emotional 
inexpressivity in the performance of masculinity. 
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Excerpt 17 follows from my asking the participants whether they thought that 
an apparent emotional 'expression' needs necessarily to accord with an 
internal emotional 'experience'. The excerpt is illustrative of two particular 
points. The first concerns the possible functions served by emotional 
inexpressivity. The second concerns the invocation of the 'hydraulic model' 
discourse to account for a constructed instance of personally detrimental male 
behaviour. 
Excerpt 17 
417 Ed: = can you not do it to hide what you're actually feeling sometimes? you 
418 Dust ] go out wearing a face so you're feeling I don't know really sad 
419 Ruddiger: yeah 
420 Ed: and depressed because I don't know something's happened but you 
421 don't want other people to know that you'll show a happy face and you'll be 
422 out really loud and really bouncy really enthusiastic and everyone thinks 
423 'yeah they've got life sorted'and then you go home and 
424 Ruddiger: = slowly get down and down about it [until] you just break (. ) I've 
425 Ed: yeah 
426 Ruddiger: seen one of my mates do it at home when his parents had just split 
427 up and none of us knew and they'd been split up for a couple of weeks and 
428 we went to a party and he just got drunk and just ended up () just (. ) starting 
429 a fight with a tree because he was that angry about it and he just ended up 
430 with blood coming off his head from where he'd head butted a tree and stuff 
431 just 'cause he'd. bottled it all up and not told anyone 
432 Chris: = yeah = 
T4: 417-432. 
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In the opening lines (lines 417-423) Ed constructs a generalised account of 
one possible situation in which public emotional 'expression' might not accord 
with an internal emotional 'experience'. A "happy face" and concomitant 
behaviour - persuasively worked up through the use of lists (lines 421-422) 
(Jefferson, 1990) - are constructed as a mask - "wearing a face" (line 418) - 
for the underlying emotional 'experience'- "feeling [] really sad and 
depressed" (lines 418 and 420). Such 'expressions' are constructed as agentic 
acts performed in order to conceal the 'real' emotional 'experience'. However, 
the reasons why this might be desirable are never expanded beyond "but you 
don't want other people to know that' (lines 420-421). This comment echoes 
the earlier interpretation that the controlling of emotional expression functions 
in the management of social relationships, through the controlling of socially 
available information about the'self. 
The invocation of the 'hydraulic model' discourse is marked by the construction 
of the consequences of concealing 'emotional experiences'. Ed only gets as far 
as constructing the context in which these consequences are likely to occur - 
"and then you go home and" (line 423) - before he is interrupted by Ruddiger. 
"Home" in Ed's utterance is interpreted as constructing a 'private' context, 
given that it is contrasted with 'public' contexts, e. g. "you just go out" and 
"you'll be out" (lines 417-418 and 421-422 respectively). Again, male emotional 
expression is constructed as occurring in as 'private' a context as possible. 
Ruddiger takes up and develops the construction of the potential 
consequences, i. e. the form of emotional 'expression' might take, which might 
follow from the concealment of 'emotional experiences'. In line 424, those 
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consequences are constructed as "[you] slowly get down and down about it 
until you just break". This utterance echoes the implicit sense of passivity 
evident in the preceding excerpt - "you just kind of just lose it' (Excerpt 16; line 
427). 
Ruddiger also takes up the context of "home" (line 426) but changes its local 
meaning. Rather than "home" as a private context, "home,, now constructs a 
geographical place of origin. Ruddiger's turn takes the form of a narrative that 
warrants the construction of emotional inexpressivity as inherently problematic 
and as personally damaging. In lines 426 to 431, Ruddiger constructs the 
antecedents of an emotional experience, constructs an absence of the 
occupation of any subject position relative to those antecedents or to the 
emotional experience, constructs alcohol as a possible determinant of a lapse 
in agentic control, and consequently of male emotional expressivity, and 
constructs the resultant, painful, form of emotional expression. The constructed 
form of emotional 'expression' within this invocation of thehydraulic model' 
discourse is striking because of its graphic and self injurious nature - "he just 
ended up with blood coming off his head from where he'd head butted a tree" 
(lines 429-430). The 'hydraulic model of emotion' is simply and directly invoked 
to account for this - "just 'cause he'd bottled it all up and not told anyone" (line 
431). 
The entire narrative from line 426 to line 431 is peppered with the word "just", 
which works up the sense of individual passivity relative to the implicitly 
constructed imperative force of emotions; one event or action is constructed as 
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simply, and directly, following from another 47 . Indeed, emotional 'expression', 
within the 'hydraulic model of emotion' is characterized by an absence of 
agency or as occurring entirely contrary to its exercise. Within this invocation of 
the 'hydraulic model of emotions', an act of suppression "just" leads to an act 
of self-injurious behaviour. 
One of the defining features of this invocation of thehydraulic model' 
discourse is that it contains an explicit prescription of an alternative, 
ameliorative course of action - "just'cause he'd bottled it up and not told 
anyone" (line 431). Talking about emotions or feelings or, in the terms of this 
analysis, occupying emotion-based subject positions is implicitly constructed 
as serving ameliorative functions. Failure to publicly occupy emotion-based 
subject positions relative to a particular emotive event or object, and the 
imperative force of emotions, are advanced as accounting for self-injurious 
behaviour. 
It is also important to consider the constructed eventual form of emotional 
expression - "starting a fight with a tree" (line 429). Emotion discourses are 
highly indexical (Edwards, 1995,1997). They construct an individual as 
experiencing a particular subjective phenomenon and locate that individual and 
that phenomenon within a particular context and relative to a particular object. 
The construction of the'self in terms of emotion discourses therefore makes a 
47 1 acknowledge that the "just" in line 426 -"his parents had just split up" - operates 
differently, constructing a sense of temporal proximity rather than passivity. 
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good deal of indexical information socially available. And yet, even in the 
constructed eventual form of emotional 'expression' that information is not 
made socially available. The behaviours and actions of men, accounted for 
through the'hydraulic model'discourse as forms of emotional 'expression', do 
not index, nor do they position the individual relative to, the constructed 
antecedent of the original emotional 'experience'. 
Consequently, the provision of that indexical information is constructed as 
potentially preventing such undesirable consequences. The performance of 
masculinity is constructed as constituted either by inexpressivity and a 
resistance of emotion-based subject positions or by emotional expressions, 
accounted for through the invocation of the 'hydraulic model' discourse, that 
are not fully indexical and which do not constitute emotion-based subject 
positions relative to the original antecedent of the emotional 'experience'. 
Arguably, if the performance of masculinity is constituted by the management 
of the socially available information about the 'self then that aim is met by both 
inexpressivity and by the forms of expression constructed in these excerpts. 
The question that arises is why are men constructed as resisting occupying 
emotion-based subject positions relative to events and objects that are 
constructed as evoking emotional experiences? Of course this question has 
already in part been answered by the preceding part of this analysis. The 
occupation of subject positions constituted through particular emotion 
discourses or'expression' and the concomitant location of the position with 
certain social structures and power relations are antithetical to the dominant 
cultural conception of 'masculinity'. These excerpts merely demonstrate the 
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resilience of the construction of masculinity as constituted by a resistance of 
emotion-based subject positions. 
The next excerpt follows from a discussion of the factors that may determine 
whether or not people express their emotions. In this excerpt, the main 
speaker, David, invokes what appears to be a version of the 'hydraulic model 
of emotions'to problematize a constructed 'other', interpreted as'straight men'. 
However, in this invocation, and in comparison with the previous excerpts, 
there is a marked reduction in the sense of passivity with regard to the 
eventual form of emotional 'expression'. Indeed, the problematic forms of 
emotional expression, which are normally accounted for by the passivity 
inherent in the 'hydraulic model' discourse, are interpretable as agentically 
undertaken. 
Excerpt 18 
178 David: = also of course there are environmental issues we might not hh feel 
179 comfortable in a certain place at a certain time to express our emotions or to 
180 visually show them hh erm and we might hold back until we're on our own or 
181 till we get home or whatever (. ) erm like a lot of people don't like to show any 
182 emotion at work (. ) I know that and erm but I'm lucky because I'm a care 
183 worker and we're all very emotional people ((laughing)) 
184 Chris: why do you think that is? (. ) 
185 David: hh well it's fear isn't it? it's it's fear of being (. ) ridiculed (. ) I think 
186 erm (. ) some some men do have: difficulty controlling their temper hh and 1 
187 think when a lot of men get emotional they as I said earlier they tend to: 
188 transpose that into anger and they may not want to show that in a place of 
189 work (. ) ((coughs)) so they wait till they get home and beat their wife up or 
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190 something (. ) or put a fist through a wall that's quite common (. ) erm but me I 
191 don't care you know if I want to express an emotion then I really don't care 
192 where I am 
Tl: 178-192 
The first of David's turns, linel 78-183, is largely concerned with invocation of 
discourses of context to account for generalised emotional (in)expressivity. 
Whether emotions are expressed or not is constructed as, in part, dependent 
upon the constructed "environmental" (social) contexts. The relationship 
between context and emotional 'expression', or'inexpression', is initially 
constructed in non-specific terms - "we might not. hh feel comfortable in a 
certain place at a certain time to express our emotions or to visually show 
them" (lines 178-180). It is worth noting that David invokes a distinction 
between 'verbal' and 'non-verbal' forms of emotional 'expression' to work up 
the extent of context dependent inexpressivity. Subsequently, two distinct 
social contexts are invoked and contrasted. As with previous excerpts, these 
contexts conform to the 'publicTprivate' distinction - "we might hold back until 
we're on our own or till we get home or whatever' (lines 180-181) and "a lot of 
people don't like to show any emotion at work" (lines 181-182). Within 
contemporary Western culture, "work" is interpretable as an exemplar of 
'public' contexts and as an exemplar of contexts that are characterized by an 
absence of emotional expression (Hearn, 1993). 
The invocation of the context of "work" affords David the rhetorical possibility of 
constructing differences between categories of people, based on the "worW' 
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contexts that they inhabit. The functions served by the invocation of "worw' 
contexts for David's own subject position are evident in his use of pronouns. 
His initial uses of first person plural pronouns -"we" and "our' (lines 178,180 
and 181 and line 179 respectively) - are interpreted as constructing a 
generalised category that includes David. However, following from the 
invocation of the category "a lot of people", located within a construction of 
generalised inexpressivity within the context of work, David invokes another 
category, which his subsequent use of first person plural pronouns must be 
interpreted as indexing. David invokes the specific category of "care worker', a 
category to which he claims membership. By constructing the members of this 
category as "very emotional people" (line 183), David distances himself from 
the qualities that he constructed and ascribed to the category of "a lot of 
people". Further, David constructs himself as benefiting from this category 
membership - "I'm lucky" (line 182). The occupation of this subject position, as 
emotionally expressive in the context of work, also warrants David's right to 
speak about and to reflect upon the unfortunate emotional inexpressivity of 
others. 
My question at line 184 invites David to account further for the constructed 
differences between categories of people and for the effects of context on 
emotional 'expression'. Following a brief pause and an audible intake of breath 
- interpreted as working up what is to follow as the product of serious 
consideration - David advances "fear' as the determining factor. This 
construction takes the form of a rhetorical question - "well it's fear isn't it? " 
(line 185). Though questions typically require answers rhetorical ones do not. 
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The interpretation of the question as a rhetorical one is strengthened by 
David's repetition and development of "fear"as the determinant of 
inexpressivity - "it's it's fear of being (. ) ridiculed" (line 185). This construction 
reflects a common theme amongst contemporary literature on men, 
masculinity and emotions and echoes the constructions of emotional 
expressivity as connoting vulnerability and as inviting ridicule, abuse or 
violence that were apparent in excerpts 1,2,4,7 and 8. Men are constructed 
as policing both their own and other men's emotional expressivity. Within such 
constructions, 'fear of the consequences of socially unacceptable or gender- 
inappropriate emotional 'expressions', may be invoked to account for the 
maintenance of the constructed status quo of severely limited male emotional 
expressivity. 
Following from his invocation of "fear' to account for emotional inexpressivity in 
public contexts, David's use of the narrowed categories "some some men" 
(line 186) and "a lot of men" (line 187) is a point of analytic interest. These 
categories of men are constructed as objects within the 'hydraulic model of 
emotions'. Though the men assigned to these categories are constructed as 
limited in their ability to control emotions, particularly "their temper' (line 186), 
this limitation is constructed as context dependent. These men are constructed 
as effectively controlling emotional 'expression' in one context but, drawing 
upon the status of emotions as imperatives, as ultimately unable to exert that 
control indefinitely. David's construction of an emotional 'experience', the 
'expression' of which is controlled in one 'public' context, being transformed 
"into anger" (line 188) and being 'expressed' as violence in the 'private' context 
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of the "home" could be interpreted as a straightforward invocation of the 
'hydraulic model' discourse. However, sense of passivity, regarding both the 
determination of the eventual form of emotional 'expression' and the context in 
which it occurs, which is typical of invocations of the 'hydraulic model' 
discourse is absent on this occasion. In its place is a heightened sense of 
agency - "they tend to: transpose that into anger and they may not want to 
show that in a place of work (. ) ((coughs)) so they wait till they get home" (lines 
187-189). The above identified categories of men are constructed as 
agentically determining both the form of emotional expression, constructed in 
terms of "anger"and interpreted as 'aggression' and 'violence, and the context 
in which it occurs, again exclusively constructed as "home". 
In rhetorical terms, the distance between the construction of an emotional 
'experience' of "anger"and the construction of the'expression' of that emotion 
as 'violence' is evidently small. It is a move that David accomplishes with 
worrying ease. The forms of violence that David constructs are significant. The 
constructed violent act of "put[ting] a fist through a wall" (line 190), echoes the 
act of head-butting a tree advanced in excerpt 17. To construct a category of 
men as able "put a fist through a wall" works up the imperative force of 
emotions and the power of male emotional 'experiences' and 'expressions'. 
David also constructs these forms of male emotional 'expression' as familiar 
and social recognisable - "that's quite common" (line 190) - and by doing so 
warrants his account. 
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More striking than the constructed act of punching a wall is David's 
construction of violence against others. The invocation of the category "wife" - 
"beat their wife up or something" (line 189-190) - functions to further narrow 
the category of men being talked about. Only one broad category of men can 
reasonably be constructed as beating their wives, married and therefore, 
presumably, heterosexual men. For a speaker such as David, who elsewhere 
in the discussion clearly occupies the subject positions of a 'gay man', this 
constitutes another possible distancing device. However, David's occupation of 
the subject position of a 'gay man' is not explicit within the excerpt. Instead, his 
apparently innocuous use of the previously identified categories and the 
attendant pronouns - "they" and "theie- distances him from the objects of his 
construction. This distancing is finally made explicit through David's clear 
construction and positioning of himself as someone whose behaviour does not 
follow the'hydraulic model' (lines 190-192). 
The constructions of aggressive or violent forms of male emotional expression, 
seen here and in excerpt 17, are interesting because they are directed at 
objects that are not constructed as related to the initial eliciting of the emotional 
experience. Further, it could be argued that some of these constructed violent 
acts are directed against the 'self, given that they are explicitly constructed or 
interpretable as resulting in injuries to the individual. To return to the concept of 
indexicality, I argue that within these excerpts 'masculinity' is constructed as 
accomplished through the management of the indexical content of talk. 
Specifically, it is accomplished through the management of the indexical 
functions served by emotion discourses, in terms of the constitution of subject 
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positions and the locations of those positions within social structures and 
power relations. Further, this management is contextually determined. Also, 
the forms of eventual male emotional expression are typically constructed as 
non-verbal, that is to say that men are implicitly constructed as resisting 
occupying emotion-based subject positions constituted through the use of 
emotion discourses. Consequently, the socially available, indexical information 
constituted by these non-verbal expressions, which must be assumed to be 
both communicative and relational, is severely limited. They index only the 
emotional 'experience', in these excerpts 'anger. Further, these constructed 
acts of emotional 'expression' do not index those contexts or objects that are 
constructed as the determinants of the emotional 'experience'. Men are 
constructed as managing the indexical content of interactions to such an extent 
that their emotional 'experiences' may appear, if they appear at all through 
emotional 'expression', to begin and end with their'selves'. From my speaking 
position as analyst, this is interpretable as a construction of the interactional 
accomplishment of emotional independence and as constitutive of the 
performance of 'hegemonic' masculinity (Connell, 1995). 
The final excerpt provides a concise illustration of the way that the 'hydraulic 
model' discourse can be invoked to account for highly problematic and 
Imasculine' social phenomena. This excerpt follows from a discussion of the 
importance accorded to football in contemporary British male culture and is 
primarily concerned with accounting for the social phenomenon of football 
violence. As with previous excerpts, there is a great deal that is potentially of 
interest. However, I will restrict this analysis to the speakers' recursive 
277 
movement towards and away from the 'hydraulic model' discourse, as a 
resource for accounting for male emotional expressivity, and the implications 
that this has for their subject positions. 
Excerpt 19 
976 Mark: = yeah I need to get out more ((group laughs)) if if er if England are 
977 playing in a big tournament the World Cup or something I will make I'll 
978 make it a point of watching the match I'll stay in and watch the match we 
979 were in Malta recently and it was on in a bar we had to go and watch the 
980 match because there there's this there's a tide of emotional support for the 
981 England team (. ) that I think it's quite a good good let out for blokes when 
982 England play and especially when they win because it's a big release of 
983 these so- sort of erm suppressed emotion whether it be obvious ones or 
984 painful ones or happy ones it's almost like a good excuse to let rip when 
985 England win 'cause = 
986 Luke: = ok so what about when they start smashing places up and all this all 
987 this aggression comes out wha- what do you say about that? (2) 
988 Mark: well that's generally connected with them loosing erm but also you 
989 know people do it anyway and I can't I don't know why people resort to 
990 violence when England win maybe they're just off home ground and they 
991 think 'let's let's wreck this place we're in 'cause'(. ) well maybe it's alcohol I 
992 don't [(inaudible) 
993 Matthew: (inaudible) not not having a means of expressing erm the emotion 
994 that they feel inside in any other way 
995 Mark: = [yeah] 
996 James: that's what I was thinking that I'm not a football. supporter er er 1 
997 follow the football like like you like you say if there's a if there's a big game 
998 on I'll sit down and I'll watch it and I can I can pick up on the emotion = 
999 Mark: = and you get involved yeah = 
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1000 James: = but er I can also understand that erm at big games when you go to 
1001 watch a big game and there's that that (. ) surge of erm fifty thousand 
1002 emotions hh going and the anticipation of winning and if it ends up in failure 
1003 all that emotion that you would have expressed as success h is still there 
1004 and I can understand how that gets expressed h through anger but it's 
1005 going back to what you said erm a while back aboutwhat's an acceptable 
1006 expression of anger? 'whether it's ok to verbalise that but not ok to 
1007 internalise it and then use it as er er a physical expression 
1008 Simon: = hmm (2) 
T5: 976-1008 
Walton, Coyle and Lyons (2004) demonstrated that 'football' was a context 
relative to which the relationships between 'masculinity' and emotional 
expressivity were easily discussed. In this excerpt, the context of an England 
international football match is constructed as beneficial to the members of a 
very particular category - "blokes" (line 981). Various speakers, across the 
group discussions, invoked the category "blokes". However, the meaning of 
"blokes", on each occasion of use, is determined by the local interactional and 
rhetorical context in which it occurs. Within this context, "blokes" is interpreted 
as signifying a category of men for whom an England football match, and 
specifically an England victory, can be constructed as an appropriate context 
for masculine emotional expression. 
Features of the 'hydraulic model' discourse are apparent in the excerpt from 
line 980. An England victory is variously constructed as "quite a good good let 
out for blokes" (line 981), "a big release" (line 982) and "a good excuse to let 
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rip" (line 984). These metaphors for emotional 'expression' imply the 
'existence' of unexpressed emotional 'experiences', within members of the 
category "blokes". The persuasiveness of the constructed existence of 
"suppressed" emotional 'experiences' is worked up through a three-part list 
(Jefferson, 1990) - "obvious ones or painful ones or happy ones" (lines 983- 
984). An England victory is constructed as a context in which "blokes" can 
passively 'express' or'expel'- "let rip" (line 984)- a range of internalised 
emotional 'experiences' that would otherwise remain unexpressed. 
The importance accorded to context, in both this and the preceding excerpt, 
represents another dimension of the'hydraulic model' discourse. Simply, the 
'hydraulic model'discourse takes context into account. Thus, change in or 
movement between contexts can be constructed as partially or wholly 
deterministic of male emotional 'expression'. The important distinction between 
masculine 'public' inexpressivity and masculine 'private' expressivity has 
already been engaged with. Discourses of context are therefore also partially 
deterministic of the likelihood that the 'hydraulic model' discourse will be 
invoked to account for male emotional 'expression'. The'hydraulic model' 
discourse may be more commonly drawn upon to account for problematic 
'public' male emotional expressivity. This is should not be interpreted as the 
statement of a rule regarding invocations of the'hydraulic model' discourse. 
The preceding excerpt provides an example of the invocation of the'hydraulic 
model' discourse to account for'private' male emotional expressivity, though 
the role of agency in the determination of both the context and form of 
emotional expression was worked up in that instance. 
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Before continuing, a few features of Mark's turn warrant further mention. The 
first is the conditional nature of the construction of an England international 
football match as beneficial, in terms of providing a context within which 
"blokes" might express "suppressed" emotions. The condition, repeated on 
lines 982 and 984, is the event of an England win. The significance of this will 
become apparent over the coming analysis. Secondly, the beneficial functions 
of the football context are tentatively constructed - "it's quite a good good let 
out" (line 981) and the extremely cautious "it's almost like a good excuse to let 
rip when England win" (lines 984-985). The implication of the tentative nature 
of these utterances is that the construction of a football match as a wholly 
appropriate context for male emotional 'expression' is potentially problematic. 
One possible reason for this is apparent within the next turn of the excerpt. 
Luke's question at lines 986-987 does not constitute a challenge to the validity 
of Mark's construction. Rather it constitutes a challenge to Mark to extend his 
construction to account for the undesirable social phenomena - "smashing 
places up" (line 986) and "all this aggression comes out" (lines 986-987) - that 
are typically associated with football matches, and England internationals in 
particular. Since Luke constructs Mark - "you" (line 987) - as separate from 
the objects of his construction - "they" (line 986), Mark is required only to 
account for his construction and not to defend his own masculine subjectivity. 
There are obvious undesirable consequences for an individual speaker with 
regard to accounting for aggression and violence. This is particularly 'true' with 
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regard to the 'hydraulic model' discourse, given that it may constitute the basis 
for the disavowal of responsibility at the level of the individual. MarWs turn, line 
988-991, is interpreted as oriented to all these concerns. Firstly, he constructs 
aggression and violence as products of England defeats, thereby 
differentiating them from his earlier construction, which was specifically 
concerned with England victories. From the conjunction "but" (line 988) he 
constructs aggression and violence as things that may occur generally outside 
the context of football - "people do it anyway" (line 989). However, he 
concedes that aggression and violence can also follow from an England win. 
Lines 989-991 are strikingly different from those that preceded them in terms of 
the discourses drawn upon. Specifically, there is a total absence of the 
'hydraulic model' discourse. 
In attempting to account for these problematic forms of emotional 'expression', 
Mark inoculates himself against the problematic possibility of appearing to 
construct violence as understandable or warranted. He positions himself as 
fundamentally unable to explain football violence -I can't I don't know why" 
(line 989) - but since he is rhetorically obliged to try to account for football 
violence he goes about it cautiously. The account contains 'softeners' 
(Edwards, 2000) - "maybe" (repeated on line 990 and 991) - that work up 
Mark's constructed uncertainty. Mark also distances himself from the objects of 
his construction through his use of nouns and pronouns; "they" (line 990) no 
longer indexes "blokes" but "people" (line 989). By invoking a gender non- 
specific category, the account that Mark constructs may have fewer 
implications for his own gendered subjectivity. 
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Further, the sense of passivity, characteristic of the 'hydraulic model' discourse 
is absent from this turn. Within the context of an England international football 
match, undesirable consequences, such as violence, are constructed as 
resulting from an actively and intentionally undertaken process rather than a 
passively experienced one. The use of the word "resort' constructs violence as 
an available option that can be taken up by individual or groups. Similarly, the 
construction of reported thought - "they think 'let's wreck this place we're in"' 
(lines 990-991) - constructs violence as the product of a collective cognitive 
process. Overall, there is a markedly greater sense of agency apparent in lines 
988-992 than there was in lines 976-985.1 contend that this limits the 
possibility for the disavowal of responsibility, at both an individual and group 
level. 
By working up the importance of agency Mark limits the possibility of being 
positioned as an apologist for football violence. This construction contrasts 
sharply with that seen in excerpt 4, where collective decision making and 
action were roundly rejected as determinants of problematic responses to male 
emotional 'expression'. In excerpt 4, owing to the gendered subject position 
occupied by the speaker, the invocation of the discourse of 'collective intention 
and action' was potentially problematic. In this instance, anything but the 
invocation of these discourses and the emphasizing of individual and collective 
agency would be potentially problematic for the speaker. The invocation of 
particular discursive resources to account for the constructed actions of men, 
whether those actions are constructed as forms of male emotional expression 
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or as responses to it, are perhaps largely determined by the subject positions 
that such resources would constitute for those who invoked them. Accounting 
for male emotional expression is, for male speakers, as much about managing 
their own gendered subjectivities. 
The construction of emotional expression as active and intentional is, however, 
softened at the end of line 991. Echoing the analysis of excerpt 17, "alcohol" is 
tentatively evoked as a potential determinant of male emotional expression 
through violence. The invocation of an external determinant softens the entire 
construction, in terms of the emphasis placed on agency and responsibility, 
and creates the rhetorical space for the construction of further external social 
or situational determinants of emotional expression. This rhetorical possibility 
is picked up by Matthew, whose construction of forms of emotional expression 
as determined by the relationship between the individual or the group and the 
social context - "not having a means of expressing erm the emotion that they 
feel inside in any other way" (lines 993-994) - echoes that of Maurice in 
excerpt 16 - "you don't find an outlet for them" (line 409). Matthew's turn also 
restates the distinction between 'experience' and 'expression'. 
Despite the previously identified problems with invoking thehydraulic model' 
discourse to account for football violence, it is taken up and developed by 
James in lines 996-998 and 1000-1007. Though James is perhaps not subject 
to the same constraints as Mark - Luke's challenge at line 986-987 was 
directed to Mark alone - he does considerable work in lines 996-998 to 
distance himself from the object(s) of his construction. He clearly locates 
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himself outside the potentially problematic category of "football supporter' (line 
996). However, since he also needs to warrant his right to speak on the subject 
he instead positions himself within the category of 'followers of football'- "er er 
I follow the football" (lines 996-997). Membership of the category of 'followers 
of football' is constructed as conditional upon context - "if there's a big game 
on" (lines 997-998) - and is warranted by the subsequent actions - the three- 
part list (Jefferson, 1990) of "I'll sit down and I'll watch it and I can I can pick up 
on the emotion" (line 998). 
James continues, from the conjunction "but' (line 1000), to qualify his subject 
position as a 'follower of football'. As such he constructs himself as 
appreciative of the context of a football match as suffused with emotion. It 
should be noted that what is constructed here is not just any old football match 
but the seemingly mythologized "big game(s)" (lines 997,1000 and 100 1) (see 
Walton, Coyle and Lyons (2004) for another example of an exceptional football 
match being invoked as a context for masculine emotional expression). This 
construction imbues the invoked 'social' context with its own unique 
significance and importance. Perhaps such an exceptional context is required 
to warrant the subsequent invocation of parts of the 'hydraulic model' 
discourse, which are evident from line 1000. The persuasiveness of the 
'hydraulic model' discourse as an account of male emotional 'expression' is 
worked up through a constructed list of sequential conditions, which includes 
the use of emphasis, a high order of quantification and an extreme case 
formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) - "when you go to watch a big game and 
there's that that (. ) su[ge of erm fifty thousand emotions hh going and the 
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anticipation of winning and if it ends up in failure all that emotion that you 
would have expressed as success h is still there" (lines 1000-1003). All these 
features work up the persuasiveness of the'hydraulic model of emotion'as an 
account for the constructed expression of emotions "through anger" (line 
1004). It is important to note that James's construction, in identifying "anger' 
as the eventual expression, avoids accounting for football violence. In fact, 
James goes on to identify the question of permissible forms of expression for 
anger as an entirely separate matter for discussion and one that has already 
been addressed (lines 1004-1007)48. 
Summary 
Across the previous six excerpts the speakers constructed 'anger as an 
emotional 'expression' that accorded with predominant cultural conceptions of 
the performance of masculinity. Emotional 'expressions' or the construction of 
the 'self in terms of emotion have the same implications in terms of positioning 
as other discursive resources (Parrott, 2004). However, the configuration of 
subject positions within social structures and power relations and the 
consequent affording of rights and duties constituted by a particular emotion 
are determined by the locally and culturally established 'meaning' of that 
emotion. The subject positions, the configuration of power relations and the 
afforded rights and duties constituted by the 'expression' of 'anger, as it is 
understood within the contexts of these excerpts, accord with the predominant 
48 This discussion of socially acceptable forms of expression of anger is contained in excerpt 
15. 
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cultural conception of the performance of masculinity, i. e., the interactional 
functions served by'anger are determinate of its status as a masculine 
emotion. These functions include positioning of the'self as independent, the 
positioning of the'self as unapproachable and positioning of the'self in such 
ways that others are both positioned and unable to renegotiate that act of 
positioning. 'Anger' is demonstrably implicated in the positioning of 'others' and 
is therefore interpretable as the materialization of power (Butler, 1993). 
However, as an emotional expression, 'anger' presents a particular problem for 
the performance of 'masculinities'. On the whole, the performance of 
'masculinities' and 'masculine' subjectivities are characterized by claims for the 
need to control 'emotions' and the illegitimizing of 'emotions' as a basis for 
action. 'Masculinities' are constituted by reason and not by emotion. This 
problem is negotiated through the invocation of the'hydraulic model' 
discourse. Through this discourse, 'expressions' of emotions, such as 'anger, 
and problematic behaviours that are constructed as forms of emotional 
#expression', are constructed as exceptional instances of the breakdown in the 
exercise of 'masculine' agentic control. They are further accounted for by the 
construction of 'emotions', within the 'hydraulic model' discourse, as having the 
force of imperatives. 'Hydraulic', 'fluid', 'energy' and 'mass' metaphors for 
emotions (Lakoff, 1987) should not be understood as simple representational 
devices but as discursive resources that explicitly function to account for 
emotional 'expression'. 
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When intersected by discourses of 'context', the hydraulic model discourse 
provides accounts of emotional 'expressions' as determined by antecedents 
that lie outside the context in which emotions are 'expressed'. What is striking 
about the hydraulic model discourse is that it still functions in the constitution of 
masculinities. Emotional 'expressions' or behaviours constructed as emotional 
'expression' accounted for through the 'hydraulic model' discourse do not 
position speakers relative to the original 'cause' of the emotional 'experience'. 
The'hydraulic model'discourse still functions in the management of subject 
positions, social structures and power relations. It constitutes only those that 
accord with dominant cultural conceptions of 'masculinity'. 
The invocation of the hydraulic model discourse is however not unproblematic 
for masculine speakers. Given that the resultant forms of expression - 
individual and group violence and aggression and self-injurious or otherwise 
self-detrimental behaviour - are accounted for as determined by context, as 
passively experienced and resulting from the imperative force of emotions, and 
as occurring despite the exercise of agency, the hydraulic model discourse is 
interpretable as providing for disavowals of responsibility. Consequently, 
masculine speakers may invoke it to account for the actions of clearly 
categorized 'other masculinities'- as David did in excerpt 18 -or otherwise 
distance themselves from it in order to manage the ideological dilemma 
constituted by accounting for socially problematic masculine behaviours such 
as football violence - as Mark did in excerpt 19. What is absent from these 
excerpts is any invocation of the 'hydraulic model' discourse by a single 
speaker to account for their own exceptional instances. The closest example is 
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Maurice's invocation of the 'hydraulic model' discourse to account for the 
emotional 'expressions' of a generalized category of 'men'. Whether or not 
'masculine subjectivities' are constituted through the 'hydraulic model' 
discourse are questions that cannot be answered by this analysis. 
4.5 Discussion 
The above excerpts were analysed in order to answer the following questions: 
e How do men construct men's relationship with emotions? 
9 In constructing this relationship, what discourses do men draw upon to 
account for it? 
* In accounting for men's constructed relationship with emotions, do men 
reflexively orient to the implications of the discourses upon which they 
draw for their own subject positions as 'men'? 
The analysis was based on one simple assumption, that the speakers in the 
focus group discussions were already gendered. They were positioned as 
'masculine'when they were approached to participate in the research, they 
positioned their'selves' as 'masculine'when they accepted the invitation to 
participate in the research and they were involved in the performance of 
masculinity and the constitution of masculine subjectivities throughout the 
discussions. This is not an essentialist assumption that 'masculinity' would be 
done as a result of these individuals' status 'males'. Such an assumption 
presupposes the primacy of 'sex' onto which 'gender' is mapped. In contrast, 
the above assumptions are informed by poststructuralist gender theory in 
which 'sex', the materialization of 'gendered' bodies as 'male' and as 'men', is 
an effect of 'gender (Butler, 1999). These speakers are 'gendered', have been 
289 
'gendered' since birth and were 'gendered' by their location within the research 
context. The question was, 'how would they negotiate their gendered 
subjectivities relative to the accounts that they would give of the relationship 
between 'masculinity' and 'emotions'? 
Given these assumptions and research questions, the use of focus group 
discussions as a means of data generation is entirely appropriate. Speakers 
were invited to construct and account for men's relationships with emotions. 
These constructions and accounts were open to contestation and negotiation 
by the other members of the group. Simultaneously, speakers negotiated their 
status as 'masculine' relative to the constructions of 'masculinity' and this 
status too was open to contestation and challenge by the other members of the 
group. What the focus group discussions generated was rich data within which 
multiple versions of masculinity and multiple masculine subjectivities were 
constituted and negotiated. The challenge for me was to represent that 
richness. 
It was stated above that the analysis would be attentive to variability both in the 
constructions of men's relationships with emotions, in the discourses that were 
invoked to account for that relationship and in the masculine subjectivities that 
were constituted by or relative to these constructions and accounts. On the 
whole the constructions of men's relationships with emotions were highly 
consistent and the discourses invoked to account for that relationship were 
readily categorized as the 'socialization' repertoire, the 'social structures' 
repertoire, the 'evolutionary' repertoire or the 'hydraulic model' discourse. 
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Briefly, the 'evolutionary' and 'socialization' repertoires were invoked to 
manage issues of accountability that arose from the construction of the 
'hegemonic masculine way of doing emotions'. Both repertoires constitute 
temporally distal determinants of the 'hegemonic masculine way of doing 
emotions' and, by doing so, provide for disavowals of responsibility for any 
consequences that may arise from adherence to the 'hegemonic masculine 
way of doing emotions' and inoculate against possible criticisms and calls for 
change. The 'socialization' and 'evolutionary' repertoires, as they were invoked 
by speakers, are both highly reactionary and perpetuate the social structures 
and power relations constituted by the 'hegemonic masculine way of doing 
emotions', i. e., patriarchy. The 'social structures' repertoire is arguably the 
more reflexive of the resources invoked to account for men's relationship with 
emotions, given that that relationship is accounted for as both occasioned by 
and constitutive of men's location within gendered social structures. Ultimately, 
though masculinity is constructed as a reflexive accomplishment within the 
#social structures' repertoire, implying a high degree of agency in the 
determining of that performance, the 'social structures' discourse is based 
upon the presupposition of an established hierarchical gender order, within 
which masculinity is dominant. As was demonstrated in the analysis even the 
construction of masculinity, through the 'social structures' repertoire, as a 
reflexively accomplished 'performance' was predicated on the construction of 
women as disempowered and subordinate. 
291 
Across the 'socialization' repertoire, the 'social structures' repertoire and the 
devolutionary' repertoire, invoked to account for masculine emotional 
inexpressivity, considerable emphasis was placed on the controlling of 
emotional expression as agentically accomplished. Indeed, the emphasizing of 
individual agency as constitutive of masculinity is evident not only in the 
speakers' constructions of men's relationship with emotions but also in the 
subject positions and subjectivities constituted relative to those constructions. 
The only occasion on which agency and the exercise of control were 
conspicuously absent as directly constitutive of masculinity was in the 
'hydraulic model' discourse. In the'hydraulic model'discourse emotions are 
accorded the status of 'imperatives', they are the 'passions' by which men are 
overcome. Importantly, the'hydraulic model'discourse is invoked to account 
for those 'emotional 'expressions' that are interpretable as consistent with 
hegemonic masculinity, e. g. 'anger and the imposition of dominance. Thus the 
'hydraulic model' discourse again provides for disavowals of responsibility for 
those masculine emotional expressions that do result on the marginalization 
and subordination of others. However, agency is present even in the'hydraulic 
model' discourse since the imperative force of emotions is worked up through 
their construction as occurring despite the masculine exercise of agency. 
The speakers' constructions of men's relationship with emotions were 
interpreted as constructions of the predominant cultural understanding of 
'masculinity'. That these constructions were advanced before other'masculine' 
speakers meant that they had to be recognizable as constructions of 
'masculinity'. The possibility for contestation and challenge resulted in broadly 
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consistent constructions of the contemporary cultural constitution of 
'masculinity'. I use masculinity in the singular because I would argue that what 
the speakers constructed when they talked about men's relationship with 
emotions was 'hegemonic masculinity' (Connell, 1995), or at least those 
features of 'hegemonic masculinity' that are concerned with emotions. The 
assertion that the speakers constructed and accounted for hegemonic 
masculinity is based on the emphasis that the speakers placed on the 
functions of emotions and emotional 'expressions' in particular. Masculine 
emotional inexpressivity, accounted for through the 'socialization' repertoire, 
the 'social structures' repertoire and the 'evolutionary' repertoire, was 
constructed relative to particular emotions or forms of 'expression'. My 
contention is that emotions such as 'upset' orlove' and their 'expression' 
either verbally or non-verbally are proscribed, not because of any implicit 
gendering of those emotions and forms of expression as'not masculine' but 
because of the relational functions that these emotions serve. 
Certain emotions or forms of emotional expression are culturally interpretable 
as constituting subject positions, social structures and power relations, as a 
result of which and within which the individual 'expressing' the 'emotion' makes 
available certain subject positions, and rights and duties (Davies & Han-6, 
1990), that might result in their disempowerment. Affording these possibilities 
or failing to manage these possibilities is antithetical to 'hegemonic j 
masculinity', which is understood as 'the configuration of gender practice which 
embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of 
patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position 
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of men and the subordination of women' (Connell, 1995, p. 77). Across the 
excerpts, 'masculinity' is demonstrably constituted through the management of 
power relations through emotional '(in)expression'. Thus, it is relative to 
'hegemonic masculinity' and indeed through features of 'hegemonic 
masculinity', primarily the emphasis on individual agency and control, that the 
speakers constituted their own masculine subjectivities. 
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Chapter 5 
"You can't humiliate me, you can't": Accounting for 
episodes of 'humiliation' and the implications for the 
constitution of a gendered subjectivity 
5.1 Introduction 
Where chapter 4 was concerned with men's accounts of men's relationship 
with emotions and their orientations to the implications of those accounts for 
their own positioning as 'masculine', this chapter is concerned with how men 
construct the 'self in terms of emotions and the implications this has for the 
constitution of masculine subjectivities. At least, that was the initial function of 
this chapter. An iterative process of movement between tlie research interests 
of the thesis, the analytic method to be adopted and the limitations of available 
and appropriate data resulted in much more specific research questions and a 
much more tailored analytic technique and interpretative framework. 
As stated above, the initial research question was 'Do men necessarily orient 
to the performance of masculinity when constructing accounts of the "self' in 
emotion terms'? This question follows readily from the cultural associations 
between 'gender' and 'emotions' and is an extension of the research questions 
and analysis of chapter 4. However, the question presupposes the content of 
the data, i. e., the data must involve men engaged in the construction of their 
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selves in terms of emotion. One possible source of such data was transcripts 
of men's sessions in therapy. 
5.2 Data 
Transcripts of therapeutic and counselling sessions have a history of being 
used as data in discursive analyses (Edwards, 1997,1998,1999; Greatbatch 
& Dingwall, 1997). The transcripts used in this study were taken from the 
Psychological Therapies Research Centre (PTRC) archive at the University of 
Leeds. This data set was generated for an original study by Shapiro, Barkham, 
Rees, Hardy, Reynolds and Startup (1994), which compared the effect of 
treatment duration and severity of depression on the effectiveness of two forms 
of psychotherapy, Cognitive-Behavioral and Psychodynamic-Interpersonal. 
Owing to the emphasis placed on the 'feelings' of the client within the 
Conversational Model of the Psychodynamic-Interpersonal approach (Hobson, 
1985; Goldberg, Hobson, Maguire, Margison, O'Dowd, Osborn & Moss, 1984), 
it was decided that this half of the data-set would be the more likely to yield 
interactions of the type that I was interested in. In the original study, three of 
the therapy sessions of each participant had been audio-recorded and 
transcribed. From the Psychodynamic-Interpersonal stream, the transcripts of 
four of the male participants were selected on the basis of an initial reading 
and the apparent prevalence of emotion terms. These were participant 
numbers 069,101,199 and 249. Owing to this being archived data and my not 
having access to the original recordings it was impossible to improve upon the 
limited transcription format. However, for the purposes of this analysis I am 
content that this level of transcription is adequate. 
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5.3 Method 
All four transcripts were read and reread before being subjected to thematic 
coding, in the manner advocated within grounded theory analysis (e. g. Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990; Pidgeon & Henwood, 1996). QSR NVivo qualitative research 
software was used to assist the process of thematic coding (QSR International, 
1999). The aim of the initial thematic coding was to render manageable a 
sizable data set; each of four participants contributed three transcripts each 
between 20 and 30 pages in length. The systematic thematic coding of data 
was used as a means of identifying and grouping those tranches of text that 
might yield interesting and relevant analyses, i. e., those which might support 
engagement with the question, 'Do men necessarily orient to the performance 
of masculinity when constructing accounts of the "self" in emotion terms'? 
Thus, the thematic coding process was informed both by the research 
questions and by the content of the data. The data were coded according to 
the clients' use of emotion terms in relation to their'selves'. Instances of the 
use of emotion terms in relation to the 'self were distinguished according to the 
tense involved - past and present. From the thematic coding, tranches of text 
emerged in which men constructed accounts of their own past or present 
emotional experiences and expressions. 
Whilst it would have been possible to use all the available transcripts, that is 
the transcripts of all four clients, as the basis for an analysis of how men might 
construct accounts of the self through emotion terms, I felt that such an 
analysis would be too close, in terms of content, to that of chapter 4. The 
alternative was to focus on the transcripts of just one client to produce a case- 
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study type analysis of one male speaker's construction of account of the self in 
emotion terms. 
Strong themes of analytic interest were identified within the transcripts of three 
of the four speakers. These included talk concerned with the issue of 'emotion 
work' in the context of a heterosexual relationship (Duncombe & Marsden, 
1993), talk about the emotions in relation to work, particularly emotional 
responses to the prospect of enforced early retirement owing to ill health, and 
talk on the topic of humiliation. The decision was taken to focus of the 
transcripts that included talk of humiliation. This decision was based on a 
number of factors: 
" humiliation had not previously been engaged within the thesis at an 
analytic level 
" humiliation may be understood as involving disempowerment49 
" humiliation may, therefore, have particular implications for the 
performance of masculinity, if masculinity is assumed to be constituted 
through negotiations of power relations 
For these reasons the transcripts of client 069's therapy sessions, which 
contained the constructions of episodes of humiliation, were selected for more 
49 In a discussion of the distinction between 'shame' and 'humiliation', Gilbert (1997) invoked 
the context of torture to explore their functional differences: 'The aim of the torturer is never 
described as a desire to shame the victim... It is about the desire to humiliate and the exercise 
of power(p. 133). Similarly, Silver, Conte, Miceli and Poggi (1986) argued that 'humiliation 
involves not having the powers that we believe the members of a group should have and this 
in turn involves standards of what is appropriate' (p. 277; italics in original). 
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detailed analysis. Based upon the above listed factors, the analysis was 
intended to address the following specific research questions; 
" How does a male speaker construct accounts of episodes of 
'humiliation'? 
" Are discourses of 'humiliation' used to construct accounts of the 
negotiation of subject positions and the constitution of power relations? 
" And, based upon the presuppositions that humiliation constitutes 
episodes of disempowerment and that the performance of masculinity 
is, in some way, constituted through the negotiation of power relations, 
does a male speaker, when constructing episodes in which he is the 
object of humiliation, simultaneously orient to their implications for the 
constitution of a masculine subjectivity? 
Essentially, these questions are reducible to, 'is masculinity done through or 
relative to a male speaker's constructions of episodes of humiliation'? 
The excerpts were subjected to a form of critical discursive psychological 
analysis of the type outlined in chapter 3. This form of analysis advocates a 
recursive movement between micro- and macro-textual levels (Coyle, 2000). 
However, moves to the macro-textual level should be firmly grounded in the 
micro-textual details of the data. In the case of a gender-focussed analysis, 
this may mean that the move towards a macro-textual analysis is contingent 
upon the presence of explicitly gendered terms or on the presence of some 
other resources that can reasonably be argued to be gendered (see Wetherell 
(1998) for a discussion of this issue). In the absence of the former, analysts 
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may rely on the latter. However, reliance on the latter is problematic owing to 
the various interpretations that are possible of any particular word or phrase, 
including whether and how it may be gendered. 
Owing to the relative paucity of gendered terms in the excerpts selected for 
analysis, these methodological concerns regarding the limits of a critical 
discursive psychological approach will be reflexively oriented to throughout the 
analysis. At this point, I will invoke the concepts of adequacy and parsimony as 
determining the analytic approach adopted and interpretative framework 
brought to bear in this analysis. In answer to the question of how much an 
analyst should bring to a text, I would say, 'As much as is needed to make 
adequate sense of the complexities of human social discursive interactions 
and no more' . 
50 However, when the excerpts selected for analysis were 
engaged with it was evident that the interpretative framework required 
development in order to engage adequately with the functions served by 
autobiographical narratives and reported speech. The subsequent 
engagement with concepts of the 'dialogical self, the 'polyphonic novel', 
'double indexicality' and the 'iterative I' represent attempts only to develop an 
interpretative framework that is sufficiently sophisticated to be able to deal with 
the multiple I-positions constituted through the use of reported speech and 
unvoiced reported thought in autobiographical narratives. It should not be 
50 Of course, it may be argued that no analyst can ever be absolutely certain what and how 
much they bring to the interpretative endeavour. 
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interpreted as an alternative interpretative framework to that of positioning 
theory outlined in chapter 3. 
This interpretative framework is informed by recent social constructionist 
conceptual izatio n of the 'self (Gergen, 1999; Han-6,1998; Harr6 & van 
Langenhove, 1999; Lewis, 2003; Shotter & Gergen, 1989). In particular, it is 
informed by concepts of the 'relational' or'dialogical''self (Gergen, 1999; 
Hermans, 1996; Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Hermans, Kempen & van Loon, 
1992) and by the emphasis placed on autobiographical narratives and the idea 
of the polyphonic novel (Bakhtin, 1929/1973; Bruner, 1986; Michotte, 
1946/1963; Sarbin, 1986). 
The central contribution of the polyphonic novel to the theory of a dialogical 
self is the possibility of multi-voicedness (Hermans, 1996). The dialogical self 
is theorised as a multiplicity of "voiced positions" (Hermans, 1996, p. 44). 
Drawing upon the metaphors of I the author and Me the actor and their 
possible spatio-temporal locations, constituted through autobiographical 
narratives, Hermans et aL (1992) outlined their conceptualization of the 
dialogical self as: 
... a dynamic multiplicity of relatively autonomous I positions in an 
imaginal landscape. ... The I has the possibility to move, as in a space, from 
one position to the other in accordance with changes in situation and time. The 
/ fluctuates among different and even opposed positions. The / has the 
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capacity to imaginatively endow each position with a voice so that dialogical 
relations between positions can be established. (p. 28). 
Simply, the I can tell stories about the adventures of multiple Me s and in doing 
so construct and negotiate its own constitution; that is to say, the constitution 
of I the author is determined by the stories that it tells about Me the actor and 
the positions that it takes relative to those Me s in the process of telling. 
Through the concepts of the dialogical self and polyphony the importance of 
the telling of autobiographical narratives and of the use of reported speech in 
those narratives to the interactional constitution of subjectivity is realised. 
Any discursive psychological analysis of autobiographical narratives and of the 
use of reported speech must therefore be able to make sense of the inevitable 
multiple significations of T and relate those to particular discursive objects. 
There are two related features of the first person pronoun T that are of 
particular importance: they are double indexicality and the potential for iteration 
(Harr6,1998). Imagine a conversation in which a speaker says "I'd like to go 
home": T indexes both the spatial location and the moral standing of the 
speaker (Harr6 & van Langenhove, 1999); this is the principle of double 
indexicality. Now imagine a conversation in which a speaker says "I think I'd 
like to go home": this is an example of the iterative possibilities of the first 
person pronoun. The force of the original statement, potentially interpretable as 
a command, is softened by the use of the iteratedT. While the innerT of the 
original statement retains double indexicality, indexing the spatial location and 
moral standing of the speaker, the outerT only indexes the moral standing of 
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the speaker and thus functions to mediate the force of the original statement. 
The iterative possibilities of the first person pronoun are also fundamental to 
the discursive accomplishment of reflexivity. 
As was discussed in the analysis of chapter 4, reported speech serves a 
variety of functions. The apparent reporting of who said what and how they 
said it can work up the persuasiveness of a construction of a particular 
interaction. It can function as a distancing device; utterances that may be 
problematic for a speaker can be ascribed to some other. It can also be used 
to afford the hearer the perspective of a "third person referent" in a context or 
interaction in which that hearer was not originally present (Urban, 1989, p. 35). 
Drawing upon the concept of the dialogical self, instances of reported speech 
are interpretable as instantiations of I positions, either through the reporting of 
what one said or in relation to the reported speech of others. The locations of 
these / positions are however relative to the / position that is constituted by the 
voice of the reporter. Through the use of reported speech, these I positions 
and the processes through which they are negotiated are made 
contemporaneous to the context in which they are invoked. An effect of the 
third of these functions is that the use of reported speech makes the hearer a 
third person referent to the process of negotiation of these I positions. 
Consider the following hypothetical 'autobiographical' narrative. Ostensibly 
speaker A is telling her friend, speaker B, about a night out with her boyfriend. 
A: and I said "I think I'd like to go home" 
B: = fair enough = 
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A: = but X was like "oh come on just one more drink" so then I said "no I want to 
go now"= 
B: so what did X say? 
Through the use of autobiographical narrative and reported speech, the 
sequence of positioning acts is made available to speaker B by speaker A. 
Thus, the invocation of autobiographical narratives may be interpreted as 
oriented to some rhetorical, interactional or ideological concern that is 
contemporaneous to the context in which the narrative is being recounted; 
"autobiographical telling articulate[s] the speakers moral commitment to the 
acts of narration and to the acts narrated" (Harr6 & van Langenhove, 1999, 
p. 66). The subject positions constituted by the reported speech of A and X are 
available to interpretation by B as constituting the basis for A's 
contemporaneous subject position, potentially as the'someone who fell out 
with their unreasonable partner. Thus the 'narrative about a night out' may 
more properly be described as a 'resource invoked to account for the 
contemporary status of a relationship'. 
As can be seen in the preceding sentences, the concepts of positioning and 
subject positions have crept in unannounced. While the introduction of the 
metaphor of positioning to discussions of the 'self and subjectivity is 
attributable to Hollway (1984), its theoretical possibilities have been most 
extensively developed by Rom Han-6 and associates (Davies & Harr6,1990; 
Harr6 & van Langenhove, 1999; Han-6 & Moghaddam, 2003). Positioning 
theory (Harr6 & van Langenhove, 1999), the concept of subject positions 
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(Davies & Harr6,1990; Smith, 1988) and the development of 'conditional' 
subject positions constituted by reported speech (see chapter 4) are resources 
that are sufficiently dynamic and sensitive to the location of multiple I positions 
across a number of spatio-temporal locations to constitute the basis of the 
interpretative framework of this analysis. 
Again, it worth stating that the above-outlined interpretative framework is 
developed only as a resource for making sense of the autobiographical 
narratives, instances of reported speech and unvoiced reported thought that 
are characteristic of the following excerpts. It is developed only as a means of 
unravelling the complex rhetorical work done by the invocation of such 
discursive resources and their implications for the constitution of the 
contemporary subjectivity of the speaker. This framework is not developed 
specifically for narratives of humiliation but is generalizable to all invocations of 
autobiographical narratives and concomitant instances of reported speech. 
5.4 Client 069 and the episodes of his humiliation 
Client 069 was male and 36 years of age at the time of therapy. He worked as 
a manager in local government. He listed his problems as: panic, fatigue, poor 
concentration and an inability to work effectively. He was taking no prescribed 
medication at the time of therapy and his therapist was male. Given that C 
(indicating the client) and T (indicating the therapist) are the terms used in the 
excerpts to identify the speakers, I will maintain that convention throughout the 
analysis. 
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The four excerpts analysed below are represented as concerned with the topic 
of humiliation. However, it is evident that they are also concerned with many 
other things. Consequently, this entire analysis must be prefaced with a 
caveat. Owing to the size of the excerpts and despite the many analytically and 
theoretically interesting features, this analysis will remain highly selective in its 
focus. Specifically it will focus on the use of autobiographical narratives and 
particularly the use of reported speech within those narratives in the 
development of accounts of episodes of humiliation. The analysis will focus on 
the conditional subject positions constituted by the invocations of reported 
speech, their organisation and their implications for C's contemporary 
subjectivity. 
The concern with autobiographical narratives and reported speech is primarily 
limited to the first three excerpts. In these excerpts, C recounts 
autobiographical narratives of occasions on which he was 'humiliated'. 
Through the analysis of these excerpts, the locally constituted meaning of 
'humiliation' will be made explicit. Specifically, the construction of an episode 
as characterized by'humiliation' is contingent upon the presence of pre- 
existing power relations, an unjust or unwarranted act of positioning, an 
inability or failure to resist that act of positioning and a resultant 'feeling' of 
disempowerment. The implications of these recounted narratives of 
'humiliation' for C's contemporary gendered subjectivity will be discussed. 
In contrast to the first three excerpts, the final excerpt is not characterized by 
autobiographical narratives. However, it does support an analysis of the 
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negotiation of the power relations upon which episodes of humiliation are 
predicated and the possibility of their existence between C and T within the 
contemporary context of the therapy session. The implications of this process 
of negotiation for C's contemporary gendered subjectivity will be discussed. 
Excerpt 1 is taken from early in session 4. The only preceding talk in the 
session was a brief negotiation of who should or would start the session and it 
is to this discussion that C's comments at the start of line 28 are oriented. 
Given that this excerpt includes the introduction of the concept of humiliation 
as both a topic and as a potential focus of therapeutic concern, I will not offer 
an introductory summary of the excerpt and its analysis. Instead I will allow the 
excerpt to stand as an introduction to the topic, as it did in the therapy 
sessions. Suffice to say, the analysis is concerned with the client's negotiation 
of subject positions and subjectivity relative to the concept of humiliation; 
particularly the analysis is attentive to any negotiation of this relationship that is 
interpretable as accomplished in terms of gender or in gendered terms. 
Excerpt I 
28 C: Mm hm. [4] Anyway I hadn't really intended to say that (laughs). I've 
29 been in a very charged up state this week ... this last week. It's been a difficult 
30 week. (Deep sigh) 
31 T: Difficult in... 
32 C: I just felt very tense all the time. Very jumpy. Well not all the time, most 
33 of the time. 
34 T: [5] And you have some ... you can see some ... some basis for that 
35 [inaudible]. 
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36 C: I can see things which may have caused me to end up like that. um, it 
37 doesn't mean I should say that I should have felt like that. (T: mm) There are 
38 a couple of things which made me very angry during the course of the week, 
39 which didn't help. 
40 T: Do you want to..? 
41 C: Yeah well they were just that ... I mean there was last Wednesday morning, 
42 we have a ... we have a departmental management team meeting to which the 
43 fifteen or so most senior people in the department attend. And the deputy 
44 director was saying that ... There had been a decision by a sub-committee of 
45 councillors on an industrial relations issue, and the deputy director was 
46 saying, "This is what it means. " And I was saying, and I was a lone voice 
47 around the table saying, "No, it doesn't mean that. " And other people ... there 
48 were only a couple of other people who had probably read the decision, and 
49 they were keeping quiet. And he was saying, "Oh you're wrong, it means 
50 this. " And I knew he was wrong, and I was saying, "look, it doesn't mean 
51 that, " and I could see the people around the table were getting a bit irritated, 
52 and (E: Name)'s going on a bit this morning, isn't he? Um, and then I got an 
53 [inaudible] who came up to me and a couple of other people [inaudible] and 
54 saying, "I've been thinking about this acting ranks ... acting ranks ... this acting 
55 ranks business, " he said, "My view is... " and he quoted my own words back 
56 at me, that I'd been using. And not a word of, "No you were right. " That 
57 made me angry. And I didn't saying to him, "Oh hang on, I'm getting angry 
58 with you. " And then the following morning I was in another meeting and he 
59 said to somebody else, "As I told the departmental management team 
60 last ... on Wednesday, " and then he stopped himself. He didn't ... he didn't say, 
61 you know, "You were right, I was wrong. " Just a little bit of acknowledgement 
62 would have helped. But I didn't feel the ability to say to him, "You're really 
63 pissing me off. " (laughs) um, but it was a ... I mean it was a fairly small 
issue 
64 in a real sense. You know the world wasn't going to collapse around it. 
Session 4 
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C's turn, beginning at line 41, involves the construction of an autobiographical 
narrative concerning 'anger-provoking incidents within the context of 'work'. 
'Work' provides the broad spatiotemporal context for the narrative of both 
these incidents, though more specific contexts are invoked at various points. 
The construction of the anger-provoking interactions is primarily accomplished 
through the use of reported speech. The remainder of the excerpts are 
interpretable as contextualising the instances of reported speech. As 
discussed above, one function of reported speech is that it allows conditional 
acts of positioning to be brought into contemporary discursive contexts. The 
acts of positioning within the narratives are therefore made accessible and 
apparently transparent to the hearer, in this case the therapist, within the 
contemporary interactional context. Of course, no claims as to the 'truthfulness' 
of these invoked acts of positioning or to the moral order within which they are 
constructed as instantiated are made; they are simply interpreted as discursive 
resources invoked to warrant a particular claim or to account for the 
contemporary constitution of a subjectivity. 
The turn at lines 41-64 involves two related narratives, with the content of the 
latter being consequent to the content of the former. This first narrative (lines 
41-58) is ostensibly about "a departmental management team meeting" (line 
42), constructed as having taken place "last Wednesday morning" (line 41). 
Thus it is to this spatiotemporal context that constructions in the first person 
pronoun, such as "And I was saying", are indexically linked. The narrative 
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concerns a disagreement between the speaker "141 and the introduced 
character of the "deputy director' over the correct interpretation of "a decision 
by a sub-committee of councillors on an industrial relations issue" (lines 44- 
45). The sequence of acts of positioning, between C and the 'deputy director' 
within the spatiotemporal context of the "departmental management team 
meeting", is constructed through the use of reported speech, the content of 
which ostensibly relates to the 'correct' interpretation of the decision at issue. 
The first two incidents of reported speech (lines 46 and 47) are relatively 
benign, in so far as they index neither the speaker nor the referent. That said, 
the construction of two speakers advancing conflicting interpretations has the 
effect of bringing their relative moral standings into question; simply, they can't 
both implicitly claim the right to be right. 
The next two invocations of reported speech differ considerably from the first 
two in terms of the positions they afford their speakers and their referent. "And 
he [the deputy director] was saying, "Oh you're wrong, it means this.... (lines 49- 
50) constitutes an explicit act of first order positioning of C as 'wrong'. There is 
an important but subtle distinction to be made between an interpretation being 
constructed as Wrong'and a speaker being positioned as 'wrong' While the 
first can easily be negotiated rhetorically, the second potentially warrants an 
explicit act of second order positioning; C could be expected to resist his being 
*51 In the analysis "I" in quotation marks is used to indicate that the first person pronouns 
appear in the excerpt and thus are differentiation from the / positions and iterative Ts of the 
above outlined interpretative framework. 
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positioned as 'wrong'. Lines 50 and 51 demonstrate many of the grammatical 
possibilities of the first person pronoun - "And I knew he was wrong, and I was 
saying, "look, it doesn't mean that"'. The first "I" is interpreted as indexing the 
"self-as-knower', while the second "I" indexes the "the self-as-known" that is 
publicly constituted through acts of positioning (James, 1890). However, it 
should be remembered that both these "I" s are constructed through the 
contemporary subjectivity, the implicitT of the author located in the 
contemporary interactional context of the therapy session. As such, both "I" s 
located within the spatiotemporal context of 'work' should be interpreted as in 
part constitutive of the contemporary subjectivity and its problematic status. 
The second incident of reported speech ascribed to C (lines 50-51) contains no 
explicit orientation to the position afforded him by the deputy director. C's 
construction of his maintenance of the focus of the argument, on the credibility 
of the interpretations rather than of the speakers advancing them, is 
interpretable as a construction of his own moral standing relative to that of the 
'deputy director'. The iterated T allows for the construction of a disparity 
between what is known (from the position of the "self-as-knower') and what is 
said or done (constituting the position of the "self-as-known"). On this occasion 
the disparity between what is constructed as known -I knew he was wrong" 
(line 50) - and what is constructed as said - "and I was saying, "look, it doesn't 
mean that ..... (lines 50-51) - is interpretable in two ways. Either, it is interpreted 
as a construction of a reflexive subjectivity, constituted through the agentic 
management of what is thought or felt and what is said, or it is interpreted as a 
consequence of a problematic subjectivity, i. e. the constructed disparity 
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between what is thought or felt and what is said is advanced, within the context 
of the therapy session, as problematic. These two possibilities should not be 
assumed to be mutually exclusive. 
The first possibility, with its emphasis on the reflexive and agentic 
management of the expression of emotional experiences, thoughts and 
feelings, is interpretable as performative of a traditional masculinity, as outlined 
in chapter 3. However, the question that must be asked of this interpretation is: 
given the power relations constituted by the respective positions of 'right' and 
'wrong' and given the supposed centrality of the maintenance of power to the 
performance of masculinity, why does C not construct himself as having 
engaged in second order positioning? The fact that C positions himself as not 
having explicitly renegotiated his being positioned as 'wrong' seems 
incompatible with the interpretation that the narrative is in some way 
constitutive of an untroubled masculine subjectivity. More persuasive, I feel, is 
the interpretation that the constructed disparity between what is thought or felt 
and what is said, and the implications that has for the negotiation of subject 
positions and power relations, is constitutive of a troubled and decidedly 
masculine subjectivity. Two of the central tenets of contemporary constructions 
of 'masculinity', not occupying subject positions that are interpretable as 
emotion-based or as having an emotional component and the occupation of 
positions of dominance within local power structures, are demonstrably in 
conflict. C's contemporary subjectivity, constituted through narratives 
characterized by a disparity between what is thought or felt and what is said 
and the resultant marginalization and disempowerment, is interpretable as 
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problematic and as a focus for therapeutic concern because of the 
presupposition that a male speaker should do 'masculinity' through the 
occupation of particular dominant positions in power relations. C's subjectivity 
is gendered as 'masculine' because in part he fails to meet the cultural 
requirements of the performance of masculinity. 
At lines 55-56, the perlocutionary forces (Austin, 1961) of the deputy directors 
reported speech -the appropriation of ownership of the correct interpretation, 
the marginalization of both C's prior ownership and C's unwarranted 
positioning as'wrong'- are constructed as combining to determine an affective 
response in C: "That made me angry" (lines 56-57). C uses reported speech to 
constitute what would be the next potential speech act in a morally correct 
sequence of positioning, from the marginalized and consequently 'angry' 
subject position. However, this speech act is again constructed as unvoiced; 
as such it is interpretable as unvoiced reported thought - "That made me 
angry. And I didn't say to him, "Oh hang on, I'm getting angry with you ..... (lines 
56-58). Again, C is either positioned as reflexively able to manage his speech 
acts and consequent acts of positioning or as speaking from a problematic 
subjectivity that is characterized by a disparity between what is though or felt 
and what is said, a consequent absence of the occupation of emotion-based 
subject positions and a consequent failure to resist disempowerment. Emotion- 
based subject positions are marginalized as illegitimate resources for the 
negotiation of power relations between male speakers in the context of work. 
C's invocation of his own unvoiced speech act in lines 62-63 is interesting 
because, for the first time, the disparity between reported thought and reported 
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speech is explicitly constructed as not reflexively and consequently not 
agentically accomplished. He positions himself as 'unable'to voice the 
reported speech/thought and consequently as'unable'to create publicly a 
discursive context within which he might finally be reinstated in the subject 
position as 'right'. This act of positioning is central to the constitution of C's 
subjectivity, and consequently to the subject positions he takes up within the 
therapy session. C's occupation of a subject position as'unable'to make such 
speech acts is central to the constitution of a problematic subjectivity and 
further accounts for his contemporary location within a therapeutic context. 
With regard to the overarching themes of this thesis, it is worth considering C's 
two invocations of his own unvoiced reported speech - "Oh hang on, I'm 
getting angry with you. " (lines 57-58) and "You're really pissing me off' (lines 
62-63). Both these statements position C as experiencing a negative affective 
response and position the referent, in this case the 'deputy director', as the 
determinant of that affective response. However, in both cases the reported 
speech is constructed as unvoiced. C positions himself, within the context of 
the therapy session, as not having contested the 'deputy directors' acts of 
positioning. Whilst C's narrative is one of injustice and righteous anger, it- is 
above all else a narrative of failure, of C's failure to renegotiate unjust acts of 
positioning. It is therefore C's positioning of himself as failing to resist these 
acts of positioning, when there were affective grounds to do so, that constitutes 
a problematic subjectivity in the context of the therapy session; a context within 
which the moral order supports the occupation of affect-based subject 
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positions. Thus, C's positioning as one who is unable or unwilling to take up 
such positions has the potential to become a topic of therapeutic concern. 
As can be seen from the line numbers, excerpt 2 follows directly from the turns 
in excerpt 1. In the excerpt, the anger-provoking incidents of part I developed 
into the topic of humi. liation. The tacit acceptance of an unjust act of 
positioning, whether through inability or unwillingness to renegotiate it, 
emerges as the locally determined definition of humiliation. In order to advance 
an analysis of these episodes of 'humiliation' that is capable of addressing the 
research questions' concerns with the simultaneous accomplishment of an 
emotional and gendered 'self, two interpretative possibilities are available. 
Either, we can assume that, as a male speaker C is at some level engaged in 
the constitution of a gendered subjectivity and, assuming that 'masculinity' is in 
some way constituted through negotiations of power relations, we can look to 
the dynamics of those negotiations as the basis for a gender-focussed analysis 
or, in order to advance a (not) gendered (by me) analysis, we can look for C's 
use of gendered terms. Both these analytic possibilities will be explored. 
Excerpt 2 
65 T: But the feeling there was-was a powerful one. 
66 C: Yeah. It was ... it was ... it was relevant to my working life in that I've had 
67 to handle a dispute over precisely that issue during the course of the week. 
68 Urn, you know, which ended up taking up a couple of my ... hours of my time 
69 on Friday when I was tired, and would have liked to be winding down for the 
70 week. So there was that. um, another occasion when I was really ... I was 
71 really hassled on Friday before that meeting, and one of the assistant 
72 directors-I mean we were at a meeting to discuss something which was 
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73 called at very short notice, I asked how long it was going to last when I was 
74 called down, and I was told twenty minutes. So that was fine, because I had 
75 another meeting to go to. This other guy arrives just as I was about to leave, 
76 he was half an hour late for whatever reason. I mean he obviously had other 
77 things to do. And I said, "I'm sorry I've got to go now because I've got other 
78 meetings. " And he said, "Oh, I've postponed my other meetings. " And I was 
79 thinking, "You stupid ass, " I wanted to say, "You absolute twat, " you know, 
80 "Don't you think I've thought about ordering my priorities. " And I felt 
81 humiliated, and I didn't say anything either then. I mean again, it wasn't a 
82 very important issue, but it's just a question of attitude of people. 
Session 4 
In lines 70-77, C does considerable work to contextualize the acts of 
positioning that will constitute the episode of humiliation and to establish his 
own and "this other guy[s]" relative moral standing in the narrative context of 
'work'. C is positioned as professional and conscientious, the "other guy" as 
tardy and unapologetic. In lines 77-80, C constructs the positioning sequence 
between himself and "this other guy" that constitutes the episode of 
humiliation. Again, this is accomplished through the use of reported speech 
and reported thought. For the sake of clarity, it is worth extracting the reported 
speech acts and the instances of unvoiced reported thought. By doing so we 
take up the position of the third person referent within the spatiotemporal 
context of the meeting, albeit a very privileged third person given that we also 
have access to C's 'thoughts'. 'Thoughts, in the telling of autobiographical 
narratives, are interpreted as a discursive resource invoked to make 
"retrospective knowledge claims" (Edwards, 1997, p. 283; italics in original), 
which are oriented to the management of contemporary interactional concerns. 
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In this excerpt, they are invoked to account for episodes of humiliation and 
disempowerment and for C's contemporary location in the therapeutic context. 
From this position of Cs contemporary subjectivity the sequence of positioning 
acts, including unvoiced ones, appears as follows -'OG' stands for'other guy': 
C: I'm sorry I've got to go now because I've got other meetings 
OG: Oh, I've postponed my other meetings 
C: ((Unvoiced)) You stupid ass (. ) You absolute twat (. ) Don't you think I've 
thought about ordering my priorities 
The interpretation of this sequence must be informed by what it is 
subsequently constructed as determining, specifically C's positioning as 
"humiliated" (line 81). Thus, this sequence of positioning acts must be hearable 
as one that constitutes an act of humiliation. An interpretation of how this is 
accomplished depends equally upon an appreciation of the subject positions 
that are constituted and an appreciation of the local moral order of the 
spatiotemporal context within which they are located. 
C's third instance of unvoiced reported thought - "Don't you think I've thought 
about ordering my priorities" (line 80) - is interpreted as oriented to the 
prescriptive quality of 'the other guy's' utterance - "Oh, I've postponed my 
other meetings" (line 78). If it were voiced, it would constitute an act of second 
order positioning; C would effectively resist being positioned as unprofessional 
and disorganized. However, the first two instances of unvoiced reported 
thought are very different, in so far as their content is not indexically linked to 
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that of any prior utterance. They are singular explicit derogatory acts of 
positioning - "You stupid ass" "You absolute twat" (both line 79) - that function 
only to bring the "other guy['s]" moral and intellectual standing relative to C into 
question. Importantly, they do not function as second order acts of positioning, 
in the way that the third instance of unvoiced reported speech does. Rather, 
they function as explicit acts of positioning of the "other guy". If these instances 
of unvoiced reported thought were voiced, they would be interpretable as 
constituting the performance of 'anger'. They are insults hurled in anger that 
are occasioned by an unwarranted act of positioning. Within this framework, 
the unvoiced reported thoughts position C as having been angered by the 
actions of the "other guy". 
These instances of reported speech and unvoiced reported thought must now 
be re-contextualized. In the context of the therapy session, the positioning 
sequence is constructed as occasioning the affective experience of 
'humiliation' and not'anger'- "And I felt humiliated, and I didn't say anything 
either then" (lines 80-81). Why is the episode constructed as one of humiliation 
and not anger? The answer lies in the two parts of the above utterance. Failure 
to engage in the discursive renegotiation of subject positions is constructed as 
simultaneous with the affective experience of 'humiliation'. The absence of 
discursive action means that C, in the narrative, remains positioned by the 
"other guy['s]" reported speech. His occupation of an emotion-based subject 
position, e. g. 'humiliated', may be more dependent upon his constructed lack 
of action than upon the content of any of the instances of reported speech. In 
this context, 'humiliation' is understood as the affective consequence of being 
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negatively positioned by others and of failing to effectively resist that act of 
positioning, even when there are moral, intellectual and affective grounds for 
doing so. Arguably, failure to resist unjust acts of positioning when there are 
reasonable grounds to do so and the resulting experience of disempowerment 
and 'humiliation' conflict with the constitution of a 'masculine' subjectivity, 
where 'masculinity' is culturally constructed as characterized by the exercise of 
agency and the occupation of positions of dominance. 
T and C return to the topic of humiliation later in session 4 and Excerpt 3 
contains a substantial portion of this second discussion. It is very similar to 
excerpt one, not only with regard to the topic of talk but also with regard to the 
way that the topic is addressed as well as the positions that are constructed, 
afforded and negotiated relative to it. As above, the analysis will be limited to 
the implications of the narratives and the reported speech that they contain for 
C's contemporary subjectivity within the context of the therapy session. The 
excerpt begins with T referring to the discussion of humiliation that took place 
at the start of the session; that discussion constitutes excerpts 1 and 2. His 
closing statement, though it functions as well as a question, constitutes an 
invitation to C to engage in the discursive act of 'remembering' (Edwards, 
1997; Middleton & Edwards, 1990). In the excerpt, C constructs three 
autobiographical narratives of episodes of humiliation. 
Excerpt 3 
288 T: [7] Mm. [8] You were talking at the beginning of the session about this sort 
289 of idea, I mean I think I actually ... humiliation, you know, where someone's 
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290 actually put down or... (C: mm hm) I'm wondering whether that's something 
291 which ... which has 
(sigh) bad memories for you. 
292 C: I've got some. Um, I mean not very ... not very early memories I don't 
293 think. [3] 1 mean the first real humiliation I can think of, I don't know if I 
294 mentioned it to you, was over school blazers. No? Urn, when I went to my 
295 nice posh secondary school, and my parents could only afford a second-hand 
296 blazer for me. And at the end of the first term I was called to the front by a 
297 master, as was another boy who was spank ... nice spanking clean uniform, 
298 very spanking clean boy, who is now a professor of philosophy in the 
299 university. And he said, "Look at you, you know, look how you treated your 
300 blazer compared with him, " right in front of the class. That's the first ... 1 
301 mean that's the only ... that's the earliest memory I've got of being humiliated. 
302 1 can't remember anything... That had a very ... obviously a very deep 
303 impression on me. And I didn't feel able of course to say, "But please, it's not 
304 my fault, my parents aren't, you know, very well off. " (T: mm) Probably also 
305 got built into a sort of resentment I felt towards my parents for being different. 
306 T: That's what I was ... I was wondering whether there was a sense of anger 
307 there, I mean this is 
308 C: No not at the time. At the time it happened I just felt anger towards the 
309 school teacher. 
310 T: For picking you out? 
311 C: Mm hm. And I remember being humiliated by the same ... not by the same 
312 man in the same class. For ... we were reading history, and one of the sons of 
313 one of the kings of England was called (H: Name) and there was a bloke in 
314 my village who we called (H: Name), as I recall. So I read out (H: Name) and 
315 everybody laughed at me, and I felt humiliated then. And then we came 
316 across the name of the town (M: Name of town) on another occasion, the 
317 same ... the first term of the school, (M: Name) and I said (M: Name) or 
318 whatever, and again people tittered. (sigh) um, but, you know those were the. 
319 first occasions I can't remember anything before then. 
320 
320 T: But it feels like there's a whole clutch of first occasions there, and maybe 
321 lots of ones afterwards. (C: um) Or certainly enough to... 
322 C: I think there was ... I think I suffered a certain ... I think most of the 
323 children there at some time suffered some injustices at the hands of the 
324 teachers who I think were prone .... 
I mean, I hate to say it about teachers, but 
325 1 mean they were mostly Oxford, Cambridge graduates, mostly Oxford 
326 graduates, who probably ended up teaching in most cases because they 
327 didn't actually have that ... that extra ability. 
(T: mm) I'm not trying to say that 
328 all teachers are like that, um, but I suffered my share of humiliations, I think, 
329 yes. There was the humiliation, the time that, there was a special path that 
330 only teachers were allowed to go up, or whatever, but beside that there was a 
331 flower border, and the games masters tripped through the flower border on 
332 the way back from a games thing, and I followed on the exact line to be 
333 hauled up by the headmaster to tell me off for walking through there. "But 1 
334 was only following somebody else. " But I mean that wasn't being... 1 mean 
335 OK I got caught, but I didn't feel that ... I didn't feel able to say, "But I was 
336 only doing what somebody else did. " I took it all on myself. But there were 
337 other ... I mean but there were other times when definitely I ... I and other 
338 children were picked on, and ... and dealt with very harshly by particular 
339 people who had their own problems, I'm sure. 
340 T: [4] But the feeling of ... the feeling of being humiliated, I mean it's a very 
341 powerful one. 
342 C: Mm hm. I just ... can I just say I justified my existence at that school by 
343 doing brilliantly in exams in my early years there. 
Session 4 
In his first turn (lines 292-305), C constructs an autobiographical narrative, 
which has a structure similar to those of excerpts 1 and 2. The episode of 
humiliation is constituted by a public and unjust act of positioning, which C is 
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positioned as unable to renegotiate discursively -"And I didn't feel able of 
course to say, "But please, it's not my fault, my parents aren't, you know, very 
well off. "" (lines 303-304). The construction of the act of positioning as 'unjust' 
begins with the construction of the origin of C's blazer. The origin of C's blazer 
is central to the subsequent act of positioning by "a master" (lines 296-297) 
being interpretable as unjust. Importantly, C provides T with information 
regarding the origin and presumably the status of his school blazer (lines 294- 
296) before constructing the reported speech and unvoiced reported thought 
that constitutes the acts of positioning that are interpretable as constituting as 
an episode of humiliation. By providing this information before advancing the 
narrative, C equips the hearer, in this case T, with the information required to 
interpret the act of positioning - ""Look at you, you know, look how you treated 
your blazer compared with him.... (lines 299-300) - by the "master' as 'unjust'. 
The narratives contained in C's turn at lines 311-319 have a different structure 
to the previous narratives of episodes of humiliation. There is no single 
antagonist whose acts of positioning are constructed as resulting in C's 
occupying the position as 'humiliated'. Rather, in these narratives, C constructs 
himself as having been humiliated by the responses of others to his own 
actions. The narratives are concerned with C's reading aloud to the class and 
his reading of names of people and places that occasioned laughter from his 
classmates. Owing to the changing or obscuring of names in the original 
transcript, in the ensuring of confidentiality, it is difficult to appreciate why these 
names should occasion the constructed response. However, the important 
feature of the turn is that C constructs the response as directed towards 
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himself - "so I read out (H: Name) and everybody laughed at me, and I felt 
humiliated then" (lines 314-315). C's advanced interpretation of his 
classmates' response is interpretable as constituting a collective act of 
positioning. 
The final narrative of the excerpt, concerning being reprimanded for walking 
through a flowerbed, has the same characteristic features of an episode of 
humiliation as were outlined above in the analysis of excerpt 2. There is an 
unjust act of positioning - "hauled up by the headmaster to tell me off for 
walking through there" (line 333), an invocation of unvoiced reported thought 
and a consequent failure to resist the unjust act of positioning -I didn't feel 
able to say, "But I was only doing what someone else did. " I took it all on 
myself' (lines 335-336). 
Throughout this analysis I have been mindful of the aims and interests of the 
thesis as a whole. Broadly speaking, it is concerned with the inter-relationship 
between the concepts of 'emotion' and 'gender'. These excerpts were selected 
because they contained instances of a male speaker negotiating subject 
positions, and his subjectivity, through and relative to the emotion term and 
concept of 'humiliation'. This analysis is therefore concerned with establishing 
whether C, in negotiating his subject positions and subjectivity, simultaneously 
negotiates gendered subject positions and a gendered subjectivity. As has 
been evident so far, there is a relative paucity of gender terms and categories 
in C's speech. Consequently, an analysis that is limited to the micro-textual 
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level would be forced to conclude that there is little evidence here to suggest 
that the performance of gender is in any way an interactional concern of C. 
The only possible evidence upon which a gender-sensitive micro-textual 
analysis could draw is the fact that all the antagonists in C's autobiographical 
narratives, that is to say all the speakers whose acts of positioning were 
constructed as causing C to occupy the position as'humiliated', were male. 
Recall the "deputy director" at work, "a master" and the "headmaster" at 
school. Given this information, it may be argued that the performance of 
masculinity, accomplished through the negotiation of power relations, is 
something that is 'done' between men. However, aside from their sex, the 
antagonists in C's narratives of humiliation are all constructed as occupying 
positions of power at least equal to or, in three cases, greater than that 
occupied by C within the spatiotemporal contexts of the narratives. 
Consequently, the narratives of humiliation and the constructed acts of 
positioning within them make more sense when understood as contingent 
upon the constructed hierarchical power relations of the institutions within 
which the narratives are located, rather than as contingent upon the gendered 
status of any of the actors in the narratives. At the micro-textual level, these 
excerpts say a great deal about 'humiliation' but do not inform an analysis of 
the relationship between 'humiliation' and 'masculinity'. At the micro-textual 
level, masculinity is not'done. 
However, a more macro-textual interpretation is possible and yields an 
analysis in which the narratives and the acts of positioning that they contain 
324 
are interpretable as constitutive of a problematic masculine subjectivity - 
problematic because it is characterized by a failure to resist and redress unjust 
or unwarranted acts of positioning, even when there are moral grounds to do 
so and masculine because these episodes of humiliation, the illegitimizing of 
emotion-based subject positions and the consequent failure to renegotiate 
unjust subject positions are advanced as problematic. Their status as 
problematic is contingent upon their contrasting with a hegemonic cultural 
conception of masculinity, which is characterized by the marginalization and 
resistance of emotion-based subject positions, agency, assertiveness and the 
occupation of positions of dominance in structures of power relations. His 
contemporary subjectivity is interpretable as masculine because emotions are 
illegitimized as acceptable bases for the negotiation of power relations but as a 
consequence he fails to meet the remaining characteristics of hegemonic 
masculinity, such as the exercise of agency and the occupation of positions of 
dominance. Arguably, C is engaged in the performance of 'masculinity in crisis' 
and accounts for his contemporary location within the context of a therapy 
session. C's gendered subjectivity seems to conform to accounts of the 
conflicts inherent in contemporary cultural requirements of men outlined by 
authors such as Seidler (1989,1997). 
In contrast to the preceding excerpts, this final excerpt is not characterized by 
autobiographical narratives of episodes of humiliation. Rather, it is concerned 
with the possibility that the power relations that are a necessary precondition 
for an episode of humiliation exist within the contemporary interactional context 
of the therapy session. In the excerpt, C is invited to construct and account for 
the power relations within the therapeutic context, with specific reference to the 
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concept and possibility of 'humiliation'. The consequent requirement for C to 
negotiate subject positions for both him and T relative to each other within a 
hierarchical power structure, which is implicit in the concept of humiliation, 
makes this excerpt extremely interesting. At the macro-textual level, it is 
perhaps worth remembering that C and T are both male speakers, as such 
they might be interpreted as necessarily invested and engaged in the 
performance of masculinity. 
Excerpt 4 
325 T: Right. [6] You see, I'm wondering here, you know, here, when we meet in 
326 these sessions (C: deep breath) [3] there ... there always has been this, I 
327 guess, this conflict with you about your desire to be scrupulously honest and 
328 actually ... what that means bearing, you know, this, we talked about very early 
329 on. (C: mm hm) [3] But for you to be scrupulously honest, [4] lays you open 
330 (C: deep breath) to maybe a fear of me humiliating you? 
331 C: [3] (sighs) Well (sighs) yes and no. I mean [8] I'm not [8] I'm, I mean [3] 1 
332 know rationally that you ... that [6] you can't affect my life outside ... I mean, 
333 you can't directly affect my ... my life outside of this room. (T: mm) [7] You 
334 can, I mean, all you can leave me with outside this room I think is a ... in a 
335 direct sense, is a feeling that I don't quite perform well in these sessions. 
336 There are other people who [5] can put me in very real danger in other 
337 situations. All that's ... you know ... I'm ... I mean sometimes feel you take me 
338 too literally. 1-1 just ... I use words to try and create a scene and you sometimes 
339 [4] (laughs) sometimes seize on those words and 1-1 feel like I'm an artist 
340 trying to paint a picture and (T: sure) and words are part of that. Urn, I mean 
341 it's stupid ... I mean I've had quite a good ... I really had quite a good 
342 week ... although it was quite a tense weekend in many ways. I mean lots of 
343 things that ... that ... that potentially could have gone wrong. And 
344 I'm ... I'm ... I'm ... I'm not trying to get away from the original question that 
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345 you asked. There was ... seeing this uncle who I'd got on very badly with in 
346 the past when I was ... the last time I saw him was about ... what, I suppose 
347 about 18-19. Er, we never got on too well. 
0 
380 it was a far less dangerous situation than 
381 when I'd ... all the ones I'd been dealing with all weekend reasonably 
382 competently with, but ... let's go back (laughs) because I'm sorry, I-I've lost 
383 where ... where we've started off on. [3] What was your original ... ? 
384 T: [19] 1 was talking about [4] you being ... feeling that you could 
385 C: Could be humiliated here? 
386 T: Be humiliated here. 
387 C: Right. [3] And the answer is no. I don't think ... I don't think I can [3] and 1 
388 think that's why (3] or largely why in the last few ... largely why, although 
389 there have been other reasons, particularly today why I'm actually physically 
390 far less tense than I was the first couple of sessions when I came here. And 1 
391 think I ... I'm much ... more 
[5] And I think I'm much more aware [3] now that 
392 your role [3] or as it appears to me, is much more of a facilitator than [5] 
393 being an ex ... you know, a human 
being with whom I have to interact either 
394 socially or at work. [6] 1 mean [8] again, just sort of trying to paint a word 
395 picture, it could be that you ... that ... that you were ... you could be a part of my 
396 more rational part which is split off from me and was sifting over there and 
397 being trained in a particular field which this part of me hasn't been and was, 
398 you know, [4] trying to help this part of me. So (laughs) [3] 1 mean you're not 
399 a person with whom I have a normal social or work relationship, I mean, we 
400 don't go drinking together, we don't play games together, [3] um, we don't 
401 have friends in common (T: mm hm) er. we don't.. we don't speak about 
402 outside experiences in common. 
403 T: And yet... (C: deep breath) and yet here you will say things about yourself 
404 or about your life or about your experiences which you... which leave 
405 you ... can leave you quite vulnerable. 
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406 C: Mm hm. Yep. 
407 T: To being humiliated. 
408 C: [3] I'm not sure about that. They leave me very vulnerable (T: OK) 
409 but ... but insofar as they leave me open to 
humiliation, I think it's self- 
410 humiliation. [4] (T: that) I mean you ... you can't humiliate me, you can't. 
411 T: But you can humiliate yourself! 
412 C: Yes. Mm hm. 
Session 7 
In T's opening turn (lines 325-330), C's subjectivity is made the topic of talk. T 
constructs C's subjectivity as characterised by a conflict between a "desire to 
be scrupulously honest' (line 327) and the management of the implications of 
that'honesty'- "for you to be scrupulously honest, [4] lays you open [] to 
maybe a fear of me humiliating you? " (lines 329-330). C's subjectivity is 
constructed as one within which T occupies a position of power, a previously 
constructed prerequisite for the occupation of the position of the humiliator 
within an act of humiliation. As such, the utterance positions C as potentially 
less powerful than T within the context of the therapy session. It is this act of 
positioning and the concomitant structure of power relations that C is 
effectively invited to renegotiate. C orients to this particular rhetorical concern 
in four ways. The first two related methods are the construction of the separate 
objects of "me" and "my life" and the use of a'real terms'framing device. The 
third strategy is an explicit act of positioning of T, which results in T's 
disempowerment. The fourth less rhetorically complex strategy is to wander 
massively off topic, to require T to do 'remembering' in order to return to the 
original topic and, through the implication that T's utterances and topic 
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changes are barely memorable, to minimise the importance of T within the 
local moral order. 
"My life" (lines 332 and 333) is interpreted as the unstated contexts -'work', 
'home', et cetera - within which and through which C's subjectivity might be 
located and constituted. The invocation of "my life" echoes the transition that 
James (1890) observed between 'me' and 'mine', such that C is understood to 
be constituted by the totality of things that he could categorise as 'mine' or as 
located within "my life". That the invoked category of "my life" is external to the 
context of the therapy session is made explicit in lines 332,333 and 334. By 
implication, the therapy session is constructed as lying "outside" C's "life". This 
separation constructs any power that T might have relative to C as context 
specific, as local to and constituted entirely within the therapy session. 
Having constructed the contextual extent of power relations, C delimits the 
potential magnitude of their effects. The consequences that might result from 
the instantiation of the power relations between C and T are constructed as 
limited to the affective level - "all you can leave me with outside this room [] in 
a direct sense, is a feeling that I don't quite perform well in these sessions" 
(lines 334-335). That C's power is constructed as entirely - note the extreme 
case formulation "all" (Pomerantz, 1986) - limited to the affective level is itself 
a subtle negotiation of the power relations. This rhetorical move effectively 
constructs affective experiences such as emotions and feelings as near 
enough inconsequential. However, more important is C's location of any 
effects of an exercise of power by T outside the context of the therapy session 
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- $fall you can leave me with outside this room [] in a direct sense, is a feeling" 
(lines 334-335). C effectively marginalizes the topic of the potential extent and 
effects of negotiations of power relations between himself and T within the 
therapy session. 
The related strategy through which C constructs and negotiates the power 
relations between himself and T is the 'real terms'framing device. This device 
is explicit in the contrast that C offers between T and "other people" - "There 
are other people who [5] can put me in very real danger in other situations" 
(lines 336-337) - and implicit in the use of the separated concepts of "me" and 
"my life" and in the location of the therapy session "outside" the latter. The 
context of the therapy session and any actions and affects that are located 
within it are contrasted with the'real'world of C's "life". In this way any power 
relations between C and T within the therapy session are contrasted with and 
constructed as inconsequential relative to those existent within 'real life'. 
'Reality'- the discursive resource of super-ordinate macro-contexts - can be 
invoked in contrast structures (Smith, 1978) as a way of negotiating and 
managing the importance of any local action, event or context. 
In lines 337-340, C explicitly positions T in such a way that he (T) is effectively 
disempowered. This is accomplished through the contrasting of C's 
construction of the intended functions of his speech acts- "I use words to try 
and create a scene" (line 338) and "I feel like I'm an artist trying to paint a 
picture [] and words are part of that' (lines 339-340) - and his construction of 
T's interpretation of them- I mean sometimes feel you take me too literally" 
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(lines 337-338) and "you sometimes [4] (laughs) sometimes seize on those 
words" (lines 338-339). Briefly, these two differing constructions of the 
functions served by C's speech acts can be categorised as 'descriptive' and 
sconstitutive' respectively. By constructing a first person account of the 
functions of his own speech, C marginalizes any account or interpretation that 
T might offer; a speaker retains the right to determine and explicitly state the 
meaning of an utterance, a right exercised through the invocation of discourses 
of 'intention'. Through the above contrast, T is positioned as interpreting Cs 
utterances in ways that were not meant or intended. C assumes the position of 
arbiter of the 'intended' meanings of his utterances. Consequently the validity 
of any interpretation that T might offer of C's utterances is undermined, as is 
any act of positioning of C by T, which might be based on the interpretation of 
C's talk. The potential importance of the topic of humiliation and its validity as a 
basis for the negotiation of power relations between C and T are diminished 
through their construction as resulting from T's over-interpretation of C. 
The section of talk in lines 340-382 is edited from the excerpt precisely 
because C wanders massively off topic and then requires T to 'do 
remembering' in order to return to the original topic. As a way of negotiating 
power relations, I can't imagine a strategy much less sophisticated than this. 
Talking on topic, the maintenance of topics and the negotiation of changes of 
topic are sensitive areas of discursive interactions given that the introduction of 
a topic is in part an instantiation of a speakers rights and duties within the local 
moral order of the interaction (Chafe, 2001; Sacks, 1992). The acceptance, 
maintenance or rejection of topics, therefore, has implications for the relative 
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standings of speakers within an interaction. By requiring T to'remember the 
topic, C diminishes its importance, implicitly contests T's right to determine the 
topic of talk and negotiates his (C's) standing relative to T within the context of 
the therapy session. 
All four of the above outlined strategies, employed by C in the negotiation of 
the power relations between himself and T, function in support of the "no" 
component of C's original ambivalent response to the possibility that he might 
'fear humiliation by T in the context of the therapy session. Through the above 
detailed rhetorical strategies, C positions himself relative to T so that he is 
empowered and T is disempowered. By disempowering T, C is able to negate 
the existence of any basis, such as a hierarchical power structure, for the 
possibility of being humiliated within the therapeutic context. 
Having emphatically rejected the possibility that he risks humiliation within the 
therapeutic context, C accounts for doing so and, in doing so, negotiates his 
own standing relative to T in the locally constituted structure of power relations. 
Two main strategies are drawn upon by C. In lines 388 and 390, C invokes the 
resource of his own subjective physiological response to being in the context of 
the therapy sessions - "I think that's why [] particularly today why I'm actually 
physically far less tense than I was the first couple of sessions when I came 
here" (lines 387-390) - as evidence of the absence of risk, and, implicitly, the 
absence of a power structure that might support his humiliation. 
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The second strategy by which C renegotiates his standing relative to T within 
the context of the therapy session is through the use of contrasting categories, 
membership categorisation devices and category-bound activities (Sacks, 
1992). Through this strategy, T and the therapeutic context are located outside 
the constructed shared norms of interpersonal interactions - "you're not a 
person with whom I have a normal social or work relationship [] we don't go 
drinking together, we don't play games together [] we don't have friends in 
common [] we don't speak about outside experiences in common. " (lines 398- 
402). The implication of C's constructions and acts of positioning is that the 
power relations between himself and T cannot be assumed to be normative. 
The moral order of the therapy session is constructed as differing from the 
moral orders of 'real life' interactions. The rights and duties of clients and 
therapists within the therapeutic context are therefore constructed as, not the 
same as those of speakers in other contexts. However, while a particular 
power relation may be assumed to exist within the therapeutic context, it is 
important to note that on this occasion the power relation is constructed as 
privileging the client. With regard to the topic of talk - the possibility that C 
might risk being humiliated by T- by constructing the moral order of the 
therapy session and the positions of speakers within it as differing from more 
normative social contexts, including those within which narratives of humiliation 
have already been constructed, C contests the existence of a local moral order 
that would support his being humiliated. 
In lines 395-398, C engages in an act of positioning of T, through which he is 
able to further challenge the existence of a local power relation that could 
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support his being humiliated. Having initially constructed T as "more of a 
facilitatoe' (line 392), C then constructs T as little more than the embodiment of 
the 'rational part' of his (C's) own subjectivity - "you could be a part of my 
more rational part which is split off from me and was sifting over there and 
being trained in a particular field which this part of me hasn't been and was, 
you know, [4] trying to help this part of me" (lines 395-398). The idea of a local 
structure of power relations within which individual speakers are located and 
upon which an act of humiliation might be based is entirely undermined by C's 
construction of T as not 'really' a person in his own right. The primary 
characteristics of an episode of humiliation are constructed as absent from the 
therapeutic context. Therapy and the therapeutic context are constructed as 
safe, unchallenging and in no sense constitute any reasonable basis for 
fearfulness. 
Over the remaining turns of the excerpt (lines 403-412), the speakers return to 
the topic of the relationship between speaking 'honestly' and the 'fear of 
humiliation', introduced at lines 329-330. However, as a result of C's 
subsequent focus on the power relations between himself and T, the 
conceptual relationship between the provision of information and the possibility 
and risk of humiliation was not developed. T reinstates the earlier topic that C's 
honesty, within the therapy sessions, might leave him open to a fear of 
humiliation. However, on this occasion he does so with specific reference to 
what C might be honest about -"yourself or about your life or about your 
experiences" (lines 403-404). T is interpreted as drawing upon the discursive 
resources introduced by C- all those contexts constructed as constituting C's 
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'real life' and as external to the therapy session, perhaps including all the 
narratives of humiliation recounted in session 4- and making them 
contemporaneous to the ongoing local interaction. The resources that C used 
to undermine the existence of power relations between himself and T are 
constructed as resources that could be invoked by T to humiliate C. 
However, T does not construct the potential consequence of Cs 'honesty' as 
'humiliation'- "can leave you quite vulnerable" (line 405). The distinction 
between vulnerability and humiliation is important, particularly since it is a 
distinction that is exploited by C, and echoes the excerpts in chapter 4 where 
emotional expression or talking about emotions were constructed as 
determinants of vulnerability. As it is locally oriented to, the distinction between 
vulnerability and humiliation rests on the respective absence or presence of 
the action of an 'other; i. e., a person can be vulnerable but not necessarily be 
humiliated. To be humiliated requires an antagonist to exploit that vulnerability. 
However, the rights of an 'other' to exploit vulnerability and to engage in acts of 
humiliation are locally determined and depend upon their position within the 
local structure of power relations. 
Having accepted that the provision of information about his life might leave him 
vulnerable (line 406), C then challenges T's suggestion that this also implicitly 
leaves him open "'To being humiliated" (line 407). This challenge is again 
grounded in a negotiation of his standing relative to that of T and takes the 
form of a show concession (Antaki and Wetherell, 1999). It should, however, 
be acknowledged that the show concession is not one of the three forms 
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identified by Antaki and Wetherell (1999), given that it lacks a concession 
marker and the initial proposition can only be understood indexically through 
reference to the preceding turns. If I borrow the notation system from Antaki 
and Wetherell, then the opening lines of C's turn would appear as follows (bold 
indicates the contrast marker, italics are used to identify the proposition and 
the reprise and a gloss is provided on the right hand side): 
C: [3] I'm not sure about that. (proposition) 
They leave me very vulnerable 0 (concession) 
But ... but in so far as they leave me open (reprise) 
to humiliation, I think it's self-humiliation 
Through the structure of the show-concession, C is able to reorient to the 
possibility of being humiliated by T and to strengthen his contention that such a 
possibility does not exist within the context of the therapy session. Drawing 
upon the preceding negotiation of his standing relative to T and the explicit 
claim that T did not occupy a position of sufficient standing or power to 
humiliate him, C takes the position as the only speaker present of sufficient 
standing to be able to accomplish such an act. 
The final words on the possibility of his humiliation within the context of the 
therapy session provide the basis for some interesting questions about what C 
has just accomplished. Through the final three turns, the negotiation of subject 
positions and power relations between C and T, in relation to the possibility of 
C's humiliation, are reduced to simple statements of first order positioning. 
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From C we get "you can't humiliate me, you can't" (line 410) and in response 
from T we hear "But you can humiliate yourself! " (line 411). Little can be said 
about the content of these turns without really just paraphrasing them, but what 
must be argued is what they do and whether that can be interpreted as a 
performance of a gendered subjectivity. 
The obvious question is, 'why does C do so much complex rhetorical work to 
manage the possibility of his being humiliated by T in the context of the therapy 
session'? Given that there is an absence of gender terms at the micro-textual 
level, the answer, I contend, lies in the imposition of an interpretative 
framework in which gender and specifically masculinity are accomplished 
through the negotiation of locations within structures of power relations. By 
positioning himself as the only speaker in the therapeutic context that is 
capable of his humiliation, C claims responsibility for all the various 
components that would necessarily be constitutive of that act. C claims 
responsibility for the provision of information that might constitute a basis for 
his vulnerability. C claims responsibility for the hypothetical actions of T, in 
making use of that information and engaging in a potentially unjust act of 
positioning. C claims responsibility for any inability or unwillingness on his own 
part to renegotiate an act of positioning that would constitute an act of 
humiliation. C claims responsibility for and power over any and all of the acts, 
even those of others, that would be necessary for him to be humiliated. If any 
of the discursive accomplishments in this analysis look anything like the 
performance of gender then this must be it. Within a contemporary 
understanding of masculinity, C's constructions and claims of agency - even to 
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the extent that it is vicarious - responsibility and power look just as we might 
expect 'masculinity' to look. That this negotiation of power relations is 
categorized as constitutive of a 'masculine' subjectivity is, however, contingent 
only upon a concern with positions of dominance and the management of 
vulnerability being identified as characteristic of 'masculinities' within 
contemporary cultural contexts and upon C's sexed status as 'male'. There is 
certainly nothing in the micro-textual details or in the rhetorical strategies 
apparent in this excerpt that would suggest that a similar negotiation of power 
relations, within a local interactional context, could not be undertaken by a 
'woman'. 
5.5 Discussion 
From the above analysis there are four key points that warrant explication. The 
first is the demonstrable importance of autobiographical narratives and 
embedded instances of reported speech and unvoiced reported thought as 
rhetorical devices that function in the constitution of a contemporary 
subjectivity. The second is that negotiations of power are implicated in the 
locally constituted meaning of 'humiliation'. The third is that the configurations 
of power relations implicit within the discourse of 'humiliation' conflict with the 
performance of masculinity when an individual who might be positioned as 
masculine is'subjected'to the discourse of humiliation. The fourth point is that 
the interpretation of a demonstrable concern with the configuration of power 
relations, negotiated through a range of rhetorical devices, as constitutive of 
masculinity is based either on the imposition of an interpretative framework 
within which orientations to such concerns are assumed to be peculiar to the 
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performance of masculinity or upon the sex of the speaker. In the absence of 
either of these two frameworks, a concern with the configuration of power 
relations, negotiated through categories of emotion, such as humiliation, is just 
that. A concern with the configuration of power relations may be implicated in 
the performance of gender, through the simultaneous invocation of gender 
terms. However, in the absence of such terms, the rights and duties afforded 
by particular locations in power relations may also be negotiated through a 
range of other discursive resources. 
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Chapter 6 
"SO DON'T START THROWING THINGS AT ME 
NICOLA": Three episodes of 'anger' in heterosexual 
relationships 
6.1 Introduction 
Having examined the relationships between discourses of emotion, discourses 
of masculinity and the performance of masculinities/the constitution of 
masculine subjectivities in the preceding two chapters, this chapter is intended 
to answer one simple question: how might all this look in practice? This 
chapter starts from the explicit assumption that'emotional expressions' are a 
form of interpersonal communication oriented to the accomplishment of 
relational goals, including but not limited to the constitution of gendered 
subjectivities (de Rivera, 1984; Fridlund, 1991,1994; Parkinson, 1995; Smith & 
Lazarus, 1993). Interactions interpretable as involving 'emotional expression' 
will be analysed to answer the following questions: 
9 What functions are served by men's responses to the emotional 
expressions of others? 
9 What functions are served by men's 'doing' of emotional expressivity? 
* Are these functions synchronous with the performance of masculinities 
or constitutive of masculine subjectivities? 
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6.2 Data 
The aims of this chapter, specifically the aim to analyse the interaction 
between the 'doing' of emotion and the 'doing' of gender in practice, meant 
data that were as 'naturalistic' as possible were required. Arguably, one of the 
most prevalent sources of such data in contemporary British society is 'reality 
TV. A host of shows, from home, garden and personal makeover 
programmes, to the likes of "I'm a celebrity, get me out of heref'and "Big 
Broth&'are predicated on the assumption that emotional expressivity makes 
interesting viewing. Of these shows, a number deal explicitly with the topic of 
heterosexual relationships, including "Would like to meet", "Wife swap", 
"Breaking poinf'and "Made for each oth&'. The decision to draw on shows of 
this type, specifically the 2003 series of "Made for each other", was based on 
the prevalence of constructions of gender complementarity with regard to 
emotions in general, and emotional (in)expressivity in particular, both in 
chapter 4 and in the broader literature on gender and emotions. Further, the 
context of heterosexual relationships was assumed to be one within which 
gendered - masculine and feminine - subjectivities were likely to be 
constituted (Butler, 1999). Five of the six broadcast episodes of the 2003 
season of "Made for each othee'were recorded and transcribed 52 . 
6.3 Method 
The transcripts were subjected to thematic coding, in the manner advocated 
within grounded theory analysis (e. g. Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Pidgeon & 
52 One episode was missed owing to a faulty video cassette recorder. 
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Henwood, 1996). Again, QSR NVivo qualitative research software was used to 
assist the process of thematic coding (QSR International, 1999). Those 
sections of text coded as involving 'emotional expressions' were subjected to a 
critical discursive psychological analysis of the type outlined and evidenced in 
chapters 3 and 4 53 . 
The construction of these interactions as occasions on which people 'did' 
emotions is necessarily post hoc. The speakers do not discursively orient to 
them as such, i. e., they do not discursively orient to the paralinguistic qualities 
of the interaction as potentially interpretable as constitutive of emotional 
expression. The discursive construction of an interaction as involving or as 
constituting an emotional episode is not necessarily accomplished 
simultaneously with that interaction; in realist terms, when people are 
'emotional', they and the people around them do not necessarily discursively 
orient to them as such. In these excerpts, whilst the speakers do not orient 
discursively to the paralinguistic qualities of speech, they do orient to them 
paralinguistically-, if one speaker shouts, then the other may respond by 
shouting. Thus, while the discursive content of thd speech in these excerpts 
may not include reflexive orientations to the functions served by the 
paralinguistic features of speech, e. g., in the constitution of the interactional 
53 The coding of particular sections of text as involving 'emotional expressions'was dependent 
on both my own interpretation of them as such and upon their representation as such within 
the context of the programme (see below for the contextualising information provided by the 
programmes' narrator). 
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context and the local moral orders upon which it is based, these functions are 
reflexively oriented to through changes in the paralinguistic features of speech. 
That said, on an anecdotal level, it is not difficult to imagine interactions in 
which such features may be oriented to discursively and an episode may be 
socially constructed as an emotional one as it is happening, e. g., if someone 
were shouting at you, an appropriate response may be "what are you getting 
angry at me for? " The act of labelling an episode as characterized by the 
expression of a particular emotion, such as 'anger, would then itself be 
amenable to interpretation as serving particular functions within the 
contemporary socio-cultural context. 
That such reflexive discursive orientations do not occur within the following 
excerpts should not be seen as a limitation of the data or as warranting any 
claim that these interactions are not interpretable as 'emotional episodes'. I 
contend that the data highlight the 'fact' that the reflexive orientation to an 
action or interaction as involving or constituting an 'emotional expression' may 
occur at any location within a spatiotemporal matrix and may be accomplished 
through modes of communication other than the discursive. The implications of 
such an argument for discourse analytic techniques will be discussed after the 
analysis. For the time being, the limited capability for discourse analytic 
techniques to engage with modes of communication other than the discursive 
is an acknowledged shortcoming. Therefore, this chapter represents a 
tentative step towards the development of discourse analytic techniques so 
that they may encompass, interpret and be informed by such things as the 
paralinguistic features of speech. 
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The limitation of the scope of this analysis to the discursive content and 
paralinguistic features of an interaction results from the requirement for the 
data to be represented textually. Consequently, though contextualizing 
information is included and is drawn upon in one particular instance, it will not 
constitute a major focus of the analysis. I accept that'emotional expressions' 
are constituted, or'done', through combinations of non-verbal cues, 
paralinguistic features and the discursive content of talk. However, the 
inadequacies of textual representations of non-verbal behaviours and the 
concomitant requirement for those 'non-verbal behaviours' to be 'described' 
(see the above discussion of discursive psychology for an account of 
descriptions as attributions and therefore as not straightforward unproblematic 
representations of 'fact') mean that non-verbal behaviours are not 
un problematically amenable to a text-based form of critical discursive 
psychological analysis. For this reason, the analysis will, for the most part, be 
limited to the relationship between the discursive content and the paralinguistic 
features of the excerpts. 
That the paralinguistic features of speech are interpretable as constituting 
emotional expressions, and that distinct emotions can be distinguished 
according to the paralinguistic features of talk, is widely accepted within the 
positivist literature on emotions (Banse & Scherer, 1996; Frick, 1985; Kappas, 
Hess & Scherer, 1991; Pittarn & Scherer, 1993; Scherer, 1986). On the 
paralinguistic features of speech alone, 'anger is amongst the most easily 
recognised 'emotions' (Banse & Scherer, 1996). According to Banse and 
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Scherer (1996), 'anger is characterized paralinguistically by increases in 
umean FO and mean energy" (p. 616). Increases in'mean FO'and'mean 
energy' roughly translate to audibly perceptible increases in the pitch and 
volume of speech. 
Whilst research on the paralinguistic features of emotions is typically located 
within a positivist framework, it should not be assumed that paralinguistic 
features are necessarily theorised either as intrinsic to or as direct 
consequences of the 'physiological' experience of emotions. Banse and 
Scherer (1996) make the point that if emotion is theorised as a process rather 
than as a state, then the idea of unregulated 'expressions' is opened to 
contestation. Within this framework, 'emotional expressions', including the 
paralinguistic features of speech, are theorised as regulated responses 
oriented to "strategic action tendencies" (p. 618). Whilst, the implied agency in 
the regulation of the paralinguistic constituents of emotional expression is 
incompatible with a poststructuralist approach, the idea that the form of 
'emotional expression' is oriented to some specific aim, i. e., it is 'intended' to 
perform some interactional function, is appealing. Such functions may include 
the management of accountability or even the constitution of a gendered 
subjectivity. 
Within this analysis, the paralinguistic features of talk will be interpreted as 
extra-discursive resources through which speakers take up emotion-based 
subject positions, without recourse to emotion terms. The analysis will, 
however, also focus on the simultaneously accomplished discursive work so 
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that an understanding of the possible functions served by the relationship 
between linguistic and paralinguistic resources at an interactional level might 
be ardved at. 
Before moving to the analysis of the excerpts, the decision to focus on those 
emotional episodes interpretable as characterized by the expression of 'anger 
must be accounted for. This decision was informed by a number of factors. As 
reported above, 'anger is often represented as the prototypical masculine form 
of emotional expression (Shields, 1987). Indeed, whilst men and women are 
reported as 'experiencing' anger with similarly frequency, men are reported as 
'expressing' anger more frequently than women (Fabes & Martin, 1991). Also, 
the expression of 'anger is regarded as constitutive of and as dependent upon 
individuals' locations within power relations (Averill, 1982; Crawford, et aL, 
1992: Shields, 2002). For Shields (2002), the question of who is entitled to 
express anger, considering the functions that it serves in the constitution of 
power relations, is answerable by recourse to gender. 
Anger per se is not a masculine prerogative; rather, a sense of 
entitlement is a masculine prerogative, and anger is the outcome of 
violations (or anticipated violations) of those entitlements. Power is the 
capacity to get what one wants, to achieve one's own goals. The use of 
power is aimed at restoring, maintaining, or acquiring what one values. 
Where gender is concerned, what is at stake is the status quo of social 
arrangements that inequitably benefit one sex over the other. (p. 146; 
emphases in original) 
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According to this framework, men 'do' anger when their entitlements and 
dominant positions within structures of power relations are implicitly or 
explicitly threatened and their'doing' of anger should function in defence of or 
in the maintenance of those entitlements and positions. Given that these 
interactions contained in the excerpts below occur within the context of 
heterosexual relationships and involve not only'men' but 'women ''doing 
anger, there is scope for the analysis to orient to any differences between 
male and female speakers in the functions served by their'doing' of anger. 
Indeed, whilst the analysis will, in line with the aims of the thesis, be, for the 
most part, concerned with the functions served by the male speakers' 'doing' of 
anger, it will also provide a complementary account of the functions served by 
female speakers''doing'of anger. 
The theorizing of women's relationship with the expression of 'anger can be 
seen as the reciprocal of men's relationship with the expression of emotions 
other than anger. Simply, where male emotional expressivity, particularly 
through 'crying, is antithetical to the performance of masculinity, female 
expression of 'anger has been theorized as antithetical to the performance of 
femininity. At least, the requirement for women to 'do'femininity - and this 
assumes compulsory heterosexuality - in a way that is complementary to 
masculinity, including the acceptance of subordinate positions within gendered 
power relations, is invoked to account for women's reported lower frequency of 
expression of 'anger and for women's reporting of the suppression of anger 
(Hochschild, 1983; Lerner, 1977; Stearns & Stearns, 1986). 
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As a result of their engagement with 'memories' of 'anger episodes, Crawford 
et a/. (1992) argued that differing social representations of 'anger existed that 
were contingent upon the sex of the angry person and that women's 
expression of anger differed markedly from men's. Specifically, they argued 
that "men's anger is often accompanied by violence, whereas women's is not. 
The absence of violence on the part of the actor in almost all of our memories 
involving anger provides support for the suggestion that the equation of anger 
with violence is not present for women. (We use 'violence' to refer to physical 
aggression) (p. 180). Women's relative powerlessness was advanced as 
determining both their 'experiencing' of anger as frustration and their 
'expression' of anger as marked by the absence of physical aggression (for a 
challenge to this view of women as non-aggressive see White and Kowalski, 
1994). Invoking Averill (1992), Crawford et aL argued that "the connection 
between anger and aggression that characterizes much anger by men is much 
more likely to be found in anger directed towards inferiors - either social or 
physical" (1992, p. 183). 
Within this framework, the form of expression of anger - the way in which it is 
'done'- and the functions that it serves are contingent upon the position that 
an actor occupies within the local structure of power relations. If we do not 
assume that the sexes of actors are necessarily determinate of those 
positions, then 'anger' is amenable to analysis as a resource that is available 
to speakers according to their position in the local moral order and structure of 
power relations, which may be determined by a good many things other than 
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their sex. Consequently, the positions occupied by individuals within local 
moral orders and structures of power relations, are made evident through their 
negotiation in episodes of 'anger'. 
6.4 Analysis 
Given that the analysis will draw upon more information than is available from 
the excerpts alone, each excerpt will be framed by contextualising information. 
The provision of this information mirrors the explicit provision of information 
that occurred throughout each programme. Within the context of the television 
programme, this contextualising information is interpreted as constituting a 
basis for the audience's interpretations of the actions and events that are 
subsequently depicted. Consequently, because this information has inevitably 
influenced my interpretations, I will provide as much information as is relevant 
to inform readings of both the excerpt and the analysis. 
Nicola and Matt 
The following information is provided by the narrator: 
"This week's couple are twenty six year old Nicola and twenty two year old 
Matt. They have been together for six years and have a five year old son 
Christian. Nicola and Matt are thinking of getting married, but first they want an 
expert opinion on whether or not they are made for each other. Nicola spends 
much of her day round at her parents looking after them, doing the shopping 
and running Christian to and from school. Matt is currently unemployed. After 
two weeks of analysis, it's obvious Matt spends much of his time on the 
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computer. Even in the evenings when they can be together he's on the Internet 
for up to four hours a night. " 
With regard to the transcription notation system for this excerpt, the use of 
upper case characters signifies not only speech of higher volume than the 
preceding speech but speech that is shouted. 
Excerpt 1 
((CCTV footage: to begin, the couple are stood in the lounge; the soundtrack to this 
footage is overdubbed with the narrator's following comments)). 
347 Narrator: Matt's still waiting for confirmation of his new job but tensions 
348 in the relationship explode into violence over a huge telephone bill. 
((The couple then move into the dining room and stand at or move around the table. 
The soundtrack is restored as the couple move into the dining room)) 
349 Matt: right with BT we can't get it back until we pay the full bill (. ) because 
350 you couldn't be bothered to pay (. ) and they ((Matt is hit in the face by an 
351 object thrown by Nicola)) = 
352 Nicola: ='CAUSE I COULDN'T BE BOTHERED TO PAY [(inaudible) 
353 Matt: DON'T 
354 THROW IT AT ME (. ) WHAT? NO YOU WERE SUPPOSED TO PAY 
355 on the = 
356 Nicola: = I'M NOT PAYING IT 
357 Matt: = YOU'RE NOT PAYING IT RIGHT WELL WE HAVENT GOT 
358 [BT THEN 
359 Nicola: I'M WITH ONETEL TOUGH YOU DON'T GET THAT ((points 
360 at the computer)) GOOD =- 
361 Matt: = OK YOU CAN'T GO ON ONETEL UNLESS YOU'VE GOT A 
362 BT LINE AND WE DON'T HAVE A BT LINE (. ) SO DON'T START 
363 THROWING THINGS AT ME NICOLA = 
350 
364 Nicola: = GOOD you can't go on Internet 
365 Matt: = you can't make phone calls 
366 Nicola: =I can get me mobile = 
367 Matt: = eh = 
368 Nicola: =I can use me mobile at least you can't go on the Internet now 
369 Matt: = what's wrong with me going on the Internet? 
370 Nicola: = well you won't be now will you? 
371 Matt: = what? = 
372 Nicola: = you won't be now 
373 Matt: = but what's wrong with it? = 
374 Nicola: = you're on it all the time = 
375 Matt: = no I'm not = 
376 Nicola: = yeah you are YOU'VE RUN THAT BILL UP t 
377 Matt: = no I haven't = 
378 Nicola: = yeah right most of it's on the Internet charges 
379 Matt: = no 
From this point on, the analysis of all three excerpts is predicated on one 
primary assumption, that the majority of the paralinguistic qualities of the 
interactions are interpretable as constituting the performance of 'anger'. That is 
to say, it is qualities such as these that may at some later time be referenced in 
accounts of these interactions as characterised by the expression of anger. 
The paralinguistic qualities, interpretable as constituting the performance of 
'anger, coincide with a discussion on the topic of responsibility for the 
payment, non-payment and generation of a phone bill. Matt's opening turn 
(lines 349-350) involves an explicit act of first order positioning (Harr6 & van 
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Langenhove, 1992) that occasions the discursive negotiation of positions of 
responsibility. The change in the paralinguistic qualities of Nicola's speech and 
her non-verbal behaviour (the throwing of the object at Matt) 54 are also 
interpreted as occasioned by and responses to Matt's act of positioning. Matt's 
turn begins benignly enough with a construction of his and Nicola's joint 
responsibility for the phone bill and for the consequences of non-payment - 
"right with BT we can't get it back until we pay the full bill" (line 349). However, 
following a brief pause, Matt then explicitly positions Nicola as singularly 
responsible for the payment of the bill - "because you couldn't be bothered to 
pay" (lines 349-350). This utterance is more than a simple renegotiation of the 
locus of responsibility; the utterance has the illocutionary force (Austin, 1962) 
of an accusation. Matt positions Nicola as wilfully negligent of her singularly 
held responsibility for the payment of the bill. In doing so, he disavows any 
responsibility for the payment of the bill. 
Nicola responds to this act of first order positioning in three ways: non-verbally, 
paralinguistically and discursively. Consequently, an interpretation of the 
function served by the content of any one of these modes of communication 
should be informed by an interpretation of the other two. This particularly 
applies to the discursive response, which is potentially interpretable as only a 
54 My reporting that "Matt is hit in the face by an object thrown by Nicola" could have been 
accomplished in myriad different ways. This point is evidenced by a comparison of my 
reporting of the incident and that of the programme's narrator: "tensions in the relationship 
explode into violence over a huge telephone bill" (lines 347-348). 
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restatement of Matt's accusation/act of positioning but re-formulated in the first 
person - "'CAUSE I COULDN'T BE BOTHERED TO PAY" (line 352). 
However, combined with the non-verbal and paralinguistic features, the 
utterance functions as, if not a resistance of the ascribed subject position as 
wilfully negligent, an orientation to the act of positioning as unjust and as 
resulting in an affected subjectivity; i. e., one that could subsequently be 
constructed as characterised by'anger at Matt's accusation/act of positioning. 
Non-verbal, paralinguistic and discursive modes of communication are now 
contextually available resources through which Nicola and Matt may negotiate 
their subject positions and subjectivities. Any or all of these resources could be 
taken up by either speaker within the interaction and equally the use of any or 
all of them could be explicitly oriented to. Both these possibilities are evident in 
Matt's turn at lines 353-355. He takes up the paralinguistic features of Nicola's 
preceding speech, discursively orients to Nicola's non-verbal behaviour and 
reiterates his primary act of positioning of Nicola as responsible for the non- 
payment of the phone bill. That Matt responds paralinguistically is interpreted 
as a response to being positioned, by both Nicola's non-verbal and 
paralinguistic cues, as the determinant of her affected subjectivity and as 
constitutive of his own consequently affected subjectivity. Matt effectively 'does 
angry' as a response to Nicola's 'anger'. Both speakers are interpretable as 
concerned with warranting their entitlement to 'do anger'. For Nicola, her 
entitlement is based on Matt's 'unjust' positioning of her, whereas Matt's 
entitlement is based on his unwarranted positioning as the object of 'anger' 
and aggression. 
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It is worth noting that, in this interaction, the non-verbal behaviour constructed 
by the narrator as an explosion of "violence" is directed by a female speaker 
against a male speaker. This contrasts with Crawford et aL's (1992) contention 
that physical aggression was typically absent from women's expression of 
anger. One possible account for why Nicola does anger in a way that is 
potentially gender atypical is that the power relations that are assumed to be a 
precondition for the absence of physical aggression from women's expressions 
of anger are not present in this instance. Simply, Nicola 'does' aggression 
because she occupies the position of the dominant partner. Consequently, 
Matt's subsequent attempt to construct Nicola's aggression as an illegitimate 
form of expression of anger is interpretable as both an appeal to gender 
typicality and an attempt to proscribe any further such actions from the 
interactional context. 
Following from Matt's reiteration of his primary act of positioning in lines 354- 
355, Matt and Nicola engage in a negotiation of subject positions relative to the 
topic of responsibility. This is accomplished through speech that is 
characterised by high mean energy (Banse & Scherer, 1996), which is 
interpretable as constitutive of affected subjectivities. It is through the 
paralinguistic qualities of speech that speakers invest their utterances with the 
weight of their affected subjectivities. Nicola's disavowal of responsibility for 
the payment of the phone bill, in line 356, occasions a restatement of her 
subject position by Matt, in line 357. Discursive orientations to acts of 
positioning seem to be a recursive and integral part of this interaction. 
Positions are taken up and then explicitly oriented to as the basis for further 
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argument. The acts of positioning are, simultaneous with the discussion of the 
payment/non-payment and the consequences of the non-payment, themselves 
the topic of discourse. Further, given the paralinguistic features of the talk, it 
can be argued that the acts of positioning are oriented to as the determinants 
of affected subjectivities. 'Doing angry' is simultaneously an orientation to an 
act of positioning, constitutive of an affected subjectivity and a negotiation of 
the right to speak from that subjectivity. The question, with regards to the 
thesis, is: is Matt's doing of 'angry' interpretable either as done relative to or as 
constitutive of the performance of masculinity? 
In line 357, Matt is interpreted as simultaneously 'doing anger' 
(paralinguistically) and 'doing' rational (discursively) through the construction of 
the consequence that will follow from Nicola's refusal to pay the phone bill. 
This might be interpreted as constituting the performance of masculinity if it 
were not for Nicola's ability to match Matt for the invocation of 'rational' 
arguments. Invoking her ability to access "ONETEL", an alternative to the use 
of a BT line, Nicola makes tenable her positioning as refusing to pay the BT 
bill. In the same line (line 359), Nicola introduces another topic, related to the 
phone bill, in relation to which she further constructs an affected subjectivity. 
From the information provided by the narrator and from rest of the programme, 
we, the viewers, are aware that Matt spends a good deal of time on the 
Internet. His potential inability to do so - "TOUGH YOU DON'T GET THAT" - 
as a consequence of the loss of the BT line is oriented to by Nicola as 
constitutive of a positively affected subjectivity - "GOOD". Through the 
invocation of this topic, Nicola is able to construct an outcome of the non- 
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payment of the phone bill and of her disavowal of responsibility for it that has 
positive implications for her subjectivity. 
Matt's next turn (lines 361-363) is comprised of two seemingly unrelated parts. 
His 'rational' counter to Nicola's 'rational' argument -"OK YOU CANT GO ON 
ONETEL UNLESS YOUVE GOT A BT LINE AND WE DON'T HAVE A BT 
LINE" (lines 362-362) - is consequentially linked to a reorientation to Nicola's 
prior non-verbal behaviour - "(. ) SO DON'T START THROWING THINGS AT 
ME NICOLA" (lines 362-363). Nicola's act of 'throwing things' is linked to a 
discursive undermining of her 'rationality'. Matt positions Nicola as 'irrational', 
in both her non-verbal and verbal actions. If we incorporate our knowledge of 
the context of this interaction, that these are male and female speakers, 
engaged in a negotiation of subject positions and subjectivities within a 
heterosexual relationship, then the invocation of 'rationality' by the male 
speaker as a means of undermining the positioning and subjectivity of the 
female speaker, effectively positioning her as 'irrational', is interpretable as an 
instantiation of 'traditional' gender relations. The male speaker does 
'masculinity' through the invocation of 'rationality' and in doing so marginalizes 
the positioning and subjectivity of the female speaker. The interpretation that 
gender is being done here is bolstered by Matt's referring to Nicola by name at 
the end of his turn. This is interpreted as an explicit instantiation of a 
sex/gender dynamic. Forenames index the embodied, and therefore the sexed 
and gendered, subjectivities of speakers. Nicola's embodied 'femininity' is 
invoked as a discursive resource in the accomplishment of her marginalization. 
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Nicola's positively affected subjectivity, regarding Matt's loss of Internet 
access, proves to be highly resilient. Rather than orienting to the undermining 
of her positioning as unaffected by the loss of the BT line, Nicola maintains her 
positioning as appreciative of the negative implications that the loss of the line 
has for Matt. Her positively affected subjectivity continues to be a useful and 
valued discursive resource - "GOOD you can't go on Internet' (line 364). Over 
the succeeding turns, lines 365-379, the issue of Matt's use of the Internet is 
firmly established as the topic. Most importantly, the establishment of Matt's 
Internet use as the topic leads to a further negotiation of the subject positions 
of the speakers relative to the topic of responsibility for the phone bill, this time 
in terms of its generation. 
In line 376, following from a discussion of the amount of time Matt spends on 
the Internet, there is a change in the paralinguistic features of Nicola's voice: 
she starts shouting again -"yeah you are YOU'VE RUN THAT BILL UP f. It is 
significant that the change in the paralinguistic features of Nicola's speech 
coincides with her positioning of Matt as responsible for the generation of the 
phone bill. This resource - Matt's positioning as responsible for the generation 
of the phone bill - warrants Nicola's earlier positioning as not responsible for 
the payment of the bill and her constituted negatively affected subjectivity at 
being positioned by Matt as wilfully negligent. As such, the utterance through 
which she renegotiates responsibility for the bill is invested, through its 
paralinguistic features, with the full weight of her negatively affected 
subjectivity. 
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Throughout this excerpt, changes in the paralinguistic features of talk were 
demonstrably occasioned by acts of positioning, which were oriented to 
discursively in subsequent turns as unwarranted or unjust. Furthermore, the 
paralinguistic features were themselves argued to constitute negotiations of 
the relational subject positions of the speakers, i. e., the paralinguistic features 
of speech were argued to be constitutive of the performance of affected 
subjectivities. The instantiations of these affected subjectivities are themselves 
interpreted as negotiations of speakers' rights or entitlements within the local 
interactional context and therefore as constitutive of the local structure of 
power relations. Thus, Nicola and Matt are seen to negotiate their respective 
positions in the local structure of power relations, and indeed to constitute the 
nature of that structure, through both discursive and paralinguistic modes of 
communication. Importantly, these modes are demonstrably linked. The 
discursive content of speech and the implications that it has in terms of the 
provision of subject positions may be oriented to either discursively or 
paralinguistically. In this excerpt, the only evidence to suggest that this 
relationship, between discursive and extra-discursive resources, may operate 
in the other direction is Matt's orientation to Nicola's non-verbal behaviour. The 
paralinguistic features of speech are only oriented to paralinguistically. 
This excerpt also supported an analysis in which the relational subject 
positions between the speakers were interpretable as being accomplished 
through resources that are 'traditionally' gendered. Matt's use of 'rationality' as 
a resource to undermine Nicola's positioning and affected subjectivity, as well 
as his questioning of the legitimacy of the form of her'expression' of anger, 
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were all interpretable as constituting the performance of 'masculinity'. 
However, Nicola also did 'anger and 'rational', plus she did 'aggressive' and 
her paralinguistically demonstrable affected subjectivity was longer lived than 
Matt's. Consequently, my feeling is that the interpretation of discursive 
resources as 'gendered', either on the basis of an interpretative framework, 
within which certain resources are assumed to be amenable only to speakers 
of a particular sex on account of the functions that such resources serve in the 
constitution or maintenance of power relations, or on the basis of the 'gender 
of the speaker, is thrown into question by such an interaction. In this very 
specific local context, the paralinguistic and discursive resources that 
constitute a position of dominance are drawn upon by a woman. In contrast, 
the next two excerpts are clearly interpretable as conforming to all the 
expectations regarding the gendered performance of emotions and the 
interactional functions that it may serve. 
Victor and Delia 
With further reference to the limitations of these data, it is evident that the next 
excerpt is from a much longer interaction to which we the viewers, analysts 
and readers do not have access, owing to the editing requirements and 
practices of the programme makers. As can be seen from the line numbers, 
the excerpt is comprised of the transcripts of two segments of CCTV footage, 
which occurred non-consecutively in the programme. Thus, the excerpt is 
without a clear beginning or end and is also potentially missing a middle 
section. That said, what remains is still capable of supporting a gender 
sensitive analysis. 
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As with all the programmes in the series, contextualizing information was 
provided by the narrator. With regard to Victor and Delia we were told: 
"Tonight's couple are Victor and Delia. Delia is forty and Victor is forty one. 
They've been married for sixteen years and have two teenage children, Ben 
and Amy. Victor and Delia feel that after sixteen years their relationship has 
become a bit stale and want to breathe fresh life into it. Every day, before and 
after work, Della spends a minimum of two hours cleaning and on a Sunday 
she would clean from 11 in the morning to 11 at night. That's a total of 23 
hours cleaning a week. " 
The narrator's opening comments, in lines 272-274, frame this interaction as 
concerned with the cleanliness of the house and the fact that responsibility for 
it falls exclusively to Della. The narrators comment is far from impartial and 
constructs Della's cleaning as a recursive source of tension in her relationship 
with Victor. Throughout the programme - as can be seen in the full transcript 
contained in the appendix - Delia's relationship with cleaning is represented as 
bordering on the o0sessive-compulsive. Obviously, this representation 
marginalizes any other possible representation of why household tidiness is a 
source of tension in the relationship. Specifically, the construction of "Dellas 
constant cleaning" absolves Victor of any responsibility. Based upon the 
content of Delia's turns, an alternative construction of why tidiness should be 
such a source of tension would be concerned with 'Victors constant 
unticliness'. My analysis must not be uncritically guided by the framing of the 
interaction by the narrator. Were it to be so important, analytic possibilities 
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regarding the functions served by Victors turns would be elided; at worst, 
Victors utterances could be interpreted as warranted by Della's 'obsessive 
cleaning'. 
This excerpt demonstrates the importance of knowledge of the contexts in 
which data were generated to the interpretative process. Most significantly, this 
applies to the paralinguistic features of speech that are evident in the excerpt; 
Victor and Delia do not speak so much as shout at each other. The 
interpretation of their shouting as constituting the performance of affected 
subjectivities should be mediated by our knowledge of the interactional 
context, specifically that Victor and Delia are not always in the same room. 
Anecdotally, when people'speak'to others who are not in the same room, it is 
common for them to shout simply in order to be heard. However, the discursive 
content of Victor's turns is certainly interpretable as constitutive of an affected 
subjectivity. 
Excerpt 2 
((CCTV Footage: Delia is shown standing in the lounge facing the kitchen area, she 
can be seen to be talking. Della makes several downward motions with her right hand 
as she is talking. However, the soundtrack to this section is overdubbed with the 
narrator's following comment)) 
272 Narrator: However in the second week Vanessa and Malcolm's concerns 
273 about this couple intensify as anger and resentment around Della's constant 
274 cleaning explode 
((CCTV footage: continuation of above described scene but full audio soundtrack is 
restored; Victor is evidently not in the same room)) 
275 Delia: LOOK AT IT THAT ALL OVER THE FLOOR ((downward motions 
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276 of right arm now interpretable as referring to the object lying on the floor)) 
277 THAT WELDING HELMET BAGS EXTRA SHOES THERE'S A 
278 HUNDRED PAIRS OVER THERE AND YOU'RE BEING THE SAME AS 
279 THEM = 
280 Victor: [expletive beeped out] OFF 
281 Delia: =I CAN'T KEEP CLEARING UP 
II 
((CCTV footage: continuation of above described scene, the camera shot shows the 
lounge, neither Della nor Victor are visible but from the soundtrack it is obvious that 
they are elsewhere in the house)) 
347 Della: IF I DIDN'T BRING'EM IN THEY'D ROT OUT THERE 
348 Victor: = [expletive beeped out] F(beep)K OFF (inaudible) 
349 Della: =I JUST CAN'T HANDLE IT ANY MORE 
350 Victor: = SHUT UP = 
351 Delia: =I CAN'T (1.5)1 CAN'T KEEP CLEARING UP AND PUTTING 
352 THINGS AWAY IT'S REALLY DIFFICULT 
In this analysis I would like to focus on Delia's construction of her affected 
subjectivity and Victor's consequent and recursive refusal to engage with it. 
Particularly, I contend that this constitutes an instantiation of gendered subject 
positions and subjectivities. Through her turns, at lines 275-279,281,347,349 
and 351-352, Delia positions herself relative to the topic of Victors untidiness 
and in doing so negotiates a subjectivity that is consequently affected. The first 
feature of Dellas turns that is worth noting is the constructed extent of Victors 
untidiness and the consequent task with which she is faced. Delia's use of an 
extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) - "LOOK AT IT THAT ALL OVER 
THE FLOOR" -a three-'part list (Jefferson, 1990) - "THAT WELDING 
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HELMET BAGS EXTRA SHOES" - and a maximizing of quantity (Potter, 
1996) - "THERE'S A HUNDRED PAIRS OVER THERE" - work up the 
constructed extent of Victors untidiness and consequently the size of the 
cleaning task with which she is faced. This extremitization warrants Delia's 
subsequent affective positioning relative to the task of keeping the house tidy. 
With specific regard to the task of keeping the house tidy, two further features 
warrant mention. The first is Della's positioning of Victor as "BEING THE 
SAME AS THEM" (lines 278-279). The third person pronoun in that utterance 
is interpreted as signifying the couple's two children, whom we, the viewers, 
know about from the rest of the programme. Through constructing Victor's 
behaviour as like that of the children, Della positions Victor as an unequal 
partner in terms of the performance of domestic chores and potentially 
undermines his adult status. This is interpretable as an instantiation of a 
discourse of 'traditional' gender inequality in terms of the division of 
responsibility for domestic chores. Thus, Della is interpretable as being 
subjected to this discourse and her subjectivity is therefore that of the 
disadvantaged female partner. This inequality is evident in the second 
significant feature where Della constructs a bottom line scenario to warrant her 
positioning as singularly responsible for domestic chores such as tidying - IF I 
DIDN'T BRING'EM IN THEY'D ROT OUT THERE (line 347). 
More important, however, than the construction of inequality between Victor 
and Della, in terms of the performance of domestic chores, is the constructed 
consequences that this inequality has for Della's subjectivity. Delia invokes her 
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affected subjectivity as a resource in her recursive positioning as unable to 
continue within such an unequal status quo in lines 281,349 and 351-352. 
This affected subjectivity subsequently functions as a determinant of the 
'difficulties' with which Delia claims she is faced. 'Clearing up and putting 
things away' are only difficult because of the effect that the inequality of 
responsibility has on Della's subjectivity, not because of any difficulty intrinsic 
to the tasks themselves. Whilst the paralinguistic features of Della's speech - 
the fact that she is shouting - are interpretable as a consequence of Della and 
Victor not being in the same room, it is also possible that they function to invest 
the discursive content of her speech with the weight of her affected 
subjectivity. If the paralinguistic features of Della's speech are interpreted as 
'doing anger, then it is very like 'anger' of the type described by Crawford et aL 
(1992) as typical of those who are disempowered and consequently typical of 
women. 
[A]nger arising out of a sense of powerlessness ... is a response to 
strong judgements about unfairness, injustice which remains 
unresolved. Under these circumstances, if anger is expressed it is likely 
to provoke in the more powerful ... angry reactions to having their power 
challenged (p. 183). 
Arguably, this description is supported by Victors contributions to this 
interaction, which are, to say the least, limited by comparison. Victor has three 
turns, at lines 280,348 and 350; each consists of a phrase the only 
interpretable function of which is to close down the topic or end the interaction 
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altogether and all of which are characterized by paralinguistic features that are 
interpretable as 'doing anger. On two occasions the phrase contains an 
expletive, which, owing to the time at which the programme was aired, was 
beeped out. On the first occasion, line 280, the sound quality does not support 
any estimation of what the expletive might have been. On the second 
occasion, line 348, the N and /k/ phonemes can be clearly heard; hence the 
expletive beeped out is assumed to be "FUCK". Though there are alternatives 
to Iuck! ' in the construction of directive phrases, such a "piss", "sod" and 
"bugger", none of these would warrant being beeped out. We might therefore 
reasonably assume that in line 280 Victor shouted "FUCK OFF" at Della. 
Whether or not "FUCK OFF" is a verb phrase is a matter of some dispute. 
Dong (1971) argues that there are two words of the form 'fuck' and only the 
one meaning 'to fornicate' functions as a verb. The other, as might be used in 
such phrases as 'fuck you' or'fuck off, Dong categorises as a 'quasi-verb'. I 
contend that we can interpret Victors use of 'fuck ofr as attempts to close 
down the interaction, based both on our social and cultural understanding of 
the occasions on which the phrase 'fuck off is used and on Victors 
subsequent use of the verb phrase "SHUT UP". Victor is positioned as refusing 
to engage with the topic of his own untidiness, the topic of the unequal division 
of domestic chores and the issue of his wife's consequently affected 
subjectivity. Further, his refusal to engage with these topics and issues is 
invested with the weight of his own affected subjectivity. Victor effectively does 
anger as a way of closing down these topics and issues and maintaining his 
position within the local structure of power relations. 
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As was apparent in the preceding excerpt, Victor and Delia's relationship is 
often strained, to say the least, and the issue of responsibility for household 
chores is represented as the source of this tension. Through the following 
excerpt, Victor and Delia negotiate subject positions and affected subjectivities 
relative to each other. These subject positions and affected subjectivities are 
negotiated relative to the topic of responsibility for household chores on Della's 
part and through the implicitly constituted 'nagging wife' discourse on Victors 
part. Again, given the traditional division of domestic responsibilities within 
heterosexual relationships, this interaction is interpretable as highly gendered. 
This excerpt also involves a greater range of paralinguistic features than any of 
the other three excerpts and interpretations of the possible functions served by 
these features will be advanced in light of the discursive content of the 
utterance. The paralinguistic features of discourse are assumed to be linked to 
the content of discourse and to mediate or at least affect its meaning and/or 
function. 
Excerpt 3 
((CCTV footage of Victor and Della sat at opposite ends of a three-seater sofa. Della 
is reading the paper and Victor is watching television)) 
365 Della: *why aren't you talking to me? o = 
366 Victor: ='cause there's no noint in talking to you 
367 Della: = why? = 
368 Victor: ='cause all you do is have a bloody go at me 
369 Della: = *I'm stressed* = 
370 Victor: = no YOU STRESS ME OUT (. ) I'M ALRIGHT (. ) UNTIL YOU 
371 COMEHOME= 
366 
372 Delia: = you just = 
373 Victor: = YOU MOAN AT STUPID LITTLE THINGS 
374 Della: = you don't put things away Vic and it feels [like 
375 Victor: WHAT? 
II 
((CCTV footage: continuation of above described scene. However, the camera angle 
changes to the far end of the room. Vic is seen to leave the sofa and move towards 
the kitchen area. )) 
387 Della: (inaudible) like I say and leave everything to me 
388 Victor: = everything to you 
389 Delia: = yeah everytNing= 
390 Victor: = like what? 
391 Della: = evervthinq 
392 Victor: = LIKE WHAT? = 
393 Delia: = EVERYTHING = 
394 Victor: = LIKE WHAT? = 
395 Delia: = JUST EVERYTHING 
396 Victor: = WHAT'S EVERYTHING? = 
397 Della: = just everything = 
398 Victor: = WHAT'S EVERYTHING? = 
399 Delia: = (fuck) just go to bed Vic 
400 Victor: WELL LIKE WHAT? = 
401 Delia: clo to bed it's normal for you innit? 
402 Victor: ((seen to slam a pad of paper and a pen down on the breakfast bar)) 
403 NO I'M SICK OF SEEING YOU 
404 Delia: = no it's normal = 
405 Victor: = BEING A SHI- AN ARSEHOLE [all the time 
406 Delia: NO:: YOU GO TO BED EVERY 
407 NIGHT LAST NIGHT YOU HAD AN'EADACHE AND YOU JUST 
408 [WENT TO BED 
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409 Victor: OH SORRY SORRY (INAUDIBLE) 
410 Delia: (INAUDIBLE) WELL (. ) NO I NEVER 
411 Victor: = OR WHAT STAY HERE AND GET TOLD OFF ALL THE TIME 
412 Della: =I didn't tell you off last night = 
413 Victor: = NO YOU'RE ALWAYS HAVING A DIG 
414 Della: = IT'S WHAT YOU DO VIC = 
415 Victor: = YOU DIGGED AS SOON AS YOU WALKED IN THE DOOR 
416 Della: =I mean it's like it's not even nine o'clock now = 
417 Victor: = AS SOON AS YOU WALKED IN THE DOOR I THOUGHT 
418 'RIGHT KEEP CALM I KNOW SHE'S GONNA GO CRAZY FOR SOME 
419 REASOWAND [YOU FOUND ONE 
420 Delia: its not even nine o'clock Vic ((Vic leaves the room)) (. ) go 
421 to bed Vic 
The structure of the excerpt and the interaction lend themselves to an analysis 
consisting of three parts. The first part will be concerned with lines 365-375, 
involving the initiation of the interaction by Della, the negotiation of the right to 
occupy the position of 'victim' and the paralinguistic features that characterise 
this negotiation. The second part will be concerned with the apparent tit-for-tat 
turn sequence of lin6s 387 to 401 and the escalation of the paralinguistic 
features involved in that sequence. The final part will be concerned with lines 
402 to 421 in which Victor constructs an account of Della's 'nagging' as both 
normative and neurotic. 
The excerpt begins with Della's question to Victor - "'why aren't you talking to 
me? "'. Though the utterance has the grammatical form of a question, it serves 
numerous other rhetorical and interactional functions. Firstly, the utterance 
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constructs Victor and Delia's contemporary relationship, within the above 
described contemporary context, as characterised by an absence of verbal 
communication. Secondly, it positions Victor as responsible for the absence of 
verbal communication and, since it takes the form of a question, invites him to 
account for this position. It should be noted that I am not claiming that there is 
an entire absence of communication; as Watz1awick et aL (1968) argued, "if it 
is accepted that all behavior in an interactional situation has message value, 
i. e., is communication, it follows that no matter how one may try, one cannot 
not communicate" (pp. 48-49; italics in original). This contention is supported by 
Della's turn, which is interpreted as an orientation to the communicative 
functions of the absence of verbal communication on Victor's part; that she 
invites Victor to account for his lack of verbal communication presupposes that 
it is in some way intentional and communicative. Further, given the relational 
component of the question, Victors account must also be relational; Victor is 
required to give a response that is, at least in part, a negotiation of his and 
Della's contemporary relational subject positions. In effect, the question 
functions as both an accusation and invitation. 
In terms of this analysis, the fact that the question is delivered through speech 
that is lower in volume than Della's 'normal' speech must also be attended to. 
The lowered volume of speech is interpreted as 'softening'the delivery of the 
utterance. Particularly I contend that it functions to mediate against the 
interpretation of the question as an accusation. Further, by mediating against 
this possibility, the lowered volume also functions as a negotiation of relational 
subjectivities. That is to say, Della is not 'heard' to be speaking from a position 
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from which she assumes the right to make accusations. Indeed, I interpret the 
lowered volume as constituting the subjectivity of the accused, a possibility that 
is implicit in Della's question; Victors communicative silence is constructed as 
an implicit accusation. 
These various rhetorical and interactional possibilities can be seen to be 
played out through the subsequent turns. Most importantly, Victor takes up the 
position as 'purposefully not talking to Della' and accounts for it - "'cause 
there's no point in talking to you" (line 366). The emphasis that Victor places 
on this utterance is interpreted as constituting the performance of an affected 
subjectivity; the discursive content is invested with a subjectivity that is affected 
by contemporary relations with Della. However, this account is oriented to by 
Della, in her subsequent turn, as insufficient and occasions a second "why? " 
question. Victors response to this question is interpreted as an invocation of 
the 'nagging wife' discourse - "'cause all you do is have a bloody go at me" 
(line 368). Victor positions himself as the 'victim' of Della's nagging and draws 
upon this position to account for his purposeful silence; by not talking to Della, 
Victor provides no opportunities for her to "have a bloody go at" him. 
Significantly, Della does not resist being positioned within the 'nagging wife' 
discourse. Rather, she accepts being positioned as such and accounts for it - 
"I'm stressed" (line 369). This act of positioning, through the invocation of the 
discursive resource of "stress", is the trigger for what could subsequently be 
interpreted and constructed as the performance of 'anger by Victor. Again, 
Della's speech has the paralinguistic quality of lowered volume and there is 
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also emphasis on the word "stressed". Analysed on its discursive content 
alone, this utterance is nothing more than an act of first order reflexive 
positioning; as such it is unclear why it should warrant such tentative delivery. 
However, the utterance must be interpreted in light of the interactional context. 
Further, the subject positions that it constitutes should be interpreted in light of 
the accountability work that they perform. Delia's positioning as "stressed" is 
located in a rhetorical and interactional context within which she has to account 
for her constructed behaviour towards Victor. 
If subject positions are implicitly relational then one interpretation of Della's 
occupation of the position as "stressed" is that Victor is consequently 
positioned as the 'stressor. These turns are therefore interpretable as a 
negotiation of the right to occupy the position of 'victim'. Victor explicitly 
positioned himself as the subject, and 'victim', of Della's nagging. In response, 
in accounting for her constructed behaviour, Della's positioning as stressed 
and her implicit positioning of Victor as the 'stressor constitute a renegotiation 
of relational subject positions in which she, rather than Victor, occupies the 
position of the'victim'. Finally, as a negotiation of accountability, Della's 
positioning as "stressed" must also be interpreted as constitutive of an affected 
subjectivity; that is to say, Delia accounts for her'nagging' by constructing it as 
a consequence of an affected 'stressed' subjectivity. Subjective states and 
affected subjectivities function as discursive resources in the interactional 
negotiation of accountability. 
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As stated above, Della's positioning as "stressed" occasions the paralinguistic 
features that are interpretable as Victor'doing anger. Victor resists both 
Della's positioning as "stressed" and his implicit positioning as the 'stressoe - 
"no YOU STRESS ME OUT" (line 370). The paralinguistic features, the 
emphasis on "no" and the subsequent increase in the volume, are concurrent 
with Victors negotiation of the right to occupy the position as the 'victim' of 
Della's behaviour. The right to occupy the position of 'victim' is, from the 
paralinguistic features of his speech, one in which Victor is heavily affectively 
invested. Certainly, challenges to his occupation of that position meet with 
utterances that are interpretable as constitutive of an affected subjectivity. We 
must assume that there is some currency in or function served by the 
occupation of the position of 'victim' and that a range of resources, not all of 
them discursive, may be invoked in the defence of that position. One possible 
interpretation of the currency of the position of 'victim' is provided by Crawford 
et aL (1992) (for a similar interpretation of anger, see Warner, 1986). 
The out-of-control aspect of anger is engendered at least in part by a 
feeling of victimization and the failure of the other person in an angry 
interchange to acknowledge the victim's status as victim. (p. 174) 
Crawford et aL use 'victim' not to construct an individual as "helpless" but as 
one "who is or perceives themselves to be aggrieved (or] wronged in some 
way" (1992, p. 174). In this interaction, the position of 'victim' is contested 
because it both warrants and accounts for the constitution of an affected 
'angry' subjectivity. 
372 
In the remaining part of his turn, lines 370-371, Victor explicitly positions Della 
as the determinant of his affected 'stressed' subjectivity. This act of positioning 
is warranted by Victor's clear invocation of discursive resources that may be 
categorized as constituting the'nagging wife'discourse - "YOU MOAN AT 
STUPID LITTLE THINGS" (line 373). The construction of Della's concerns as 
trivial further works up Della's positioning within the 'nagging wife' discourse 
and further warrants both Victor's occupation of the position as the 'victim' and 
his right to speak from an affected subjectivity. Victor's invocation of the 
6nagging wife' discourse and his trivialization of Della's concerns and 
subjectivity must be interpreted as constitutive of gender power relations. 
Through them Victor, though he claims to speak from the position of the 
tvictim', is able to marginalize and subordinate Della. If we accept that the 
discursive constituents of patriarchal ideology are invoked and played out in 
the day-to-day 'realities' of the lives of men and women, particularly those in 
heterosexual relationships, this is perhaps an empirical example of what such 
interactions might look like. 
It is perhaps stating the obvious to claim that relational subject positions, such 
as 'the nagging wife' and the 'long suffering husband', are heavily invested by 
the institution of patriarchy with power relations that favour the male partner. 
What occurs in this context is interpretable as a negotiation of the affected 
subjectivities of the speakers relative to each other but not a negotiation of the 
existent power relations between the speakers, which appear to be determined 
by nothing more than gender. Della does 'submissive but nagging wife' and 
Victor does 'dominant but long suffering husband'. That the possible 
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paradoxical natures of these positions are never oriented to is interpretable as 
evidence of the ubiquity and insidiousness of gender and gender power 
relations within heterosexual relations. The interpretation that these are the 
positions taken up by Victor and Delia also potentially accounts for the way in 
which they paralinguistically negotiate the position of 'victim'. Victors 
dominance entitles him to 'do' anger in a powerful way, whereas Delia's 
subordinate position precludes the possibility of doing 'anger' to work up her 
status as 'victim'. 
Though the length of the edit is uncertain, I interpret the turns beginning at line 
387 as following relatively shortly after Victors interruption at line 375 and I 
interpret Della's affected subjectivity as still the topic of discussion. Though the 
line numbers are suggestive of a lengthier edit, they are an artefact of the 
editing of the programme, in which reflective footage of the two experts 
watching the CCTV footage was interspersed with the CCTV footage of Victor 
and Della. Lines 388 to 401 consist of seven consecutive question-answer 
pairs (Sacks, 1992), five of which are basically the same. These five question- 
answer pairs follow from what is interpreted as Della's construction of her 
subjectivity - that she feels that Victor leaves everything to her (line 387). 
Della's use of the extreme case formulation "everything" in the construction of 
her subjectivity provides Victor with a resource by which he can effectively 
close down this topic. Victor makes "everything" the topic. Victors questions, 
beginning with "everything to you", orient to Della's use of "everything" as a 
matter-of-fact claim about the day-to-day division of household chores. Since 
Victor's questions are requests for objective specificity on the topic of individual 
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responsibilities, they can in no way be interpreted as engagements with the 
topic of Della's subjectivity. Whilst Victor attempts to close down the topic of 
Delia's subjectivity, Della resists this move through the restatement of the 
extreme case formulation "everything". 
Over the five similar question-answer pairs (lines 388 to 397), there are 
commensurate changes in the paralinguistic qualities of Victor and Della's 
speech - from normal speech to emphasized speech to shouting. This 
escalation is initiated by Victor (lines 390 and 392). The changes in the 
paralinguistic qualities of Della's speech are occasioned by those of Victors 
speech. Morally, both Victor and Della are entitled to 'do angry' as a response 
to the others persistent refusal to engage with their own topic. The impasse, 
constituted by their refusal to engage with the other's topic and their reciprocal 
and equivalent performances of affected subjectivities, is only resolved when 
Della gives way on both counts. Della is the first to stop shouting (line 397) and 
subsequently abandons the topic of her subjectivity - "(fuck) just go to bed Vic! ' 
(line 399). This is interpreted as an attempt to close down both her own and 
Victor's topics and consequently to end the interaction. However, Victor 
maintains his topic for just one more turn (line 400) and has the 'last word'. It 
could be argued that there is a moral currency attached to this. By appearing 
still to be willing to talk on what he oriented to as the topic, Victor may be 
interpreted as doing 'reasonable'. An alternative interpretation, may see Victor 
as doing 'obdurate' and Delia as doing 'calming' or'defusing'. Either way, it is 
Della who surrenders the topic. 
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The turns between line 387 and line 401 show a clear negotiation of subject 
positions, subjectivities and power relations. This process of negotiation is 
demonstrably simultaneously accomplished through both the paralinguistic and 
discursive features of speech. In these lines, the invocation and escalation of 
paralinguistic features, interpretable as constitutive of the performance of 
$anger, is led by the male partner. However, given that both speakers could be 
argued to do 'anger in ways that are roughly equivalent, we might question the 
extent to which the outcome of the interaction - Delia's submission - is at all 
dependent upon the performance of emotions. Indeed, I would argue that the 
eventual outcome - the apparent dominance of the male speaker over the 
female speaker, of the objective over the subjective and of the rational over the 
affective - is a consequence of the discursive resources invoked rather than 
the paralinguistic features that are also evident. 
The discursive resources that are shown to be hegemonic in this instance 
advantage the male speaker. The question that should be asked is: are such 
resources hegemonic because they are invoked by a male speaker? Or are 
there other reasons why these might be 'winning' resources? One possible 
argument would be that certain resources are hegemonic because they are 
resources that are constitutive of and function in the maintenance of patriarchal 
ideology. They constitute culturally 'winning arguments' precisely because they 
are the resources that are invoked in the maintenance of male power and 
privilege and are therefore culturally privileged resources . As such, these 
discursive resources could be argued to be gendered, as masculine. However, 
this argument is based upon one simple ontological presupposition, men's 
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dominance over women. While this presupposition may, from feminist 
perspective, be a "reality that should not be denied" (Edwards, et al., 1995, 
p. 26; emphasis in original), there must surely be some question as to whether 
it properly can or should form the basis of an interpretative framework in a 
social constructionist analysis, unless, the interpretative framework is 
represented not as based upon the known status of ontological reality but as a 
theory of how gender and gender power relations might be organised. 
In the final section of the excerpt, lines 401-422, what was originally interpreted 
as an attempt to close down the interaction - "(fuck) just go to bed Vic! ' (line 
399) - is developed into a topic - "Oust go to bed it's normal for you innit? " (line 
401). Victors subsequent orientation to this construction of his normative 
behaviour clearly establishes it as the topic. However, Victor challenges the 
construction of his going to bed as'normative' behaviour. Instead he implicitly 
constructs it as an agentically undertaken consequence of an affected 
subjectivity; this affected subjectivity is, of course, constructed in relation to 
Delia and her subject position within the 'nagging wife discourse'- "NO I'M 
SICK OF SEEING YOU" (line 403). Over the remainder of the excerpt, Victor 
and Della maintain their respective subject positions relative to the topic of the 
I 
times at which Victor goes to bed. Della maintains her construction that this is 
normative behaviour for Victor and in response Victor accounts for his alleged 
avoidance of Delia by constructing her behaviour as normative and as 
$neurotic'. It is Victors turns, at lines 411,413,415 and 417-419, all of which 
are characterized by paralinguistic features that are interpretable as 'doing 
angry, which are of particular interest. 
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In line 411, Victor constructs one part of the 'choice' with which he claims to be 
routinely faced - "OR WHAT STAY HERE AND GET TOLD OFF ALL THE 
TIME" - the implicitly constituted other option being the thing for which he is 
accounting, his going to bed. In working up the constructed determinant of his 
affected subjectivity, being "TOLD OFF ALL THE TIME", Victor invokes an 
extreme case formulation, which is seized upon by Della in much the same 
way that Victor seized upon Della's use of an extreme case formulation in the 
construction of her subjectivity in lines 387-400. Delia responds to Victor's use 
of the extreme case formulation with an exception - "I didn't tell you off last 
night" (line 412). 
Victor employs a second extreme case formulation in line 413 - "NO YOURE 
ALWAYS HAVING A DIG" - and further constructs Della's behaviour as 
normative, rather than a response to any situational factors - "YOU DIGGED 
AS SOON AS YOU WALKED IN THE DOOR" (line 415). This construction of 
Della's behaviour as normative is fully developed in lines 417-419. Drawing 
upon the resource of reported thought, Victor constructs himself as agentically 
managing his subjectivity in the light of Delia's behaviour. In this turn, Della's 
behaviour is constructed as not only normative but inevitable and as neurotic - 
I THOUGHT'RIGHT KEEP CALM I KNOW SHE'S GONNA GO CRAZY FOR 
SOME REASOWAND YOU FOUND ONE" (lines 417-419). That Victors 
speech in this turn is interpretable as constitutive of an 'angry' subjectivity 
further warrants his construction of Dellas behaviour as highly problematic; 
Victor is 'angry' despite his own best intentions and as a result of Delia's 
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behaviour, her inability to appreciate the effect that it has and her subsequent 
attempts to position him as responsible for it. Again, though Victor positions 
himself as the 'victim' of Delia's behaviour, the perlocutionary force of his 
utterances (Austin, 1962) and the fact that for the most part Delia does not 
match the paralinguistic features of his speech - she does not'do' anger in 
response to being positioned as 'normatively engaged in neurotic nagging'- 
do not suggest that he occupies a subordinate position within the power 
relations of this local interactional context. 
Indeed, this part of the exchange, perhaps more than any other, is readily 
interpretable as an instantiation of 'traditional' or typically assumed gender 
power relations within heterosexual relationships. A man 'does anger and in 
doing so positions his wife as the neurotic determinant of his 'anger'. Further, 
his anger is constructed as a 'passion', a force by which he is overcome 
despite his own best intentions and his exercise of agency, the result of which 
is the marginalization of his wife's discursive concerns and affected subjectivity 
and the maintenance of a local structure of power relations within which he is 
dominant. All of this is constructed as resulting not from him but from his wife's 
actions; her subordination is the result of her own unwarranted affected 
subjectivity and her attempts to position her husband as accountable. 
Reciprocally, Delia's 'doing of anger is also highly consistent with what may be 
expected of a woman within the context of a heterosexual relationship, 
according to existent theories of the cultural structure of gender power 
relations (Crawford et aL, 1992). Delia's 'anger' is advanced as the result of 
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her frustration and marginalization and is strongly linked to her husband's 
refusal to engage with her own affected subjectivity, of which he is positioned 
as determinant. 
6.5 Discussion 
Firstly, I acknowledge that the transcription notation system used in the above 
excerpts is barely adequate to convey the complexities and subtleties of the 
paralinguistic features of human speech, simultaneous with conveying its 
discursive content. If discourse analytic techniques are to engage with the 
paralinguistic features of speech, as they must if we are to further examine 
#emotional expression' in vivo, then a more sophisticated transcription notation 
system must be developed. However, I believe that the above excerpts still 
constitute an adequate resource for an initial engagement with the relationship 
between 'emotions' and 'gender in 'real-life' interactions. 
Across these three excerpts and two couples, very differing accounts of the 
functions served by'doing anger within the context of heterosexual 
relationships emerge. In both couples, both the male and female speakers are 
interpretable as 'doing anger'. In both couples, 'doing anger is clearly seen to 
follow from and function in the renegotiation of ascribed subject positions. 
Within a local interactional context, 'doing anger' is demonstrably a means of 
negotiating the rights and entitlements of speakers to take up and ascribe 
particular subject positions. 'Doing anger' is demonstrably constitutive of 
individual subjectivities, local moral orders and local structures of power 
relations. How then does this analysis of episodes of anger in heterosexual 
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relationships answer the above research questions regarding the relationship 
between 'doing anger and 'doing masculinity'? 
Both Matt and Victor'do angry' in response to challenges to and in defence of 
their entitlement to position others. Simultaneous with 'doing anger, both Matt 
and Victor'do rational' as a way of undermining the subject positions of those 
speakers who challenge their rights and entitlements. Arguably, that both 'do 
anger is interpretable as evidence that they do indeed occupy positions of 
dominance within the local interactional context (Crawford et aL, 1992). That 
both 'do anger and that their'doing anger serves the above-identified 
functions relative to speakers who occupy positions either as 'wife' or 'partner 
within the context of heterosexual relationships, is interpretable as constituting 
the performance of masculinities (Connell, 1995). Both Matt and Victor may be 
interpreted as 'doing hegemonic masculinity, except for the fact that in Matt's 
case it doesn't ensure his position of dominance within the local interactional 
context. It is the contrast between the two couples and their interactions that 
constitutes the basis for the most productive arguments. 
In excerpt 1, Nicola 'does anger' and 'does physical aggression' in way that 
may be interpretable as based on particular rights and entitlements that follow 
from and are constitutive of her dominant position within the local interactional 
context. Given the form of expression of anger, the presumption of rights and 
entitlements and the inferred organisation of the local structure of power 
relations, should we then assume that Nicola is 'doing masculinity'? I contend 
that this question lies at the heart of critical discursive psychological analyses. 
381 
Based upon the presence of discursive resources and configurations of power 
relations that are assumed to be gendered, as masculine, at the cultural level, 
do we impose that framework to make sense of the micro-textual level? 
Undeniably, Nicola and Matt are engaged in the negotiation of power relations, 
rights and entitlements, but should this demonstrable process necessarily be 
interpreted as constitutive of the performance of gender? I would say not. 
There are occasions on which Matt'does masculinity, for example when he 
invokes Nicola's embodied status as sexed and gendered in the proscription of 
her physical aggression towards him - "SO DON'T START THROWING 
THINGS AT ME NICOLA7 (lines 362-363). For the remainder of the excerpt, I 
would say that he and Nicola draw equally on a range of discursive and extra- 
discursive resources in the negotiation of power relations, which ultimately 
benefits Nicola. Neither the resources nor the positions taken up by speakers 
are necessarily gendered, nor should they be interpreted as necessarily 
gendered, at the micro-textual level. 
Similarly, while excerpts 2 and 3 appear to confirm all predications about the 
ways by which anger may be 'done' by male and female speakers within the 
context of heterosexual relationships, this should not be interpreted as 
evidence that Victor and Delia 'do' masculinity and 'femininity' respectively. Nor 
should the resultant configuration of power relations and its resemblance to 
'the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted 
answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is 
taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of 
women' (Connell, 1995, p. 77) be imposed as an interpretative framework to 
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argue that through 'doing anger in the way that he does, Victor does 
hegemonic masculinity. 
As extra-discursive resources, constituted through paralinguistic and non- 
verbal behaviours, 'emotions' are available to speakers, according to their 
rights and entitlements within interactional contexts for the negotiation of 
locations within local structures of power relations. Whilst I acknowledge that 
those 'rights' and entitlements' may be constituted through categories of 
gender they may also be based on concepts such as 'age' or'employment 
status'. Matt's relatively disempowered position within the context of his 
relationship may be accounted for by either of these resources. Consequently, 
to impose 'gender as an interpretative framework to make sense of an 
interaction on the basis that features of that interaction conform to cultural or 
ideological understandings of 'masculinity' and 'femininity' may be to gloss 
over the complexities, subtleties and most importantly flexibility of the micro- 
textual resources invoked by speakers in the negotiation of their rights and 
duties. 'Emotions' are not always 'gendered' and 'gender' is not always done 
through 'emotions'. Or at least, there is not always the micro-textual evidence 
to suggest such a link. As discourse analysts, we must be as attentive to what 
is absent as we are to what is present. 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion: Several versions of the 'truth'about men 
and emotions 
7.1 Introduction 
I 
As a whole this thesis represents an engagement with the culturally prevalent 
construction of men's relationship with emotions as limited, impoverished and 
detrimental to both men and those around them. This construction, it was 
argued, represents one feature of a broader project of second-wave feminism. 
Within this project masculinities, understood as the culturally prescribed ways 
of 'doing being men', are taken as the focus of analysis on the assumption that 
they function in the maintenance of male power and privilege and female 
, I. disempowerment and marginalisation, i. e., masculinities are assumed to 
function in the maintenance of patriarchy. 
However, whilst they are assumed to function in the subordination of women, 
masculinities have also been theorised as operating to the detriment of men. 
Particularly, it has been argued that the marginalization of 'emotions' and the 
concomitant privileging of 'reason' as bases for knowledge and action - 
embodied in the traditional, objective scientific method - results in both the 
subordination of women, owing to their supposed greater propensity for and 
affinity with emotions, and the impoverishment of men. Through their assumed 
requirement to conform to prescribed masculinities in order to maintain their 
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material privileges and to avoid socio-cultural sanctions for transgressing 
normative conceptions of gender, men are commonly represented as 
suppressing emotions and as divorcing themselves from their own subjective 
emotional lives, to such an extent that either their emotions are manifest in 
behaviours that are damaging both to themselves and to those around them or 
they entirely lose the ability to represent their'selves' in emotion terms. Men's 
emotional lives are commonly represented as characterized only by the 
expression of positive self-oriented emotions, such as 'pride', and negative 
other-oriented emotions, such as'anger. 
The three empirical chapters of this thesis (Chapters 4,5 & 6) represented 
engagements with the topic or problem of men's relationship with emotions. 
The empirical chapters were informed by poststructuralist theories of gender 
(Chapter 2). Briefly, language, conceptualized as'discourse', was assumed to 
constitute, rather than simply describe, the relationship between gender and 
emotions. Further, the materialization of gendered subjects and subjectivities 
was assumed to be an effect of 'discourse'. Simply, when speakers 
constructed and accounted for men's relationship with emotions and the 
functions that emotions served in the performance of masculinity, they were 
assumed to be subjected to'discourse'. Their status as gendered 'masculine' 
subjects was accomplished through or relative to the discourses that they 
invoked. Once subjected to discourse, i. e., constituted as masculine, speakers 
were assumed to speak from that position and subsequent constructions were 
interpretable as products of a masculine subjectivity. Speakers were theorized 
as simultaneously the products and the producers of discourse. As such, 
385 
gender, conceived as the oppositional categories of masculinity and femininity, 
is theorized as endlessly reproduced and reiterated. It should be noted that the 
conception of 'masculinity' and 'femininity' as oppositional does not preclude 
variability within those categories; 'masculinities' constituted through a range of 
discursive resources are oppositional to'femininities'. Constructions and 
accomplishments of 'masculinity' are therefore assumed to be inherently 
relational and to locate gendered subjects and subjectivities within social 
structures. 
Of primary concern amongst these social structures are systems of power 
relations. Gendered subjects were assumed to occupy particular locations 
within systems of power relations that afford those subjects particular rights 
and duties. Importantly, one assumption that does not inform the analysis is 
that the location of gendered subjects within those systems of power relations 
is already known, i. e. patriarchy is not assumed. Thus, configurations of power 
relations and the discursive resources through which they are constituted are 
not assumed to be consequences and constitutive of patriarchy. Rather, power 
relations are assumed to be highly dynamic and negotiated on a tum-by-turn 
basis within interactional contexts. 
Drawing on poststructuralist discourse analytic techniques - outlined in chapter 
3- these analyses engaged with men's talk about men and emotions, a single 
man's talk about experiences of humiliation and the negotiation of his possible 
humiliation within a specific interactional context and interactions between men 
and women in heterosexual relationships that were characterized by 
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expressions of anger. These analyses were oriented to a set of linked research 
questions. Chapter 4 was concerned with answering the following questions: 
9 How do men construct men's relationship with emotions? 
* In constructing this relationship, what discourses do men draw upon to 
account for it? 
9 In accounting for men's constructed relationship with emotions, do men 
reflexively orient to the implications of the discourses upon which they 
draw for their own subject positions as 'men'? 
The answers to these questions that emerged from the analysis of chapter 4, 
specifically the idea of emotional 'expressions' as constitutive of social 
structures and power relations, informed the research questions of chapters 5 
and 6. Within a single interactional context, the analysis of chapter 5 was 
concerned with the way by which a male speaker negotiated his contemporary 
subjectivity relative to an emotion concept that had demonstrable implications 
for the constitution of power relations. The questions that were asked of this 
particular data set were: 
e How does a male speaker construct accounts of episodes of 
'humiliation'? 
,* Are discourses of 'humiliation' used to construct accounts of the 
negotiation of subject positions and the constitution of power relations? 
* And, based upon the presuppositions that humiliation constitutes 
episodes of disempowerment and that the performance of masculinity 
is, in some way, constituted through the negotiation of power relations, 
does a male speaker, when constructing episodes in which he is the 
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object of humiliation, simultaneously orient to their implications for the 
constitution of a masculine subjectivity? 
The final empirical chapter (chapter 6) represented a departure from the 
previous two in terms of the data that were subjected to analysis. Chapters 4 
and 5 had drawn on ruminative data, within which men talked generally about 
men's relationship with emotions or specifically about their own relationship 
with a particular emotion concept. In contrast, chapter 6 drew on talk-in-action; 
transcripts of 'naturalistic' interactions between men and women in 
heterosexual relationships. The choice of this data set was informed by a need 
to move away from ruminative discussions of men's relationship with emotions 
to data that would allow engagement with that relationship in practice. To this 
end the data in chapter 6 were analysed in order to determine: 
" What functions were served by men's responses to the emotional 
expressions of others? 
" What functions were served by men's 'doing' of emotional expressivity? 
* Were these functions synchronous with the performance of 
masculinities or constitutive of masculine subjectivities? 
The contributions of the findings of each of these chapters to our 
understanding of men's relationship with emotions, our understanding of the 
concepts of 'masculinities' and 'emotions' and to the use of discourse analytic 
methods will be discussed in turn. 
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7.2 "It's not a man thing is it? ": The constitution of masculine 
subjectivities relative to 'hegemonic' masculinity 
The analysis of chapter 4 was concerned with ruminative data within which 
men constructed accounts of men's relationship with emotions. The speakers 
whose voices are heard in chapter 4 were argued to be involved in the 
constitution and negotiation of masculine subjectivities relative to the 
predominant construction of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995). This 
argument was based on the assumption that the speakers were already 
gendered as 'masculine' (Butler, 1993,1999) and upon their acts of positioning 
(Davies & Harr6,1990; Harr6 & van Langenhove, 1999) relative to their 
constructions of men's relationships with emotions. The contention that the 
speakers constructed 'hegemonic masculinity'was based on the interpretation 
of the constructed relationships between men and emotions being based on 
the relational functions served by emotion discourses and 'expressions' 
(Armon-Jones, 1986; Averill, 1985; De Rivera, 1984; Harr6,1986; Harr6 & 
Gillet, 1994; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Parkinson, 1995; 
Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Within the accounts of men's relationship with 
emotions, certain emotion 'discourses' and emotional 'expressions' were 
constructed as incompatible with masculinity on the grounds that they resulted 
in disadvantageous subject positions and locations within power relations. In 
contrast, those emotion discourses and 'expressions' constructed as according 
with masculinity were those that resulted in advantageous subject positions 
and dominant locations within structures of power relations. Thus the 
relationship between men and emotions 'described' by the speakers was 
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interpretable as one that would function in the maintenance of male power and 
privilege, i. e. in the maintenance of patriarchy. 
The speakers in the excerpts drew upon a set of familiar repertoires to account 
for the constructed relationship between 'masculinity' and 'emotions'. These 
repertoires included the 'socialization' repertoire, the 'social structures' 
repertoire, the 'evolutionary' repertoire and the 'hydraulic model' discourse. 
Thus, the repertoires of 'aetiology' that are reified through positivist research 
methods -for the 'evolutionary' repertoire see Buss (1995), Buunk, 
Angleitner, Oubaid and Buss (1996), Buss, Larsen, Westen and Semmelroth 
(1992), and Buss and Shackleford (1997); for the 'social structures' repertoire 
see Eagly (1987), Fischer (1993), Grossman and Wood (1993), LaFrance and 
Banaji (1992); and for the 'socialization' discourse see Brody (1985), Brody 
and Hall (1993), Davis (1999), Haviland and Malatesta (1981), Saami (1993), 
and Shields (1991,1995,2002) -are interpretable as speakers'resources 
invoked in discursive and interactional contexts to manage particular 
interactional or ideological concerns. 
Within these repertoires and the constructions for which they account, the 
various 'rhetorical contrasts' identified by Edwards (1997), such as the 
potential for emotions to be variously constructed as 'controllable action or 
passive reaction', 'internal states versus external behaviour: private ("feelings") 
versus public ("expressions", "displays")' (p. 194) are all clearly present. 
Further, these rhetorical contrasts are integral to the accountability-oriented 
work that is accomplished by the various 'aetiological' repertoires. 
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The presence of these repertoires and the discursive resources that are 
constitutive of them may be interpreted as evidence of the dissemination and 
cultural prevalence of psychological concepts and discourses. However, their 
presence should not be interpreted as in any way supporting the theories of 
gender differences in emotions in which these repertoires are reirled as 
aetiological accounts. My contention is that the best approach to an 
understanding of the ways that these repertoires may determine gender 
differences in emotions is a poststructuralist and social constructionist one, in 
which these repertoires and discursive resources demonstrably function in the 
construction of concepts of gendered emotions and in the constitution of 
gendered subjects and subjectivities. 
Arguably, one of the most important and least remarkable findings of the 
analysis in chapter 4 is that masculinity/masculinities is/are consistently 
constructed and accomplished relative to femininity/femininities. Consequently, 
I would contend that there is some empirical support for the contention that 
gender, the constitution of masculinities and fernininities, is a consequence of 
the location of speakers within the 'heterosexual matrix' (Butler, 1999). Further 
support is lent to this contention when the prevalence and power of gender 
categories within constructions of ma. sculinities is considered. The argument 
that compulsory heterosexuality and the consequent determination and 
materialization of sexed and gendered bodies delimits 'gendered possibilities' 
is evidenced by the construction of variability within 'gay masculinity' in 
gendered terms. 
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In terms of the development of critical discursive psychology as an analytic 
method, I am aware that the analysis of chapter 4 was dominated by micro- 
textual considerations and a focus on the accountability-oriented work done 
within the immediate interactional context. That said, with only a parsimonious 
interpretative framework, speakers were interpreted as constructing accounts 
of a stable concept of 'hegemonic' masculinity relative to which they negotiated 
their own gendered status and subjectivities. Further, the constitution of these 
gendered subjectivities was demonstrably oriented to interactional and 
ideological concerns such as warranting one's right to speak and the 
management of accountability for both one's own actions as a 'man' and the 
actions of other'men'. In specific terms, the analysis contributes the concept of 
'conditional' subject positions, constituted through instances of reported 
speech, as a speakers resource through which they are able to negotiate 
positions and subjectivities relative to subject positions that lie outside the 
immediate interactional context. The analysis also contributes the idea of 
'figurative' invocations of voice, in which the paralinguistic qualities of speech 
can be used to index concepts that are not discursively constituted, I am 
thinking of Maurice's lowered tone which was interpreted as constructing the 
resistance of an emotion-based subject position as constitutive of a particularly 
masculine masculinity (chapter 4: excerpt 5). 
Overall, the most important findingof the analysis in chapter 4 is that it is not 
discrete emotions or emotional 'expressions' per se that are gendered, i. e., 
scrying' is not exclusively fernininized. Rather, it is the functions- served, the 
subject positions, subjectivities, social relationships and power relations that 
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are constituted by emotional 'expressions' that are the basis of their gendered 
status. Thus, crying in public is proscribed for men but crying in private is not. It 
is not the'expression' per se but what that 'expression' may do or make 
possible, in terms of constituting the basis for the actions of 'others', that is 
determinate of whether it accords with or is antithetical to the performance of 
masculinity as relationally accomplished. That said, the case can still be made 
that, across the excerpts, 'emotions' are illegitimized as discursive resources 
for the negotiation of masculine subject positions and the constitution of 
masculine subjectivities. 
7.3 "You can't humiliate me, you can't": The interactional 
accomplishment of a troubled masculine subjectivity 
The argument that it is the function of an emotion that determines whether that 
emotion is consistent with or antithetical to the performance of masculinity or 
the constitution of a masculine subjectivity was explored in considerable detail 
in chapter 5. This chapter had always been intended to address the question of 
how a single male speaker would construct their'self in emotion terms and 
whether they would simultaneously orient to the performance of masculinity 
and the constitution of a masculine subjectivity. The decision to engage with 
'humiliation' was based upon my increasing awareness that it was the function 
of emotions, specifically, the subject positions and configurations of power 
relations they constituted that determined their gendered status. Thus the 
presence of talk on 'humiliation' in the therapy session transcripts afforded the 
opportunity to engage with an 'emotion' that had not been engaged with 
previously and which might be culturally understood to have negative 
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implications for the location of the 'humiliated' individual within systems of 
power relations (Gilbert, 1997; Silver, et aL, 1986). 
That the 'episodes of humiliation' that C 'described' experiencing were 
constructed through autobiographical narratives and the use of reported 
speech and unvoiced reported thought required the development of an 
interpretative framework that could make sense of multiple / positions (Han-6 & 
van Langenhove, 1999). This interpretative framework drew upon the concepts 
of the dialogical or relational self (Gergen, 1999; Hermans, 1996; Hermans & 
Kempen, 1993; Hermans, Kempen & van Loon, 1992) and multi-voicedness 
and polyphony within autobiographical narrative structures (Bakhtin, 
1929/1973; Bruner, 1986; Hermans, 1996; Michotte, 1946/1963; Sarbin, 1986). 
Within this framework the dialogical self is conceptualized as: 
... a dynamic multiplicity of relatively autonomous I positions in an 
imaginal landscape. ... The I has the possibility to move, as in a space, 
from one position to the other in accordance with changes in situation 
and time. The I fluctuates among different and even opposed positions. 
The / has the capacity to imaginatively endow each position with a voice 
so that dialogical relations between positions can be established. 
(Hermans et aL, 1992, p. 28) 
These theoretical concepts provided the basis for a critical discursive 
psychological analysis in which the contemporary subjectivity of a speaker was 
interpreted as constituted through his location in and movement between 
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multiple I positions, constituted by his telling of autobiographical narratives and 
his use of reported speech. As such, the analysis represents the development 
of these theories into a useful framework for the performance of critical 
discursive psychological work. 
Within the analysis of chapter 5, the subjectivity of C- the client in the therapy 
sessions - was argued to be, in part, constituted through and relative to the 
conditional subject positions apparent within the narratives of humiliation; 'in 
part' because the analysis only focussed on one feature of the transcripts. 
Attention to other features would have resulted in an analysis in which C's 
subjectivity was constituted differently. This should not form the basis of any 
criticism of this approach but is an acknowledgement of the highly dynamic 
processes constituted through language use in day-to-day life, including the 
constitution of subjectivities. It is important that discourse analytic work 
reflexively acknowledges that the data subjected to analysis and presented to 
an audience are likely to be only a fraction of the data that were originally 
generated. The requirement to present analyses that are sufficiently coherent 
and consistent means that the 'things that are seen to be done' in those 
analyses may, unintentionally, be misrepresented as more common discursive 
phenomena than they 'really' are or may elide the other work that is done 
within any given interactional context. Certainly, in the transcripts of C069's 
therapy sessions, a good deal of interactional, subjectivity-constituting work 
was done but which is not represented here. This is undeniably a consequence 
of the research questions asked of the data and of the aims of the thesis as a 
whole, specifically the stated aim of engaging with the relationships between 
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men, masculinity and emotions and a consequent need to produce a gender- 
focussed analysis. 
The interpretation of C's subjectivity as gendered and as 'masculine' was 
based on the interpretation of the narratives of humiliation. Through these 
narratives, particularly through the use of reported speech and unvoiced 
reported thought, a locally-determined meaning of 'humiliation' was 
constituted. Within the context of the therapy sessions, episodes of 
'humiliation' were characterized by unjust acts of positioning by an'other'and 
by a subsequent failure to renegotiate that act of positioning. In positioning 
terms, episodes of humiliation are characterized by acts of first order 
positioning and by an absence of second order positioning, despite the first 
order positioning being constructed as unjust or unwarranted and there being a 
moral basis for the act of second order positioning (van Langenhove & Harr6, 
1999). Acts of 'humiliation' are not constitutive of moral social structures and 
morally correct configurations of power relations. For the speaker, in this case 
C, autobiographical episodes of humiliation are interpretable as narratives of 
episodes of disempowerment. 
The interpretation of these narratives as constitutive of a 'masculine' 
subjectivity was based upon three assumptions. The first was that C was 
already gendered as 'masculine' (Butler, 1993,1999). The second was that 
speakers in therapy sessions must in some way account for their being there; 
one way by which this might be done is through the construction of a troubled 
or problematic subjectivity. The third was that the narratives were implicitly 
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comparative, i. e., the events constructed in C's narratives were implicitly 
contrasted with a normative concept of masculine behaviour. Simply, the 
interpretation advanced was that C's subjectivity, constituted through the 
autobiographical narratives of humiliation, was implicitly contrasted with 
'hegemonic' masculinity (Connell, 1995), which is constituted through the 
simultaneous management of emotional expressions and the determining of 
configurations of power relations that are individually advantageous. 
C's subjectivity is therefore interpretable as 'masculine' and 'problematic' on 
two counts. Although C constructs himself as emotionally inexpressive within 
the narratives - done through the use of unvoiced reported thought - in 
accordance with the illegitimacy of emotions as discursive resources for the 
constitution of masculine subject positions, particularly within the work place 
(Hearn, 1993), his inexpressivity is complicit in his disempowerment. 'Doing 
emotional', specifically 'doing anger, are ways by which C might morally have 
renegotiated his unjust positioning and resisted disempowerment. The 
illegitimizing of emotions as the basis for acts of positioning, in accordance 
with 'hegemonic' masculinity, and the resulting disempowerment, which is 
entirely contradictory to 'hegemonic' masculinity, are interpreted as constitutive 
of a subjectivity that is simultaneous 'masculine' and 'problematic'. 
More than the analysis of chapter 4, the analysis of chapter 5 demonstrates 
the importance of an interpretative framework and an engagement with macro- 
textual issues, specifically the imposition of some of the analysts' concerns and 
awareness as to the contexts within which particular utterances may be 
interpreted. That said, I would still advocate parsimony. The interpretative 
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framework in the analysis of chapter 5 drew on poststructuralist theories of 
gender (Butler, 1999) and the ideas that the 'self could be made the topic of 
talk and that subjectivity could be constituted through a negotiation of related / 
positions (Hermans et aL, 1992). The analysis was also informed by the 
concept of 'hegemonic' masculinity - as the practices by which patriarchy is 
reproduced (Connell, 1995) - as accomplished through the illegitimizing of 
emotions as the basis for actions and the consequent constitution of systems 
of power relations that ensure masculine privilege (derived from chapter 4). 
Without these frameworks, operating at a purely micro-textual level, the paucity 
of gender terms in these excerpts would have resulted in an analysis that had 
little to contribute to a thesis concerned with the relationship between 
masculinity and emotions. Again, I would reiterate the importance of 
parsimony. The account of the constitution of C's subjectivity offered by the 
analysis is largely in C's own terms and it is, I believe, an adequate and 
persuasive account. I see no reason for the importation of interpretative 
frameworks, such as psychoanalysis, to make sense of subjectivity. People 
'see' the world in their own terms and that is made apparent when they speak. 
7.4 "SO DON'T START THROWING THINGS AT ME NICOLA! ': 
'Hegemonic' masculinity in context 
The analysis of chapter 6 represented a fairly radical departure from the 
preceding two chapters both in terms of the data taken for analysis and in 
terms of the interpretative framework involved. Where 'masculinities' had 
previously been, broadly speaking, the topic of talk and had been talked about 
relative to 'fernininities', the data in chapter 6 provided an opportunity to 
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examine the accomplishment of gendered subjects and subjectivities in vivo, 
between male and female speakers in the context of heterosexual 
relationships. Also, 'emotions', which had previously been engaged with only at 
a 'representational' level, were made available to analysis as instantiated and 
negotiated configurations of subject positions, social structures and power 
relations. These data, it was hoped, would allow a critical discursive 
psychological engagement with 'emotions' as systems of 'interpersonal 
communication' and as'relational' (De Rivera, 1984; Fridlund, 1991,1994; 
Parkinson, 1995; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Further, they would allow the 
analysis of 'emotions' at the 'local' level and as oriented to particular 'local' 
interactional concerns. 
The choice of episodes of 'anger as the focus of the analysis was informed by 
two primary considerations. The first was that'anger is often categorized as a 
'masculine' emotion (Fabes & Martin, 1991; Shields, 1987; see also chapter 4) 
and is theorized as constituting particular, sometimes gendered, social 
structures and power relations (Averill, 1982; Crawford, et aL, 1992: Shields, 
2002). For these reasons, episodes of 'anger seemed an appropriate site of 
enquiry. 
The second consideration was an effect of the choice of critical discursive 
psychology as the analytic method and the consequent requirement for 
interactions to be represented textually. Owing to the stated intention of the 
analysis to engage with 'emotions' in a 'performative' as well as 'discursive' 
sense, there was a resultant requirement for the extra-discursive features of 
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the interaction to be amenable to analysis, i. e., to be represented as text. Of all 
the interactions coded as'emotional episodes', those categorized as'episodes 
of anger had by far the most obvious paralinguistic features. Simply, the most 
obvious examples were selected for what was an exploratory attempt at 
developing a critical discursive psychological approach that was 
simultaneously attentive to the paralinguistic features and the discursive 
content of talk. 
The potential for poststructuralist discursive analyses to move beyond talk to 
other 'com mu n icative systems' is a challenge that must be met. One way by 
which this may be accomplished with regard to 'emotions' is through a more 
sophisticated transcription notation system that is informed by positivist 
approaches to the paralinguistic features of emotion (Banse & Scherer, 1996; 
Frick, 1985; Kappas, Hess & Scherer, 1991; Pittam & Scherer, 1993; Scherer, 
1986). Such a transcription notation system would allow the analysis of the 
relationship between the paralinguistic and discursive content of an interaction 
in a more detailed and sophisticated way than was possible in chapter 6. 
Within the excerpts analyzed in chapter 6, the paralinguistic features of talk, 
and occasionally non-verbal behaviours, that are interpretable as constituting 
the performance of 'angee are demonstrably occasioned by discursive acts of 
positioning. The paralinguistic features of talk are consequently interpreted as 
oriented to those acts of positioning. 'Doing angee is interpreted as a both a 
means of negotiating the rights of speakers to position others and as 
constitutive of individuals' 'affected' subjectivities. These 'affected 
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subjectivities', once paralinguistically constituted in talk, are available as topics 
to be oriented to either discursively or paralinguistically or through some other 
means of communication. In response to someone 'doing anger through 
shouting, an individual may either respond by shouting - reciprocally 'doing 
anger - respond in speech that is quieter than surrounding speech -'doing 
conciliatory' - or respond by saying 'What are you getting angry at me forT - 
constructing shouting as constitutive of the performance of anger. All are ways 
by which the negotiation of subject positions and right and duties may be 
negotiated through interactions categorized as episodes of 'anger'. 
Within chapter 6, 'anger' was identified as a resource that was equally 
available and equally invoked by both male and female speakers. 
Consequently, the functions served by'doing anger, in terms of constituting 
and ascribing subject positions and their locations within social structures and 
power relations were also available to both male and female speakers. The 
relational functions served by'doing anger, in terms of the constituting of a 
position of dominance within the interactional context and the consequent 
marginalization of the'other, were seen in one couple to benefit the female 
speaker - Nicola in excerpt 1- and to benefit the male speaker in the other - 
Victor in excerpts 2 and 3. 
This finding would present an interesting conundrum for an analyst operating 
from the top-down who might presuppose either that particular acts, such as 
'doing aggressive', or the occupation of particular positions in systems of 
power relations, for example positions of dominance, are already gendered. 
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Within such a framework, Nicola's acts and her occupation of a position of 
dominance within that interactional context might be interpreted as constituting 
the performance of 'masculinity'. This interpretation is based on the 
assumption that the direction of the flow of power is already known, i. e., that 
patriarchy is the social order and that dividends are paid to those individuals 
who 'do masculinity'. Such an interpretation and conceptualization of power 
has succumbed to the misleading 'metaphysics of external relations' (Butler, 
1993). 
Power, Butler argues, should be understood at the level of 'materiality' which 
'designates a certain effect of power or, rather, is power in its formative and 
constituting effects' (ibid., p. 34; emphasis in original). Within such a framework, 
power is evident in the 'materializing' of gendered bodies and of relationships 
between those bodies as a consequence of discursive interaction and 
negotiation. As a means by which relationships are discursively and 
interactionally negotiated between gendered speakers, 'emotions' are 
resources that are at least equally available to speakers of both genders and 
are flexible enough to constitute myriad configurations of power relations within 
discrete, local interactional contexts. Just as the subject positions, rights and 
obligations that are the basis for emotional 'expressions' may only have a 
dremote connection with culturally imposed rules and roles' (Parkinson, 1995, 
p. 1 62), so might the configurations of subject positions that result from 
emotional 'expressions'. 
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7.5 Conclusions 
This thesis started from concerns regarding the representation of the 
'inexpressive male', the idea that men's relationship with emotions was 
troubled and individually and socially problematic and the idea that this 
troubled and problematic relationship was normative. Across the thesis, men's 
relationship within emotions has been explored at discursive and ideological 
levels, through the constitution of a masculine subjectivity and as it is enacted 
and embodied in the interactions between gendered speakers. One consistent 
finding across the thesis is the extent to which the use of emotion discourses is 
either constructed as antithetical to the performance of masculinities or is 
absent from interactions in which emotions are being 'done'; men reportedly 
don't account for their selves in emotion terms and people don't necessarily 
reflexively index interactions as 'emotional' at the time of their occurrence. 
Whilst there is plenty of data within this thesis on the ways that men account 
for their'selves' and constitute masculine subjectivities through and relative to 
emotion discourses, those data were generated with fairly discrete, even 
contrived, interactional contexts. Consequently, the findings on how men may 
negotiate masculine subjectivities in focus group discussions on the topic of 
men and emotion or in therapy sessions through and relative to 'emotion 
discourses' should not be interpreted as generalizable to the ways by which 
men 'do emotions' and 'do masculinities' in the 'real world'. On this issue this 
thesis supports two courses of further research. 
The first is the development of critical discursive psychological analyses and 
transcription notation systems such that they are able to engage with 
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interactions that are interpretable as characterized by emotional episodes but 
from which the explicit use of emotion discourses is absent. Such an approach 
will allow greater understanding of the social functions served when men 'do 
emotions' and the implications of those functions for the constitution of 
masculine subjectivities. Importantly, the approach and the data that it might 
engage with will not be constrained by the required presence of 'emotion 
discourses', which should be accepted as potentially a dispreferred discursive 
resource for masculine speakers. 
The second course draws upon the finding that it is the social functions served, 
the subject positions constituted and their location within social structures and 
power relations that are determinate of whether a particular emotion discourse 
or form of emotional 'expression' accords with or is antithetical to the 
constitution of masculine subjectivities. Simply, by adopting an analytic 
approach that is sensitive to the social constitutive functions served by 
discourses, it may be possible to identify the discursive resources preferred by 
masculine speakers in the accomplishment and negotiation of subject positions 
and social relationships, which are similar in structure to those that may be 
constituted through emotion discourses or through particular forms of 
'emotional expression'. Essentially, I am suggesting looking for resources such 
as 'That'll do, pig'. 
Both the proposed courses of further research require the generation and 
collection of more 'real-life' data, but it is only through an engagement with the 
constitutive effects of language in vivo that we will reach satisfactory social 
404 
psychological answers to questions regarding men's relationship with 
emotions. Objects, such as men and emotions, are assigned meaning through 
discourse, but it is the social functions of those meanings that matter. 
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Appendix 1- Transcription notation system 
The form of notation used is based on a system developed by Jefferson 
(1985), a complete description of which can be found in Atkinson and Heritage 
(1984). Some basic features are outlined below: 
9 Square brackets mark overlap between utterances -[ 
9 An equals sign at the end of one speaker's contribution and at the start 
of another's indicates no discernible pause -= 
9A full stop within round brackets indicates a brief pause in the talk, both 
within one speakers utterance and between turns - (. ); numbers within 
round brackets denote the duration of longer pauses in seconds - (4.8) 
e One or more colons indicate the extension of the preceding vowel 
sound - e:: verybody 
* Underlining indicates those words said with particular emphasis, while 
words in upper case characters were said louder than the surrounding 
talk -a mean HARD rotten bastard 
9 Text within round brackets indicates that the speech was either 
inaudible or that there is doubt concerning its accuracy - (blibbing) 
* Empty square brackets indicate that some of the transcript has been 
omitted, whilst material in square brackets is clarificatory information 
about the talk - 
o[] well (blibbing) [crying] 
9 Material in italics is additional contextual information about the talk or 
interaction - group laughs 
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Appendix 2- Participant Information 
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University 
of Surrey 
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Telephone 
+44 (0)1483 300800 
Facsimile 
+44 (0)1483 300803 
www. surrey. ac. uk 
oheet 
Schoolof 
Human 
Sciences 
Department of 
Psychology 
Direct Facsimile 
+44 (0)1483 689553 
My name is Chris Walton and I am a Ph. D. student in the Department 
of Psychology at the University of Surrey. This study, and my research as a 
whole, is supervised by Dr. Adrian Coyle and Dr. Evanthia Lyons also of the 
Department of Psychology at the University of Surrey. 
What's this research about? 
The aim of the research is to study how men talk about emotions; what 
they describe as emotions and in what situations men say they experience 
emotions. The study is also interested in differences between men in how 
they talk about emotions. The reason for this interest is that, in recent years, a 
lot has been written (in books, magazines and'newspapers) about men and 
emotions. However, what is often missing from this writing is men talking 
about what emotions mean to them. This study will try to address this by 
getting lots of different men to talk about how they see emotions. 
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What will you have to do if you take part? 
Those men who volunteer for the study will be asked to take part in a 
group discussion with other men on the subject of men and emotions, followed 
by a group task and then finally another short group discussion about the task. 
All parts of the study will be led by the researcher, Chris Walton. It is estimated 
that, as a whole, the discussions and task will take about two hours, including 
breaks for refreshments. 
Will it hurt? 
Neither the group discussions nor the group task are thought likely to 
cause distress. Although the research focuses on emotions and men's talk 
about emotions, this does not mean that participants will be expected to reveal 
personal information about their own experiences of emotion. Participants will 
only be asked to talk about emotions on a level with which they are 
comfortable. If any participant feels uncomfortable at any stage during the 
discussions or group task, he is free to leave without having to give his 
reasons. 
What will happen to the information that I provide? 
The discussions and group task will be recorded on both audio and 
video tape, so that we have an accurate record of what was said. The audio 
recordings will be transcribed by the researcher; the video recordings will be 
used to provide additional information if necessary. In the transcripts, no real 
names will be used to identify the speakers; any other information which could 
reveal the identity of the men taking part in the research will be changed or left 
out. The transcripts will be analyzed and the research findings will be 
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presented in my Ph. D. thesis and in other research reports. These will include 
quotations from the transcripts. However, no one will be able to identify who 
produced these quotations, except the men who took part in the group from 
which the quotations were taken. 
Why should I take part and what good will this research do? 
On a personal level, talking about emotions and hearing other men talk 
about them might turn out to be an interesting and even beneficial experience. 
Taking part in the research may help you to understand more about your own 
emotions and about how other men see emotions. 
I also hope that the research will do something to help change the way 
that men's emotional lives are talked about and written about by people such 
as psychologists and sociologists, therapists and counsellors, doctors and 
journalists. This might even lead to developments in the way that men with 
emotional problems are dealt with by professional services. 
What if I have any further questions about the study? 
If you have any questions or problems arising from participation in the 
study you are welcome to contact the researcher, or his supervisors, at the 
address below. 
Contact Details: 
Chris Walton 
Department of Psychology 
University of Surrey 
Guildford GU2 7XH 
Tel. No. 01483686894 orat: C. Walton@surrey. ac. uk 
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Appendix 3- Consent Form for Participants 
The Social Construction of Men and Emotions 
Schoolof 
Human 
Sciences 
Department of 
Psychology 
Direct Facsimile 
+44 (0)1483 689553 
Please read the following statements and, if you are in agreement, sign where 
indicated. 
I acknowledge that the purpose of this research and the nature of my 
participation in this research have been explained to me to a level which I find 
satisfactory. 
I voluntarily agree to participate in the study and to comply with the 
requirements of the study. 
I also give my consent to both audio and video recordings being made of my 
participation in this study and to all or parts of said recordings being 
transcribed for the purposes of the research. 
I am aware of my rights as a participant in this study, that I have the right to 
withdraw from the study at any time without having to give a reason, that I can 
request that any information that I have provided be omitted from the research 
and that any information I provide will be treated in a confidential manner. 
Signed Date 
Name (Block Capitals) 
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On behalf of all those involved with this research project, I undertake that 
professional confidentiality will be assured with regard to any audio or video 
recordings of the above participant. That any audio or video recordings, or any 
transcribed material from those recordings, will be used for the purposes of 
research only. 
Signed Date 
Name (Block Capitals 
Witnessed by Date 
Name (Block Capitals) 
Participant Number 
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Appendix 4- Participant Demographic Information 
Sheet 
The Social Construction of Men and Emotions 
The information provided on this sheet will be held in the strictest confidence. 
Participant Number 
Age in years 
Please tick the appropriate box for the sections below. 
Sexuality 
Gay El 
Heterosexual m 
Bisexual El 
Other EJ 
Ethnicity 
White 
British F-1 
Irish 
Any other White background 
(please write in) 
Mixed 
White and Black Caribbean 171 
White and Black African r-1 
White and Asian r-I 
Any other Mixed background El 
(please write in 
Asian or Asian British 
Indian Fl 
Pakistani El 
Black or Black British 
Caribbean 
African 
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Bangladeshi 
Any other Asian background 
(please write in 
Chinese or other ethnic group 
Chinese 0 
Any other El 
(please write in) 
Highest attained educational level 
None EJ 
GCSE 0 
BTEC/GNVQ El 
A Levels/Highers/lB 
HNVQ 
Bachelors degree F1 
Masters degree FJ 
Doctorate n 
Post-Doctorate F1 
Any other Black background 
(please write in 
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Appendix 5- Interview Schedule 
Focus group discussions 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MEN AND EMOTIONS 
Study I 
The interview schedule is intended to facilitate the achievement of the below 
listed aims. 
1. To promote the use of 'emotion'words and discourses. 
2. To promote the negotiation of rights to use emotion words and discourses. 
3. To facilitate the negotiation of 'emotions' and 'subject positions' on both a 
social and individual level. 
The questions and prompts listed below represent only a brief outline of the 
potential lines of enquiry which may be pursued through the course of the 
group discussion. As such questions and prompts used in the discussion will 
not be limited to those listed here. Rather as the discussions proceed and 
other lines of enquiry arise further questions will be added and employed. 
The questions listed below are constructed to fulfil at least one of the aims and 
in most cases more than one. 
QUESTIONS AND PROMPTS 
Questions marked with an asterisk are starting questions; all others are 
possible follow up questions. 
General and Personal 
* What words or images spring to mind when someone talks about 'emotions'? 
Psychological studies of emotions typically list 5 or 6 basic emotions, 
happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and surprise. Do you think that's an 
accurate list? 
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Are there any experiences which you would describe as emotions that are 
missing from that list? 
Or are there things which you would remove from that list? 
What do you think the word 'emotions' refers to? 
* In your opinions what is it that makes a particular experience an emotion as 
opposed to anything else? 
Personal 
* Would you say emotions always have to be felt or are there occasions on 
which they are simply enacted? 
Would anybody here describe themselves as an 'emotional person'? 
Would anybody here describe themselves as an 'unemotional person'? 
In both instances, to what extent and in what ways? 
General 
* In society at large how do you think emotions are viewed, good things/bad 
things, valued or not, as signs of weakness or strength? 
(Prompts, depending on context, person etc. ) 
Personally do you view emotions in the same way? 
How much value, if any, do you personally place on emotions for yourself and 
for others? 
How much value, if any do you think emotions are accorded socially, on a 
general level? 
Constructions of masculinity and emotions 
* How would you describe a 'typical' man with regard to his emotional life? 
Do you think there are differences between men with regard to their emotional 
lives? 
If it has been reported that there are differences between men, do you think 
that differences in emotional behaviour between men of different ages are the 
products of generation gaps or changes over the life span? 
Social Expectations/Constraints 
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* Do you think there are social expectations about emotional behaviour, 
particularly displays of emotion? 
Do you think these expectations are different for different people? 
* Do you think there are any restrictions or controls placed on your emotional 
experiences expression? 
And across different contexts, scenarios and causes? 
For example, are there any situations in which a man should control his 
emotions? 
Are there any causes for which an emotional reaction is expected? 
In what contexts or for what reasons would you expect a man to show his 
feeling? 
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Appendix 6- Demographic information for participants 
in focus group discussions 
Group I/Transcript I 
Name Age Sexuality Ethnicity Educational 
Level 
Ray 41 Gay White British A level 
David 54 Gay White British NVQ3 
Jeff 21 Gay White British BTEC/GNVQ 
Alex 32 Gay White Irish Bachelors 
Eric 36 Gay White 
European 
descent 
Post-Doctorate 
Philip 31 Gay Asian or Asian 
British Indian 
Bachelors 
Group 2/Transcript 2 
Name Age Sexuality Ethnicity Educational 
Level 
John 22 Heterosexual White Maltese None 
Paul 27 Heterosexual White British GCSE 
Group 3/Transcript 3 
Name Age Sexuality Ethnicity Educational 
Level 
Vic 24 Heterosexual Mixed White Bachelors 
and Black 
Caribbean 
Bob 32 Heterosexual Mixed Masters 
Anglo/Chinese 
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Charlie 27 Heterosexual White British Masters 
Paul 32 Heterosexual White British Post -Doctorate 
Harry 22 Heterosexual White British Bachelors 
Tom 28 Heterosexual White British Doctorate 
Group 4/Transcript 4 
Name Age Sexuality Ethnicity Educational 
Level 
Cornelius 19 Heterosexual White British A levels 
Ruddiger 19 Heterosexual White British A levels 
Bruce 20 Heterosexual White British A levels 
Ed 22 Heterosexual White British BTEC/GNVQ 
Group 5/Transcript 5 
Name Age Sexuality Ethnicity Educational 
Level 
Matthew 46 Heterosexual White British Bachelors 
Mark 31 Heterosexual White British Bachelors 
Luke 55 Heterosexual White British None 
John 47 Heterosexual White British Bachelors 
Simon 44 Heterosexual White British Doctorate 
James 33 Heterosexual White British Bachelors 
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Group 6/Transcript 6 
Name Age Sexuality Ethnicity Educational 
Level 
Lawrence 20 Gay White British A levels 
Kieran 23 Gay White British A levels 
Dave 19 Gay White British A levels 
Ben 22 Gay White British Bachelors 
Xander 19 Gay White British A levels 
Group 7/Transcript 7 
Name Age Sexuality Ethnicity Educational 
Level 
Ian 38 Heterosexual White British HNVQ 
Rory 27 Heterosexual White British A levels 
Tony 37 Heterosexual White British GCSE 
Colin 37 Heterosexual White British None 
Graham 24 Heterosexual White British GCSE 
Neil 25 Heterosexual White British HNVQ 
Sam 19 Heterosexual Mixed White 
and Black 
Caribbean 
GCSE 
Paul 18 Heterosexual White British GCSE 
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Group 8/Transcript 8 
Name Age Sexuality Ethnicity Educational 
Level 
Maurice 39 Heterosexual Black Bachelors 
Caribbean 
Philip 37 Heterosexual Black Doctorate 
I Caribbean 
Carl 28 Heterosexual I Black African Masters 
Group 9/Transcript 9 
Name Age Sexuality Ethnicity Educational 
Level 
George 61 Heterosexual White British Masters 
Arthur 70 Heterosexual White British Bachelors 
James 67 Heterosexual White British Bachelors 
Richard 78 Heterosexual White British Bachelors 
John 68 Heterosexual White British Master 
David 70 Normal Married White English Bachelors 
Robert 74 Normal White British None 
Bob 72 Heterosexual White British School teacher 
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Appendix 7- Transcript 9 
14.2.02 
8 Participants 
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I Chris: so the first question erm which I would like to offer () is you were all 
2 invited to participate in (. ) a group discussion on the subject of men and 
3 emotions it's particularly the idea of emotions that we're interested in (. ) so if I 
4 were to ask what words or images sprung to mind when you thought about 
5 emotions what would they be? (3.2) 
6 James: I think it's feelings reactions to other people or situations that affect 
7 how one er reacts (2.2) 
8 Chris: ok (2.3) 
9 Robert: I should think fear 
10 Chris: = fear = 
11 Robert: = yeah hmm 
12 Chris: = so that that would be a very quite a specific emotion 
13 Robert: yeah yeah hmm = 
14 Arthur: I would think also apprehension 
15 Robert: apprehension yes yes hmm 
16 Arthur: or worry 
17 Robert: hmm = 
18 Arthur: though they're the same think I suppose 
19 Robert: yes though I think it's not quite the same as real fear 
20 Bob: =what have I let myself in for what type of emotion am I going to have 
21 to try and explain somewhere down the line'= 
22 Robert: = yeah yeah hmm = 
23 James: = you're speaking in terms of this situation ((Chris laughs)) rather than 
24 in a more general sense 
25 Bob: = oh yes = 
26 Chris: = well hopefully this isn't a situation which will evoke too much fear 
27 ((group laughs)) erm (. ) so we have fear as an example of one emotion there 
28 and we had the idea that emotions were feelings = 
29 Richard: =II would think of erm er (1 . 4) no n-rational er reactions or reactions 
30 which you cannot (1) easily control by reason erm by er operation of your own 
31 hh reason faculties = 
32 John: = agreed in both cases (. ) absolutely 
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33 James: =I think love is another emotion which can be very strong indeed 
34 Chris: = particularly important today = 
35 John: = sadness joy isn't there there's lots of them 
36 Bob: =I mean wasn't it a coincidence that this happened to be on February 
37 fourteenth ((group laughs)) = 
38 Chris: = yeah it was (. ) erm so we had lots of examples of particular emotions 
39 there er one of the interesting features I'm sorry er one of the things I ought to 
40 do is shut this door properly which I forgot to do and the other thing which 1 
41 also forgot to do is ask you all to introduce yourselves erm which was awfully 
42 er (. ) remiss of me so could we just do that and then we'll go from there 
43 James: = James 
44 Robert: = Robert &oughs)) excuse me Robert 
45 David: = David = 
46 Richard: = Richard 
47 John: = John 
48 George: = George 
49 - Arthur: = Arthur 
50 Bob: = Bob = 
51 Chris: = Chris Walton (. ) ok one of the things that you mentioned was the idea 
52 of emotions being different erm non-rational I think was the word that you 
53 used erm could you explain what you mean by that? = 
54 Richard: = erm well I went on to say erm I did use the word non-rational 
55 perhaps mistakenly hh bu- er I went on by way of correction I would say to er 
56 suggest that (1.4) it's a reaction that you're not completely in control of 
57 ' Chris: = ok = 
58 Richard: = that was what er would be a better way of putting it (3) 
59 Bob: I was thinking not erm (-) completely anyway I wouldn't say (. ) not 1 
60 wouldn't say you're not necessarily in control but you're not (. ) always in 
61 , control of the situation not all the way down the line sometimes I think you 
62 maybe in control of one's emotions (. ) other times (. ) things happen 
63 unexpectedly and how does one react a different type of emotion I think on 
64 that one some you can predict almost or you can carry on with but others = 
65 Richard: well by my way of thinking [I wo]uld disagree with you on that point 
66 Bob: yeah 
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67 Richard: because I think as far as emotions are concerned hh they are part of 
68 ones er err hhh. (2.5) 1 can't think of the word now but I keep coming back to 
69 this idea of you're not being in complete control of yourself if you go into a film 
70 for instance and it is er particularly moving you might be moved to tears now 
71 you don't want to be moved to tears at least I certainly don't I know some 
72 people go to the cinema for that sort of catharsis I don't erm I rather resent 
73 that and erm I find that an example of my emotions taking over which is not 
74 what I like = 
75 Bob: = what I was saying was if I then went to that film a second time I would 
76 be anticipating that emotion and I know how I'd be reacting (and I'd act) 
77 slightly differently = 
78 Richard: = well yes 
79 James: = of course there are situations where it is necessary and essential 
80 indeed that you do actually controlt your emotions erm road-rage ((sounds of 
81 acknowledgement from group)) if somebody does something particularly 
82 annoying erm you have to er force yourself sometimes not to:: react er and 
, 83 the temptation to react is an emotional response and you have to apply your 
84 reason to not do it = 
85 David: =I mean to some extent you're (. ) erm as youngsters told more or less 
86 to suppress your emotions I mean for instance 'boy's don't cry' was a 
87 common one = 
88 James: = that's a thought that occurred to me when this was (. ) proposed was 
89 that er we or certainly 1 feel I come from an age where er the stiff upper lip 
90 was the thing and er you were not encouraged to be demonstrative in your 
91 emotions at all in fact it was hh in some ways considered to be unmanly = 
92 John: = yes that was the who:: Ie point of much of the traditional sort of prep 
93 and public school education and erm I think as a result one does tend to grow 
94 up at least hh externally = 
95 Arthur: = yep I was brought up in that 
96 Bob: = we cover our emotions 
97 John: = exactly exactly = 
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98 Arthur: =I think it's made me more introverted than I might otherwise have 
99 been I mean to suppress emotions an- and er cope particularly at boarding 
100 school with situations on my own as it were (. ) 
101 Bob: are you suggesting that people are more extrovert these days? 
102 Arthur: =I don't know = 
103 Bob: =I just you know I was thinking then about our dear friend Flintock for 
104 taking his shirt off ((group laughs)) which we would never have done in our 
105 time would we you can imagine what people would think = 
106 John: = yes all that stuff about the captain's hand on his shoulder (inaudible) 
107 quite quite foreign ((laughing)) (4-7) 
108 Chris: you talked about the perhaps the need to control the expression of 
109 emotions in particular situations erm and we had anger cited as one example 
110 do you think there would be any other situations in which you would be 
111 expected to control the expression of your emotions (4.5) 
112 Robert: if you're in charge of people I'm thinking in terms of erm I'm not a 
113 military person but I'm thinking in terms of a military (. ) commander who's in 
114 charge of men in battle hh he must not show fear he must keep a stiff upper 
115 lip mustn't he? = 
116 George: if you know you're sending people to get killed 
117 Robert: yes yes and [he mustn't (express) his fear] 
118 George: it must be a strange emotion to have actually 
119 Robert: sorry? = 
120 George: it must be a terrible thing to have 
121 Robert: yes absolutely = 
122 George: = to know that [you'r]e sending people in to battle [and ch]ances are 
123 that 
124 Robert: oh yes yes yes 
125 George: ten percent of those are [not] going to come back = 
126 Robert: yes yes that's true 
127 George: are you prepared to take that decision? 
128 Robert: yes exactly (2.5) 
129 John: yes I think Montgomery erm says something about it er in his in his 
130 writings and he erm and he himself did was very concerned not to predict 
131 anything but erm a sort of cocky optimism but I think he he he says that that 
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132 sort of (. ) thing was amongst the most sort of terrible thing he had to do to 
133 conquer that (3.7) 
134 Bob: back again unfortunately on to public school deliberately tried to teach 
135 you to cover up those sort of emotions 
136 John: = hmm (1.5) 
137 Robert: to prepare you for battle ((group laughs)) 
138 Bob: = or life generally 
139 Robert: = well yes (4) 
140 Chris: where what (. ) the need to control the emotions or the requirement the 
141 emotions in that way what functions does it serve (. ) what does it (. 7) why 
142 would you need to? (2.2) 
143 James: well fear is an emotion which communicates itself between people 
144 Chris: = hmm = 
145 James: = if you're erm leading er again I'm thinking military situations you're 
146 leading a group of (. ) men or perhaps ladies even these days in into er a 
147 dangerous situation if you want them to come with you (. ) erm you really ýo 
148 need to encourage them to believe that theyought to do it (. ) and that 
149 therefore er (. ) to communicate your fear to them er in the beginning there's a 
150 good chance that they'll say'it's not for me' 
151 Chris: = hmm = 
152 John: = it's almost a sort of opposition isn't it duty versus emotion or or if you 
153 like efficiency versus emotion = 
154 Chris: =a requirement to do the job 
155 John: =indeed = 
156 Chris: = but I mean that's partic- with particular regard to fear I mean we've 
157 talked about that you can control anger and also (. ) Eric mentioned also boys 
158 don't cry what what value or function would there be = 
159 George: =I think it possibly to embarrass others if you're too overtly emotional 
160 it can make a situation uncomfortable for other people so I think that's one of 
161 the factors = 
162 Richard: = also erm building on that point erm a demagogue can get er 
163 emotions roused in other people in effect that is his object is it not? 
164 John: = yep = 
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165 Richard: = and er er this ca- could be done in a beneficial way or an 
166 unpleasant way depending upon what his motives were (2.1) so I think that's 
167 a point worth considering 
168 Chris: = that? = 
169 Bob: = to an extent that applies to Afghanistan doesn't it with all the problems 
170 they've had out there with September and everything else how one was able 
171 to must have been able to control those people's minds 
172 Richard: = yes = 
173 Bob: = to such an extent that they would go out and they would you know 
174 commit suicide and they would fly those planes into it knowing that they were 
175 going to be (. ) you know going to be killed as a result what sort of power has 
176 that sort of person got you know to change those peoples emotions (. ) but 
177 their normal emotion would be fear to do it in the first place so you'd have to 
178 override that sort of fear haven't you to drive people to it (. ) I think they're 
179 more guilty myself sometimes the people who ((group laughs at inaudible 
180 comment)) work on people to convince them that they're doing the right thing 
181 you know = 
182 John: = so perhaps the traditional tr- er training to suppress one's emotions is 
183 a is a er failure in training one to resist that kind of manipulation 
184 Bob: = maybe (2.5) 
185 David: yes I think controlling your emotions is is purely for yo- for your own 
186 safety in those cases isn't it whether er it's a er a pan of fat that's on fire you 
187 can't sort of say'what the hell' (if you like) you've got to act calmly and do 
188 something about it same as a ship under attack or something like that it's no 
189 use throwing your hands in the air you've got to respo- respond very calmly to 
190 the to the danger that's around you = 
191 James: = yes there's also the aspects connected with what you might call the 
192 laddish culture (. ) how men in company are expected to behave (. ) you know 
193 sort of being all soppy cissy. hh erm is likely to attract a lot of scorn from your 
194 peers so that if you did feel particularly sad about something that they were all 
195 pouring scorn on you hh would er suppress your true feelings so that you 
196 didn't stand out from the crowd = 
197 Chris: = that er that was going to be linked into a question that I was going to 
198 ask = 
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199 James: = oh sorry ((group laughs)) = 
200 Chris: = no it's ok 'cause it does lead into it erm it the idea that there is a 
201 requirement to control the expression of emotions begs the question where 
202 does that requirement come from? 
203 James: = hmm = 
204 Chris: = and you've cited perhaps male company as being one source 
205 James: = yes there is that = 
206 Chris: = so would there be any others (. ) and what would the others be? 
207 Bob: =I think it's in one's upbringing it seems to develop in school and 
208 perhaps in one's family (. ) looking at how other people behave (. ) following 
209 their example there are sort of social pressures I think like = 
210 George: =I think there may be a feeling that emotions are fairly private and 
211 that er they should be sort of kept that way except for er special occasions 1 
212 suppose erm people are fairly happy at a wedding and and when you go to a 
213 funeral you know people feel that they can if you like give vent to their 
214 emotions and it's quite natural so I think it's fairly = 
215 Bob: =I think it's a very good thing that one can give vent to your emotions at 
216 times = 
217 George: = yeah sure 
218 Bob: = and to suppress them (. ) there are times when it can be completely 
219 wrong to suppress your emotions 
220 George: = yes = 
221 Bob: = but that's something you only learn from experience 
222 Arthur: I think that if you do have a loss of any kind then then you have to go 
223 through a sort of mourning stage and er = 
224 Bob: = erm there are emotions when I hit that golf ball sometimes ((group 
225 laughs)) = 
226 Arthur: usually suppressed 
227 James: now we're back to anger aren't we ((group laughs)) or joy 
228 Arthur: depends again on the company you're keeping doesn't it who you're 
229 playing with at the time whether it's a mixed match or whether it an all men 
230 we're back to the all men again (2.7) 
231 Richard: there could be occasions where not to display er emotions could be 
232 considered offensive [are]n't there that's probably what you were saying = 
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George: yes 
Arthur: 
yes = 
Chris: = or inappropriate = 
Richard: = sorry = 
Chris: = or inappropriate = 
Richard: = or inappropriate yes 
Chris: because there is a certain (. ) er value in not being perceived as 
unemotional = 
Richard: =I suppose so yes (. ) well unfeeling you see (2.6) 
Chris: do you think there's a difference between those ((laughs from group)) 
between unemotional and unfeeling 
Bob: =I was going to say that = 
Richard: = in in it's a question of appearance isn't it [you ]see 
Bob: [yeah] 
Chris: yeah or experience and 
expression (. ) would that be a way of 
Richard: = hmm = 
Chris: = that it (. ) unfeeling implies that you don't actually experience the 
emotion whereas unemotional perhaps relates to not actually expressing it 
Richard: = well the observer [can't] necessarily tell = 
Chris: yeah = exactly 
Richard: = what you're (. ) (actually) experiencing = 
James: = that's right isn't it because if you are unemotional you're liable to be 
accused of being unfeeling = 
George: = definitely yes (3.9) 
Chris: ok (1.5) and unfeeling is not desirable either 
James: = well it depends on the situation doesn't it I mean sometimes erm 
accusing somebody of being unfeeling is is meant to be a criticism isn't it or I 
should think most often it is because whoever is issuing that remark thinks 
that you should be showing more emotion than you are 
John: = as with the Diana (. ) business two years ago ((group laughs)) 
James: = oh well ((group laughs)) mass hysteria = 
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266 John: = outpouring of grief (. ) well the Queen was accused widely of being 
267 unfeeling because she apparently showed little emotion erm (1.5) 
268 Chris: = she didn't tap in to the mood of the nation and she was insensitive to 
269 the mood of the nation (1.6) it's an interesting scenario that one because I'm 
270 something of a cynic anyway and and did sort of regard it as perhaps mass 
271 hysteria and that the Queens reaction almost seemed reasonable that it the 
272 public perception and the public reaction was extreme in a way that had had 
273 not been seen previously 
274 James: = true = 
275 Bob: = it built up on itself it got more and more and it was egged on by the 
276 press as well = 
277 Arthur: well that's right 
278 James: well yes and the BBC (. ) yes it was really I think the most 
279 extraordinary phenomenon erm and er it seems to have gone on from there 
280 because now commonly if when at the sites of street accidents you find 
281 people leaving bunches flowers don't you and I was never conscious of that 
282 occurring before erm you know the Dutch flower industry has a sort of field 
283 day ((group laughs)) = 
284 John: = ohh there were an awful lot after the Clapham rail disaster which took 
285 place right opposite the school I was hh teaching at and that little spot was 
286 absolutely heaped heaped up with [with flow]ers and so on 
287 David: we've had we've had 
288 flowers up by where we live (. ) going back twenty years there used to be a 
289 spot where there were road accidents regularly people getting at least one 
290 person a year being killed = 
291 James: =I guess I'm unobservant ((group laughs)) (inaudible) 
292 David: = yes exactly = 
293 Bob: = it does seem (so much) in the last few years 
294 James: = yes = 
295 Chris: = it was interesting watching the news last week with the death of 
296 Princess Margaret and that there was people who were trying to draw 
297 comparisons between the public mood in in reaction to her death as opposed 
298 to Diana's = 
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299 Arthur: =I think if Margaret had died in her thirties instead of in her seventies 
300 the reaction would have been very different (. ) 
301 Richard: there does seem to be a erm connection between racial origin and er 
302 er emotion or at least er demonstration of emotion 
303 Chris: = hmm = 
304 Richard: = er I don't know if it's a matter er worth considering 
305 John: = yes Latins are hot and all the rest of us are cold ((group laughs)) 
306 ((Comments from other group members inaudible for 10.1 sec. owing to 
307 laughter)) 
308 Richard: well it's a matter that I'm I'm interested in because erm I used to do 
309 quite an amo- an amount of travelling and er I eventually finished up er with 
310 the view that erm human beings are very much the same the world over er 
311 and if there are differences they're culturally induced differences rather than 
312 er possibly er racially or genetically induced but that's purely a personal view 
313 
314 Bob: =I think that's very true though yes I think that's what you were saying 
315 there there is everybody's basically the same I think it's just the way we have 
316 over the centuries been developing you know that sort of education training 
317 whatever it might be that general general upbringing where the other people 
318 haven't but I think basically people are the same (. ) when it comes down to it 
319 we've got the emotions but we've been trained so trained in the past 
320 indoctrinated I was going to say as well 
321 Arthur: = the Latin races = 
322 Bob: = not not to show them whereas they are up and dancing straight away 
323 James: =I don't know how you can tell really (. ) whether it's socially induced 
324 or genetically because er I mean for instance you see a sort of middle Eastern 
325 funeral there's all this wailing [sobbing] rending of garments et cetera er you 
326 say'well 
327 Bob: oh yes 
328 James: that's the way they are' now is that because it is er the done thing in 
329 that country to show emotion or is it because it's inbreed into that race (. ) how 
330 do you know? = 
331 Bob: = well I don't really know I'm making a few surmises I think maybe down 
332 the line = 
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333 John: I thouqht it was a sort of cultural cultural ritualization thing 
334 Bob: yes yes = 
335 James: = do you think if you went and lived in Italy for ten years you'd become 
336 a sort of very excitable ((group laughs)) 
337 Bob: = you'd do as other people did 
338 Arthur: = it'd take longer than that = 
339 Bob: = otherwise they'd think you hadn't got any feelings 
340 Chris: = it does beg the question if it is social at what point do you become 
341 socialised into behaving in that way and is it from that point on is it fixed can it 
342 change if you went and lived in another country would you change your 
343 patterns of behaviour = 
344 James: = yes I think that's right you have to be brought up that way (. ) can 
345 you change in later life I don't know = 
346 Bob: =I don't think you would change that much actually I think your 
347 children's children might change more than you yourself it would take more 
348 than your lifetime to er settle into that sort of environment (. ) 
349 Chris: = do you think this could be answered in a personal way or a general 
350 one but I would say hh do you think perhaps from your own perspectives 
351 men do change over their life span? 
352 Richard: = as opposed to females? = 
353 Chris: = er well I suppose people whether or not there is any difference do you 
354 think people change with regard to emotions or or men or women? (2.6) 
355 Arthur: I think you can be changed by a (. ) difference in situation I think when 
356 you get married I think that can change you (. ) quite considerably ((chuckles 
357 from group)) for better or worse so I think you do react to situations in the 
358 environment but er right to the core I suppose you're not fundamentally 
359 changed = 
360 Bob: = fundamentally I don't think it changes at all (. ) I feel I'm exactly the 
361 same as I was (. ) er sixty years ago er in the way of the emotions I have it's 
362 just that certain ones have now been I've learned to maybe suppress them or 
363 bring them out at certain times hh but I think what I was born with virtually 
364 has been I'm still the same 
365 John: = hh I'm not so sure (2.2) 1 think (. ) fo:: r many years as a young man 1 
366 used to su- suffer from periodic hh erm extreme depressions erm (. ) whi:: ch 
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367 hh. don't seem to have recurred withi:: n you know the erm second half of my 
368 life (5.7) possibly simi- similarly the peaks of elation ((group laughs)) have 
369 disappeared as well = 
370 Bob: = (or the pleasure) 
371 David: = ((coughs)) I mean a young erm a young boy of five or something it's 
372 obvious when he is very excited you can recognise it instantly but erm I still 
373 think you can get quite just as excited throughout life but you just don't don't 
374 show it sort of conceal it again it's probably that we've learnt it's not the thing 
375 to hh run around maniacally ((laughing)) = 
376 Bob: = the emotions are still there I think it's just that we don't show them so 
377 much = 
378 James: = well that's right I think one of the things you actually learn as you 
379 grow up is is to control your emotions 
380 David: = [yes] 
381 Bob: oh yes 
382 Richard: = very much so that's the point I was going to make an emotion is 
383 the result of an external stimulus of some sort is it not? and as we've got older 
384 erm the erm amount to which we react to these stimuli erm diminishes I would 
385 say and so it is (. ) so it is a er an age related matter = 
386 George: but is that natural or one of sort of deliberate control 
387 James: yeah that was my point too does does the er 
388 George: yeah does maturity = 
389 James: does the erm reducing reaction to emotion arise from the erm erm 
390 you know a less susceptibility erm the need to have a stronger dose to 
391 produce the same emotion or is it due to the fact that you've learned to resist 
392 it to control it more as you the older you get = 
393 Arthur: =I think it's a bit of both I think you get set in your ways [I think you get 
394 more confidence [through experience [you're not so worried about what other 
395 people think [I think you're more more your own man 
396 James: = hmm = 
397 George: =a growing sense of self-confidence you don't quite worry quite so 
398 much what you say ((group laughs)) = 
399 Bob: = you feel you can say what you like sometimes 
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400 Chris: = it's interesting that you should say that because it (. ) it sounds (. ) you 
401 talked about the fact that generally you learn through your life to control 
402 emotions more and yet you've just talked about self-confidence that you can 
403 have to to express emotions in ways that you're comfortable with and and 
404 these two sound perhaps a little contradictory (. ) can it work such that you 
405 would throughout the course of your life span ggLin sufficient confidence to 
406 express emotions more openly = 
407 James: = no I think it's it's it's not that at all I think that erm you become more 
408 confident in your opinions and you're more willing to them hh due to a 
409 number of factors I mean the fact that you don't have to keep in the boss's 
410 good books ((group laughs)) may have something to do with it er there's also 
411 the fact that you grow to have greater confidence in your own judgements that 
412 you know what you can get away with and what you can't which is erm based 
413 on experience of similar situations in the past I would think so there are a 
414 number of different factors aren't there and I don't think that you can actually 
415 er put this sort of growing confidence or growing willingness to have your say 
416 down to any single factor 
417 Chris: = ok (3.7) 
418 Bob: apart from age 
419 James: = well yes (. ) well that's right yes you get these old people who erm 
420 talk very loudly about somebody within their hearing and you wonder whether 
421 ((group laughs)) they just don't care you know 
422 Bob: = (inaudible) = 
423 Chris: erm we talked earlier about expectations of people to express or control 
424 their emo- the expression of their emotions in particular ways erm stiff upper 
425 lip and the kind of traditional way of behaving being one of them erm do you 
426 think that those hold true (. ) today do you think that is still the way that people 
427 are recommended to do emotions to behave emotionally? (2.1) 
428 Arthur: well I think much less than when I was growing up I think there's erm 
429 (. ) just looking around I think people do express their emotions more than 
430 would have been the case fifty years ago I think there's been a lot or perhaps 
431 education as well to say that it's bad to suppress emotion it's good to er let 
432 things come out so I think we do live in a rather different situation now than 
433 say fifty years ago 
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434 John: = yes it's been suggested several times hasn't it that education 
435 particularly primary education has been feminized and I think that that what 
436 you've just been describing is perhaps part of that whether it whether it's an 
437 accurate term er other than in the sense that the vast majority of primary 
438 school teachers are in fact women er II don't know (4.7) 
439 James: yes well that and single parent families I suppose a lack of a male role 
440 model amongst other things but I'm inclined to think that er the 
441 , encouragement to show more emotion (rather than) actively ý Liscouraged to 
442 show emotion is er I think we can blame psychologists to some extent 
443 ((chuckles from group)) erm this whole idea that letting it all hang out is is 
444 good for you seems to be an idea that is generated by psychologists ((group 
445 laughs)) = 
446 Chris: = I'll no I'll not try to defend that ((group laughs)) 
447 James: = no comment 
448 Chris: = no though in private I might venture that I agree with you ((group 
449 laughs)) it is it is an interesting idea it's primarily one of the reasons that I was 
450 interested in performing this research is that there seems to be an expectation 
451 (. ) or there are expected ways for people to behave and that those do seem to 
452 be changing = 
453 James: = (inaudible) 
454 George: = the young today don't sort of grow up in the same atmosphere well 
455 atmosphere's probably the wrong word but the same expectation if you like 
456 that that strongly held views of of what is right and what is wrong there seems 
457 to be much more er willingness to sacrifice other people to the self er (. ) today 
458 than there was in the past = 
459 Bob: = is that right or wrong? 
460 George: =I [don't know] 
461 Bob: funny question but ((coughs)) who are we to say? 
462 George: = absolutely but erm (. ) 
463 Bob: I mean what would our parents have said would they have said the same 
464 conversations do you think? 
465 George: = I've no idea = 
466 
- 
Bob: = ((laughing)) no I don't know either 
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467 John: =I know my grandparents would have found it quite impossible to 
468 discuss anything on this sort of level [at all] I'm not so sure about my parents 
469 [but ce]rtainly 
470 Bob: oh yes no no 
471 John: my grand parents ((inaudible for period of 9.1 sec. owing to laughter and 
472 number of voices)) 
473 Bob: I think they would have strongly have disapproved of quite a lot of things 
474 
475 George: = would they yes I think they would have felt that the rules have 
476 relaxed and that since then = 
477 Bob: = certainly the idea of living with people now rather instead of getting 
478 married I'm sure I think they would have strongly disapproved (. ) mind you we 
479 may have done as well ((group laughs)) 
480 Roger: = much good it did us 
481 Bob: = it didn't do any good = 
482 Richard: = ((coughs)) the thing about emotions it's just occurred to me is that 
483 erm emotions are completely unconnected with morals I would say whereas 
484 er or on the other hand most er (1.5) forms of human activity or (2.1) er 
485 matters concerning human activity are very much connected with morals 
486 George: = but the control of emotions is very much connected with morals 
487 - (2.6) 
488 Richard: I'm not quite sure whether that's what I mean er no it isn't what 1 
489 mean no it isn't what I meant no but I'm I'm not talking about control [morals 
490 ]er emotions at 
491 George: no sure 
492 Richard: = all I'm talking about (. ) emotions which appear in one's self and 
493 which I said right at the start I don't like (. ) too much erm (3.0) it seems to me 
494 that this makes er emotions rather different from other human er er 
495 ý experiences because they're completely con- unconnected with erm as I say 
496 morals = 
497 Arthur: = morals erm imply a judgement we make erm emotions are a reaction 
498 which you can't control much more difficult (. ) but to er act on moral behaviour 
499 er a moral that's a judgement you make yourself = 
500 Richard: = yeah but morals are to some extent imposed upon one 
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501 Arthur: yeah but you either accept them or you don't = 
502 George: = either willingly or unwillingly ((group laughs)) 
503 John: = yes I suppose Neal has a lot of to say about that from his educational 
504 , experiment at summer hill ((voices in background and sound of door opening 
505 as Q leaves room)) = 
506 Richard: =I don't know this 
507 John: = it it it's worth getting hold of a copy if you can find it still in print hh it's 
508 just called Summer Hill and er I think I think it would interest you (. ) 
509 Chris: sorry erm it's an interesting idea because if emotions are divorced from 
510 morality (1.2) well then (2.4) they are as you say a different class of behaviour 
511 aren't they it's to react in a way which (1.4) is not necessarily moral er and for 
512 that it means I suppose that they can do very different things if somebody's 
513 behaving emotionally erm it has particular effects and you can't you can't 
514 make the assumption that they're actually behaving in a moral way then 
515 Richard: = sorry I missed that bit = 
516 Chris: = it's an sorry I'm trying I'm just trying to work it out for myself (. ) what 
517 the effect would be erm if if emotions are divorced from morality 
518 Richard: = hmm 
519 Chris: = erm because it means that their that their impact socially er is not one 
520 in which morals are important and therefore they're likely to do very different 
521 things erm it's it's ano- it's a different way of actually thinking about why 
522 people behave in particular ways they're not behaving morally they're 
523 behaving emotionally and that will (. ) will do different things 
524 Richard: = well there have been cultures 
525 Chris: = yeah = 
526 Richard: = er where erm (. ) c-c-certain behaviour is excused because it was 
527 er assumed that they individual was er under an emotional 
528 Chris: = hmm 
529 Richard: = er er stress at the time I'm not talking about sort of things that 
530 happen in England but erm I believe I'm right in saying that erm murder [in 
531 so]me cultures 
532 Chris: hmm 
533 Richard: is perfectly excused on the grounds of er the emotional stress that 
534 the individual was er experiencing at the time 
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535 Chris: =a crime of passion being the classic French example isn't? 
536 Arthur: = it can arise in English law too = 
537 Richard: = well yes yes speaking as a lawyer I'm afraid it can ((group laughs)) 
538 yes = 
539 John: = or the Sicilian feud I suppose ((sound of door opening and Q 
540 returning)) = 
541 Chris: = an- and what it does is it excuses behaviour that if something is an 
542 emotion results from an emotion then it means that that behaviour is well yeah 
543 excu:: sed so emotions as expressions do particular things for people to 
544 behave in an emotional way is to perhaps to excuse erm the way that you 
545 behaved = 
546 Robert: = is excused the same as understanding? 
547 Arthur: = ((laughing)) that's a good question = 
548 Robert: = you can understand the why of something but you can't excuse 
549 someone = 
550 Chris: = that's true 
551 Robert: = from doing it I don't know 
552 Arthur: = I mean I think road rage was mentioned before that's that's an 
553 emotional reaction but then the moral situation comes in 
554 Chris: = hmm = 
555 Arthur: = which means you should try and control it (. ) and that's the second 
556 stage isn't it = 
557 George: = there are times when you can understand why ((group laughs)) 
558 David: = teenagers who can ((coughs)) sort of set fire to the toilets in the 
559 school get very excited about that but erm hh they're they're not quite so 
560 pleased er a few wee- well the next day or so when they get expelled from 
561 school and hh the emotions must be the opposite way and (7.2) 
562 Chris: we've talked erm in very general ways erm about emotions an- and 
563 people and obviously the subject of of my research is concerned specifically 
564 with men and emotions and it may be the case that we've been talking about 
565 men to to the greatest extent with regard to emotions but I would (. ) my 
566 question is is then (. ) do you think there are differences between people and, 
567 obviously the simplest class of difference is gender er with regard to emotions 
568 and the erm rules that govern erm emotional expression particularly? (2.7) 
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569 Bob: we always say that women are more emotional than men (. ) whether 
570 they are or not or is it they just appear to show it more then the men do 
571 (inaudible) in education I'm not quite certain we always do (. ) you were talking 
572 interestingly about the er the primary schools and the effects of having all 
573 female (. ) people in there teachers in there hh I was just wondering actually 
574 you know has anybody ever thought what effect that's going to have or been 
575 able to measure what effect that's had (. ) or could have shall we say over fifty 
576 years or whatever the period might be that we could do a judgement on it 
577 whether it would effect (. ) I don't know = 
578 Arthur: =I think it must have some effect mustn't it I think there is a desire to 
579 have more male teachers in primary school [level to] balance it out so I don't 
580 know 
581 Bob: oh yes 
582 Arthur: whether studies have been done it's obviously a fruitful area to study 
583 John: = well educational psychologists look at this I believe this is a problem 
584 that concerns them it's the lack of male role models for little boys erm but 
585 because this is not my topic but erm you hear about it so erm obviously er it is 
586 suspected that it has some effect = 
587 Bob: =I think it certainly has an effect on the (. ) on the sports side or the 
588 games side = 
589 John: = hmm 
590 Bob: = if you haven't got that's where they need the man to talk them out 
591 there and you know have a game of football or whatever it might be or rugby 
592 or whatever they are doing which you wouldn't get from the female now are 
593 they loosing something by not having that 
594 John: = hmm = 
595 Bob: =I don't know 
596 James: = well you know does it not also extend to the emotional field as well 
597 as the football field 
598 Bob: = hmm = 
599 James: = erm that er little boys don't see how men react emotionally to 
600 circumstances an- = 
601 Arthur: = I think it's even more the case now with single parent families so that 
602 home = 
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603 James: = [hmm 
604 Bob: hmm = 
605 Arthur: = that the little boy just has a mother in many cases and at school it 
606 almost primary school teachers are most of them are women where does he 
607 get the male input? = 
608 Jarnes: = that's it I mean I think that's the problem they look at isn't it or to see 
609 if there is a problem I suppose is a fairer way of putting it = 
610 John: = of course er it's a whooping great generalisation isn't it ((group 
611 laughs)) to pose half the human race against the other half [though like most 
612 questions] 
613 Richard: it's like most questions 
614 John: there's something in it sorry are women more emotional than men to 
615 answer to your question erm (1.5) 
616 James: how do you tell? I mean yes certainly some women (. ) would appear 
617 to be more emotional than some men hh you know and some of them aren't 
618 erm but it is a socially. hh accepted norm that women will show emotions and 
619 are expected to behave in a certain way and so they dot and the same thing 
620 with men they're expected not to show hh a lot of emotion and therefore they 
621 strive not to = 
622 Arthur: = hmm yes (1.9) 
623 George: that's true (. ) but how much is due to the expectation? 
624 James: = yeah well that's er [that what ]we're expecting to be able to sort out 
625 ((group 
626 Brian ((laughing)) 
627 James: laughs)) = 
628 Chris: that's what these sessions are for 
629 David: you might be better off standing in the Friary site ((local shopping 
630 centre)) and watching ((laughs)) a thousand and I think this is partly the 
631 trouble isn't it that I mean er we haven't been married a thousand times which 
632 is about what you need for a statistical sample isn't it? = 
633 James: = so there's also the question of er er I wonder how many of us take 
634 Beta-blockers like I do and fo- for er blood pressure and how much that 
635 suppresses the emotions (. ) it certainly seems to = 
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636 John: = well that's why Joe Werbernuik ((BN Werbeniuk)) took it the snooker 
637 player wasn't it? = 
638 James: = oh right ((group laughs)) well that's 'cause he used to get the shakes 
639 
640 John: = ye(h h)s yes (3) no it wasn't he took pints and pints of lager 
641 James: = same same thing ((group laughs)) well that's a question that you 
642 haven't posed is the effect of er al- alcohol on emotions hh (. ) if if for instance 
643 you're you're in the company of several people and one of them is far more 
644 drunk than the rest hh erm his behaviour and I suppose it's his emotional 
645 behaviour is very tiresome to the other people = 
646 George: = oh er I agree there's nothing worse is there than you being the 
647 sober one = 
648 James: = hmm 
649 Bob: = and listening to other people talking ((laughs)) 
650 Chris: = is that the idea of the emotional drunk then? 
651 James: = YEss yes = 
652 John: = tired and emotional ((laughs)) 
653 James: = yes so that er (. ) I supp- yes you know it's not just the how powerful 
654 the emotional stimulus is that. hh how much emotion you (. ) show it's er due 
655 to a number of factors such as the amount of (. ) alcohol in your blood stream 
656 
657 Richard: = yes just as you can have erm changes in erm emotional response 
658 because of drugs you can have emotional response (. ) change because of 
659 injury er brain injury and er (4.7) deliberate erm surgical = 
660 John: = lobotomy yeah = 
661 Richard: = yes thank you er s-s-surgical er (1.4) erm work (5.9) 
662 Arthur, but er I mean coming back to to women being more emotional I mean 
663 they certainly seem to think (. ) er in different ways than men they've they er 
664 certainly seem to be able to:: (. ) do multi-tasks if you like all at the same time 
665 to a much greater extent than possibly men can 
666 James: yes I see what you're saying = 
667 Arthur: erm (2.1) whether or not they're well I suppose they're caring side is 
668 is is more developed 
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669 James: = yes I mean obviously it leads one to suppose that erm because 
670 they're unlike us in in their psychology in their way of thinking about 
671 somethings that er they're liable to be different from us emotionally as well 
672 Arthur: = but they could be I mean er we touched on the expectations but er 
673 they probably do react erm (3.4) with more anxiety I think (2.0) ((coughs)) 
674 particularly about their sort of offspring and what's happening hh hh. 
675 James: = oh the maternal instinct 
676 Bob: = the mother feeling 
677 Arthur: = yeah you know it's (a gale) and one of them's due to be flying in an 
678 aeroplane or or some such (. ) flights and fancies will come out 
679 Bob: = that's not restricted of course to the human beings is it? 
680 Arthur: = no = 
681 Bob: = you can get emotions in animals 
682 Arthur: = sure 
683 Bob: = for the same things especially on the on the female side 
684 Chris: = it is aa(. ) common idea throughout emotion research erm that 
685 women are er (. ) more comfortable perhaps with intimate [erm ]emotional 
686 expressions 
687 Bob: yeah 
688 Chris: [such] as between [and ]the caring side [an- ]the opposite view to that is 
689 Bob: yeah yeah yeah 
690 Chris: obviously then that men aren't [erm ]as as able or as willing to erm 
691 show 
692 Bob: right 
693 Chris: intimate or affectionate or erm caring emotions wo-would is that an idea 
694 that that rings true for you? (. ) that men shouldn't = 
695 Arthur: = by and large I think there are exceptions to that but I think well 1 
696 wouldn't want to generalise but I would agree = 
697 Bob: = there are some females who are more masculine than other females 
698 and there are men who are more female I mean you can't always use hard 
699 and fast rules = 
700 David: =I mean if you're talking about (. ) relations of the mother and father 
701 with their (. ) their child I think that's sort of (3.1) 1 was going to say improving 
702 but I mean ((laughs)) er I mean first of all both both parents have to go out to 
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703 work these these days and erm very often the fa- you know in a large number 
704 of cases the father is present at the birth but hh he has a very strong link a 
705 much stronger link I think with the child than perhaps people did men did in 
706 the past (. ) er and I think as a result he has the same sort of emotions as a as 
707 a woman does with with regard to the child = 
708 Bob: =I think the child needs that's why I think the child needs both 
709 David: = hmm yes = 
710 Bob: = mother and a father that's why I'm dead against these (. ) two men who 
711 try and adopt children ((laughs from group Eric and Roger audible)) 
712 John: = (h h)ye(h h h)s 
713 David: yes it's er = 
714 Arthur: or two women 
715 Bob: = there's nothing worse that's more likely to [upset my emotions I've 
716 learnt 
717 ?: get you into the Guinness 
718 book 
719 Bob: to control ]them maybe (1.4. ) maybe 
720 ?: of records 
721 John: = leading on from that is it true as as I've been told and read that hh in 
722 terms of say forming confidential friendships com- companionship rather than 
723 er love hh that women find it much easier to relate to homosexual hh men 
724 than to fully heterosexual on- er men because erm homosexual will have if 
725 you like a greater natural emotional af- er affinity now I read that I've no idea 
726 whether it's true or not but it seems to hh sort of follow on a bit from what 
727 we've just been talking about (3.0) 
728 Arthur: yes I've gained that impression like you 
729 James: = yes you hear it said don't you I mean er (1.5) 1 wonder what it's due 
730 to though is it due to this sort of emotional affinity or is it erm due to the fact er 
731 that a lot of people hold certainly that er there's no such er thing as a as a 
732 friendship between a man and a woman that erm that er the old er hoary devil 
733 of sex comes into it every time erm hh and that erm when however you're 
734 dealing with a homosexual man and a woman they can be genuine friends 
735 John: = because sex is out of [the way] 
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James: sex is out of the way (. ) in exactly the same 
way as you can have a male friend or your lady can have er female friend and 
er they can be it can be just a pure friendship = 
Richard: =I don't know to what extent the premise is erm erm (. ) er valid in 
this particular case because when you talk about homosexuals you're really 
thinking about the overtly homosexuals and they of course tend to be (. ) 
uninhibited and emotional and erm relate very easily with their fellow human 
beings which is why they make such excellent er stewards and er in all the 
caring s-spheres of activity so I think er a generalisation has been made here 
((group laughs)) which is not (h)strictly valid 
John: you maybe right II er I simply posed the question 
Chris: it [is a 
Richard: well just to complete that point what I'm saying is somebody 
maybe er er homosexual doesn't display this homosexuality and therefore his 
behaviour is not taken into account when we're talking about homosexuals as 
a group = 
John: sure that's right yes 
Chris: it is just the common perception of hh homosexual men as more 
emotional and as you say more overt overtly emotional erm which I think 
tends to (. ) links into what Roger was saying about them why ! hey are 
perceived as forming better relationships with women erm because there is 
that link of of er kind of an emotional awareness and a freedom to express 
emotion = 
Richard: = well no that's not what I'm saying [wh]at I'm saying is I'm 
classifying 
Chris: no 
Richard: homosexuals into two groups [there]'s the overtly ones and there's 
the the 
Chris: right 
Richard: the er the others [and] we tend to think of the h-homosexual as the 
first 
Chris: hmm 
Richard: group [that's what I'm saying 
Chris: exactly 
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770 James: = yeah well the other group the clandestine homosexuals if you like or 
771 or those that haven't er (. ) recognised their own homosexuality whoever they 
772 are erm you don't know really because you don't know whether they're 
773 homosexual or not er you don't know that they're not behaving like overt 
774 homosexuals er you say o-overt homosexuals behave in this sort of pattern 
775 and then there's everybody else er and they behave to a certain extent 
776 differently but how do you know? how do you know that er some of these 
777 people that er are not supposed to be homosexual but are are not er also 
778 behaving the same as your overtly homosexuals? = 
779 Richard: = well no that's not [what I'm ]saying is you 
780 John: ((laughing)) 
781 James: sorry did you 
782 understand that? 
783 Richard: = (inaudible) suggested with erm the rest of humanity to put it rather 
784 crudely and unkindly whereas if we are talking about homosexuals then 
785 you've got to be careful we're not thinking about those erm >1 don't know 
786 whether this is offensive< but overtly erm er h-h-homosexual people those are 
787 the people we tend to er think about and talk about everybody else as far as 
788 we're concerned might just be er er a standard erm (2.2) unpleasant word h- 
789 human being = 
790 James: = hmm 
791 Chris: = er it is as you're saying it's the idea that gay men are exemplified by 
792 (. ) erm that that overtly emotional overtly homosexual stereotype and the 
793 danger is that that (. ) they will all (. ) gay men will be viewed as being that way 
794 er or behaving in that way when that is obviously most likely not the case = 
795 George: = is it going from that is it not possible to er suggest that if you like 
796 the role in life determines erm (. ) the emo- the emotional response rather than 
797 the gender I mean those ((coughs)) very successful women are very hard 1 
798 mean you wouldn't call Mrs Thatcher a er highly emotional female ((group 
799 laughs)) = 
800 Chris: = no 
801 Arthur: = she may well be 
802 George: = well she covered it up very well and similarly all the other women 
803 who are sort of pouring into er the city or the professions tend to focus very 
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much on er their role in life which in this instance if you like much more of a 
sort of hunting er work ethic if you like rather than (. ) a caring (. ) whatever so I 
mean you could suggest that ((coughs)) that the role if you like determines 
erm whether people feel that they need to suppress emotions so that they can 
actually concentrate on a particular [fu]nction 
Chris: it's = it's the idea = 
George: = and get on with it so to speak 
Chris: = of of erm (. ) se- gender as opposed to sex differences when gender is 
talked about in social sciences [it's ]most commonly dichotomised as 
masculine 
George: right 
Chris: and feminine [we ]don't directly map onto male and female [ther]e are 
George: yeah sure 
Chris: masculine and feminine ways of behaving 
George: = yeah 
Arthur: = hmm = 
George: = that's right 
Chris: = and you think one possible way of differentiating is is that there are 
masculine and feminine ways of [expressin]g and behaving emotionally = 
George: yeah sure yeah 
(3.3) 
Chris: erm 
George: = so I don't know whether you can regard erm (. ) emotions as a 
luxury that you can indulge in when ((group laughs)) (h)the moment is right 
erm but if there are other things to worry about then you tend to er (2.5) put 
them out of the way (2.9) 
Chris: it's the = 
Arthur: = there comes a point I'm sure when you can't [I mean the ]emotions 
will 
George: I'm sure yes 
Arthur: become too strong [par]ticularly if you're suppressing them all the time 
George: yes 
yes yes 
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838 Arthur: = hmm = 
839 Bob: = my friend the (horse) comes back in again too doesn't it ((group 
840 laughs)) (3.7) 
841 Chris: erm (2.7) I'm trying I'm thinking what we what I'm likely to do at the 
842 minute is is wrap this up in about ten minutes erm and then we'll actually 
843 leave it there erm only because I think its seems to be a pertinant day to 
844 address the issue erm love is an emotion was mentioned earlier er it just 
845 seems like an ideal opportunity to to to address the issue of the emotion of 
846 love erm (. ) does does it fit? how does love fit with either male or female or 
847 masculine or feminine hhh ways of behaving emotionally? (2.0) are men or 
848 masculine people able to express love freely or? = 
849 Arthur: = well if you mean failing in love that applies doesn't it to both sexes 
850 [an and] 
851 Bob: yes yes 
852 Arthur: I suppose they react rather similarly at the height of er of that 
853 relationship = 
854 Robert: = on first thing I'd say'yes both can fall in love very similarly' 
855 whether this is true statement I'm not too certain or not on second thoughts 
856 ((laughs)) but my first reaction is 'yes both parties do' whether they fall in love 
857 in the same way I'm not too certain but to a mutual end anyway ((laughs)) 
858 (4.1) 
859 James: hh yes but what about the question of talking about love? 
860 Bob: = ah = 
861 Chris: = yeah 
862 James: =I don't think the sexes behave the same then (4.4) men tend to be 
863 repressed about these things (3.5) 
, 
864 Arthur: I think a man has more difficulty saying 'I love you' than than a woman 
865 does basically (2-0) 
866 James: that may be so you can say it quietly so nobody else can hear ((group 
867 laughs)) = 
868 Chris: perhaps when she's asleep ((group laughs)) 
869 David: saying that I suspect that is something that has changed very much 
870 over the years and that the younger generation look at very differently (3.0) 
471 
871 Chris: would any of you be willing to venture an opinion as to why that might 
872 be the case (. ) why it's changed or or (4.2) 
873 Bob: is it just the general openness that is around these days? 
874 James: =I think it's the American influence [I I you know we get ]so much sort 
875 of 
876 Bob: well they influence it 
877 James: media from America don't we 
878 Bob: = oh yes yes = 
879 James: = Hollywood and all these things have erm an effect on behaviour 
880 patterns = 
881 Bob: =I don't know what effect soap operas had on behaviour patterns too 
882 , (3.7) 
883 James: yes quite (. ) well I think you need to suspend your disbelie- your 
884 sense of disbelief ((group laughs)) they do seem to er go for the full gamut of 
885 emotions in their everyday meetings don't they? hh that particular sort of 
886 format is very special isn't it because they fall in love marry and get divorced 
887 all in about a month 
888 Bob: = yes (2-3) 
889 David: I mean you may have a point blaming the Americans ((group laughs)) 1 
890 mean the (. ) I was thinking I mean the big change er when they came over 
891 here in the war wasn't there with the with the effect on on the girls all of the 
892 British hhh troops sort of thought the Americans were taking their girls from 
893 them = 
894 George: =I think the same things happened wherever the British troops were 
895 sot = 
896 David: = well yes exactly ((group laughs)) 
897 James: = it's certainly true though isn't it you know the American GI's were 
898 seen as being very glamorous = 
899 David: = they were weren't they they brought plenty of stuff over for the girls 
900 James: = plenty of money and they had their foreign accent which was er 
901 seen as being somewhat glamorous and exotic anyway and it may well have 
902 started then but er I think it's gone on and Hollywood has er and Tin Pan Alley 
903 and all this er music industry have 'all had an effect haven't they? (1.3) 
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904 Arthur: well I think television has too you talked about soap operas but I do 
905 think they have had a big effect (. ) people spend so much time watching them 
906 they hh and er I think (. ) that tends to set a pgce for some people 
907 Bob: = hmm (1.7) 
908 James: yes you do start to get the impression that's the normal way to behave 
909 ((group laughs)) *yes* (3.4) 
910 Richard: er I was going to say that it's interesting that er this matter of love 
911 has only been introduced right at the end of the session and(h) not by one of 
912 us ((group laughs)) and I don't know if this is a reflection of the hh lack of 
913 randomness of selection of this group or the date is the fourteenth ((group 
914 laughs)) er (2.3) gnyway er joking apart we didn't mention it 
915 Chris: = hmm = 
916 Richard: = and we're all (. ) getting on a bit is that is there some connection 
917 here? = 
918 Chris: = er I don't I don't know I mentioned I think in part because of the date 
919 and when I do these things albeit I have a very general schedule erm II have 
920 in mind sometimes (. ) issues or areas that it would be perhaps interesting to 
921 touch upon Tareas that perhaps haven't been explored in previous groups 
922 that you would be interested to hear erm an opinion on er and albeit fairly 
923 clumsily perhaps it seemed that today might be a reasonable date on which 
924 you know the idea of love might be on peoples minds obviously I didn't select 
925 this date for that reason erm (. ) er and it is::: the idea the com- the idea of 
926 men not communicating intimate sentiments hh erm like that such as was 
927 was suggested that it might be (. ) saying 'I love you' might only be whispered 
928 erm or or not said very often you know perhaps said only on Valentines Day 
929 erm (. ) just it was an interest like that I was just interested to see (1.4) to hear 
930 what you would have had to say on that = 
931 Arthur: = it would been interesting if you'd got a group of eight men aged thirty 
932 something rather than our age whether it would have come up more = 
933 David: = isn't that why there's so many cards in the shops I mean they all try 
934 to make as much money as possible but I mean hh it must partly come from 
935 the fact that it's it's something that people don't say so much but they 
936 they're happy to pass it on in the form of a card = 
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937 Arthur: =I think it's interesting erm because we talked about men's 
938 unwillingness to show emotion generally but I think I think you can talk about 
939 different emotions er in in different ways because there are some emotions 
940 we're not particularly worried about expressing and anger would be one of 
941 them we talked about anger in a car rage situation hh er and of course 
942 there's safety factors that governs your reaction then but hh (. ) men 
943 confessing that they got angry about something to other men or to anyone 
944 indeed er is something that they're not particularly reluctant to do but talking 
945 about love (. ) now that's that really is very difficult for men I think (2.5) so you 
946 know you can fit I think you can fit the other emotions in there somewhere 
947 maybe they don't all come in the same order for everybody but erm I think 
948 they do come in gra-gradations of difficulty 
949 Bob: = hmm yes (3-1) 
950 Chris: = why might anger be I mean anger is one of the themes that has run 
951 through all these groups that men can express anger and [can talk about] it 
952 John: it's acceptable 
953 Richard: 
954 it's acceptable for females to be angry er if they will (. ) er er they would not 
955 just confess to it they will make a point of saying 'I was absolutely furious' 
956 (3.7) 
957 John: hh I would suggest that one specifically:: male hh emotion which 1 
958 don't think occurs to the same extent in females >or at least in a very different 
959 wav< hh is the sort of pride which we tend to call patriotism for instances erm 
960 now in er I would suggest that in females it is concentrated very strongly in hh 
961 o-on the family erm hh whereas among men it tends to be a wider (. ) er as 1 
962 say I think the best word is pro-probably patriotism erm and that again is 
963 something that we in fact haven't mentioned at all but I would have thought 
964 men would probably find hh relatively eas-easy to discuss in some 
965 circumstances = 
'966 Chris: = 1-it-it's (. ) strange in a to a certain extent that you've mentioned that 
967 because it's a word which I've no memory of ever having occurred in any 
968 other group is the idea of pride hh and yet it sounds like (. ) a very masculine 
969 and (normal) emotion to to feel you know it is the one thing you would expect 
970 men most to experience and to report experiencing 
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971 James: =I would call patriotism loyalty rath-rather than pride (. ) 
972 Richard: I would like to know erm is is there a survival benefit er (. ) er derived 
973 from any emotion (. ) I say survival benefit to to the species the human species 
974 [it's] 
975 Chris: er 
976 Richard: something we're born with quite clearly [and ]have been and do 
977 animals have 
978 Chris: hmm 
979 Richard: er emotions er well some would say'yes' and some other people 
980 would say'what do you mean by emotionsTof course but erm erhh. it would 
'981 be interesting to know if it does have er er a benefit in er (3.2) genetically 
982 strengthening the species = 
983 Chris: = well the er I mean Darwin wrote'The Emotions in Man and Animals' 
984 erm obviously you know at the time that he was formulating the ideas of of 
985 evolution and in various a number of of other groups the idea of evolution and 
986 emotions as an adaptive trait has come up erm most likely as a response to 
987 my question if they offer a erm a construction of men as behaving in a 
988 particular way perhaps as needing to control their emotions and in response 
989 to my question of 'well why would that beT erm they have produced 
990 evolutionary explanations er to say well er I don't like to introduce it myself but 
991 hh the phrase that I've heard so many times previously is 'well it's that 
992 hunter-gatherer thing' 
993 James: = hmm = 
994 Chris: ='you need to control your emotions if you're going out to hunt'er and 
995 in a group hh which I did here erm with some ph psychology phd students the 
996 example that was given was 'well you don't want to show fear when you're 
997 confronted by a rhinoceros' 
998 Richard: = sure = 
999 James: = ((laugh, s)) 
1000 Chris: = so whether or not (. ) I Idon't 
think anybody can as you say in response 
1001 to your question Ware emotions an adaptive traitTwell you can answer 
1002 either 'yes' or'no' and produce arguments or you can turn round and say'well 
1003 what are emotionsT and you end up in in rprious different places if you try 
1004 and approach that question from those directions hh certainly it has been 
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1005 advanced as an explanation for why there maybe erm sex differences 
1006 between men and women hh with regard to emotions and emotional 
1007 expression and the ability to control emotional expression (3.4) 
1008 James: hh well yes the erm I mean you can get emotional reactions that 
1009 contribute to the survival of the species and the one I'm thinking of of course 
1010 is fright (. ) it makes you run a away and that may very well be very sensible if 
1011 you're being chased by something with big teeth 
1012 Robert: = yeah = 
1013 James: = and that I think would probably apply to women as much as it would 
1014 to men wouldn't it? = 
1015 Chris: =I would hope so ((group laughs)) 
1016 Bob: =I don't think it makes any difference what they are by the time it comes 
1017 to that I've always said 'if I'm leading a walk and there's a bull walking across 
1018 that f- comes across the field it's every person for themselves' none of this 
1019 ladies first ((laughs)) = 
1020 Richard: = what we haven't really classified erm in emotions I mean loosely 
1021 when we're talking conversationally it's been about the higher emotions and 
1022 the baser emotions now the higher emotions are the ones I was really thinking 
1023 about when I was asking'do they have a survival benefit? " now I would call 
1024 fear a pretty taýLic erm er emotions er (3.2) sex for instance that's pretty basic 
1025 so I mean it's necessary for the er survival of the species 
1026 James: =I would say so yes = 
1027 Richard: = but erm the higher emotions I would question 
1028 Arthur: = SUCH as could you Ogive us some exampleso? 
1029 Richard: = erm (. ) pityT (2.7) er (2.4) that's the sort of thing er difficult to er be 
1030 too specific here hh er perhaps someone else could help me ((group laughs)) 
1031 
1032 Robert: I'm just trying to think of something 
1033 James: I would think pity was something that was wasn't doing anything for 
1034 the survival of the race at all hh er if I was going to be cold and hard about it 
1035 survival of the fittest you know feeling sorry for the weakest and the hh least 
1036 able to defend themselves [is g]oing to (damn) the species to the extent 
1037 where you stand a better 
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Richard: ye: s 
James: chance of dying out 
Richard: = er f-family love of course that is for the survival of the species 
obviously (. ) pity for somebody who doesn't share your. hh genetic inheritance 
would seem to have no erm benefit (1.5) 
Chris: arguably er (. ) yeah = 
Richard: =I mean obviously you're going to try and protect your offspring 
Chris: = hmm 
Richard: = and that is er is is that pity er or is that an emotional response? I 
would think it is = 
Chris: = most likely 
Richard: = but are you going to try and protect someone else someone from 
another tribe for instance hh I think nowadays you probably would you'd 
probably if you saw a human being in trouble you'd probably go and help him 
Chris: = and that I mean what that introduces is that idea that perhaps pity as 
aa higher emotion and perhaps higher emotions as a whole are not 
necessarily adaptive traits but socially and morally prescribed = 
Arthur: = yeah I think morals come into that you were talking about the 
distinction between emotions and morals 
Richard: = yes I was 
Arthur: =I think when you get to pity there's an element of morality about that 
as well = 
Richard: =I well I would I'd take issue with you on that [because I ]would say 
that 
Arthur: would you? 
Richard: they are connected very much and if you were a moral person you 
certainly ought to exhibit pity but I don't think you have to be a moral person in 
order to (. ) exhibit pity 
Arthur: = maybe not = 
Richard: = er well that's my view I'm not disagreeing ((laughs)) well I am I 
suppose ((group laughs)) in the nicest possible way (2.0) 
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1070 Chris: what I ought to do now is wind this discussion down because time is is 
1071 getting on erm (. ) the (1.9) wha-what I normally do is say does anybody have 
1072 any questions or comments about what we've talked about today? = 
1073 Arthur: = just to hope that it will be useful for you in your research here 
1074 John: yes = 
1075 Chris: it's massively useful 
1076 John: good = 
1077 Robert: = as long as it's some use 
1078 Bob: = it's been an interesting time you know at times you know it's nice you 
1079 know to find out what's happening or expressing you own thoughts and to be 
1080 given the opportunity to do so = 
1081 John: = yes it's nice to have the opportunity not only to think but to bounce 
1082 your thoughts of others = 
1083 Arthur: = yes very much (1.3) 
1084 Richard: what ever we haven't really discussed the er matter of emotions in er 
1085 the other sex to very much er effect and er 
1086 Bob: = we're frightened ((group laughs)) = 
1087 James: = not qualified to speak on the subject ((group laughs)) 
1088 Chris: = there er seemed to be erm a certain reluctance to generalise on that 
1089 subject which is interesting I suppose certainly it will be when I come to do the 
1090 analysis ((tape runs out) 
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Appendix 8- Victor and Delia 
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1 ((CCTV Footage: The couple are stood in the kitchen, Della is cleaning Victor 
2 is stood by the fridge)) 
3 Victor: Well what can I do sit here and watch you clean (. ) while you walk past 
4 me and go upstairs 
'5 Della: *no" 
6 
7 Narrator: would you let cameras into your home for two weeks? 
8 
9 Victor: how how long are you going to be? 
10 Della: about fifteen minutes = 
11 Victor: why doing what? = 
12 Della: just finishing off here = 
13 Victor: NO THERE'S NOTHING that needs a clean 
14 Della: and then I'll come up with you 
15 
16 Narrator: Are you brave enough to face the facts about your relationship? 
17 
18 ((CCTV Footage: Victor walks away into the sifting room)) 
19 Della: then we'll go to bed at the same time for a change 
20 Victor: = [inaudible] for a change my arse 
21 
22 Narrator: This couple were 
23 
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24 ((Title sequence)) 
25 
26 Narrator: Each week on Wde For Each Other CCTV cameras are put into a 
27 different couples home and their relationship is monitored twenty four hours a 
28 day for two weeks. Tonight's couple are Victor and Delia, Della is forty and 
29 Victor is forty one, they've been married for sixteen years and have two 
30 teenage children Ben and Amy. On hand to dissect the couples strengths and 
31 weakness are divorce lawyer Vanessa Lloyd-Platt and psychotherapist 
32 Malcolm Stern. After two weeks of observation they will face the couple with 
33 some hard hitting truths about their relationship 
34 
35 ((Reflective footage: Malcolm and Vanessa are shown watching CCTV 
36 footage of Victor and Della)) 
37 
38 Malcolm: this is a man who's going 'I can't take this anymore'= 
39 Vanessa: = twell I can't take it anymore I'm watching it and I want to kill her 
40 
41 ffootage of couple out with their children, soundtrack over dubbed by voice 
42 of narrator)) 
43 
44 Narrator: Victor and Della feel that after sixteen years their relationship has 
45 become a bit stale and want to breathe fresh life into it. But two weeks of 
46 careful monitoring raises serious question marks over this couples future and 
47 Vanessa and Malcolm decide to take a closer look at three key areas. The 
48 first is one of the main subjects that couples fall out over, household chores. 
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49 
50 ((Graphics sequences in which 'Chores' appears as the first key area)) 
51 ((Reflective footage: Delia and Victor are individually shown talking to camera, 
52 apparently responding to the question "Are you satisfied with the way chores 
53 are split", which appears at the bottom of the screen)) 
54 
55 Delia: no I'm not happy with the way that the chores are split no 
56 
57 Victor: I'm quite satisfied with the way tha- they are split yeah I think er at the 
58 moment it's an arrangement we've got and we've lived through since we've 
59 been married so (. ) that's how we've always worked it 
60 
61 ((CCTV Footage: Delia is shown tidying a messy kitchen)) 
62 
63 Delia: just leave it like a shithole Vic 
64 
65 ((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and reflecting on 
66 CCTV footage of Delia cleaning)) 
67 
68 Vanessa: that was not untypical of e:: veryday 
69 Malcolm: that's right = 
70 Vanessa: over and over again cleaning round and round and round 
71 
72 ((CCTV Footage: A montage of clips of Della cleaning the kitchen and lounge 
73 is shown, the days of week from Monday through to Sunday appear on the 
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74 bottom of the screen; the soundtrack to these clips is overdubbed by the track 
75 "round round" by the Sugababes and by the voice of the narrator)) 
76 
77 Narrator: Everyday, before and after work, Della spends a minimum of two 
78 hours cleaning and on a Sunday she would clean from II in the morning to 11 
79 at night that's a total of 23 hours cleaning a week 
80 
81 ((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and reflecting on 
82 CCTV footage of Della cleaning)) 
83 
84 Vanessa: see how she's cleaning the top of the dustbin 
85 Malcolm: yeah = 
86 Vanessa: she must have wiped it ten times 
87 Malcolm: mhmm = 
88 Vanessa: that's not normal Malcolm 
89 
90 ((CCTV Footage: Della is shown cleaning around or near the television, Victor 
91 is sat on the couch apparently watching TV)) 
92 
93 Della: spotless = 
94 Victor: lovely = 
95 Della: that used to be yellow 
96 Victor: well I really wanted to watch that great 
97 Della: well you can 
98 
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99 ((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and reflecting on 
100 CCTV footage described above)) 
101 
102 Vanessa: she's turned off the telly while he's watching it to clean it 
103 
104 ((CCTV Footage: Delia is shown cleaning around or near the television, Victor 
105 is sat on the couch apparently watching TV)) 
106 
107 Victor: how you've just turned it off 
108 Delia: = I'll be really quick 
109 
110 ((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and reflecting on 
111 CCTV footage described above)) 
112 
113 Vanessa: tactually Malcolm she's just being thoroughl irritating 
114 Malcolm: = sometimes people can't help what they're doing they just go round 
115 the same groove again and again 
116 Vanessa: = well she should stop it now I think she's being a complete idiot 
117 
118 ((CCTV Footage: Della is shown vacuuming the area between the couch and 
119 the coffee table and cleaning the coffee table, the time appears recursively in 
120 the bottom left corner of the screen; 16.53,17.02,17.22,17.39 and 17.48 are 
121 the times shown; again the soundtrack to these clips is overdubbed by the 
122 track "round round" by the Sugababes: at 17.48 Victor appears on the couch)) 
123 
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124 Victor: whack the telly on will you? = 
125 Della: = yeah ((sound of vacuum cleaner is heard above anything else)) 
126 
127 ((CCTV Footage: Victor is shown sat on the couch with his hands covering 
128 this face)) 
129 
130 ((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and reflecting on 
131 CCTV footage described above)) 
132 
133 Vanessa: oh look at his face = 
134 Malcolm: = hmm = 
135 Vanessa: = ((shaking head)) he can't stand it (1.4) 1 mean look at it she's 
136 going over the same bit over and over and ov- >there is not one crumb that 
137 she's couldn't have got up the first time (. ) 
138 Malcolm: ri:::: ght (. ) now this is starting to get a lot clearer this is starting to be 
139 a really (. ) obsessive pattern that she has around cleaning ffollowing speech 
140 is dubbed over CCTV footage of Della vacuuming)) this is not someone who is 
141 choosing to clean this is someone who is driven to clean 
142 
143 ((CCTV Footage: Della is shown vacuuming in the lounge, Victor is sat on the 
144 couch apparently watching TV. Victor stands up and leaves the room)) 
145 Della: I'm turning it off I'm turning it off can't you hear.? 
146 Victor: ((from outside the room)) [you've been at it for bloody four hours] 
147 Della: ((tums off the vacuum and drops it)) right (1.2) it's off (1.3) VIC 
148 Victor: = ((from outside the room)) I'VE HAD ENOUGH DELLA 
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149 Della: it's off (1.8) you've been upstairs anyway = 
150 Victor: ((from outside the room)) yeah and then I've come down here and it's 
151 a madhouse again 
152 
153 ((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and reflecting on 
154 CCTV footage described above)) 
155 Vanessa: it's so intrusive nobody can hear the television nobody can sit in the 
156 kitchen it's just all consuming noise 
157 Malcolm: = it's almost like she is avoiding looking at herself so she keeps 
158 relentlessly going going going 
159 
160 ((CCTV Footage: Della is cleaning the kitchen cupboard doors, the two 
161 children are sat at the breakfast bar, Victor appears periodically as he moves 
162 around the room in and out of shot)) 
163 Della: see what I mean this is what I don't like about Sundays (. )'cause I can't 
164 get nothing done if I was only here on my own I'd have this work done in no 
165 time = 
166 Amy: = if I could go to bed anytime I want I'd be really happy 
167 ((Edit)) 
168 Della: [inaudible] queuing up I've got everyone around me I just want to run 
169 awa:: y 
170 Ben: run away then 
171 Amy: [inaudible] 
172 Della: I just want to run awa:: y 
173 Amy: = but why? = 
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174 Delia: ='cause I can't get nothing clean =, 
175 Amy: = when I get [wound up] I just go to bed 
176 
177 ((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and reflecting on 
178 CCTV footage described above)) 
179 Malcolm: she's telling us all we need to know there she's saying 'I want to run 
180 away I want to run away' and she's running away into the cleaning it's almost 
181 like the cleaning is a fantasy world hh that she's entered into because she 
182 can't face her life (1.5) 
183 , Vanessa: that's very sad = 
184 Malcolm: it's very sad and this is I believe that this boil is ready to burst here 
185 as well = 
186 Vanessa: = Malcolm I'm very worried I have to say hh that if I received just 
187 this bit in isolation I would say that their marriage is virtually at an end h it's 
188 that serious I would be very interested to see the sex area and intimacy and 
189 how that's affected by the cleaning issues as well ý 
190 
191 ((Graphics sequences in which 'Sex' appears as the second key area)) 
192 ((Reflective footage: Della and Victor are individually shown talking to camera, 
193 apparently responding to the question "How often would you like to have 
194 sex? ", which appears at the bottom of the screen)) -: 
195 
196 Victor: I would probably like to have sex maybe at least four times a month (. ) 
197 which would equate to once a week would be great - 
198 
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199 Della: ((Della is on screen for 3.7 seconds before offering her response)) 1 
200 don't really know (1.6) 11 don't really (2.1) 1 can't really gauge that (. ) I mean 
201 maybe when I was younger it was more frequent hh but (1.8) maybe (1.9) 
202 once a week t once a fortnight 
203 
204 Victor: at the moment we're lucky to get once a month 
205 
206 Della: I don't think sexually I give him enough (h hh hh hhh. ) 
207 
208 ((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and commenting 
209 on reflective footage described above)) 
210 Malcolm: That's very interesting that she saysI don't think sexually I QLye him 
211 enough' that is a very telling statement hh because actually it's about sharing 
212 and she is clearly on a model of saying 'I ought to be delivering the goods at a 
213 certain amount of time'= 
214 Vanessa: = is this lay back and think of Britain still =-, - 
215 Malcolm: = this is lay back and think of Britain and interestingly enough the lay 
216 back and think of Britain syndrome is normally once a month and a woman 
217 normally feels she can get away with hh once a month if she doesn't want to 
218 have sex with her partner (. ) hhh it is Lare! y because a woman is frigid. hh it is 
219 because a woman is not being approached in an intimate way [by her man 
220 Vanessa: she's not being unleashed is 
221 she she's not being encouraged and nurtured hh well if she'd stop cleaning 
222 for five minutes maybe he'd have a chance to nurture her 
223 
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224 ((CCTV Footage: Montage of clips showing Della and Victor in the same room 
225 but hardly interacting with each other: the soundtrack is overdubbed with 
226 'Where have all the good times gone" by The Kinks and by the voice of the 
227 narrator)) 
228 
229 Narrator: In the two weeks we filmed Victor and Delia held hands once 
230 snuggled on the sofa twice kissed each other on the cheek four times never 
231 kissed on the lips and didn't have sex once 
232 
233 ((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and commenting 
234 on CCTV of Victor and Delia sat or slouched on the sofa)) 
235 
236 Vanessa: I have to say throughout a lot of the time that we watch this couple 
237 she was the one that was actually wanting some kind of affection and he was 
238 quite cold 
239 Malcolm: he's physically lacking in spontaneity and when this comes between 
240 a couple a man has actually lost his confidence in approaching a woman 
241 physically and it feels to me as though he's able to respond to her (. ) almost a 
242 delayed (. ) delayed action a few seconds afterwards he doesn't immedi ately 
243 respond to her touch 
244 
245 ((CCTV Footage: Della pulls a blanket over her legs and tries to curl up 
246 resting against Vic)) 
247 
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248 Malcolm: here you are here's an opportunity Vic put your arm around her 
249 stroke her instead of cover up your face (1.8) , 
250 Vanessa: he doesn't want it look this is a very negative reaction OH now now 
251 there's a [delayed reaction 
252 Malcolm: delayed reaction (. ) and very minimal (. ) but if he wants to have a 
253 sexual relationship with her which he clearly does -h he is going to have to fix 
254 the intimate relationship with her and he HE has the responsibility (Vanessa: 
255 hmm) here because she's open to being kissed and cuddled hh at least the 
256 first step in a sexual relationship is available for him but he has to take that he 
257 can't expect to go from nought to ten and jump into a sexual relationship 
258 without having a good physical relationship with her 
259 
260 ((CCTV Footage: Victor is shown interacting with the children Ben and Amy)) 
261 
262 Narrator: While Victor shows little affection to Della the experts soon see it's a 
263 different story with their children Ben and Amy 
264 
265 Vanessa: Oh he has a lovely relationship with the daughter (. ) HE NEEDS TO 
266 DO THAT with his wife COME ON = 
267 Malcolm: = and with the son (. ) he's great with his kids affectionately (2.8) 
268 again I see this very often in families when (. ) when there's a lack of affection 
269 between the mother and father they = 
270 Vanessa: lots on the kids they give it to 
271 Malcolm: they put loads on kids which also means you're never really facing 
272 the issue that you've got an affection need that's not being met 
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273 
274 ((CCTV Footage: Della is shown standing in the lounge facing the kitchen 
275 area, she is talking (but the soundtrack is backgrounded to the voice of the 
276 , narrator) Della makes several downward motions with her right hand as she is 
277 talking)) 
278 
279 Narrator: However, in the second week Vanessa and Malcolm's concerns 
280 about this couple intensify as anger and resentment around Della's constant 
281 cleaning explode 
282 
283 ((CCTV footage: continuation of above described scene but full audio 
284 soundtrack is restored Victor is evidently not in the same room)) 
285 
286 Della: look at it that all over the floor ((downward motions of right arm now 
287 interpretable as referring to the object laying on the floor)) that welding helmet 
288 bags extra shoes there's a hundred pairs over there and you're being the 
289 same as them 
290 Victor: [beeped out expletive] OFF 
291 Della: =I can't keep clearing up 
292 
293 ((Graphics sequence and break for adverts)) 
294 
295 Narrator: Victor and Delia are putting their relationship under the microscope 
296 divorce lawyer Vanessa Lloyd Platt and psychotherapist Malcolm Stern are 
297 analysing two weeks of CCTV, footage taken in the couple's home. So far our 
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298 experts have examined Della's obsession with cleaning the house and Victors 
299 lack of affection, but before calling the couple in they want to take a closer 
300 look at this couples communication. 
301 
302 ((Graphics sequences in which 'Communication' appears as the third key 
303 area)) 
304 ((Reflective footage: Delia and Victor are individually shown talking to camera, 
305 apparently responding to the question "What causes most arguments between 
306 you? ", which appears at the bottom of the screen)) 
307 
308 Della: I'd say the most common cause of arguments is (. ) really who's going to 
309 do what chores and (. ) you know me complaining about (. ) not getting enough 
310 help and that sort of thing 
311 Victor: a messy house that would be the first cause of an argument 
312 
313 ((CCTV footage: Delia can be seen in the lounge near the kitchen area)) 
314 Della: I think you've sabotaged these drawers 
315 Victor: why have I sabotaged them? 
316 Della: well they're not very tidy 
317 Victor: = well for god's sake they weren't very tidy when I went in 'em 
318 ((possible edit)) it's been one thing after another 
319 Della: = yeah but Vic don't think you can get stuff out and just leave it'cause 
320 that 
321 is [something that you 
322 Victor: I haven't I haven't ((possible edit)) 
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323 Delia: you're lazy though Vic you bring 'em in right when they're absolutely 
324 caked with mud 
325 Victor: = they weren't [I'd taken it all off 
326 Della: and I don't want'em in 
327 
328 ((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and commenting 
329 on CCTV footage)) 
330 
331 Vanessa: if you are constantly criticising your partner whether it's when you 
332 are arguing with them or otherwise hh you are so demoralising them hh that 
333 there is no room for anything else in the relationship 
334 Narrator: And before long this constant criticism erupts into a major row 
335 
336 ((CCTV footage: Della is shown standing in the lounge facing the kitchen 
337 area, she is talking (but the soundtrack is backgrounded to the voice of the 
338 narrator) Della makes several downward motions with her right hand as she is 
339 talking, when the full audio soundtrack is restored Victor is evidently not in the 
340 same room)) 
341 
342 Della: look at it that all over the floor ((downward motions of right arm now 
343 interpretable as referring to the object laying on the floor)) that welding helmet 
344 bagS extra shoes there's a hundred pairs over there and you're being the 
345 same as them 
346 
493 
347 ((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and commenting 
348 on CCTV footage)) 
349 Malcolm: what happens in a big argument is attack attack attack attack and 
350 build up hh and someone has to sometimes go 'I'm going to lower the tone' 
351 and neither of these two has learned how to lower the tone (1.0) if you throw 
352 heavy artillery at somebody all they can do is either hit back with heavy 
353 artillery or crumple 
354 
355 ((CCTV footage: continuation of above described scene, the camera shot 
356 show the lounge but neither Della or Victor are visible but from the soundtrack 
357 is obvious that they are elsewhere in the house)) 
358 
359 Della: If I didn't bring 'em in they'd rOT OUT THERE 
360 Victor: ((expletive beeped out)) F(beep)K OFF [inaudible]= 
361 Della: I JUST CAN'T HANDLE IT ANYMORE 
362 Victor: SHUT UP 
363 Della: I CAN'T (1.5)1 CAN'T KEEP CLEARING UP AND PUTTING THINGS 
364 AWAY IT'S REALLY DIFFICULT, 
365 
366 ((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and commenting 
367 on CCTV footage of above described interact-ion and then footage of Victor 
368 and Della sat at opposite ends of a three-seater sofa Della is reading the 
369 paper Victor is watching television)) 
370 
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371 Vanessa: out it comes I've had enough I can't stand it (2.3) she doesn't want 
372 to be there she wants to get on a plane and escape from the whole thing but 
373 actually from herself 
374 
375 ((CCTV footage: of above described scene)) 
376 
377 Della: Owhy aren't you talking to me? * 
378 Victor: ='cause there's no point in talking to you 
379 Della: = why? = 
380 Victor: ='cause all you do is have a bloody go at me 
381 Della: ="I'm stressed" = 
382 Victor: no you stress me out (. ) I'm alright (. ) until you come home 
383 Della: you just = 
384 Victor: you moan at stupid little things = 
385 Della: you don't put things away Vic and it feels [like 
386 Victor: WHAT? 
387 
388 ((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and commenting 
389 on CCTV footage)) 
390 
391 Malcolm: she's now feeling quite reticent about having a go at him he's angry 
392 and she knows she's overstepped the mark 
393 
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394 ((CCTV footage: continuation of above described scene, however camera 
395 angle changes to the far end of the room Vic is seen to leave the sofa and 
396 move towards the kitchen area)) 
397 
398 Della: [inaudible] like I say and leave everything to me 
399 Victor: everything to you 
400 Della: yeah everything= 
401 Victor: like what? = 
402 Della: evenýhinq = 
403 Victor: LIKE WHAT? 
404 Della: EVERYTHING 
405 Victor: LIKE WHAT? - 
406 Della: just everything = 
407 Victor: = what's everything? 
408 Della: just everything 
409 Victor: what's everything? 
410 Della: [fuck] just go to bed Vic 
411 Victor: well like what? 
412 Della: iust -qo 
to bed it's normal for you innit? 
413 Victor: ((seen to slam a pad of paper and a pen down on the breakfast bar)) 
414 NO 
415 [I'm sick of seeing you 
416 Delia: = no it's normal 
417 Victor: = BEING A SHI- AN ARSEHOLE [all the time 
496 
418 Delia: no:: you go to bed every night last night you 
419 had an'eadache and you just [went to bed 
420 Victor: oh sorry sorry [inaudible] 
421 Della: [inaudible] well (. ) no. 1 never 
-422 Victor: or what stay here and get told off all the time 
423 Della: I didn't tell you off last night 
424 Victor: no you're always having a dig 
425 Della: it's what you do Vic 
426 Victor: you digged as soon as you walked in the door 
-427 Della: I mean it's like it's not even nine o'clock now 
428 Victor: AS SOON AS YOU WALKED IN THE DOOR I THOUGHT'RIGHT 
429, KEEP CALM I KNOW SHE'S GONNA GO CRAZY FOR SOME REASON' 
430 AND [YOU FOUND ONE 
431 Della: it's not even nine o'clock Vic ((Vic leaves the room)) (. ) go to bed Vic 
432 
433 ((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and commenting 
434 on CCTV footage)) 
435 
436 Malcolm: It is quite common to see men and sometimes women leave the 
437 room it it's saying 1 can't actually match you in this argument therefore I have 
438 to get away= 
439 ((CCTV footage: continuation of above described scene, Della is now seen 
440 leaving the lounge and following Vic out of the room)) 
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'141 Vanessa: = but for some women that is not something they can tolerate they 
42 say whenever we're having an argument he just won't listen and he'll walk 
443 away and it will actually send them into orbit 
444 
445 ((CCTV footage: continuation of above described scene the screen shows an 
446 empty lounge but the soundtrack suggest that Victor and Delia are elsewhere 
447 in the house as they can be heard shouting at each other. Owing to the fact 
448 that they are shouting and the possible positioning of microphones in the 
449 house much of what is heard is incomprehensible)) 
450 
451 ((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and commenting 
452 on CCTV footage)) 
1 
453 Malcolm: =I would describe that as an unhealthy argument 
454 Vanessa: = that is an understatement of the year an unhealthy arg- they hate 
455 each other at this moment Malcolm =, -, 
456 Malcolm: = that's not necessarily ba:: d in relationships to expLess that from 
457 time to time what is bad is to throw it from different rooms around the place 
458 hh what is bad is to not be able to actually listen to each other and they very 
459 rarely hh stop and take stock of what's happening it just keeps building and 
460 building 
461 Vanessa: = Malcolm when people reach this point in a relationship this kind of 
462 arguing this kind of exhaustion they are virtually at the end of a relationship it's 
463 as simple as that 
464 Malcolm: =I still believe that there are techniques and there are skills they 
465 can learn to lower the tempo (2.3) hh negative habit patterns (. ) come very 
498 
:11 
466 very insidiously into a relationship and gradually eat away at the foundation of 
467 the relationship and that's whafs been happening here the cleaning has eaten 
468 away at the relationship hh the lack of physical intimacy has eaten away at 
469 the relationship hh and the resentment and anger that they have with each 
470 other that is never really cleared has also eaten away at the relationship and 
471 that needs to be reversed it's a big job 
472 
473 Narrator: Having studied over two hundred hours of footage our experts are 
474 ready to meet Victor and Della and tell the couple if they think they are made 
475 for each other but will it be the verdict Victor and Della want to hear 
476 
477 ((Assessment meeting with Vanessa, Malcolm, Victor and Della)) ' 
478 
479 Vanessa: well you look very nervous you guys don't be one of the things we 
480 noticed was you don't seem to have a lot of fun 
481 Victor: = no no 
482 Vanessa: = the two of you the fun and laughter seems to have gone out of 
483 your relationship hh when was the last time you laughed together 
484 Victor: not a lot 
485 Delia: no I've [been very down 
486 Victor: the end of the week you know you're sort of bloating out and your 
487 your brain's 
488 Della: = and actually I just feel III don't have a life really 
489 Malcolm: = ri:: ght 
490 Della: = in general I don't I'm very fed up about it Dust generally but even now 
499 
491 Vanessa: 
492 see 
493 Della: 
494 Vanessa: 
495 
we could see that we could 
I'm fed up about it = 
that = we would just like to show you some clips 
496 ((Victor and Della are shown CCTV footage that shows Della initiating or 
497 trying to initiate affection between the two of them)) 
498 
499 Vanessa: = WE FELT that Della was desperate for a bit more affection hh 
500 and that you weren't giving it to her and she was feeling a little bit rejected 
501 Malcolm: = and every time you don't respond she becomes a little less 
502 confident about reaching out to you and feels a little bit less loved hh and this 
503 then starts a vicious cycle where you feel unconfident about reaching out to 
504 her because hh she's closed down towards you you've closed down towards 
505 her. hh and you carry on not being intimate = 
506 Della: = sometimes in the morning I mean I'm not adding fuel to the fire but 
507 sometimes in the morning he'll he'll say'goodbye' he'll (. ) give me a kiss 
508 goodbye and it it's just (h)awful it's just like that ((mimes a peck on the cheek)) 
509 you know and there's no and I= 
510 Malcolm: = show him what you want just tell him (. ) give him a kiss you think 
511 he'd you'd like show him what you want = 
512 Della: = well I'd like a nice kiss like ((leans towards Vic puts her hand on the 
513 back of his neck and kisses him on the lips)) you know a nice just [a nice 
514 proper kiss but 
515 Malcolm: a real contact a real 
500 
516 Della: you know it's like it's a duty but you may [as well not some 
517 Malcolm: contact 
518 Victor: it's not from the heart 
519 Delia: mornings [you may as well not bother 
520 Malcolm: we've got it hear did you hear that one ((staccato)) it's not 
521 from the heart = 
522 Vanessa: = it's mechanical 
523 Delia: = yeah = 
524 Malcolm: =I would have been absolutely staggered to find that you had a rich 
525 sex life to be perfectly honest (Victor: hmm) because there is so little of the 
526 glue that makes a really rich sex life here = 
527 Vanessa: = you want more sex don't you? = 
528 Victor: = oh yeah definitely = 
529 Malcolm: = my guess is what happens in your sex life and excuse me if this is 
530 a little indelicate is that every so often you lay back and think of England 
531 because you think that the relationship needs some punctuation with sex but 
532 really what you're looking for is much more affection from the relationship 
533 aren't you? (1.7) 
534 Delia: yeah I suppose I do say that sometimes don't I 
535 
536 Vanessa: let's have a look at the next clip shall we 
537 Della: = oh go: d = 
538 
539 ((Victor and Della are shown the CCTV footage of them arguing and 
540 shouting)) 
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542 Della: I'm not laughing 'cause I think it's funny it's just awful (7.7) hhh ((to 
543 Vic)) your language (1.3) oh no I can't hear anymore (ha ha ha) 
544 Malcolm: well I'm not surprised = 
545 Vanessa: we couldn't either'yes I am"no you're not''yes' I mean it's like a 
546 pantomime and you weren't getting anywhere 
547 Della: = no = 
548 Vanessa: = absolutely nowhere 
549 Malcolm: = let me tell you that also involved in your arguments is all the 
550 resentment that comes from the other areas of your relationship = 
551 Vanessa: = so you end up actually hating each other and that's not what we 
552 want we want [you to rebuild 
553 Della: that's how I felt about him at the moment I hate him (1.4) 1 love him 
554 but I hate him = 
555 Vanessa: I know 
556 Malcolm: you carry with you all the pain of not having been cared for or not 
557 feeling cared for to you it's feeling like you're living in a house where a 
558 hoover's running around you all the time hh and you've got to change this 
559 pattern that's become completely ingrained 
560 
561 ((possible edit)) 
562 
563 Malcolm: I think you're going to see some interesting things in our next 
564 sequence here 
565 
502 
566 ((Victor and Delia are shown the CCTV footage of Della cleaning and 
567 vacuuming around the sofa and coffee table)) 
568 
569 Vanessa: what do you feel having seen that clip? = 
570 Della: ((with hands over her mouth)) it's awful isn't it (h h) 
571 Vanessa: = why? = 
572 Della: ='cause it's just constant (. ) 
573 Vanessa: = yep (. ) it is obsessive (. ) I'm sorry I know this is very difficult for 
574 you but it is over the top and it is driving your ((staccato)) entire family barmy 
575 (. ) when you hoovered you hoovered the same area four five times hh and 
576 this wasn't just one isolated incident it was ((staccato)) every single day hh 
577 there were patterns where you were cleaning the table where you went round 
578 and round the same area maybe five or six time hh round the dustbin lid 
579 again and again and again it's not healthy for you and there is a problem there 
580 
581 Della: =I don't get the hoover out every night though I'm not sticking up for 
582 myself I know I'm fussy I admit and I'm not arguing the point >but I don't do 
583 that everyday(h h) =I--, 
584 Malcolm: "twenty three hours a week" was the amount of time you cleaned 
585 hhh if you had a cleaner in to do your house they would spend three hours 
586 you might have them in twice a week and they might spend six hours 
587 altogether= 
588 Della: =I do look at it like that sometimes 
589 Malcolm: =I don't want to make this where we shame you into doing anything 
590 what I want to suggest [is a 
503 
591 Delia: I'd rather I'd rather because I'm unhappy so if I can look 
592 for. hh something that's going to make me happier = 
593 Malcolm: yes = 
594 Vanessa: it will make you happier Della once we break the mould once we 
595 break this pattern = 
596 Malcolm: = what I want to say is that when someone cleans a lot there's often 
597 a part of their lives they want to run away from and I feel like there's a part of 
598 you that's very unhappy and I think you've declared that already and tries to 
599 lose yourself in making your environment as clean and as clear as you can 
600 possibly make it now 
601 Vanessa: = now = 
602 Della: =I feel awful = 
603 Vanessa: = 1why do you feel awful? = 
604 Victor: = you're not awful you're not awful = 
605 Malcolm: = there is an area in your relationship which doesn't work and we 
606 have to find a way of putting that right (1.0) what we were looking at was 
607 actually choosing an hour where you- would normally be cleaning and you 
608 would choose not to clean in that hour (. ) you would do that for a whole week 
609 and you can support her Vic not by saying 'stop this cleaning' and getting 
610 really angry with her but by recognising hh that this is a major problem and a 
611 really difficult area for Della and that you're in this togethe 
612 Victor: = mhmm = 
613 Malcolm: = that will make the difference (8) which do you think is more 
614 important having a clean house or actually feeling that you love each other 
615 and connect with each other? = 
504 
616 Della: = well yeah that is more important isn't it 
617 Victor: = yeah = 
618 Vanessa: = yeah 
619 Della: = but you sort of don't realise it you have to sort of have a wake up call 
620 sometimes you have to sort of tell yourself don't you = 
621 Malcolm: = bingo here's your wake up call and you know whatever it was that 
622 inspired you to (. ) come on this programme is whatever it was that was saying 
623 'we need some help' and together you can find ways of starting to get the 
624 relationship back on the track that you want it to be 
625 Della: I'll put an ad out for a cleaner 
626 Vanessa: = she's going to get a cleaner in 
627 Della: I am = 
628 Victor: you're not going to sack her are you? 
629 Della: well no (. ) but they can do the dusting I can't stand dusting 
630 Victor: = if she did get a cleaner then I would take her out somewhere and say 
631 'right look what you're doing now you know we're actually having a good time' 
632 
633 Malcolm: ='we're having a meal out while our house is being looked aftee 
634 Victor: = yeah 'cause that's physical 'cause something that you can see 
635 physically is OK = 
636 Malcolm: = would you like that? 
637 Delia: = mm 
638 Malcolm: = would you like him to take you out and woo you and 
639 Victor: = [woo woo ((others laugh)) =, 
640 Della: yeah 
505 
641 Vanessa: = lots of wooing OK? 
642 
643 ((After the assessment meeting Victor and Della are stood together talking to 
644 camera)) 
645 
646 Della: it's been very good for me 
647 Victor: you see it from a totally different perspective 
648 Della: yeah definitely = 
649 Victor: when you're looking down in 
650 Della: yeah and I you know we have got to change things definitely 
651 
652 ((Three months later ... Victor takes Della out regularly and the family are 
653 going out more at weekends. However, -Della is still trying to find a cleaner 
654 appears on screen 
506 
